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Abstract 
 
 
 
Pompey’s representation suffers from a hostile modern historical tradition. Mommsen’s 
Römische Geschichte selectively crafted a portrait of Pompey which was loosely based on the 
ancient source tradition that resulted in a devaluation of his political, military, and personal 
capacity. This interpretation originated from Mommsen’s nineteenth century Prussian context, 
wherein Romanticism, Historicism, Militarism, and the ‘Great men’ reading of history dictated 
historical discourse. Accordingly, Mommsen adapted and refined Niebuhr’s pro-Caesar 
reading of the late republic, which prioritised and celebrated Caesar’s legendary portrayal in 
his Commentaries. These conclusions determined modern approaches to Pompey in the 
Germanic and Anglophone traditions, which perpetuated the misleading construct. 
 
This thesis investigates these issues by re-evaluating the ancient literary evidence for Pompey’s 
character and career. It then compares the characterisations of the ancient authors and 
Mommsen, thereby highlighting the ways in which his selective and determinist methods 
created an anti-Pompey construct. Following this, this thesis diachronically analyses how 
subsequent Anglophone scholarship, particularly in the popular genres of narrative history and 
biography, have adapted aspects of Mommsen’s Pompeian paradigm which perpetuated his 
negative reading.  
 
By outlining and addressing the methodological problems inherent within Mommsen’s 
scholarly legacy and interrogating the ancient evidence, this thesis demonstrates that the 
common view of Pompey is the product not of the nuanced and diverse ancient evidence but 
rather the product of the long term acceptance of a Mommsenian construct. This is symptomatic 
of a wider issue in late republic scholarship which, often inadvertently, reproduces these 
unverified assertions without consideration of their origins. 
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Introduction 
 
 
For his ruthlessness in destroying Sulla’s enemies in Sicily and Africa he acquired the 
nickname teenage butcher; for his selfish ambition he earned the distrust of his own side. 
From the dictator, who had treated him as an exception to his own rules and allowed him 
to command legions when he had not held public office, Pompey extorted a triumph. 
After being cut out of Sulla’s will for supporting Lepidus, he then suppressed Lepidus’ 
rebellion and used his troops to extort the Spanish command from the Senate. In Spain 
he managed to steal the limelight from Metellus Pius, who was already making headway 
against the rebel general Sertorius, and then returned to Italy to do the same to Crassus. 
After dealing with some fugitives from the rising led by the gladiator Spartacus, Pompey 
wrote to the Senate that Crassus had conquered the slaves but that he himself had 
extirpated the war. 
Miriam Griffin, ‘Cicero and Rome’, in Boardman, J., Jasper Griffin, and 
Oswyn Murray (eds.) The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford, 
1986), 391. 
 
This passage is a profound example of the negative discourses prevalent in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century scholarship concerning Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus. Pompey is frequently 
characterised as treacherous, cruel, stupid, vain, incompetent, and weak to name but a few, 
despite his famous military campaigns and dominance in the senate for over twenty years. The 
negative stereotypes have their origins in the ancient evidence, but the force with which they 
are presented here owes more to the influence of Theodor Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte. 
Mommsen’s monograph displays selective usage, subtle manipulations, and outright 
fabrication of the ancient evidence to craft a Pompey that suited his nineteenth century Prussian 
perspective, itself shaped by various notions of determinism, Romanticism, militarism, and the 
‘Great Men’ reading of history. These frameworks interacted with each other in forming 
Mommsen’s portrayal of Julius Caesar as the embodiment of the ideal statesman, both for 
ancient Rome and as an answer to Prussia’s turbulent political climate. Negative readings of 
Pompey are the consequence of mythologising Caesar. Yet, as Griffin’s passage demonstrates, 
Mommsen’s views continue to be disseminated throughout subsequent scholarship even 
though scholars have moved on from his optimistic reading of Caesar.  
 
This thesis addresses the problem of unfavourable representations of Pompey in the modern 
scholarship by assessing the nature of the ancient evidence and interrogating the influence of 
Mommsenian and Prussian historiography. Its foremost aim is to highlight the existence of a 
tradition and how it shaped scholarly approaches, particularly accessible historical genres, such 
as biographies and narrative histories. It combines textual analysis, discourse theory, reception 
studies, and historiography to investigate methodological issues in modern scholarly 
approaches to Pompey. Its scope is limited to English works and key German monographs, 
because a broader survey would have required a longer treatment than the current project 
allowed.  
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Chapters One and Two conduct a diachronic analysis of the evidence for Pompey in the ancient 
historical discourse ranging from the first century BC to the third century AD. The discourse 
comprises multiple diverse literary genres such as epic poetry, letters, speeches, histories, 
biographies, and commentaries from Roman, Greek, and Jewish authors which attests the 
breadth of varied evidence concerning Pompey. This catalogue of assorted evidence provides 
a mixed and highly nuanced portrayal that varies according to author, historical context, 
motive, and genre. This reinforces the contested tradition concerning Pompey which should 
have made it impossible to reduce his character to a black and white interpretation. 
Accordingly, this chapter demonstrates the diversity of the ancient evidence and the importance 
of contextualisation. 
 
Chapter Three assesses the influence of historical context, scholarship, methods, and 
philosophical theories during 1789-1848 upon Mommsen’s scholarly approach. It thus 
examines the historical context for Mommsen’s negative generalisations of Pompey, providing 
a general overview of the nature, and composition of Prussian society as well as contemporary 
philosophical and historical movements with a specific focus upon Historicism, Determinism, 
and Nationalism. It pays close attention to four key Germano-Prussian thinkers: Hegel, Herder, 
von Humboldt and von Ranke. It then considers the influence of Niebuhr who was the first 
classicist to popularise an anti-Pompeian reading which Mommsen adopted and refined. The 
key theoretical framework is Determinism: a philosophical doctrine which proposed that 
history is guided by the virtue of necessity, and therefore outcomes are inevitable. It was based 
on strict notions of causality, diminishing the significance of rational agents. It assumed that 
free will cannot exist; events, rather, are essentially an unbroken chain of circumstances for 
which no single link can be altered. This has consequences for figures such as Pompey, who 
ultimately lost the Civil War. If individuals are assessed by their inevitable failure, then their 
historical legacy is rarely treated fairly. For Niebuhr and Mommsen, knowing the outcome of 
the war between Caesar and Pompey meant that it would have been pointless to champion the 
defeated instead of the victor. The advantage of hindsight encouraged the view that Caesar, the 
winner, was the ultimate embodiment of Roman virtues; he could thus be held up as an example 
of the ideal statesman. This determination, however, was far from clear to Caesar’s 
contemporaries, who were uncertain about the inevitability of his military success. Ultimately, 
determinist readings defy logic. If Pompey had known that defeat was certain then he would 
have avoided the conflict. Indeed, Cicero lamented the unpredictability of the civil war and its 
outcomes: 
…the wonder is that such events could happen rather than that we did not see them 
coming and, being but human, could not divine them. (…ut magis mirum sit accidere illa 
potuisse quam nos non vidisse ea futura nec, homines cum essemus, divinare potuisse.)1 
 
Determinist readings are based on picking and choosing between various pieces of ancient 
evidence. Passages that provide more favourable images of Pompey’s generosity, capacity for 
military leadership, intelligence, and political acumen are passed over in favour of evidence 
which reinforces a negative image. This habit is examined in Chapter Four which provides a 
                                                 
1 Cic. Fam. 15.15.2. (SB 174). 
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close analysis of the characterisation of Pompey in Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte. It 
concentrates on three key techniques intrinsic to Mommsen’s methodology: selectivity, 
distortion, and over interpretation. Such techniques allowed Mommsen to construct a picture 
of Pompey which consistently diminished his significance and his talents. The reception of the 
Römische Geschichte extended its influence over nineteenth-century audiences.  
 
Chapter Five assesses the First Wave of Scholarship after Mommsen (1865-1910), 
concentrating on the works of Ihne, Fowler, Froude, and Heitland who directly cite or reference 
him. These specific works are chosen because they were considered accessible and popular. 
They gave general audiences a broad (and Mommsenian) overview of Roman history. By 
deconstructing and assessing each author’s specific treatment of Pompey, this chapter 
demonstrates the continuation of Mommsen’s negative judgement. Each author, however, 
focuses on different aspects of Mommsen’s Pompey. For instance, Ihne concentrates on 
Pompey’s cruelty rather than his stupidity while Heitland focuses on his stupidity and 
marginalises his cruelty.  
 
Chapter Six assesses the Second Wave of Scholarship with a focus on Gelzer, Syme, and 
Scullard. The direct references to Mommsen in these works are scant, but the legacy of his anti-
Pompey paradigm endures. The influence of Mommsen demonstrates how the image moved 
from one scholarly generation to the next in different ways. Gelzer’s academic career 
demonstrates both direct and indirect influences on both generations of scholarship. Syme, 
however, rejected Mommsen’s deterministic view of the Roman Empire, but maintained the 
hostility to Pompey. Scullard’s narrative history became a standard textbook. It reduced the 
history of the Roman Republic and the onset of the Julio-Claudian dynasty to one volume, but 
even so adopted Mommsen’s judgement of significant characters, including Pompey. 
  
Chapter Seven covers later 20th Century biographies, including those of Leach, Seager, and 
Greenhalgh. Each author is assessed independently because each work has markedly different 
approaches and motives. Leach composes a biography that uses predominantly ancient 
evidence with limited recourse to the modern scholarship. Leach’s intention is to recount 
Pompey’s life faithful to the ancient evidence and to remove modern prejudices. However, he 
fails to deal adequately with the polarised nature of the ancient evidence. Seager’s biography 
acknowledged its immense debt to Gelzer and, by proxy, to Mommsen through its blatant 
reiteration of his anti-Pompeian paradigms. On the other hand, Greenhalgh completely inverts 
this tradition through a redemptive interpretation of Pompey’s life. The inherent issue with his 
reactionary approach is its extreme nature whereby Pompey’s positive characteristics are 
exaggerated beyond the scope of historical proof. Greenhalgh is Mommsen in reverse, and just 
as problematic. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to redeem Pompey as a historical figure. Rather, it examines 
an enduring tradition that promotes a skewed reading of Pompey as a combination of vices, 
ineptitudes, and failures based on Mommsen’s selective reading of the ancient evidence. The 
image of Pompey left behind by the ancient literary record is based on strong and diverse views 
of Pompey during his lifetime and after his death. Accordingly, the evidence shifts between 
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positive and negative assessments which reflect more than one turbulent political context. 
Mommsen’s simplification produced an attractive and authoritative narrative that avoided the 
complexities and suited his pro-Caesar reading of late republican history. What emerges from 
this examination is the multifaceted interaction between modern scholars, their ancient 
evidence, and the legacy of the scholarly discourse. 
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Chapter One: The Ancient Evidence (Latin Authors)  
 
It is important to begin this study with a brief outline of the surviving ancient evidence and its 
relation to Pompey before considering his portrayal within this evidence. This will lay the 
foundation for a subsequent analysis of the ways that modern scholarship manipulates 
Pompey’s portrayal. 
  
On the surface, the state of the ancient evidence regarding Pompey appears plentiful. Numerous 
works, spanning multiple genres, reference him throughout the late republic onwards. Among 
contemporaries, Pompey appears in the speeches and letters of Cicero, the memoirs of Caesar, 
and the histories of Sallust. Pompey is further referenced in multiple non-contemporary sources 
that were recorded after his death. Plutarch’s Lives dedicates an entire volume to him. Several 
first and second century histories mention him – including Appian’s Civil Wars, Cassius Dio’s 
Roman History, Velleius Paterculus’ Roman History, and briefly in Tacitus’ Annals. Pompey 
is an important tragic figure in Lucan’s poetic epic Pharsalia, a frequent arbiter of strong moral 
character in Valerius Maximus’ Memorable Deeds and Sayings, and even appears in Pliny’s 
Natural History for his exploits and discoveries in the East. It is clear that Pompey’s presence 
throughout the corpus of extant late republic and early imperial literature is highly diverse. This 
frequency, however, does not equate to a portrayal of much depth.  
 
What modern readers know about Pompey is more myth than reality. Pompey is a notoriously 
enigmatic figure in both the contemporary and non-contemporary ancient evidence and this 
issue is consequently carried into the modern scholarship. His mysteriousness stems from the 
contradiction between Pompey’s great influence on late republican Roman politics and his 
shallow portrayal throughout the corpus of extant evidence. Pompey frequently appears in the 
contemporary works of Cicero, Caesar, and Sallust, but his portrayal is often limited to 
circumstantial evidence or political motive. Cicero is somewhat of an exception. He offers 
some detail about Pompey’s character, though his opinion is commonly determined by the 
context of his remarks. As a result, Pompey’s portrayal varies throughout Cicero’s works, often 
with great fluctuations over brief periods. While this is problematic, a cautious approach, which 
considers all the evidence, can yield a balanced outcome. Unfortunately, Cicero’s letters have 
been abused by posterity to formulate a selective negative portrayal of Pompey. This is not the 
only source to suffer this type of mistreatment.  
 
This problem is amplified by the relative shortage of first-hand evidence for Pompey. Unlike 
Caesar and Cicero, Pompey did not leave posterity a literary corpus. A few letters, written in 
correspondence with Cicero, survived him. However, the editing and selection process for these 
letters cannot be determined, so their usefulness is limited. Furthermore, the contents of these 
letters reveal little about Pompey’s character. Some have argued that they support Pompey’s 
harshness, particularly regarding his political friendships, though this is debatable.  
 
The general state of the ancient evidence means that little is known about Pompey beyond what 
non-contemporary sources ascribed to his persona. Plutarch is the most influential source in 
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this regard, as his work elucidates a large swathe of Pompey’s career and offers direct 
commentary regarding Pompey’s character. This also applies to Appian and Dio’s histories, 
which occasionally offer personal verdicts on Pompey’s career that reflect their 
conceptualisation of his nature. However, modern audiences must acknowledge that the 
opinions within these sources were influenced by the advantage of hindsight and were 
consequently determined by knowledge of Pompey’s entire career and his ultimate demise. 
These works accordingly reflect a continuous desire to seek causality between events, which 
were distinct when they occurred. Their readings thus distort the historical record and 
Pompey’s portrayal within it. Furthermore, modern scholars are unable to examine how greatly 
this affected the non-contemporary evidence because much of the primary evidence no longer 
survives. Hence, the available evidence must be accepted, albeit with some caution.  
 
Most of our evidence for Pompey comes from later authors and as is well known there are a 
number of historiographical issues that need to be addressed to make this material useful. This 
work is not interested in solving these historiographical issues, but instead analyses how later 
historians, especially Mommsen, used the material to construct their portrayals of Pompey and 
investigate how their prejudices shaped these portraits.  
 
A chronological approach that reflects on the historiographical issues within the literature and 
how these affect Pompey’s portrayal will highlight factual contradictions and elucidate 
Pompey’s relatively mixed portrayal throughout the extant ancient evidence. This study thus 
examines all available evidence which contains any discourse on Pompey and which governs 
modern analyses of his character. These include, in roughly chronological order: Marcus 
Tullius Cicero, Gaius Julius Caesar, Gaius Sallustius Crispus, Strabo of Amaseia, Valerius 
Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Marcus Annaeus 
Lucanus, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, Flavius Iosephus (Josephus), Lucius Mestrius 
Plutarchus (Plutarch), Sextus Julius Frontinus, Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Gaius Suetonius 
Tranquillus, Appian of Alexandria, Lucius Annaeus Florus, and Cassius Dio. I will split these 
works into two sections, which will be divided between authors writing in Latin and those 
writing in Greek, in order to better manage them. These traditions are interconnected 
nonetheless. These works vary greatly in scope, genre, as well as their literary and historical 
foci, which requires each being introduced within their specific context. While many texts 
survive in fragmentary or semi-fragmentary states, each is important for understanding Pompey 
and his perception in the ancient world. As such, all the available evidence will be considered, 
so that the thesis’ subsequent study into modern reconstructions of Pompey can be fully 
informed1.  
 
1.1. Cicero 
Cicero’s letters, despite their stylistic eloquence and richness, are notoriously difficult 
evidence. They are heavily invested in Cicero’s immediate context, which increases their value 
as primary evidence, but also makes them liable for misappropriation. The primary letters used 
                                                 
1 I have used the Loeb editions and translations of the ancient evidence, unless otherwise specified. I have also 
provided the original language for emphasis when necessary. 
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throughout this thesis were written throughout the sixties and fifties BC. Their intended 
audience was mainly Atticus, a close political ally and confidant of Cicero, although several 
key letters were sent to other recipients, including Pompey. The letters were originally intended 
for private or sensitive discourse. Unfortunately, most of Atticus’ and other responses to Cicero 
were lost in antiquity, resulting in one-sided dialogue. Some interpretation, on the part of 
modern scholars, is thus necessary to comprehend parts of the letters. Further modern 
interpretation is required when Cicero brushes over the details of a topic of conversation. This 
usually occurs because of circumstances, as Cicero’s letters weren’t originally intended for 
circulation, thus never offer lengthy explanations about any topic if his intended audience (the 
letter’s recipient) was already well-informed.  
 
Cicero’s surviving speeches highlight the complex and evocative nature of Roman rhetoric in 
the late Republic. They exhibit Cicero’s genius and ability to manipulate the emotions of an 
audience, thereby inducing favourable responses from them. The speeches also preserve 
Cicero’s conceptualisation of Roman virtues and law. These are invaluable for modern scholars 
as they allow for a more complete conceptualisation of Roman social and political interactions 
and their consequences. While the speeches are essential evidence, their use of oratorical 
devices must be recognised as a defining literary trait. Thus, Cicero’s comments, when in full 
oratorical flight, cannot be taken as fact. He masterfully embellishes every speech with 
dramatic conventions to assert his opinion. Often, this entailed bending the truth to suit his 
cause - which was invariably to win his audience’s approval and reflect suggestions from allies 
and interested politicians, which likely included Pompey himself. Furthermore, the surviving 
speeches were edited before circulation and thus aren’t perfect records of the speeches given 
before the senate. They consequently preserve Cicero’s intended sentiments, rather than a 
perfect iteration of his speeches.  
 
The Pro lege Manilia is the most important of Cicero’s speeches for this thesis, as it entirely 
concerns Pompey. Other Ciceronian speeches also briefly reference Pompey, including Pro 
Flacco (‘In Defence of Lucius Flaccus’) and Pro Sestio (‘In Defence of Sestius’). These will 
be included in the ensuing analysis when relevant. 
 
It is fortunate that both Cicero’s letters and speeches have survived antiquity, because the 
intimacy of Cicero’s letters counterbalances the hyper-positivity of Cicero’s Pro lege Manilia. 
Together they consequently allow for a balanced interpretation of Pompey’s persona at various 
points in his career. Importantly, this chapter demonstrates the diversity of Pompey’s portrayal 
in Cicero’s letters, which range from inseparable political ally2 to despotic Sullan tyrant3. 
Furthermore, this polarity is demonstrated as a reflection of Cicero’s immediate circumstances. 
                                                 
2 Cic. Fam. 5.7.2-3. (SB 3). “I have no doubt that if my own hearty goodwill towards you does not suffice to win 
your attachment, the public interest will join us in confederacy…Not to leave you in ignorance of the particular 
in which your letter has disappointed me, let me speak plainly, as becomes my character and our friendly 
relations.” 
3 Cic. Att. 4.9.3. (SB 174). “For our Gnaeus is marvellously covetous of despotism on Sullan lines. Experto crede; 
he has been as open about it as he ever was about anything.” 
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Cicero’s works thus present a foundational representation of Pompey’s character, which can 
be compared against subsequent contemporary and non-contemporary sources. 
 
Cicero and Pompey’s Friendship 
Cicero and Pompey shared a close relationship, both politically and socially, throughout most 
of their careers. Cicero outlines their friendship in May 62, where their political opponents 
label Pompey ‘Gnaeus Cicero’4 to jeer at their close relations. This letter highlights their mutual 
respect and closeness. Cicero references Pompey’s distanced disposition5 later in that same 
year. When considered alone it suggests that Pompey was cold, and this is how modern scholars 
choose to interpret the letter. However, Cicero’s distress at Pompey’s demeanour highlights 
the importance of their friendship and the unusualness of Pompey’s behaviour6. It thus 
reinforces the strength of their bond as they subsequently resumed pleasantries. Furthermore, 
Cicero’s loyalty to Pompey is apparent even when their relations were strained, as he does not 
allow circumstances to alter his kindly disposition to Pompey in the letter’s opening passage7. 
Thus, the friendship was valuable to Cicero, though there are some doubts as to whether 
Pompey reciprocated this sentiment at this time. However, there are other occasions where 
Pompey’s political goodwill is very much on show. For example, Cicero highlights Pompey’s 
strenuous efforts to aid his ally P. Lentulus Spinther in 568, stressing the importance of his 
affections. Cicero’s positive portrayal is reinforced by his intimate personal interactions with 
Pompey. This is best exemplified by their habitual dining in each other’s company9. In other 
instances, Cicero exhibits a deep respect for Pompey’s political opinion. For example, Cicero 
comments that what Pompey deemed best for himself was also best for the state10 in 55. He 
reiterates this sentiment in a letter to Caelius in 51, stating that Pompey “was a very good 
patriot, ready in spirit and plan for every political contingency against which we have to 
                                                 
4 Cic. Att. 1.16.11. (SB 16). “There is a further point: this wretched starveling rabble that comes to meetings and 
sucks the treasury dry imagines that I have no rival in the good graces of our Great One. And it is a fact that we 
have been brought together by a good deal of pleasant personal contact, so much so that those conspirators of 
the wine table, our goateed young bloods, have nicknamed him Cn. Cicero.” (“accedit illud, quod illa 
contionalis hirudo aerari, misera ac ieiuna plebecula, me ab hoc Magno unice diligi putat; et hercule multa et 
iucunda consuetudine coniuncti inter nos sumus, usque eo ut nostri isti comissatores coniurationis, barbatuli 
iuvenes, illum in sermonibus Cn. Ciceronem appellent.).” Shackleton Bailey comments on Cicero’s 
denouncement of these ruffians and their fashionable affectations. See: Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: Letters to 
Atticus, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press (London, 1965), 310. 
5 Cic. Fam. 5.7.2-3. (SB 3).  
6 Shackleton Bailey asserts that Pompey’s behaviour was hardly a shock, considering the behaviour of Metellus 
Nepos, but that Cicero was slighted by Pompey’s absolute lack of niceties. He further comments that Cicero’s 
measured letter highlights his desire to retain this friendship and important political ally. See: D. Shackleton 
Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press (London, 1977), 279.  
7 Cic. Fam. 5.7.2-3. (SB 3). 
8 Cic. Fam. 1.1.2. (SB 12). “…both in day-to-day conversation and publicly in the Senate he (Pompey) has pleaded 
your (Lentulus Spinther’s) cause as eloquently, impressively, zealously, and vigorously as anybody could 
possibly have done, with the fullest acknowledgement of your services to himself and his affection for you.” 
9 Cic. Fam. 1.2.3. (SB 13). 
10 Cic. Fam. 1.8.1. (SB 19). “My inclination, indeed my affection for Pompey is strong enough to make me now 
feel that whatever is to his advantage and whatever he wants is right and proper. Even his opponents would in 
my opinion make no mistake if they gave up fighting, since they cannot be a match for him.” 
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provide.”11 Moreover, this letter dismisses Caelius’ comment earlier in the correspondence 
with Cicero that Pompey “is apt to say one thing and think another, but is usually not clever 
enough to keep his real aims out of view.”12 While the letters certainly prove that Pompey and 
Cicero’s relationship ebbed and flowed, they are not indicative of Pompey having a deficient 
character or of any permanent hostility or coldness between them.  
 
Cicero’s frequent praise for Pompey’s virtuousness and kindliness13 in his private discourse is 
reinforced by his portrayal throughout the speeches, which were public declarations of their 
friendship and Pompey’s abilities. This is most evident within Pro Lege Manilia, which sought 
to justify Pompey’s elevation to the command against Mithridates in the East according to the 
proposed Manilian Law (Lex Manilia). To accomplish this, Cicero outlines Pompey’s previous 
successes, particularly his swift removal of piracy from the Mediterranean. He intertwines his 
commentary on Pompey’s achievements with frequent references to his strong moral 
character14 and remarkable abilities, which made him an ideal candidate for the command15. 
However, this pro-Pompeian sentiment also resulted from Cicero’s political ambitions, wherein 
Pompey’s promotion to the command would also aid Cicero’s career. It thus highlights 
Cicero’s immense efforts to win Pompey the Eastern command and a close alliance with 
Pompeius himself. Cicero also outlines his friendship with Pompey in Pro Sestio, which he 
delivered in 56. He remarks that Pompey was an illustrious man who showed him friendliness 
when the senate were treating him with contempt16. He adds that Pompey attempted to protect 
him from the tribune Clodius, but that Clodius’ despicable character and illegal aspirations 
undermined him17.  
 
                                                 
11 Cic. Fam. 2.8.2. (SB 80). 
12 Cic. Fam. 8.1.3. (SB 77). 
13 Cic. Fam. 1.8.1. (SB 19). “He has performed on your (Lentulus Spinther’s) behalf every friendly service that 
affection, sagacity, and industry could render.” Bailey highlights Cicero’s continued gratitude for Pompey’s 
friendship. However, the letter also underlines Cicero’s indebtedness to Pompey at this time. See: D. Shackleton 
Bailey, Cicero ad Familiares, 306. 
14 Cic. leg.Man. 36-9. Highlights Pompey’s financial honesty. 
15 Cic. leg.Man. 1.3. Trans. H. Grose Hodge (Cambridge, 1927). “For it is mine to speak of the unique and 
extraordinary merits of Gnaeus Pompeius, and a speech upon that topic is harder to end than to begin; so that 
my task as a speaker lies in the search not for material but for moderation.” 
16 Cic. Sest. 15. “Gnaeus Pompeius, a most illustrious man and most friendly to me when many persons were 
setting themselves against me, had bound him (Clodius) by every kind of guarantee, agreement, and solemn 
oath that he would do nothing against me during his tribunate.” (Hunc vir clarissimus mihique multis 
repugnantibus amicissimus, Cn. Pompeius, omni cautione, foedere, exsecratione devinxerat nihil in tribunatu 
contra me esse facturum.) 
17 Cic. Sest. 15-6. “But that abominable wretch, sprung from the offscourings of every sort of crime, thought that 
his bond would not be properly violated unless the very man who guaranteed another from danger should be 
threatened with dangers of his own. This foul and monstrous beast, although the auspices had bound him, 
although ancient custom had tied him down, although the fetters of the leges sacratae held him fast, a consul 
suddenly released by a resolution of the curiae either (as I suppose) because he had been over-persuaded, or (as 
some thought) because he was angry with me, but certainly not knowing and not expecting the great crimes and 
troubles that were hanging over our heads.” 
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Negative Portrayals of Pompey 
In a letter written as early as 59, Cicero portrays Pompey as impetuous and angry, particularly 
when tormented by inferiors18. In this same letter, he pities Pompey’s political impotence and 
notes that his career has taken a remarkable downward turn19. Neither portrayal is flattering. 
Cicero’s feeling of helplessness20 regarding the republic’s welfare dictates this letter’s 
disposition. He wrote it soon after Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus’ political compact, which 
largely undermined the senate’s authority. Thus, Cicero’s frustration toward Pompey is fuelled 
by current political tensions, which soon passed.  
 
Cicero famously attacked Pompey’s character in March 49, during the opening movements of 
the civil war. He labelled Pompey a monster21, referencing a passage from Homer’s Odyssey22, 
and subsequently criticised Pompey’s Sullan aspirations23 - an assertion loaded with 
connotations of tyranny. Firstly, these comments are undeniably negative. Nonetheless, 
Pompey’s portrayal is somewhat salvaged by contemporary political circumstances and 
Cicero’s perspective. The letter illuminates Pompey’s brooding mood and in the lead up to the 
civil war, when he was under immense pressure and entirely aware of Caesar’s military 
capabilities. While this does not exonerate Pompey, his demand for control during this time of 
crisis is understandable. Furthermore, Cicero’s tone throughout this entire letter to Atticus is 
                                                 
18 Cic. Att. 2.21.4. (SB 41). “To me I must say they (Clodius and his associates) are unpleasant, both because they 
torment too savagely a man for whom I have always had a regard and because I am afraid that impetuous as he 
is, a fierce fighter not accustomed to insults, he may give free rein to his mortification and anger.”  
19 Cic. Att. 2.21.4. (SB 41). “So there is our poor friend, unused to disrepute, his whole career passed in a blaze of 
admiration and glory, now physically disfigured and broken in spirit, at his wits end for what to do. He sees the 
precipice if he goes on and the stigma of a turncoat if he turns back. The honest men are his enemies, the rascals 
themselves are not his friends. See now how soft-hearted I am. I could not keep back my tears when I saw him 
addressing a public meeting on 25 July about Bibulus’ edicts. How magnificently he used to posture on that 
platform in other days, surrounded by an adoring people, every man wishing him well! How humble and abject 
he was then, what a sorry figure he cut in his own eyes, to say nothing of his audience!” 
20 Cic. Att. 2.21.1. (SB 41). “The republic is finished. Its plight is all the sadder than when you left because at that 
time it looked as though the authoritarian regime was agreeable to the masses and, though odious, not actually 
lethal to their betters; whereas now it is all at once so universally detested that we tremble to think where it will 
erupt.” 
21 Cic. Att. 4.9.7. (SB 174). “…but I am afraid of causing Pompey embarrassment and of his turning on me the 
Gorgon’s head, monster most terrible. “ 
22 Hom. Od. 11.634. Trans. A.T. Murray, Rev. G.E. Dimock. 
23 Cic. Att. 4.9.7. (SB 174). See also: Cic. Att. 4.10.7. (SB 198). “This is a fight for a throne. The expelled monarch 
(Pompey) is the more moderate, upright, and clean-handed, and unless he wins the name of the Roman people 
must inevitably be blotted out; but if he does win, his victory will be after the Sullan fashion and example. 
Therefore in such a conflict you should support neither side openly and trim your sails to the wind. My case 
however is different because I am bound by an obligation and cannot be ungrateful.” 
Cic. Att. 4.8.2. (SB 161). “…our statesman’s object is the happiness of his countrymen – to promote power for 
their security, virtue for their good name. This is the work I would have him accomplish, the greatest and noblest 
in human society. To this out Gnaeus has never given a thought, least of all in the present context. Both of the 
pair have aimed at personal domination, not the happiness and fair fame of the community.” 
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dictated by his foul mood and feelings of hopelessness24. This is rarely mentioned by modern 
authorities25.  
 
Another letter, written on the fourth of March 49, powerfully exemplifies Cicero’s occasional 
disdain for Pompey. As with the previous letter, Cicero was frustrated with the breakdown of 
civil order and feared the looming civil war. He vents his frustration in a letter to Atticus, where 
Pompey was demonised for his role in the events, as well as his continual decision to ignore 
Cicero’s advice. Cicero brought Pompey’s decisions under scrutiny and denounced outright 
Pompey’s abilities as a statesman and general26. He is extremely critical of Pompey’s decision 
to flee Italy27, whilst also highlighting Pompey’s fear-mongering tactics with the senate28. Yet, 
even at this low point, Cicero raises points that are favourable to Pompey. He refers to 
Pompey’s former immense popularity among the towns of Italy29, especially those who prayed 
for his swift recovery from illness. Although Cicero continues by stating that the people’s 
favour was now shown to Caesar, allusions to Pompey’s popularity exist nonetheless. This 
letter typifies how greatly Cicero’s mood affects this intimate evidence. Cicero was outraged 
at the course of transpiring events, which he believed should have been handled differently. 
His venomous tone and denunciation of Pompey alludes to a political break between the two, 
or, at the very least, a heated disagreement. Consequently, Cicero rejects Pompey’s influence, 
instead stating that his decision to leave Italy was guided by the counsel of Philotimus, who 
informed Cicero that the Optimates were vehemently attacking him in public30. When 
considered alone, this letter suggests that Pompey and Cicero had reached a political rift in 
early March 49. Fortunately, however, Cicero’s letter to Atticus two days later (the sixth of 
March) offers an entirely different account. Here Cicero mentioned that the current state of 
politics was a source of great anxiety, which was cured only by his allegiance and trust in 
Pompey. In direct opposition to his former letter, Cicero attributed all his actions to the respect 
and friendship he shared with Pompey31. 
                                                 
24 Cic. Att. 4.9.7. (SB 174). “I realise that we shall never have a free state in the lifetime of those two or of one 
singly. So I have no longer any hope of a quiet life for myself and I am ready to swallow every bitter pill.” 
25 See Kathryn Welch, ‘Sons of Neptune: Serving the Res Publica Between 49 and 46’, in Magnus Pius: Sextus 
Pompeius and the Transformation of the Roman Republic, ed. K. Welch, Classical Press of Wales (Swansea, 
2012), 43-91.  
26 Cic. Att. 8.16.1 (SB 166). “I already knew him (Pompey) to be a hopeless failure as a statesman, and I now find 
him an equally bad general.” 
27 Cic. Att. 8.16.2 (SB 166). “I mean news of his (Pompey’s) disgraceful flight and the victor’s (Caesar’s) return—
his route and destination.” 
28 Cic. Att. 8.16.2 (SB 166). “Jurors of the panel of 360, who were our Gnaeus’ especial admirers (I see one or 
other of them every day), are shuddering at certain threats of his.” 
29Cic. Att. 8.16.2 (SB 166). “As for the towns, they make a god of him (Caesar), and no pretence about it either, 
as there was when they were offering their prayers for Pompey’s recovery.” 
30 Cic. Att. 8.16.1 (SB 166).  
31 Cic. Att. 9.1.4. (SB 167). “I shall do this for Pompey; it is what I owe him. No one else influences me, neither 
the honest men’s talk (there are no honest men) nor the cause, which has been conducted without courage and 
will be conducted without scruple. I do it simply and solely for Pompey, who does not even ask it of me and is, 
so he says, fighting not for himself but for the country.”  Shackleton Bailey comments that Cicero’s argument 
was flimsy, at least in Atticus’ eyes. Moreover, he questions Cicero’s assertion that he goes for Pompey’s sake. 
After all, if Pompey was not fighting for himself, this was all the less reason for Cicero to join him on personal 
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The contrast in tone and content between these two letters highlights the difficulties that arise 
when using Cicero’s letters as evidence. It demonstrates that one Ciceronian comment alone 
cannot be used to illuminate his attitude because it is so frequently a result of a particular mood 
or reaction. Hence, scholars who pick and choose Cicero’s letters risk seriously misinterpreting 
the information that Cicero is providing. 
 
1.2. Caesar 
Caesar’s Civil War is a politically charged masterpiece of literary invective. It offers an 
exhilarating and detailed account of the civil war and its major figures, which was unsurpassed 
in stylistic purity and substance by its ancient literary peers. Two notable fields that exemplify 
its exceptional qualities are Caesar’s engaging, personable, and honest literary style32, and, his 
unmatched level of detail concerning military matters, which stemmed from his immense 
expertise in this field. These factors, alongside Caesar’s seemingly accomplished military 
career and fame33, constitute a formidable legacy that survives into the modern world.  
 
The work was a commentary (Commentarius), which had two primary functions: to affirm a 
person’s achievements or defend their actions34, and to supplement future historical endeavours 
as source material. In composition, their style was typically austere, which served to provide a 
sense of honesty. Caesar’s account achieved both these aims, as illustrated by Cicero’s 
assertion:  
“(They are) Admirable indeed!” (Cicero); “they are like nude figures, straight and 
beautiful; stripped of all ornament of style as if they had laid aside a garment. His 
(Caesar’s) aim was to furnish others with material for writing history, and perhaps he has 
succeeded in gratifying the inept, who may wish to apply their curling irons to his 
material; but men of sound judgement he has deterred from writing, since in history there 
is nothing more pleasing than brevity clear and correct.35 
 
Importantly, Cicero emphasises that Caesar’s commentaries were so well written any historian 
of sound judgement was deterred from attempting to outstrip this monumental piece of 
literature. However, Cicero presented this speech while Caesar was dictator in 46 and this likely 
affected its tone and contents.  
 
Caesar’s intended audience and literary aspects of the work reveal much about his literary style. 
Caesar’s primary audience was Rome’s most important political figures, whose help he would 
                                                 
grounds. See: D. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero’s Letters to Atticus, Vol IV, Cambridge University Press (London, 
1968), 360. 
32 Quint. Inst. 10.1.114. “As for Julius Caesar, if he had devoted himself wholly to the forum, no other of our 
countrymen would have been named as a rival to Cicero. There is in him such force, such perspicuity, such fire, 
that he evidently spoke with the same spirit with which he fought. All these qualities, too, he sets off with a 
remarkable elegance of diction, of which he was peculiarly studious.” 
33 See: Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments, eds. Kathryn Welch 
and Anton Powell, The Classical Press of Wales, (London, 1998). 
34 W.W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2006), 10. 
35 Cic. Brut. 262. 
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need to administer the post-war state. Thus, the Civil War was composed to justify his actions 
and offer this audience, which largely comprised of senators who voted for the final decree 
against Caesar, a narrative of the war which facilitated their cooperation. It also had two other 
target audiences. Firstly, it wished to acknowledge the loyalty of Caesar’s initial adherents, 
which also illustrated the benefits of Caesar’s goodwill. Secondly, it informed both learned 
provincials and posterity of the war’s basic narrative. This last group were marginally 
significant as Caesar was more concerned with the immediate political and military climate. 
Due to his audience, Caesar was meticulous with his stylistic approach and content throughout 
the work. As noted by Batstone and Damon, Caesar employed a more careful and sensitive 
method when writing the Civil War than that utilised in his Gallic War. There were two reasons 
for this. Firstly, his adversaries in the Civil War were no longer uncivilised Gauls and Germans, 
but respected and influential Roman senators. Secondly, most of his audience – particularly the 
upper-class public figures – had their own view of the events detailed36, which were based on 
epistolary dialogue and first-hand experience. Thus, Caesar could not exaggerate or create a 
fraudulent account because its deception would be obvious to his audience. Instead, he subtly 
manipulated the war’s portrayal to promote a negative representation of his adversaries’ vices, 
namely their warmongering37, threats38, and cruelty39. These same concerns are exhibited in 
Cicero’s letters during this period40, though Cicero equates cruelty to the fundamental nature 
of civil war41. 
 
Caesar uses various direct and indirect techniques to undermine Pompey’s position. For 
example, his negative representation of the Pompeians (particularly Labienus42 - Caesar’s 
former officer - and Metellus Scipio43 - Pompey’s new father-in-law) are, by proxy, an attack 
against Pompey who was their commander. However, Caesar also had particular grudges with 
                                                 
36 W.W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War, 90. 
37 Caes. Bell. Civ. 1.2.3. “…Caesar, he (M. Calidius) said, was afraid lest it should be thought that Pompeius, 
having extorted two legions from him, was holding them back and retaining them near Rome with a view to 
imperilling him…” Here Pompey’s decision to recall the two legions from Caesar, under the premise that they 
be sent to protect the Eastern provinces, is construed as deliberately provocative.  See also: Caes. Bell. Civ. 
1.4.5. “Stirred, too, by the discredit attaching to his (Pompey’s) diversion of two legions from their route by 
Asia and Syria and his appropriation of them for his own power and supremacy, he was eager that the issue 
should be brought to the arbitrament of war.” 
38 Caes. Bell. Civ. 1.2.5-6. “All these speakers were assailed with vehement invective by the consul L. Lentulus. 
He absolutely refused to put the motion of Calidius, and Marcellus, alarmed by the invectives, abandoned his 
proposal. Thus most of the senators, compelled by the language of the consul, intimidated by the presence of 
the army and by the threats of the friends of Pompeius, against their will and yielding to pressure, adopt the 
proposal of Scipio that Caesar should disband his army before a fixed date, and that, if he failed to do so, he 
should be considered to be meditating treason against the republic.” 
39 Caes. Bell. Civ. 1.2.8. “Opinions of weighty import are expressed, and the more harsh and cruel the speech the 
more it is applauded by the personal enemies of Caesar.”  
40 Pompey’s overconfidence and warmongering, see: Cic. Att. 7.8.4-5. (SB 131). 
41 Cic. Att. 9.10.2 (SB 177); 9.14.1 (SB 182). 
42 W.W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War, 109. “If in creating his portrait of Labienus Caesar had in 
mind the desertion with which Labienus began the civil war, he succeeded in drawing a man who continued to 
act in character. Caesar’s Labienus is fundamentally unreliable.”  
43 W.W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War, 113. “The dominant features of his portrait are selfishness 
and a failure to comprehend the nature and purpose of military command. Such is the man in whose hands, 
while Caesar is writing the Civil War, lies the direction of the forces gathering against him in North Africa.”  
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both of these men, particularly Labienus, who had served as his right-hand man in Gaul and 
had deserted him soon after the outbreak of the civil war. To support his negative portrayal of 
the Pompeians, Caesar continually contrasts his approach to the civil war against his enemies. 
Caesar is always merciful to vanquished foes and rewards the loyalty of his supporters44, while 
Pompey is cruel and harshly punishes malfeasance. Curio’s direct speech, the longest of its 
kind in the Civil Wars, embodies this binary opposition. He states that Caesar encourages 
loyalty by showing trust to his inferiors45, while the Pompeians seek to betray Caesar’s trust in 
his troops and implicate them in an unspeakable crime for their own advantage46. This moral 
point – that supporting Caesar is virtuous, while supporting Pompey involves crime - is 
reinforced by Caesar’s important military victories in Spain47. Caesar thus manipulates every 
facet of the civil war’s major events, which perpetuates positive representations of his 
ambitions coupled with a detrimental portrayal of Pompey’s cause. This was particularly so for 
events in 48 and thereafter when Caesar became consul and could represent himself as the 
proper legal commander of the entire Roman force. 
 
This reductionist approach, whereby he carefully selects the level of detail and inclusion of 
events, offers his audience a narrowed perspective of the civil war. It establishes broad 
characterisations and themes throughout the work, which culminate in Caesar’s success over 
the unjust and war-mongering Pompeians. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in his specific 
portrayal of Pompey. 
 
In book one of Caesar’s Civil Wars, Pompey is defined by his overconfidence48, stubbornness 
to accept peaceful terms49, and cruelty50. In book three, situated at the civil war’s climax, 
Pompey’s record as a commander is mixed. He achieves some successes, as at Dyrrachium51, 
but these are embellished with important Caesarian moral victories. The best example of this 
is post-Dyrrachium, where Caesar encourages his men by stating that their defeat will flush the 
enemy with confidence and allow them to risk open battle52. Naturally, this forms a prelude for 
the battle of Pharsalus, where Caesar achieved victory over Pompey. More importantly, this 
book characterises Pompey’s central failures and flaws. Caesar highlights Pompey’s 
                                                 
44 Even in instances where his subordinates (i.e. Curio) failed, but showed loyalty. See: Caes. Bell. Civ. 2.42.4. 
45 Caes. Bell. Civ. 2.32.3. “Caesar entrusted me, whom he holds very dear, to your loyalty, as well as a province—
Sicily and Africa—without which he cannot keep Rome and Italy safe.” 
46 Caes. Bell. Civ. 2.32.4. “Granted, there are people (the Pompeians) who urge you to defect. Well, what more 
can they desire than causing trouble for us while simultaneously involving you in an unspeakable crime? Or 
what harsher feeling can angry men have about you than that you should betray those who judge that they owe 
everything to you, and come into the power of those who think that you brought about their ruin?” 
47 W.W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War, 100. 
48 Caes. Bell. Civ. 1.4.4-5.  
49 Caes. Bell. Civ. 1.9.1-6. Carter outlines the context, though favours Caesar’s perspective in J.M. Carter, Julius 
Caesar: The Civil War – Books 1 and 2, Aris and Phillips, (Warminster, 1990), 166-7. 
50 Caes. Bell. Civ. 1.2.8. 
51 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.69. 
52 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.73.6. “If this is done, the damage will turn into advantage, as happened at Gergovia, and those 
who before now were afraid to fight will offer themselves for battle of their own accord.” 
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arrogance53 and inability to grasp victory at Dyrrachium54. Subsequently, Pompey yields to his 
underlings and engages in open battle at Pharsalus55. Caesar provides a speech, laced with 
literary devices, which justifies this decision in Pompey’s voice56. Here, Pompey’s rationale, 
as depicted by Caesar, is questionable from the outset. His relationship with his troops is odd, 
as he persuades - not orders - the cavalry to follow his orders. Furthermore, Pompey’s 
confidence throughout the speech is extremely misguided. He foolishly believes victory will 
be easily accomplished because of his advantage in numbers, which will force Caesar’s veteran 
army to lose heart. Finally, it closes with an allusion to defeat, which Caesar obviously knew 
was imminent in hindsight. Here Pompey asserts that the troops’ demand for battle was met 
and they should now not disprove the opinion that he and everyone else has of them57. This 
passage casts uncertainty over Pompey’s leadership and further presages his defeat by Caesar. 
It also highlights Caesar’s method of constructing the historical record from his own 
perspective, wherein its conclusions inevitably favour him. As the author, Caesar controls 
Pompey’s depiction to justify his own decisions throughout the civil war. This passage best 
exemplifies how Pompey is cast as Caesar’s inferior throughout the commentaries. Elsewhere 
in book three, Caesar shows Pompey to be dishonest. In the moments before the battle of 
Pharsalus, Caesar shows his enemy’s leaders, Pompey included, swearing not to return from 
the field unless victorious.  
Having said this, he (Labienus) swore that he would not return to the camp except as 
conqueror and exhorted the rest to do the same. Pompeius, commending this, took the 
same oath, nor was there any one of the rest who hesitated to swear. Such were their 
proceedings at this council, and they departed with general rejoicing and high 
expectation.58 
 
Pompey soon after betrays this oath when he witnesses his men, from whom he expected 
victory, fleeing the field of battle59. He thus returns to his camp and deceptively orders his 
troops to defend it at all costs while he makes a circuit of the gates to shore up the defences60. 
                                                 
53 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.45.6. “It was at this time that Pompeius is said to have made the boastful remark to his friends 
that he did not object to be considered a worthless commander if Caesar’s legions should succeed in retiring, 
without the most serious loss, from the place to which they had rashly advanced.” See also: 3.82.1. “Pompey 
arrived in Thessaly a few days later. In an address to the whole army he thanked his men and encouraged 
Scipio’s soldiers: since victory was already in hand, they should agree to share the booty and rewards.” 
54 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.70.1. “Pompey, fearing an ambush, did not dare approach the fortifications for quite some 
time—in my view, because things had turned out contrary to the expectation of a man who had seen his men 
running away from their camp shortly before—and his cavalry was slowed down in its pursuit by the narrow 
space, particularly since it was held by our men.” J.M. Carter emphasises Caesar’s commentary on luck in Caes. 
Bell. Civ. 68.1. See: J.M. Carter, Julius Caesar: The Civil War – Books 1 and 2, 191-2.  
55 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.86.1. 
56 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.86.2-4. “I know that I am making a nearly incredible promise. But here is the thinking behind 
my plan, so that you can approach the battle with sturdier morale. I have persuaded our cavalry—and they have 
assured me that they will do this—to attack Caesar’s right wing on its open flank when the approach is complete. 
Once they have encircled Caesar’s line from the back, they are going to rout the army in disarray before our 
men throw a weapon at the enemy. We will thus finish the war with no danger to the legions and practically 
without a wound. It is not a difficult matter, given how strong we are in cavalry.”  
57 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.86.5. 
58 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.87.5-6. 
59 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.94.5. 
60 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.96.5-6. 
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Instead, he abandons his men and leaves Thessaly altogether. Here, Caesar’s account is 
questionable, as he is unlikely to have noticed these details in the thick of battle. Thus, either 
they are literary embellishments or were later additions he received from Pompey’s forces after 
the battle had already been decided. Modern scholars point out that Caesar gives physical 
expression to this characterization of Pompey through the removal of his insignia that marked 
him as a commander61. Caesar recognised the power of this symbolic gesture and dramatised 
it in his commentary 62. Finally, Caesar’s negative portrayal of Pompey culminates in his death 
in Egypt. Here Pompey dies with his last companion at the hands of a former beneficiary and 
a former soldier63. In a moment of poetic justice, the man who had failed his supporters was 
ultimately betrayed by them64. 
 
Caesar’s account of the civil war is extremely important and offers an intimate glimpse into 
late republican political and military affairs. However, it also has several issues. The most 
evident, which was stated in the introduction of this sub-chapter, is Caesar’s intent. Caesar did 
not record his aims in the Commentaries, so posterity can only hypothesise what he was trying 
to achieve during the civil war. The best suggestion is that Caesar was out to defend himself 
and the best way to do this was to attack his opponents as strongly as he could. Irrespective of 
this issue, Pompey suffers harsh treatment in a source composed by his military adversary 
throughout the civil war. To counterbalance this problem, Caesar’s account cannot be held 
superior to other contemporary accounts. Instead, it should be contrasted with the other 
contemporary evidence to modify its perspective, thereby revealing Caesar’s manipulative 
designs and intentions throughout the work. The pitfalls of Caesar’s account are most evident 
in his selective retelling of the political anarchy in Rome before his invasion. Cicero’s letters 
to Atticus state that the political anarchy in Rome was the result of Caesar’s march into Italy65, 
which forced Pompey, the two consuls, and a large portion of the senate to abandon the capital 
and prepare for war elsewhere. Caesar’s account, however, flips this equation and suggests that 
the political anarchy justified his invasion. His selection and organisation of the story highlights 
Pompeian failure, but is chronologically false. In short, it was Caesar’s march into Italy that 
created the chaos, not the chaos that provoked Caesar’s march.  
 
Unfortunately, many early modern scholars refused these issues as determinants shaping 
Caesar’s commentary on the civil war. They instead maintained a positive reading of Caesar’s 
Civil War even when this was rather difficult. Consequently, they believed that the Civil War 
                                                 
61 W.W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War, 106. 
62 J.M. Carter notes how Caesar’s expression at Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.96.3 successfully provokes a sense of frantic 
haste in J. M. Carter, Julius Caesar: The Civil War – Books 1 and 2, 216.  
63 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.104. 
64 W.W. Batstone and C. Damon, Caesar’s Civil War, 106. 
65 Cic. Att. 7.10 (SB 133).  
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was a truthful depiction of the conflict66, including the portraits of his adversaries67 and various 
battles68. However, these views lack critical incision and promotes Caesar as a markedly 
superior being. This in turn marginalises Pompey’s significance and skews the narrative of the 
late republic. Fortunately, more recent scholars are more sceptical of Caesar’s motives. In 
summary, Caesar propagated anti-Pompeian stereotypes throughout the Civil War, while 
simultaneously aggrandising himself. This reconstruction was later adopted by modern authors 
who perpetuated these portrayals for their own purposes. Therefore, Caesar’s Civil War and 
the assertions in this sub-chapter about this text, are crucial to this thesis and are presented from 
the outset and throughout. 
 
By contrast, Caesar also briefly mentions Pompey in his commentaries on the Gallic War, 
where at the opening of book 7 he states that Pompey’s actions in the wake of Clodius’ murder 
demonstrated his virtus (‘Excellence)69. This adds a positive portrayal of Pompey, which 
highlights Caesar’s perception of his energy and efficiency in the political arena at that time. 
 
1.3. Sallust 
Gaius Sallustius Crispus (probably 86-35 BC) was Pompey’s contemporary and actively 
participated in the civil war. His political career was dubious, as exhibited by his expulsion 
from the senate in 49 for unspecified offences. Sallust was, however, held in favourable regard 
by Caesar due to his unwavering support during the civil war. This relationship saw Sallust re-
enrolled in the senate and granted a praetorship for 47. Sallust again evinced dubious conduct 
as he was alleged to have extortionately governed the province of Africa Nova during his 
praetorship, which resulted in serious charges against him upon his return to Rome in 46. While 
detailed records of his praetorship are lost, the accusations levelled against Sallust must have 
been well supported as he only escaped conviction through the acquittal of Caesar – who was 
then acting as dictator. With his political career in tatters, Sallust retired from public life and 
spent the remainder of his life writing historical works. His history was written in the shadow 
of Caesar’s assassination and the institution of the Triumvirate at the end of 43. 
 
Sallust wrote three historical works during his life, two of which survive in their entirety. The 
surviving works are: The Conspiracy of Catiline and The Jugurthine War; while his last 
monograph, the Histories, survives in a few fragments, speeches, and letters. The latter work 
is of greatest importance to this thesis, despite its heavily fragmented state and occasionally 
controversial authorship. The surviving fragments detail Sallust’s perception of Pompey and 
                                                 
66 M.L.W. Laistner, The Greater Roman Historians, University of California Press (Los Angeles, 1947), 37-8 
states that “Even in the commentaries on the Civil War the unprejudiced reader will find it hard to discover 
deliberate falsification of evidence; but he will encounter passages where Caesar’s memory of past events was 
at fault.” 
67 M.L.W. Laistner, Roman Historians, 41. “Labienus was the one important officer who changed sides in the 
civil war; his action must have hit Caesar hard on both personal and military grounds. Yet there is no bitter 
criticism in his later book. Labienus’ military competence is as clearly portrayed in the Civil War as in the Gallic 
War.” 
68 M.L.W. Laistner, Roman Historians, 39. “Military reversals or near-disasters are not glossed over, and the 
attentive reader is led by sheer sequence of events to the highest degree of tension…”  
69 Caes. Bell. Gal. 7.6. 
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the events of the civil war. However, Sallust’s monographs are important because they outline 
his historical method and purpose. Therefore, a brief analysis of Sallust’s historical method 
within the Conspiracy of Catiline opens this sub-chapter to outline his intent. 
 
Sallust’s Conspiracy of Catiline and Jugurthine War were carefully selected and executed 
monographs which embody their creator’s historical methodology and purpose. Rather than 
writing narrative history in an annalistic framework, Sallust chose engaging and thematically 
consistent episodes in Roman history for the subject of his works. For example, the Conspiracy 
of Catiline focuses on the dramatic events of 63 BC, where Catiline and his fellow conspirators 
were controversially executed for their designs to overthrow the Republic. The monograph 
embodies Sallust’s belief that Roman society was in a state of moral decline. He uses several 
techniques to outline this process. Firstly, Sallust chose Catiline as the work’s protagonist 
because the dissipation and corruption in Catiline’s character offered a suitable contrast to 
Sallust’s high-minded stoic morality. This was characteristic of Sallust’s approach to history, 
whereby emphasis is placed on the personalities of history70. Secondly, the backdrop of 
political anarchy, corruption, impoverishment in rural Italy, near universal disregard for legal 
precedence, and social disorder, dramatically embodied Sallust’s concerns for Rome’s decline 
and future71. Sallust’s focus on these moral issues underpins his belief in didacticism as the 
purpose of history. In his opinion, historical pursuits were an extension of public life and should 
accordingly guide the actions of future generations.  
 
The Histories was Sallust’s most ambitious work72 and covered the period from 78-67 BC. It 
makes several brief allusions to Pompey. Book two refers to the transfer of the Sertorian 
command from Metellus Pius to Pompey. Meanwhile, books four and five, relate directly to 
Pompey. Book four records the political struggles in Rome which preceded Pompey and 
Crassus’ joint consulship in 70, while book five documents the passing of the Lex Gabinia and 
the final phases of Pompey’s war against the pirates. Unfortunately, the narrative fragments of 
the last two books are brief. Thus, only the longer passages which pertain to Pompey will be 
included in this sub-chapter. From these few fragments, however, modern scholars are able to 
sketch a rough outline of Pompey’s character.  
 
McGushin comments that Sallust’s inclusion of Pompey’s early career, as part of his 
introduction to the narrative proper, indicates the importance Sallust attached to Pompey73. It 
is an assertion strengthened by Pompey’s character sketch in book two74, situated immediately 
before Pompey takes the Sertorian command, where Sallust pauses the narrative to introduce 
                                                 
70 M.L.W. Laistner, Roman Historians, 55. 
71 D.C. Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust, Cambridge University Press (London, 1961), 104-5. 
72 D.C. Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust, 106. “As far as it goes, the evidence of the fragments of the Historiae 
indicates the same general standpoint as that behind the two earlier monographs. The one substantial 
modification which can be detected seems to be in the interest of greater historical accuracy…” 
73 Sall. Hist. 1.44-6. See too P. McGushin, Sallust: the Histories, Trans. and commentary by Patrick McGushin, 
Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1992), 17.  
74 Sall. Hist. 2.16-22. 
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him. Unfortunately, only eight lines of this sketch have survived as references in other ancient 
works. Yet the fragments still establish Sallust’s negative portrayal. He comments on Pompey’s 
desire for power75, his insulting behaviour toward honourable men from young manhood76, and 
his shameless character77. These amount to a fairly damning portrait, albeit one which appears 
historically objective because of its restrained delivery78.  
 
Included in book two of the history is a letter which Pompey addressed to the senate at the 
height of the Sertorian war. Its authorship is undeniably Sallustian79, though most modern 
scholars accept that its tone could have originated from a Pompeian original80 – to which Sallust 
likely had access. The letter adheres to Sallust’s earlier portrait of Pompey, wherein Pompey’s 
vanity and ruthless ambition were central themes. However, Sallust exaggerates these traits in 
the letter for dramatic effect. Consequently, Pompey’s request for aid is portrayed as a thinly 
veiled threat81, his vanity is highlighted through the continual reassertion of his self-
importance82, while his manipulative tendencies are illustrated in his incessant self-pity83. 
Overall, Sallust’s portrayal of Pompey throughout the letter is damning84.  
 
This letter has interesting consequences for modern scholarly readings of Sallust. Its blatant 
hostility, alongside Sallust’s politically motivated approach to history, has resulted in an 
unsurprisingly cautious treatment among modern scholars85. Yet this has not prevented modern 
                                                 
75 Sall. Hist. 2.18. “(Pompey was) moderate in all things except in his thirst for power.” 
76 Sall. Hist. 2.19. “Nevertheless from young manhood he had behaved insultingly towards many honourable 
men.” 
77 Sall. Hist. 2.17. “So that Lenaeus… savaged Sallust the historian in a bitter satire because he had written of him 
(Pompey) as noble of countenance, shameless in character.” 
78 P. McGushin, Sallust: The Histories, 193. 
79 M.L.W. Laistner, Roman Historians, 52. “It is likely enough that Pompey sent a strongly worded dispatch to 
the Roman government, complaining of lack of support in the Sertorian War; but the letter reproduced in the 
Histories, though it may give the gist of what Pompey wrote, has Sallustian features.” 
80 P. McGushin, Sallust: The Histories, 242. “It is not unlikely that Sallust had seen the original letter sent by 
Pompeius to the senate. His version of it, however is in keeping with his earlier portrait wherein he dealt with 
leading character-traits of that ambitious general.” 
81 Sall. Hist. 2.82.9-10. “I have exhausted not only my means, but even my credit. You are our last resort; unless 
you come to our aid my army, against my wish but as I have already warned you, will cross to Italy and bring 
with it the whole Spanish war.” 
82 Sall. Hist. 2.82.6. “Why need I enumerate battles or winter expeditions or the towns we have destroyed or 
captured? Actions speak louder than words: the taking of the enemy’s camp at the Sucro, the battle of the river 
Turia… all these are sufficiently known to you. In exchange for them, grateful senators, you present me with 
famine and shortages.” See also: Sall. Hist. 2.82.1. “…having exposed me to a most cruel war, you have as far 
as you were able destroyed by starvation, the most wretched of all deaths, me and my army which deserves your 
highest gratitude.” 
83 Sall. Hist. 2.82.1. “If it had been against you and my country’s gods that I had undertaken all the toils and 
dangers which have accompanied the many occasions since my early manhood when under my leadership the 
most dangerous enemies have been routed and your safety secured, you could not, Fathers of the Senate, have 
taken more severe measures against me in my absence than you are now doing.” 
84 Ronald Syme, Sallust, University of California Press (Los Angeles, 1964), 201. “The document (speech) 
discloses chill ambition, boasting, menace and mendacity.” 
85 M.L.W. Laistner, Roman Historians, 55. “If we reject this portrait of Pompey, as we must, it is not because it 
conflicts with the uncritical eulogies of Theophanes of Mytilene, traces of which survive in Plutarch, but because 
it cannot be reconciled with the sober contemporary evidence in the writings of Cicero.” 
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historians from admiring Sallust as a historical writer, particularly for his ability to capture the 
essence of history’s great characters86. The most notable example of this is Caesar and Cato’s 
exchange in Sallust’s Conspiracy of Catiline87. This admiration for Sallust’s artistic merits has 
resulted in a willingness for modern audiences to accept his historical flaws. Unfortunately, 
this is problematic. While it is likely that Sallust’s portrayal of Pompey was the product of 
personal disdain, merely acknowledging the issue and thereby rejecting a small portion of the 
evidence is deeply flawed. This does not consider the wider ramifications the letter has for 
Sallust’s historiographic approach.    
 
As mentioned previously, Sallust references Pompey on a few occasions in the surviving 
fragments of the Histories’ later books. In book three, Pompey is mentioned in the tribune C. 
Licinius Macer’s speech given to the general assembly in 73. Here Pompey is portrayed as an 
upholder of the common person’s cause because he sought to reinstate the powers of the tribune 
of the plebs taken by Sulla88. These attractive features, however, do not reflect a redeeming 
Sallustian portrayal of Pompey. Rather, Sallust recreated the speech to reflect the views of 
Macer, who evidently supported Pompey’s cause at that time. Unfortunately, most of the 
speech’s context within Sallust’s work is lost. It is thus impossible to situate the speech among 
the author’s opinion on the wider events. Despite this, Sallust’s negative portrait of the 
Optimates which emphasises their treachery and jealousy89 diminishes Pompey as well because 
of his allegiance to them both in the time of Sulla and in the later civil war with Caesar.  
 
Sallust’s last notable comment on Pompey survives in a fragment from book three. Pompey’s 
vanity was again the central theme, as he bowed to the sycophancy of his supporters who 
claimed he was the equal of Alexander. This adulation inspired Pompey to equal the 
achievements and plans of Alexander90. Sallust’s vocabulary usage is telling within this 
                                                 
86 Ronald Mellor, The Roman Historians, Routledge Press (London, 1999), 45. “His surviving characterizations 
of men like Jugurtha, Marius, and Catiline may not be subtle but they are certainly forceful. These portraits are 
often drawn through speeches and letters – not using the precise words of the subject but, like Thucydides, 
constructing speeches with ideas and argument appropriate to the specific personality.”  
See also: Ronald Mellor, The Roman Historians, 41-2. “While Sallust may have seen a copy of the letter Pompey 
sent to the Senate in 74 BCE, his concern was likewise not to repeat Pompey’s words but to provide a forceful 
impression of the vanity and ambition of the man. Sallust despised Pompey, whom he always saw as the 
bloodthirsty gangster in Sulla’s employ rather than the later, far more respectable, leader of the senatorial party 
and defender of the Republic.” 
87 Ronald Mellor, The Roman Historians, 37. 
88 Sall. Hist. 3.34.23. “For my own part I am fully convinced that Pompeius, a young man of such renown, prefers 
to be the leading man of the state with your consent, rather than to share in their (the Optimates) mastery, and 
that he will join you and lead you in restoring the power of the tribunes.” 
89 Sall. Hist. 3.34.21-2. “You must guard against craft; for by no other means can they prevail against the people 
as a whole, and in that way only will they attempt to do so. It is for this reason that they are making plans to 
soothe you and at the same time to put you off until the coming of Gnaeus Pompeius, the very man whom they 
bore upon their necks when they feared him, but presently, their fear dispelled, they tear to pieces. Nor are these 
self-styled defenders of liberty, many as they are, ashamed to need one man before they dare to right a wrong 
or to defend a right.” 
90 Sall. Hist. 3.84. “From his earliest youth, Pompeius had been persuaded by the flattery of his supporters to 
believe that he was the equal of King Alexander. Therefore he tried to rival Alexander’s achievements and 
plans.” 
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fragment. Firstly, he insinuates that Pompey tried to equal Alexander, thereby alluding to 
Pompey’s failure on this count. Furthermore, Pompey’s susceptibility to his supporters’ flattery 
indicates an impressionable nature unsuited to leadership positions.  
 
Above is a collection of the notable Sallustian evidence relating to Pompey where the 
authorship is uncontested by modern scholars. There are, however, other controversial works 
which resemble Sallust’s attitudes and have certain Sallustian literary features. Most modern 
scholars deem them later Sallustian imitations. I will avoid taking a side in the debate about 
their authenticity because the question of authorship is of secondary importance here. The 
evidence reflects, at the very least, a subsequent author’s understanding of Sallust.  
 
This ‘pseudo-Sallustian’ evidence comprises a speech and letter addressed to Caesar after the 
civil war. The author addresses Caesar, outlining his concerns for the republic and the steps 
that should be taken to cure its ills91. Both works capture the strong moralist tone exhibited 
throughout Sallust’s surviving works92. In doing so, the works polarise the characters of 
Pompey and Caesar. Needless to say, Pompey’s portrayal is negative throughout. As with the 
authentic Sallustian evidence, there are several references to Pompey’s insatiable desire for 
power93 and his reliance on luck94 - which also alludes to his foolishness. Pompey’s portrayal 
is also defined by his early career and affiliation with Sulla. His cruel acts95 thus become a 
centrepiece for Sallust’s justification for Caesar’s decision to declare war on the State. Finally, 
in his letter to Caesar, the pseudo-Sallustian author outlines several Pompeian flaws. He 
comments on the perversity of Pompey’s spirit and his lowly acts, whereby Pompey prefers to 
put arms into the hands of his enemies than allow Caesar to restore the republic96. The passage 
concludes with Pompey as the republic’s destroyer, a portrayal juxtaposed with Caesar as its 
restorer97.   
 
                                                 
91 Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 8.7. “I have set forth in the fewest possible words the conduct which I think will benefit 
our country and bring glory to you.” See also Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 3-12. 
92 Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 1.7-8. “But for you it is harder than for all before you to administer your conquests, 
because your war was more merciful than their peace.” See also Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 5.5. “For it has become 
the custom for mere youths to think it a fine thing to waste their own substance and that of others, to refuse 
nothing to their won lust and the demands of their fellows, to regard such conduct as evidence of manliness and 
high spirit, but to consider modesty and self-restraint as cowardice.” 
93 Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 2.3. “For no one of them (the Optimates) had any share in his power, and if he had been 
able to brook a rival, the world would not have been convulsed by war.” 
94 Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 2.2. “You waged war, Caesar, with a distinguished antagonist, of great prowess, greedy 
for power, but not wise so much as favoured by fortune.” 
95 Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 4.1. “Or has oblivion destroyed the murmurs which, a short time before this warm were 
directed against Gnaeus Pompeius and the victory of Sulla; when it was said that Domitius, Carbo, Brutus and 
others were slain, not in arms nor in battle according to the laws of war, but afterwards with the utmost barbarity, 
while they were begging for mercy…” 
96 Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 3.1. “Now, since Gnaeus Pompeius, either from perversity of spirit or because he desired 
above all things to injure you, has fallen so low as to put arms into the hands of the enemy, you must restore the 
government by the same means by which he has overthrown it.” 
97 Ps.-Sall. Epist. Caes. 3.1. 
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In sum, the Sallustian evidence outlines a negative portrayal of Pompey, founded on his early 
misdemeanours, eventual defeat by Caesar, and personal enmity. However, the evidence is too 
scanty for modern scholars to analyse Sallust’s opinion sufficiently, primarily due to the 
fragmented nature of the Histories. As such, Sallust’s evidence for Pompey should be treated 
lightly. This is unfortunate, as Sallust was a contemporary of Pompey and a more complete 
sketch would have given Pompey’s enigmatic persona greater detail. His importance is 
emphasised by the apparent influence that his Histories had on subsequent narratives 
concerning the period98.  
 
Despite the inherent issues in Sallust’s works, the premise of his detestation is markedly like 
those contained in modern historical works concerning Pompey. Thus, despite the dismissive 
claims of modern historians toward his evidence, Sallust’s portrayal of Pompey has had a 
lasting effect on modern scholarship.  
 
1.4. Valerius Maximus 
Valerius Maximus was a Roman rhetorician who worked during the reign of Tiberius, though 
little else is known about his familial heritage or career. He served under Sextus Pompeius, the 
proconsul of Asia and cousin of Gnaeus Pompeius, during his campaigns in the East in 27 and 
owed his career’s advancement to Sextus. Valerius Maximus most important work was the 
Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX, otherwise known as Nine Books of Memorable 
Doings and Sayings, which was a compilation of historical anecdotes used to educate young 
rhetoricians. Valerius Maximus mentions Pompey several times in the work with varying 
impacts and insightfulness. These references form a favourable depiction of Pompey, albeit 
with some contrasting negative features.  
 
Valerius first references Pompey in book one, where he comments that Pompey was 
treacherously murdered by King Ptolemy99. While not particularly enlightening, it at least 
presents a sympathetic reading of Pompey’s demise. Although, this might simply be a product 
of Valerius’ Augustan times, where literature commonly demonised the Egyptians and 
Cleopatra100.  
 
Valerius next praises Pompey for his modesty in book four. Here he relates Pompey’s actions 
after his defeat at Pharsalus. The townspeople of Larisa rush to greet him, which prompts him 
                                                 
98 Ronald Syme, Sallust, 178. “Sallust’s presentation of those dozen years dominated subsequent writers. His trace 
can be detected in their arrangement of events, in the emphasis and in the colouring. Plutarch in his Lives of 
Sertorius and Lucullus is of prime value.” See also: Sil. Pun. 10.658, for an early imperial writer lamenting 
Rome’s moral decline and wishing that Carthage were still standing for the betterment of Roman values. 
99 Val. Max. 1.8.9. “When L. Lentulus was sailing past the shore on which the body of Cn. Pompeius Magnus, 
slain by the treachery of king Ptolemy (perfidia Ptolomaei regis interempti), was being burned with the wood 
of a boat cut up for the purpose, he saw the pyre for which Fortune herself should have blushed…” 
100 Propertius’ poetry reflects a similar attitude during the Augustan period. See: Prop. 3.29-36. “What of her 
(Cleopatra) who of late has fastened disgrace upon our arms, and, a woman who fornicated even with her slaves, 
demanded as the price of her shameful union the walls of Rome and the senate made over to her dominion? 
Guilty Alexandria, land ever ready for treason, and Memphis, so often blood-stained at our cost, where the sand 
robbed Pompey of his three triumphs, no day shall ever wash you clean of this infamy, Rome.” 
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to demand that they go and pay their duties to the victor101 (ite inquit et istud officium 
praestate). Valerius praises Pompey’s conduct in the advent of disaster, and for his sense of 
modesty when no longer able to employ his dignity102. 
 
Valerius further perpetuates a favourable Pompeian portrait in chapter five. He refers to 
Pompey’s innate capacity for showing kindness, while also stressing that his demise was a 
pitiable example of humanity lacking in others103. Valerius then reiterates the debauched 
treachery of the Egyptians, which resulted in a demise that even Caesar pitied104. The theme of 
this passage is to relate the unpredictable and cruel role of Fortune. Valerius cites Pompey’s 
death as a remarkable example. However, he also stresses Pompey’s greatness, relating him as 
a man “who a little while earlier (before his death) had been looked upon as the crown of the 
Roman empire”105 (paulo ante Romani imperii columen habitum). Valerius thus cites a positive 
Pompeian tradition, while offering praise for Pompey’s character.  
  
Later in book five, Valerius references negative Pompeian traits. This chapter concerns Ingrates 
(De Ingratis) who acted against their benefactors. Valerius’ passage begins with a summary of 
Pompey’s greatness, Fortune, and achievements, which is followed by his mighty downfall. He 
gives little detail for these events and instead humbly stresses that they were “too mighty to be 
approached by his hand”106. The passage then outlines Pompey’s ill treatment of Carbo, who 
had helped him acquire his father’s estate when he was a young man. Valerius condemns 
Pompey’s disgraceful decision to execute Carbo on Sulla’s orders, and thus betray a man who 
helped him reach political significance107. Importantly, Valerius stresses that his silence on 
these matters wouldn’t hide Pompey’s treachery, which would “be present to men’s minds not 
without some censure”108 (mors animis hominum non sine aliqua reprehensione obuersabitur). 
This alludes to an enduring negative Pompeian tradition, which appears widely acknowledged.  
 
Valerius Maximus’ most influential commentary on Pompey is found in book six. The chapter 
concerns things freely spoken or deeds freely done and outlines the countenance of famous 
men when impeached by their peers or inferiors. Valerius opens the section with an explanation 
of his intent, stating that each example is relative to its circumstances. Furthermore, he stresses 
                                                 
101 Val. Max. 4.5.5.  
102 Val. Max. 4.5.5. “I should say he did not deserve to be conquered had he not been defeated by Caesar. Certainly 
he behaved well in misfortune. Since he could no longer employ his dignity, he employed modesty.” 
103 Val. Max. 5.1.10. “How illustrious an example of humanity accorded was Cn. Pompeius and how pitiable an 
example of humanity found lacking!” 
104 Val. Max. 5.1.10. “… (His head) severed from its body and lacking a pyre, it was carried as the wicked gift of 
Egyptian treachery, pitiable even to the victor. For when Caesar saw it, he forgot the role of enemy and put on 
the countenance of a father-in-law and gave tears to Pompey, his own and his daughter’s too; and he had the 
head cremated with an abundance of the costliest perfumes.” 
105 Val. Max. 5.1.10. 
106 Val. Max. 5.3.5. 
107 Val. Max. 5.3.5. 
108 Val. Max. 5.3.5. 
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that each figure’s reaction is only favourable if a positive outcome was achieved109. He thus 
places himself as an arbiter of moral righteousness. Valerius subsequently offers an unflattering 
portrayal of the consul L. Philippus, who spoke in hostile terms against the senate110, and a 
positive portrayal of Scipio Africanus, who spoke freely against the people thereby earning 
their respect with his honesty111. These sections outline the parameters of Valerius’ distinction 
between favourable and unfavourable outcomes. They are followed by Valerius’ section on 
Pompey, whose immense authority is likened to Africanus’112 which was a large honour. 
Valerius exhibits respect and approval for Pompey’s ability not only to tolerate the criticism of 
his inferiors, but to endure it with unruffled countenance (quieta fronte)113. Valerius then offers 
some examples, including Gnaeus Piso’s attack against Pompey’s unjust interference in 
Manilius Crispus’ trial114; the reproachful criticisms of the consul Gnaeus Lentulus 
Marcellinus, who accused Pompey of aspiring to tyranny115; and a sardonic comment by 
Favonius, who reproached Pompey for desiring monarchical powers116. This leads up to the 
greatest test of Pompey’s exemplary tolerance, wherein Pompey is criticised by people of lowly 
birth. The first and most important example is that of Helvius Mancia of Formiae. Helvius was 
an elderly man who was accusing Lucius Libo before the Censors and thus received Pompey’s 
ire117. Helvius, rather than shying away from the conflict, labels Pompey the teenage butcher 
(adulescentulus carnifex) by referencing his executions of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, M. 
Brutus, Cn. Carbo, and Perperna118. This description is routinely revisited by later hostile 
Pompeian traditions as a vicious attack against Pompey, wherein his cruel demeanour was 
widely apparent to his contemporaries. While it suggests that anti-Pompeian sentiments existed 
during Pompey’s lifetime, this reading ignores Valerius’ intention with this passage. Firstly, 
Valerius opened the passage by praising Pompey’s dignified patience when confronting 
criticism. It was thus intended to be favourable. Secondly, Valerius’ subsequent commentary 
on Helvius’ outburst strengthen this favourable outcome for Pompey. In a passage frequently 
overlooked by modern scholarship, Valerius attacks Helvius’ insolence for recalling the 
                                                 
109 Val. Max. 6.2. praef. “Though not inviting the freedom of a passionate spirit attested in deeds and words alike, 
I would not exclude it coming unasked. Located between virtue and vice, it deserves praise if it has tempered 
itself beneficially, blame if it has launched out where it should not.” 
110 Val. Max. 6.2.2. 
111 Val. Max. 6.2.3. 
112 Val. Max. 6.2.4. 
113 Val. Max. 6.2.4. “Therefore we ought the less to wonder that Cn. Pompeius enormous authority so often 
struggled with such freedom, and not without great credit, since with unruffled countenance he let himself be a 
mockery to the license of all sorts of men.” 
114 Val. Max. 6.2.4. 
115 Val. Max. 6.2.6. “Consul Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus was complaining at a public meeting of Magnus Pompeius 
excessive power and the whole people loudly assented. “Applaud, citizens,” he said, “applaud while you may; 
for soon you will not be able to do it with impunity.” The power of an extraordinary citizen was assailed on that 
occasion, by invidious complaint on the one hand, by pathetic lamentation on the other.” 
116 Val. Max. 6.2.7. “To Pompey, who was wearing a white bandage on his leg, Favonius said: “It makes no odds 
on what part of your body you have the diadem,” quibbling at the tiny piece of cloth to reproach him with 
monarchical power. But Pompey’s countenance did not change one way or the other. He was careful neither to 
seem to be gladly acknowledging his power by a cheerful look nor by a sour one to avow annoyance.” 
117 Val. Max. 6.2.8. “In the altercation Pompeius Magnus said that he (Helvius Mancia) had been sent back from 
the underworld to make his charge, casting his lowly station and old age in his teeth.” 
118 Val. Max. 6.2.8.  
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wounds of the civil wars119. Moreover, he praises Pompey’s composure for allowing such a 
lowly man, “smelling of his father’s slavery”120, to question an Imperator’s decisions. The 
misuse of this passage has become commonplace in modern scholarly characterisations of 
Pompey. It is thus essential to identify the anomaly modern sources cause by misinterpreting 
it.  
 
Valerius offers three further comments regarding Pompey’s character. In book eight, he 
mentions Pompey’s craving for glory121, though subsequently adjusts this description with 
Pompey’s generous rewards to Theophanes, who chronicled and thus preserved his famous 
exploits122. Hence, the passage promotes Pompey’s generosity and, conversely, his vanity. 
Later in the same book, Valerius speaks about greatness and offers a resoundingly affirmative 
portrayal of Pompey’s achievements123, which were received with overwhelming support by 
the people and clamorous envy from his adversaries. Finally, Valerius mentions Pompey’s 
insolent (insolenter) disregard for friendships and the law. Contrary to the generous and kindly 
portrayal given previously, Valerius outlines Pompey’s occasional tendency to treat friends 
with contempt. He mentions Pompey’s abhorrent treatment of Hypsaeus, a nobleman and 
friend, who was deemed a hindrance once he faced electoral malpractice124. This is followed 
by Pompey’s shameless acquittal of P. Scipio, his father-in-law, who was both guilty of 
trespassing a law Pompey himself had passed, and faced an illustrious number of defendants125. 
Valerius stresses Pompey’s selfishness, as “the blandishments of the nuptial bed made him 
violate the stability of the commonwealth”126 (maritalis lecti blanditiis statum rei publicae 
temerando). 
 
Valerius’ Memorable Deeds and Sayings offers a diverse collection of Pompeian anecdotes, 
which reflect his contested historiographical tradition and multi-faceted character. Valerius’ 
                                                 
119 Val. Max. 6.2.8. “A country townsman, smelling of his father’s slavery, unbridled in his temerity, intolerable 
in his presumption, was allowed to recall with impunity the gaping wounds of the civil wars, now overlaid with 
shrivelled scars.” 
120 Val. Max. 6.2.8. 
121 Val. Max. 8.14.3. “Pompeius Magnus too was not averse from this hankering after glory.” 
122 Val. Max. 8.14.3. “He bestowed citizenship on Theophanes of Mitylene, the chronicler of his exploits, in a 
military assembly and followed up the gift, ample in itself, with a detailed and well publicized speech. As a 
result no one doubted that Pompey was repaying a favour rather than initiating one.” 
123 Val. Max. 8.15.8. “The ample and novel distinctions heaped on Cn. Pompeius assault our ears in literary 
memorials with choruses of approving support on the one hand and of clamorous envy on the other. A Roman 
knight, he was despatched as Proconsul to Spain against Sertorius with authority equal to Pius Metellus, Rome’s 
leading citizen. Not yet having entered upon any curule office, he triumphed twice. He took the first steps in 
magistracy from supreme command. He held his third Consulship alone by decree of the senate. He celebrated 
victory over Mithridates and Tigranes, many other kings, and a multitude of communities and nations and pirates 
in a single triumph.” 
124 Val. Max. 9.5.3. “Coming from his bath he left Hypsaeus, who was under prosecution for electoral malpractice, 
a nobleman and a friend, lying at his feet after trampling him with an insult. For he told him that he was doing 
nothing but hold up his (Pompey’s) dinner; and with this speech on his mind he could dine without a qualm.” 
125 Val. Max. 9.5.3. “But even in the Forum he did not blush to ask the jury to acquit his father-in-law P. Scipio 
as a present to himself when Scipio was answerable to the laws that Pompey himself had carried, and that too 
when a great many illustrious defendants were coming to grief.” 
126 Val. Max. 9.5.3. “The blandishments of the nuptial bed made him violate the stability of the commonwealth.” 
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work exemplifies how the misappropriation of evidence affects the portrayal of Pompey and 
how this shapes common perceptions of the past. This is particularly evident with the 
Aduluscentulus Carnifex story, which is routinely cited in modern works out of its context and 
erroneously promoted as a commonly accepted epithet of Pompey. 
 
1.5. Velleius Paterculus 
Marcus Velleius Paterculus (approximately BC 19 - 31 AD) was a Roman historian who lived 
and worked during the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius. His Compendium of Roman History 
consists of two books which cover the dispersion of the Greeks after the fall of Troy to the 
death of Livia in 29. Portions of the first book are missing today, but it was probably a sweeping 
overview of a large time period because the later book of the history, that is the period nearest 
Velleius’ own times, is covered in greater detail and occupies a disproportionately large part 
of the work. 
 
Velleius’ introduction of Pompey is flattering and emphasises Pompey’s innate purity and 
honesty, which was reflected in his physical appearance. In a Roman society preoccupied with 
considerations of physiognomics, a “personal beauty”127 which reflected “the distinction and 
good fortune”128 of his career was a compliment. His personality is further developed by 
positive military129, political, and social interactions130. Velleius is also aware of Pompey’s 
shortcomings, such as displaying less than temperate conduct “when he feared a rival”131, but 
this is countered by subsequent acknowledgements of his forgiveness, loyalty, and restraint in 
regards to abuses of power132. Indeed, “Pompey was free from almost every fault” and Velleius 
stresses that, even his ambition that is elsewhere considered a flaw was excusable in respect to 
Roman political competition133. Nonetheless, this compliment is somewhat backhanded as 
Pompey was unable to accept an equal in a free state134.  
 
                                                 
127 Vell. Pat. 2.29.2. “He was distinguished by a personal beauty, not of the sort which gives the bloom of youth 
its charm, but stately and unchanging, as befitted the distinction and good fortune of his career, and this beauty 
attended him to the last day of his life.” 
128 Vell. Pat. 2.29.2. 
129 Vell. Pat. 2.29.5. “From the day on which he had assumed the toga he had been trained to military service on 
the staff of that sagacious general, his father, and by a singular insight into military tactics had so developed his 
excellent native talent, which showed great capacity to learn what was best, that, while Sertorius bestowed the 
greater praise upon Metellus, it was Pompey he feared the more strongly.” 
130 Vell. Pat. 2.29.3. “… (He was) easily placated when offended, loyal in re-establishing terms of amity, very 
ready to accept satisfaction, never or at least rarely abusing his power…” See also Vell. Pat. 2.18.1. “The 
Mytilenians subsequently had their liberty restored by Pompey solely in consideration of his friendship for 
Theophanes.” 
131 Vell. Pat. 2.29.4. 
132 Vell. Pat. 2.31.4. 
133 Vell. Pat. 2.29.4. “Pompey was free from almost every fault, unless it be considered one of the greatest of faults 
for a man to chafe at seeing anyone his equal in dignity in a free state, the mistress of the world, where he should 
justly regard all citizens as his equals.” 
134 Vell. Pat. 2.29.4. 
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Velleius’ portrayal of Pompey is inconsistent throughout the history. Seager suggests that this 
is perhaps explained by Velleius’ personal interest in Pompey135, as his grandfather had been 
appointed as a juror and also served under Pompey as praefectus fabrum136. Several comments 
throughout Velleius’ work contradict his glowing introduction for Pompey. For example, 
Velleius criticises Pompey’s ruthless ambitiousness upon his assumption of the Eastern 
command137, despite previously excusing this flaw138. He is also inconsistent with remarks 
about Pompey’s popularity. Velleius stresses that Pompey was widely unpopular for attempting 
to steal the triumphs of Lucullus and Metellus139, yet later portrays Pompey as Italy’s foremost 
citizen and an icon who received the entire country’s prayers in hope of his full recovery from 
illness140. Furthermore, Velleius muddles this portrayal by referencing Pompey’s indisputable 
greatness141, as demonstrated by successes in the East142, which thereafter became the source 
of both Lucullus and Metellus’ envy143 and disdain. This, however, contradicts Velleius’ prior 
explanation for Pompey’s political disagreements with Lucullus and Metellus, wherein 
Pompey unjustly attempted to steal their triumphs144. Instead, Pompey is accused of stealing 
Metellus’ captive generals, which was not previously mentioned.  
 
Velleius next references Pompey’s demise at the end of the civil war, wherein he pauses the 
work’s narrative flow to dramatise Pompey’s end. He emphasises the role of fortune in 
                                                 
135 Robin Seager, PAENE OMNIUM VITIORUM EXPERS, NISI…: Velleius on Pompey, in Velleius Paterculus: 
Making History, ed. Eleanor Cowan, Classical Press of Wales (London, 2011), 287. 
136 Vell. Pat. 2.76.1. 
137 Vell. Pat. 2.33.3. “No one was ever more indifferent to other things or possessed a greater craving for glory; 
he knew no restraint in his quest for office, though he was moderate to a degree in the exercise of his powers. 
Entering upon each new office with the utmost eagerness, he would lay them aside with unconcern, and, 
although he consulted his own wishes in attaining what he desired, he yielded to the wishes of others in resigning 
it.” See also: Vell. Pat. 33.2. “The law was passed, and the two commanders began to vie with each other in 
recriminations, Pompey charging Lucullus with his unsavoury greed for money, and Lucullus taunting Pompey 
with his unbounded ambition for military power. Neither could be convicted of falsehood in his charge against 
the other.” 
138 Vell. Pat. 2.29.4.  
See: R. Seager, Velleius on Pompey, 297-8. “The first (narrative technique) is the dislocation between political 
intrigue and military or administrative action, between the way in which a man secures a command or 
magistracy and the way in which he exercises it.” 
139 Vell. Pat. 2.34.2. “Gnaeus Pompeius could not refrain from coveting some of this glory also, and sought to 
claim a share in his victory. But the triumphs, both of Lucullus and of Metellus, were rendered popular in the 
eyes of all good citizens not only by the distinguished merits of the two generals themselves but also by the 
general unpopularity of Pompey.” 
140 Vell. Pat. 2.48.2. “…at the time when he was attacked by a serious illness in Campania and all Italy prayed for 
his safety as her foremost citizen, fortune would have lost the opportunity of overthrowing him and he would 
have borne to the grave unimpaired all the qualities of greatness that had been his in life.” 
141 Vell. Pat. 2.31.1. “The personality of Pompey had now turned the eyes of the world upon itself, and in all things 
he was now regarded as more than a mere citizen.” See also: Vell. Pat. 2.40.2. “Then, after conquering all the 
races in his path, Pompey returned to Italy, having achieved a greatness which exceeded both his own hopes 
and those of his fellow-citizens, and having, in all his campaigns, surpassed the fortune of a mere mortal.” 
142 Vell. Pat. 2.38.6. “Syria and Pontus are monuments to the valour of Gnaeus Pompeius.” 
143 Vell. Pat. 2.40.4-5. “Greatness is never without envy. Pompey met with opposition from Lucullus and from 
Metellus Creticus, who did not forget the slight he had received (indeed he had just cause for complaint in that 
Pompey had robbed him of the captive generals who were to have adorned his triumph).” 
144 Vell. Pat. 2.34.2. 
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Pompey’s fall145, despite subsequently linking Pompey’s defeat to an impulsive decision146 
contrary to the opinions of his peers147. This later amendment highlights Pompey’s vanity. 
Furthermore, he laments how differently Pompey would be perceived had he fallen to illness 
two years prior to his death148. Velleius then reiterates Pompey’s greatness in contrast to his 
unworthy death by the orders of an “Egyptian vassal” (Aegyptium mancipium)149.  
 
Velleius’ history underlines the contested historiographic tradition of Pompey’s character. 
Moreover, it typifies how ancient authors reacted to Pompey’s legacy on a personal level. As 
stated previously, Velleius was particularly interested in Pompey’s character and achievements 
because his grandfather had served him. This consequently affected Velleius’ portrayal of 
Pompey, which was split between eulogy and disparagement. In addition, Velleius’ history has 
shaped modern stylistic approaches to Pompey. His reflective obituary after Pompey’s 
assassination became a prototype for modern scholarship, alongside the sentiment that 
Pompey’s legacy would be different had he died before the civil war.  
 
1.6. Pliny the Elder 
Pliny was a Roman author, naturalist and philosopher who lived during the first century AD. 
His ‘Natural History’ (Naturalis Historiae) is an encyclopaedic work which collected and 
investigated both natural and geographic phenomena. The work includes analyses of 
extraordinary biological phenomena, which extends from anomalies in the animal kingdom to 
noteworthy historical figures that excelled their peers. A relatively long chapter on Pompey’s 
greatness is included, which outlines his success in both the military and political spheres.  
 
The chapter opens with resounding praise for Pompey’s conquests, which concerned the glory 
of the entire Roman Empire. Pliny states that Pompey’s successes not only matched 
Alexander’s in brilliance but even almost those of Hercules and Father Liber150. Pliny 
subsequently outlines Pompey’s other victories in quick succession. These included: the 
“recovery of Sicily” (Sicilia recuperata) and conquest of the “entire African continent” (Africa 
tota subacta), which aided Sulla’s rise to becoming the champion of the Republic; his decisive 
action to crush the potential for civil war in Spain, which earnt him his second triumph as a 
Knight, and was unheralded as he was also commander-in-chief twice before even serving in 
                                                 
145 Vell. Pat. 2.53.1-2. “Such was the inconsistency of fortune in his case, that he who but a short time before had 
found no more lands to conquer now found none for his burial.” 
146 Vell. Pat. 2.52.2. “Then Caesar marched with his army into Thessaly, destined to be the scene of his victory. 
Pompey, in spite of the contrary advice of others, followed his own impulse and set out after the enemy.” 
147 Vell. Pat. 2.52.2. This tradition runs entirely contrary to all other evidence, particularly Plutarch, which 
suggests that Pompey was hindered by his inferiors.  
148 Vell. Pat. 2.48.2. “Had Pompey only died two years before the outbreak of hostilities, after the completion of 
his theatre and the other public buildings with which he had surrounded it, at the time when he was attacked by 
a serious illness in Campania and all Italy prayed for his safety as her foremost citizen, fortune would have lost 
the opportunity of overthrowing him and he would have borne to the grave unimpaired all the qualities of 
greatness that had been his in life.” 
149 Vell. Pat. 2.53.2. 
150 Plin. NH. 7.26.95. 
 
29 
 
the ranks151; before finally receiving two prestigious commands, against the pirates and 
Mithridates respectively, from which he returned with “titles without limit for his country” 
(infinitos retulit patriae titulos152). Pliny’s passage focuses on the sum of Pompey’s successes 
rather than questioning his individual decisions. For example, Pliny is unconcerned by either 
Pompey’s allegiance to Sulla or his decision to execute Carbo, two instances where other 
sources are critical153. Instead, he focuses solely on the breadth of Pompey’s political and 
military achievements. Pliny’s positive portrayal thus suggests that he rejected aspects of the 
anti-Pompeian tradition. This is reinforced by Pliny’s inclusion of a Pompeian text which 
summarises his campaigns and was placed with a dedication at the shrine of Minerva154. Pliny 
offers no criticism of Pompey for his destruction in the East155, in contrast to his criticism of 
Caesar, whose wars were a “wrong inflicted on the human race”156. Moreover, he asserts that 
Pompey deserved greater credit for capturing 846 ships from the pirates than Caesar received 
for his slaughter of the Gauls.157 Pliny’s preference for Pompey is reiterated in the chapter’s 
summarising comments. After citing an extensive list of the places Pompey conquered158, Pliny 
states that Pompey’s crowning achievement was to found Asia, the most remote of Rome’s 
provinces, as an important centre for his power159. He subsequently rejects the pro-Caesarian 
sentiment, which is alluded to by the phrase “anybody on the other side” (si quis e contrario)160, 
that Caesar’s achievements were greater things than Pompey’s. Pliny concedes that Caesar 
appeared superior (qui maior illo apparuit)161 because he won the civil war, but stresses that 
outdoing Pompey’s achievements was a “task without limit” (quod infinitum esse conveniet)162. 
 
Pliny’s Natural History also portrays Pompey positively in other chapters. For example, Pliny 
emphasises Pompey’s respect for both Greek culture and intellectual pursuits in an anecdote 
                                                 
151 Plin. NH. 7.26.96. “…after erecting trophies in the Pyrenees he added to the record of his victorious career the 
reduction under our sway of 876 towns from the Alps to the frontiers of Further Spain, and with greater 
magnanimity refrained from mentioning Sertorius, and after crushing the civil war which threatened to stir up 
all our foreign relations, a second time led into Rome a procession of triumphal chariots as a Knight, having 
twice been commander-in-chief before having ever served in the ranks.” 
152 Plin. NH. 7.26.97. 
153 See: K Welch and H. Mitchell, ‘Revisiting the Roman Alexander’, in Antichthon, Vol. 47 (2013), 80-101. 
154 Plin. NH. 7.26.97. “Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, Commander in Chief, having completed a thirty years war, 
routed, scattered, slain or received the surrender of 12,183,000 people, sunk or taken 846 ships, received the 
capitulation of 1538 towns and forts, subdued the lands from the Maeotians to the Red Sea, duly dedicates his 
offering vowed to Minerva.” 
155 Plin. NH. 7.26.97. “…fusis fugatis occisis in deditionem acceptis hominum centiens viciens semel l͞x͞x͞x͞i͞i͞i͞…” 
156 Plin. NH. 7.25.92. “…for I would not myself count it to his glory that in addition to conquering his fellow-
citizens he killed in his battles 1,192,000 human beings, a prodigious even if unavoidable wrong inflicted on 
the human race, as he himself confessed it to be by not publishing the casualties of the civil wars.” 
157 Plin. NH. 7.25.93. “It would be more just to credit Pompey the Great with the 846 ships that he captured from 
the pirates…”  
158 Plin. NH. 7.26.98. 
159 Plin. NH. 7.26.99. 
160 This may stem from Pompey’s own description of his triumph. 
161 Plin. NH. 7.26.99. 
162 Plin. NH. 7.26.99. 
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concerning the abode of Posidonius – the famous Greek philosopher163. This theme is repeated 
when Pompey rewards Varro, a Roman intellectual, with a naval crown for his exploits in 
war164. This portrayal directly challenges Oppius’ account, as preserved in Plutarch’s Life of 
Pompey165. In this source, Oppius accuses Pompey of executing Quintus Valerius out of envy 
of his immense intellect. Pliny’s account states that Pompey rewarded intellectuals, rather than 
maligning them. 
 
Pliny is hostile to Pompey in book 37 of his Natural History, where he outlines how Pompey’s 
victory over Mithridates made fashion “veer to pearls and gemstones”166. According to Pliny, 
pearls and gems were used to decorate an ornament for Pompey’s triumph over Mithridates, 
including a portrait of Pompey “rendered in pearls”167 which captured his youthful 
handsomeness. However, Pliny detests this extravagant display and adds that pearls were 
“wasteful things meant only for women”168. Moreover, the pearls mar an otherwise noble 
portrait of Pompey and thus symbolise his oriental splendour and vanity. However, Pliny 
concludes that the rest of this triumph was worthy of Pompey, a “good man and true”169. 
 
1.7. Lucan 
Marcus Annaeus Lucanus was born at Corduba in AD 39. His family was highly distinguished 
in Spain and their talents had secured wide recognition and wealth in Rome170. This was 
primarily based around their considerable literary heritage and political influence: Lucan’s 
uncle was the younger Seneca, the son of the elder Seneca. Lucan was brought to Rome at an 
early age and was quickly drawn into Roman social and political life. He shared a relationship 
with the emperor Nero, though the extent of its intimacy is unknown, as Suetonius reports that 
he was recalled from his studies in Athens to become part of Nero’s imperial cohors 
amicorum171. This relationship later soured in AD 64 when Nero forbade Lucan from engaging 
in poetic recitations or advocacy in the law courts172. This ban spelled an end for Lucan’s career 
and was likely imposed as punishment for something Lucan had written and presented publicly 
against Nero. While the details of this period are relatively unclear, Lucan soon afterwards (in 
early AD 65) joined a conspiracy to assassinate Nero. However, the plot was discovered and 
Nero forced the conspirators to either commit suicide or be executed. Lucan committed suicide 
soon afterwards in April AD 65 at the age of 25.  
                                                 
163 Plin. NH. 7.30.112. “Roman leaders also have borne witness even to foreigners. At the conclusion of the war 
with Mithridates Gnaeus Pompey when going to enter the abode of the famous professor of philosophy 
Posidonius forbade his retainer to knock on the door in the customary manner, and the subduer of the East and 
of the West dipped his standard to the portals of learning.” 
164 Plin. NH. 7.30.115. 
165 Plut. Pomp. 10.4. 
166 Plin. NH. 37.6.14. 
167 Plin. NH. 37.6.14. 
168 Plin. NH. 37.6.15. 
169 Plin. NH. 37.6.16. 
170 Frederick M. Ahl, Lucan: An Introduction, Cornell University Press (London, 1976), 36. 
171 Suet. Poet. 332.9-10. 
172 Tac. Ann. 15.49; Cass. Dio. 62.29.4.  
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In the scope of his brief life, Lucan left a large and prodigious literary legacy. References to 
his various works of poetry173 highlight his versatility and industriousness as a writer. The brief 
account of Lucan’s political career, included above, serves two purposes: to stress the influence 
that the political climate had on his literary activity174 and to outline Lucan’s immense talent 
demonstrated by an oeuvre created over five years combined with political activity. 
Unfortunately, only his incomplete Pharsalia, concerning the events of the civil war between 
Caesar and Pompey, survives today. The work is essential for this thesis as it offers a 
fascinating, albeit dramatic, depiction of Pompey. 
 
The poem was composed in dactylic hexameter, known as the metre of epic, though its themes 
and harsh portrayals of several main figures reflect an ‘anti-epic’ sentiment175. Modern scholars 
attribute two contributing factors to this portrayal, agreeing that Livy was Lucan’s primary 
historical source for the events of the war176 and that this shaped the poet’s pro-republican 
outlook177, and, that Lucan’s political career, the oppressive intellectual climate178 and eventual 
personal break with Nero shaped his perception of the principate and Caesar - its antecedent179. 
Lucan’s Pharsalia thus laments the republic’s demise180 and the ensuing tyranny of his times. 
Caesar’s portrayal is accordingly unflattering181, a depiction some modern scholars have 
attempted to refute182. As a result of Lucan’s outlook and perception of the civil war, Pompey’s 
portrayal is relatively positive. However, Leigh correctly asserts that Lucan’s portrayal of 
Pompey is double-edged183. Hence, Lucan’s depiction of Pompey cannot be reduced to rigid 
                                                 
173 Frederick M. Ahl, Lucan: An Introduction, 333. 
174 Frederick M. Ahl, Lucan: An Introduction, 39. “The intensity, compactness, and brevity of Lucan’s experience 
make nonsense of attempts to isolate Lucan the politician from Lucan the poet.”  
175 W.R. Johnson, Momentary Monsters: Lucan and his Heroes, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, 1987). 
176 R. Pichon, Le Sources de Lucain, Ernest Leroux (Paris, 1912), 51-105. 
177 R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy: Books I-V, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1965). For ancient 
perspectives, see Tac. Ann. 4.34. “Titus Livius, pre-eminently famous for eloquence and truthfulness, extolled 
Gnaeus Pompeius in such a panegyric that Augustus called him Pompeianus, and yet this was no obstacle to 
their friendship.” and Sen. Controv. 10. Preface 5. 
178 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.432-48; 7.638-46. 
179 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.641. “All future generations doomed to slavery (under the principate) were conquered by 
those swords (at the battle of Pharsalus).” See also Frederick M. Ahl, Lucan: An Introduction, 49. “But more 
important: his Pharsalia is not about Nero himself. It is an ideological onslaught on Caesarism rather than a 
personal attack on the latest of the Caesars. Clearly generalized attacks on Julius Caesar and the Caesars can 
hardly avoid encompassing Nero.” 
180 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.638-46. 
181 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.592-6. “You will achieve nothing on this occasion though you are aiming for the throat of 
Caesar. For he has not yet attained the pinnacle, the height of human power when everything is crushed beneath 
him.” 
182 Frederick M. Ahl, Lucan: An Introduction, 45. “Both Heitland and Bruère imply that these expressions of 
anger and disgust on Lucan’s part are either irrelevant or nonsensical. If they are right, then Lucan is hardly 
worth reading.” See also: Lucan, Pharsalia, ed. C.E. Haskins, with an introduction by W.E. Heitland, G. Bell 
& Sons (London, 1887), xxxii-xxxiv and R.T. Bruère, ‘The Scope of Lucan’s Historical Epic’, Classical 
Philology 45. (1950), 217-35.  
183 Matthew Leigh, Lucan: Spectacle and Engagement, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1997), 115. “It is therefore 
almost inevitable that, however much one part of Lucan can celebrate the philosophical dignity of Pompey’s 
retreat from ambition, that other part which can never give up the fight should be troubled by a commander who 
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labels that are positive or negative, as these are dishonest to the complexity of the work’s 
subject matter. Two key passages perfectly demonstrate this tension. The first instance occurs 
in book one, where Lucan metaphorically juxtaposes Caesar and Pompey at the commencement 
of the civil war184. The second is found in book seven at the height of the battle sequence when 
Pompey decides to flee the battlefield to save his fellow citizens185.  
 
Book one of Lucan’s Pharsalia is a lengthy introduction to the context of the civil war, its 
causation, and combatants. In its introduction, Lucan outlines Pompey’s persona, 
achievements, and involvement in the civil war, which are all directly contrasted with Caesar. 
Pompey’s portrayal is highly nuanced throughout. He is represented as a weary and aged 
combatant, who had grown accustomed to praise and relied upon his former greatness186. The 
passage of primary concern alludes to Pompey’s vanity, a vice mentioned by the 
aforementioned ancient evidence187. However, Lucan mitigates this vice by outlining 
Pompey’s clear popularity and meritorious achievements188 which, despite being rooted in the 
past, continued to exist nonetheless189. The negative component of this representation was 
guided by Lucan’s source material. As noted previously, Pompey’s vanity was a recurrent 
theme among his contemporaries and Lucan’s literary integrity would be compromised if he 
failed to acknowledge this. However, the rest of this portrayal was governed by retrospection 
and dramatic poetic conventions. With the benefit of hindsight, Lucan knew that Pompey was 
ultimately defeated by Caesar190. He thus established a tragic portrayal of Pompey’s demise 
early in the work, wherein his death symbolizes the end of the republic. This depiction is 
supported by Lucan’s ensuing metaphor, wherein Pompey is likened to an aged oak-tree whose 
roots have lost their toughness and which stands by its weight alone191. Pompey’s enduring 
influence is represented by the bare boughs of the oak-tree which casts a shadow with its trunk, 
a symbol of the tree’s former growth, rather than its leaves – on which its continued survival 
and progress depends192. The metaphor is not, however, one of complete desolation. Lucan 
asserts that the fruits of Pompey’s labours remain, as the oak towers in a fruitful field193. 
Furthermore, he cites Pompey’s enduring influence, whose achievements alone are worshipped 
despite numerous worthy peers194. Pompey’s impending doom is signalled toward the end of 
                                                 
turns his back on the battle and rides away.” See too: W.R. Johnson, Momentary Monsters: Lucan and his 
Heroes, 85. “Lucan’s Pompey is an unintelligible compound of innocence, folly, and bad luck.” 
184 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1. 135-157.  
185 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.647-711. 
186 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.129-35. “The one was somewhat tamed by declining years; for long had he worn the toga and 
forgotten in peace the leader’s part; courting reputation and lavish to the common people, he was swayed 
entirely by the breath of popularity and delighted in the applause that hailed him in the theatre he built; and 
trusting fondly to his former greatness, he did nothing to support it by fresh power.” 
187 Sall. Hist. 3.84; Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.45.6.  
188 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.131-3. “…courting reputation and lavish to the people, he was swayed entirely by the breath 
of popularity and delighted in the applause that hailed him in the theatre he built…” 
189 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.135. “The mere shadow of a mighty name he (Pompey) stood.” 
190 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.129. “The two rivals were ill-matched.”  
191 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.138-9. 
192 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.139-40. 
193 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.138-9. 
194 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.142. 
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the passage, where the oak tree is destined to fall at the first gale195. This line pre-empts 
Caesar’s metaphoric portrayal as a bolt of lightning driven forth by wind through the clouds 
and spreading its destruction far and wide196.  
 
Lucan respects the longevity and grandeur of Pompey’s political and military achievements, 
despite the negative elements of Pompey’s portrayal in book one 197. His decision to represent 
Pompey as an oak-tree alludes to an enduring physical presence which exists in harmony with 
its context. By contrast, Lucan presents Caesar as an overpowering lightning bolt. Whilst a 
powerful phenomenon, it is ephemeral and only brings change through the destruction of its 
surrounds198 and does so with utter indifference to the laws of society and its environs. This 
reading is contrary to W.R. Johnson’s assertion that Lucan was not moralising Caesar or 
Pompey in this metaphor, a statement from which he quickly retreated199. Pompey thus emerges 
from the introduction of Lucan’s Pharsalia with greater positive attributes than negative200, 
contrary to the portrayals of Sallust and Caesar, and roughly agreeing with Cicero’s overall 
conception of Pompey.  
 
As in book one, Pompey figures as a heroic figure in book seven of Lucan’s work. Book seven 
outlines the climax of the civil war, wherein Caesar and Pompey’s forces engage at the battle 
of Pharsalus. It begins with a Pompeian dream sequence. Here Pompey’s greatest source of 
happiness, the joyful lamentations of the multitude201, is contrasted against an allusion to his 
imminent defeat202. This sets the groundwork for the ensuing battle sequence which graphically 
emphasises the horrors of civil war and its consequences203. At a critical moment during the 
battle, Lucan shifts the audience’s perspective from the soldiers to Pompey, which adds further 
dramatic tension to the sequence of events. Here Pompey reflects on the cost of the war and its 
                                                 
195 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.141. 
196 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.143-57. 
197 As cited above, these stemmed in part from Sallust. Lucan’s familiarity with Sallust, possibly through his 
appreciation for Livy, is highlighted by the moral undertones attributed to Rome’s decline at Luc. Bell. Civ. 
1.158-82.  
198 For Lucan’s portrayal of Caesar as a destructive force, see: Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.786-99.  
199 W.R. Johnson, Momentary Monsters: Lucan and his Heroes, Cornell University Press (Ithaca, 1987), 74-5. 
“He (Caesar) is a bolt of lightning destroying whatever happens to be in its way, including, of course, tall oak 
trees. Although there is no suggestion of moralizing here (the lightning is as innocent as the doomed oak), Lucan 
reveals more than a trace of admiration.”  
200 W.R. Johnson completely refutes a positive Pompeian portrayal in: W.R. Johnson, Momentary Monsters: 
Lucan and his Heroes, 67-100.  
201 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.9-12. “He dreamed that he was sitting in his own theatre and saw in a vision the countless 
multitudes of Rome; and that his name was lifted to the sky in their shouts of joy, while all the tiers vied in 
proclaiming his praise.” 
202 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.7-8. “That night, the end of happiness in the life of Magnus, beguiled his troubled sleep with 
a hollow semblance.” 
203 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.617-30. “(Pharsalus) Where a whole world died, it were shame to spend tears upon any of a 
myriad deaths, or to follow the fate of individuals and ask, through whose vitals the death-dealing sword passed, 
who trod upon his own entrails poured out upon the ground, who faced the foe and dying drove out with his last 
gasp the blade buried in his throat… One man pierced a brother’s breast, and then cut off the head and hurled it 
to a distance, that he might be able to rob the kindred corpse, while another mangled his father’s face and tried 
by excess of fury to convince the eye-witnesses that his victim was not his father.” 
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futility204, displaying a highly uncharacteristic nobility and selflessness205. He laments the 
death of his fellow citizens and recoils at their costly sacrifice206, wishing not to draw all things 
into destruction with him207. Pompey finally offers prayer to the gods208 and flees the field of 
battle, not through fear of his enemy, but with courage toward his final doom209. At this critical 
juncture, Lucan offers Pompey resounding praise. He denounces any suggestion of Pompey’s 
loss of dignity after the battle. Instead, he asserts that the ensuing sorrow was what Rome 
deserved from Magnus, whom they had treated so poorly210. Finally, Lucan emphasises 
Pompey’s static countenance. Pompey was unmoved by the battle’s result, as victory had never 
lifted him, nor should defeat ever see him cast down211. Losing the adoration of the people was 
the only path to Pompey’s destruction, and his decision to flee absolved him of this guilt and 
responsibility212. The final portion of this passage completes Pompey’s portrayal as a dramatic 
hero213. He accepts treacherous Fortune’s decision214 and seeks a land suitable for his death215.  
 
Lucan’s conception of victory and defeat throughout this passage subverts traditional norms. 
While most of this representation is explained by the passage’s Pompeian perspective, Lucan 
injects his own opinion in several cases. For instance, he uses rhetorical questions to indicate 
both the advantage Pompey obtained from fleeing216 and the bleakness of Caesar’s task after 
                                                 
204 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.647-711. 
205 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.666-72. “Thus he spoke, and rode round his army and the standards and the troops now 
shattered on every hand, recalling them from rushing upon instant death, and saying that he was not worth the 
sacrifice. He lacked not the courage to confront the words and offer throat or breast to the fatal blow; but he 
feared that, if he lay low, his soldiers would refuse to flee and the whole world would be lain upon the body of 
their leader…” 
206 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.649-53. “Far off on a rising ground he stayed, to see from there the carnage spread through 
the land of Thessaly, which the battle had hidden from his sight; he saw all the missiles aimed at his life, and 
all the prostrate corpses; he saw himself dying with all that bloodshed.” 
207 Luc. Bell. Civ. 654-5. “But he desired not, as the wretched often do, to draw all things in destruction after him 
and make mankind share his ruin.” 
208 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.659-66. 
209 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.677-9. “Thus Magnus rode swiftly from the field, fearing not the missiles behind him but 
moving with high courage to his final doom.” 
210 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.680-2. 
211 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.682-4; Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.708. “The world must bow before Pompey in his misfortune as they 
bowed before his success.” 
212 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.689-91. “Let him flee from the fatal field, and call Heaven to witness that those who continue 
the fight are no longer giving their lives for Pompey.” Luc. Bell. Civ. 7. 693-4. “…so most of the fighting at 
Pharsalia, after Pompey’s departure, ceased to represent the world’s love of Pompey or the passion for war…” 
213 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.207-13. “It may be their own fame that ensures the memory will survive amidst distant races… 
And when these wars are read about, hope, fear, and doomed prayers will still move the readers, and all will be 
shaken as they hear of this destiny as if it is still to come, not a story of the past; and they will still, Great 
Pompey, take your side.” See also Matthew Leigh, Lucan: Spectacle and Engagement, 149. “It is therefore 
worth noting that a consistent feature of Lucan’s narrative is to compromise the constitutional Pompey by 
decking him out in the trappings of epic.” 
214 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.685-6. 
215 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.709-11. 
216 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.698-9. “Is it not happiness to you, Pompey, to have withdrawn defeated from the battle, 
without witnessing that horror to its close?” 
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the war, as necessitated by victory217. Per this representation, Pompey was victorious, as the 
cost of civil war only spells defeat. Lucan openly asserts this toward the end of the passage218. 
This passage of the Pharsalia has been interpreted as a dichotomous representation of Pompey. 
While conceding that Pompey receives some favourable treatment, he also cites the inherent 
tension between Pompey’s heroic portrayal and his decision to flee the battle. To support this 
claim, Pompey’s justification for flight is deemed delusional and counter-intuitive, particularly 
for a general well versed in the arts of Roman warfare. Leigh, for instance, defends this 
standpoint by referencing other moments of devotio in Livy’s history219, which assumes that 
this shaped Lucan’s poem. Leigh raises some valuable issues with Lucan’s heroic Pompey, 
which diminishes a positive reading of Pompey. However, his argument ignores Lucan’s 
humanising representation of Pompey which extends far beyond his capabilities as a general. 
Thus, Lucan does not deny Pompey’s failure as a military commander at Pharsalus. Rather, he 
re-evaluates the civil war and its climactic moment to challenge Caesar’s reading of the civil 
war. Pompey’s demise is thus explained by both Fortune’s unavoidable decision to turn against 
him, as even Pompey could not avoid Fortune’s decisions, and he is redeemed by the moral 
victory he won by rejecting civil war and its worst horrors.  
 
Regarding the other ancient evidence, Lucan’s heroic Pompey, who fled the field of battle to 
save his people in an act of devotio, stands in direct contrast to that provided by Caesar220. In 
Caesar’s account, Pompey’s flight is cowardly and exhibits disloyalty to his troops. This is 
hardly surprising given the context of Caesar’s remarks. The contrast between the two 
representations highlights how each narrative is governed by its author’s perspective. Lucan 
lived and worked under the constraints of Nero’s principate and envisaged freedom’s demise 
coinciding with Caesar’s rise. Consequently, he did not base his Pharsalia on Caesar’s 
commentaries. Instead, he utilised Livy’s Roman history, wherein Pompey received a 
favourable portrayal. Lucan thus sculpted Pompey as his work’s tragic hero, albeit one marred 
by flaws221.  
 
While Lucan’s portrayal of Pompey does not match others from antiquity, his characterisation 
of Pompey sheds light on several Pompeian traits otherwise lost. Pompey is portrayed as 
selfless, emotive, and passionate throughout the Pharsalia; traits lacking among the 
representation in either Caesar or Sallust. Most modern scholars either dismiss this portrayal 
altogether or identify it as a product of Lucan’s imagination. This is a harsh treatment which 
seeks to justify anti-Pompeian perspectives. Unsurprisingly, there are few scholars who accept 
                                                 
217 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.699-702. “Look back on the ranks reeking with carnage, and the rivers darkened by the inrush 
of blood, and then pity your kinsman. With what feelings will he enter Rome, owing his good fortune to yonder 
field?” 
218 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.706. “…victory was worse than defeat”  
219 Matthew Leigh, Lucan: Spectacle and Engagement, 125-34. 
220 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.94.5. “As for Pompey, when he saw his cavalry routed and realized that the unit he trusted 
most was terrified, having no confidence in the rest he left the line and rode immediately to his camp.” 
221 Modern scholars often impose a particularly negative reading of Lucan’s Pompey. See: W.R. Johnson, 
Momentary Monsters, 72. “Yet he (Pompey) has his own vice, which is as fatal to freedom as the lust for tyranny 
or the venom of self-righteousness: he is stupid from small vanities and from indolence. He is complacent; he 
wants only popularity, comfort, and calm. He is, in short, supremely banal…” 
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the positive elements of Pompey’s portrayal in the Pharsalia. Cicero, for example, offers 
elements of Lucan’s portrayal in his letters, though these are counterbalanced by his negative 
portrayal of Pompey at other times. The greatest issue is that the relevant passages of Livy, 
which we know were favourable to Pompey, are lost. Should these have survived, modern 
readings of Lucan would undoubtedly be different. Irrespective of these issues, Lucan’s 
portrayal of Pompey indicates that a favourable tradition existed and that this gained traction 
during Nero’s principate. 
 
1.8. Quintilian 
Marcus Fabius Quintillianus was a Roman rhetorician from the province of Hispania who lived 
during the first century AD. His only surviving work is the ‘Institutes of Oratory’ (Institutio 
Oratoria) which is a twelve-volume textbook on the theory and practice of rhetoric, and 
includes references to Quintilian’s education and development as an orator.  
 
Quintilian mentions Pompey several times throughout the work. He references Pompey’s 
oratorical abilities, stating that he exhibited the oratorical eloquence of a general or triumphant 
conqueror and was “a very eloquent narrator of his own deeds” (sicut Pompeius abunde 
disertus rerum suarum narrator222). This opposes other ancient evidence which states, or which 
modern readers have interpreted to suggest, that Pompey was a mediocre orator223. 
 
Quintilian also passingly comments on Pompey’s position during the civil war. The passage 
concerns Tubero, a man who accuses Ligarius of fighting against Caesar’s cause, despite 
himself also being guilty of these charges – his father fought on the Pompeian side. Quintilian 
mentions Pompey when explaining the war’s broader context. He states that Pompey and 
Caesar were engaged in a contest for personal status and that each believed they were acting to 
preserve the state224. Although brief, Quintilian’s comment highlights that each side 
promulgated justifications for the civil war, and that neither was more convincing225. 
 
1.9. Sextus Julius Frontinus  
Sextus Julius Frontinus was a distinguished Roman senator who lived in the late first century 
AD. He held several importance offices, including the governorship of Britain and the Water 
Commissioner of the Aqueducts (curator Aquarum), which exhibit his high social standing. He 
also wrote several works, the chief being ‘The Aqueducts of Rome’ (De Aquis Urbis Romae 
Libri II) which was an official report to the Emperor on the state of the aqueducts in Rome. 
                                                 
222 Quint. Inst. 11.1.36. “Some things are becoming for rulers, which one would not allow in others. The eloquence 
of generals and triumphant conquerors is to some extent a thing apart; thus Pompey was a very eloquent narrator 
of his own deeds…” 
223 Cic. Att. 2.21.4. (SB 41). See also: Vell. Pat. 2.29.2-3. “He was a man of exceptional purity of life, of great 
uprightness of character, of but moderate oratorical talent…” 
224 Quint. Inst. 11.1.80. “Tubero says that he went as a young man accompanying his father, who had been sent 
by the senate not to make war but to buy corn, and abandoned their side as soon as he could, whereas Ligarius 
stayed there, and took the side not of Pompey (whose struggle against Caesar was for personal status, because 
both of them wished to preserve the state)” 
225 This likely originates from Cic. leg. Man. 
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Moreover, Frontinus wrote a theoretical treatise on military science, which is lost, and the 
‘Stratagems’ (Strategemata), which is a collection of military stratagems from Greek and 
Roman history that informed generals on sound military conduct. The last text frequently 
references Pompey’s campaigns, successes, and defeats. Importantly, it also references earlier 
histories, for example Livy226, as source material, which illustrates Frontinus’ interaction with 
the wider corpus of available historical evidence.  
 
Frontinus references Pompey on fifteen occasions throughout the Stratagems. These form a 
generally positive depiction of Pompey’s military capabilities and generalship. Eight of the 
fifteen passages refer to successful military encounters227, including Pompey’s conduct in 
Spain228, in the East229, and during the civil war230. These demonstrate Pompey’s sound 
                                                 
226 Frontin. Strat. 2.5.31. “According to Livy, ten thousand men were lost in Pompey’s army, along with the entire 
transport” 
227 Frontin. Strat. 2.2.14. “When Gnaeus Pompey was fighting in Albania, and the enemy were superior in numbers 
and in cavalry, he directed his infantry to cover their helmets, in order to avoid being visible in consequence of 
the reflection, and to take their place in a defile by a hill. Then he commanded his cavalry to advance on the 
plain and to act as a screen to the infantry, but to withdraw at the first onset of the enemy, and, as soon as they 
reached the infantry, to disperse to the flanks. When this manoeuvre had been executed, suddenly the force of 
infantry rose up, revealing its position, and pouring with unexpected attack upon the enemy who were heedlessly 
bent on pursuit, thus cut them to pieces.” 
228 Frontin. Strat. 2.5.32. “Pompey, when warring in Spain, having first posted troops here and there to attack from 
ambush, by feigning fear, drew the enemy on in pursuit, till they reached the place of the ambuscade. Then 
when the opportune moment arrived, wheeling about, he slaughtered the foe in front and on both flanks, and 
likewise captured their general, Perperna.”  
229 Frontin. Strat. 2.1.12. “Gnaeus Pompey, desiring to check the flight of Mithridates and force him to battle, 
chose night as the time for the encounter, arranging to block his march as he withdrew. Having made his 
preparations accordingly, he suddenly forced his enemy to fight. In addition to this, he so drew up his force that 
the moonlight falling in the faces of the Pontic soldiers blinded their eyes, while it gave his own troops a distinct 
and clear view of the enemy.” Frontin. Strat. 2.2.2. “In Cappadocia Gnaeus Pompey chose a lofty site for his 
camp. As a result the elevation so assisted the onset of his troops that he easily overcame Mithridates by the 
sheer weight of his assault.” Frontin. Strat. 2.5.33. “The same Pompey, in Armenia, when Mithridates was 
superior to him in the number and quality of his cavalry, stationed three thousand light-armed men and five 
hundred cavalry by night in a valley under cover of bushes lying between the two camps. Then at daybreak he 
sent forth his cavalry against the position of the enemy, planning that, as soon as the full force of the enemy, 
cavalry and infantry, became engaged in battle, the Romans should gradually fall back, still keeping ranks, until 
they should afford room to those who had been stationed for the purpose of attacking from the rear to arise and 
do so. When this design turned out successfully, those who had seemed to flee turned about, enabling Pompey 
to cut to pieces the enemy thus caught in panic between his two lines. Our infantry also, engaging in hand-to-
hand encounter, stabbed the horses of the enemy. That battle destroyed the faith which the king had reposed in 
his cavalry.” Frontin. Strat. 2.11.2. “Gnaeus Pompey, suspecting the Chaucensians and fearing that they would 
not admit a garrison, asked that they would meanwhile permit his invalid soldiers to recover among them. Then, 
sending his strongest men in the guise of invalids, he seized the city and held it.” 
230 Frontin. Strat. 1.5.5. “When Gnaeus Pompey at Brundisium had planned to leave Italy and to transfer the war 
to another field, since Caesar was heavy on his heels, just as he was on the point of embarking, he placed 
obstacles in some roads; others he blocked by constructing walls across them; others he intersected with 
trenches, setting sharp stakes in the latter, and laying hurdles covered with earth across the openings. Some of 
the roads leading to the harbour he guarded by throwing beams across and piling them one upon another in a 
huge heap. After consummating these arrangements, wishing to produce the appearance of intending to retain 
possession of the city, he left a few archers as a guard on the walls; the remainder of his troops he led out in 
good order to the ships. Then, when he was under way, the archers also withdrew by familiar roads, and overtook 
him in small boats.” See also: Frontin. Strat. 3.17.4. “Gnaeus Pompey, when besieged near Dyrrhachium, not 
only released his own men from blockade, but also made a sally at an opportune time and place; for just as 
Caesar was making a fierce assault on a fortified position surrounded by a double line of works, Pompey, by 
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judgement as a general and his ability to use the surrounding environment to his advantage. 
However, some of these passages also exhibit traits which may be deemed negative. Pompey’s 
cunningness, for example, is evident in his distrust toward the Chaucensians, whose city he 
deceptively seized to ensure the safety of his army. While some of the ancient evidence is 
critical of Pompey’s deceptive nature231, which continues into the modern discourse, Frontinus 
does not frame Pompey in this light. He instead focuses on Pompey’s successes, ensuring that 
the end always justified the means. 
 
Three other references exhibit Pompey’s control over his troops232 and strict discipline233, 
which further highlight his qualities as a commander and ability to relate to the common 
soldier. Thus, eleven of the fifteen passages portray Pompey favourably. 
 
Of the remaining four passages, one fleetingly mentions Pompey’s conduct in Spain. It relates 
Metellus’ conduct in Spain against Sertorius, wherein he withdrew from battle out of fear of 
Sertorius’ army. Frontinus comments that Pompey was likewise forced to retreat because only 
their joint forces could challenge Sertorius234. It thus reveals little about Pompey’s nature, 
beyond his awareness of the stakes against Sertorius.  
 
The three remaining passages outline Pompeian defeats. In the first instance, Pompey is 
outsmarted by Sertorius and convincingly defeated235. Frontinus emphasises the defeat’s 
importance to the war alongside the casualties sustained by the Pompeian forces. This is the 
                                                 
this sortie, so enveloped him with a cordon of troops that Caesar incurred no slight peril and loss, caught, as he 
was, between those whom he was besieging and those who had surrounded him from the outside.” 
231 See Tac. Hist. 2.38; Val. Max. 5.3.5.  
232 Frontin. Strat. 1.4.8. “When Gnaeus Pompey on one occasion was prevented from crossing a river because the 
enemy’s troops were stationed on the opposite bank, he adopted the device of repeatedly leading his troops out 
of camp and back again. Then, when the enemy were at last tricked into relaxing their watch on the roads in 
front of the Roman advance, he made a sudden dash and effected a crossing.” 
233 Frontin. Strat. 1.9.3. “When the senate of Milan had been massacred by Pompey’s troops, Pompey, fearing 
that he might cause a mutiny if he should call out the guilty alone, ordered certain ones who were innocent to 
come interspersed among the others. In this way the guilty came with less fear, because they had not been 
singled out, and so did not seem to be sent for in consequence of any wrong-doing; while those whose 
conscience was clear kept watch on the guilty, lest by the escape of these the innocent should be disgraced.” 
Frontin. Strat. 4.5.1. “When the soldiers of Gnaeus Pompey threatened to plunder the money which was being 
carried for the triumph, Servilius and Glaucia urged him to distribute it among the troops, in order to avoid the 
outbreak of a mutiny. Thereupon Pompey declared he would forgo a triumph, and would die rather than yield 
to the insubordination of his soldiers; and after upbraiding them in vehement language, he threw in their faces 
the fasces wreathed with laurel, that they might start their plundering by seizing these. Through the odium thus 
aroused he reduced his men to obedience.” 
234 Frontin. Strat. 2.1.3. “When the same Metellus had joined forces with Pompey against Sertorius in Spain, and 
had repeatedly offered battle, the enemy declined combat, deeming himself unequal to two. Later on, however, 
Metellus, noticing that the soldiers of the enemy, fired with great enthusiasm, were calling for battle, baring 
their arms, and brandishing their spears, thought it best to retreat betimes before their ardour. Accordingly he 
withdrew and caused Pompey to do the same.” 
235 Frontin. Strat. 2.5.31. “When Pompey led out his entire army to help the legion, Sertorius exhibited his forces 
drawn up on the hillside, and thus baulked Pompey’s purpose. Thus, in addition to inflicting a twofold disaster, 
as a result of the same strategy, Sertorius forced Pompey to be the helpless witness of the destruction of his own 
troops. This was the first battle between Sertorius and Pompey. According to Livy, ten thousand men were lost 
in Pompey’s army, along with the entire transport.” 
 
39 
 
closest to criticism that Frontinus offers throughout the work. The second reference highlights 
Pompey’s failed siege of Asculum, wherein the inhabitants deceived the Romans and 
subsequently put them to flight236. Finally, the third passage comments on Pompey’s defeat at 
Pharsalus from Caesar’s perspective237. It explains Caesar’s ingenious subversion of Pompey’s 
superiority in cavalry, which ultimately won the battle.  
 
Frontinus is not critical of Pompey’s decisions, even when they lead to failure. The passages 
instead focus on the ingenuity of the victor, rather than the errors of the defeated, thereby 
embodying Frontinus’ intention – to highlight exemplary generalship throughout history. In 
doing so, Pompey’s failures are not explicitly criticised.  
 
1.10. Tacitus 
Tacitus was a Roman historian and senator who wrote extensively about the early imperial 
period, covering the period from Augustus to the Jewish wars. His two most significant works 
are the ‘Histories’ (Historiae) and the ‘Annals’ (Ab Excessu Divi Augusti), which survive with 
several significant lacunae. These only briefly mention Pompey because they focus on later 
periods of Roman history. It should be noted that Tacitus’ sparse writing style allows for 
significant creative licence with modern translators. As a result, certain aspects of the ensuing 
translations stretch the bounds of Tacitus’ Latin. 
 
Tacitus first references Pompey in his Histories, during a tirade against the decline of Roman 
virtues and character at the end of the Republican period. He conjures a dystopian outlook 
through selective vocabulary and rolling verses of negativity238, citing the defeat of Rome’s 
greatest military threats as the foundation for its moral demise239. Thereafter he cites a list of 
tyrannical dissidents, beginning with Marius “who had sprung from the dregs of the people”240 
(mox e plebe infirma), and followed by Sulla “the most cruel of nobles that defeated liberty 
with arms and turned it (the Republic) into a tyranny”241. These precedents foreshadow 
Pompey’s introduction, wherein Tacitus uses the comparative to emphasise Pompey’s amoral 
character. He states that Pompey was no better than these men, but concealed his true nature 
                                                 
236 Frontin. Strat. 3.17.8. “As Pompey was about to assault the town of Asculum, the inhabitants exhibited on the 
ramparts a few aged and feeble men. Having thus thrown the Romans off their guard, they made a sortie and 
put them to flight.” 
237 Frontin. Strat. 4.7.32. “Since in the army of Pompey there was a large force of Roman cavalry, which by its 
skill in arms wrought havoc among the soldiers of Gaius Caesar, the latter ordered his troops to aim with their 
swords at the faces and eyes of the enemy. He thus forced the enemy to avert their faces and retire.” 
238 Tac. Hist. 2.38. “The old greed for power, long ingrained in mankind, came to full growth and broke bounds 
as the empire became great. …men were free to covet (concupiscere) wealth without anxiety, then the first 
quarrels between patricians and plebeians broke out. Now the tribunes made trouble (turbulenti), again the 
consuls usurped too much power (modo consules praevalidi); in the city and forum the first essays at civil war 
were made.” Trans. Clifford Moore. 
239 Tac. Hist. 2.38. “When resources were moderate, equality was easily maintained; but when the world had been 
subjugated and rival states or kings destroyed, so that men were free to covet wealth without anxiety, then the 
first quarrels between patricians and plebeians broke out.” 
240 Tac. Hist. 2.38. 
241 Tac. Hist. 2.38. “…et nobilium saevissimus L. Sulla victam armis libertatem in dominationem verterunt.” 
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more cleverly (Post quos Cn. Pompeius occultior non melior242). Tacitus thus insinuates that 
Pompey was like his power-mongering predecessors, only sneakier, and was consequently the 
worst of a bad group. Tacitus’ comment also references Pompey’s vanity and feigned 
contentment in the absence of commands and power. This tradition is commonly cited, as 
illustrated by the later works of Plutarch243 and Appian244. Within these narratives, Pompey 
avoided appearing over-ambitious and maintained a reserved distance from leadership, wishing 
to receive commands if contemporaries conferred them onto him. Pompey thus concealed his 
true purpose, the desire to hold supreme power, to escape allegations of aspiring to a 
dictatorship.  
 
Tacitus also briefly references Pompey in the Annals. While outlining the succession of sole 
power in the late republic period, Tacitus comments that Pompey and Crassus’ powers were 
quickly yielded, or in some translations ‘forfeited’, to Caesar245. This is a dismissive remark 
which understates Pompey’s importance. Tacitus’ comment fits into an outline of the rapid 
transition of power through the late republic and into the imperial period, which stresses the 
transitory nature of this period, and insinuates that the vanquished were inferior246. It is thus 
laden with negative intentions and actively diminishes Pompey’s significance.  
 
1.11. Suetonius 
Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus was a Roman historian of the equestrian order, who wrote during 
the early imperial period. He began his career as a teacher of rhetoric, but later served as the 
emperor Hadrian’s private secretary. His most famous work was the Lives of the Caesars, 
which was a collection of biographies about Rome’s first emperors and their progenitor: Julius 
Caesar. His Lives are filled with anecdotes and the gossip of the imperial court and thus 
preserve an invaluable perspective for the early imperial period.  
 
Pompey features in the ‘Life of the Deified Julius’ (Divus Iulius), primarily as Caesar’s 
triumviral partner and eventual adversary in the civil war. Suetonius’ comments about Pompey 
are brief and usually inform his audience of Caesar’s wider political context. Therefore, there 
is no reference to Pompey’s early career or political successes, because these did not relate to 
Caesar. Furthermore, Suetonius routinely emphasises the political primacy of Caesar 
throughout his Life, which relegates Pompey to a position of secondary influence. For example, 
Suetonius first references Pompey during the formation of the ‘triumvirate’. He states that 
Caesar formed the ‘triumvirate’ after being slighted by the senate, who wouldn’t allow him a 
command in the provinces. He thus courted the goodwill of Pompey, who was also at odds 
                                                 
242 Tac. Hist. 2.38. “After them came Gnaeus Pompey, no better man than they, but one who concealed his purpose 
more cleverly…” 
243 Plut. Pomp. 30.6.  
244 App. Bell. Civ. 2.3.20. Trans. H. White. 
245 Tac. Ann. 1.1. “…Pompey and Crassus quickly forfeited their power to Caesar…” (et Pompei Crassique 
potentia cito in Caesarem cessere) Trans. C.H. Moore and J. Jackson. 
246 Tac. Ann. 1.1. “Neither Cinna nor Sulla created a lasting despotism: Pompey and Crassus quickly forfeited 
their power to Caesar, and Lepidus and Antony their swords to Augustus.” (non Cinnae, non Sullae longa 
dominatio; et Pompei Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere...) 
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with the senate for not ratifying his acts after his return from the East, for his own benefit. 
Furthermore, Caesar mended Pompey’s relationship with Crassus and made a compact with 
each, which stated that no step should be taken unless it suited all three men247. Suetonius 
subsequently highlights Pompey’s importance with Caesar’s decision to promote him to the 
first speaker in the Senate house, a privilege which previously belonged to Crassus248. 
Suetonius again portrays Caesar as the driving political force in Rome, when he compelled 
(conpulit) Pompey and Crassus to confer with him in Luca249. Caesar thus succeeded in his 
political aims, whereby he was granted a five year extension to his proconsulship in Gaul.  
 
Suetonius’ description of the civil war is favourable for Pompey. He does not criticise 
Pompey’s political oversight in 52, wherein he passed a law forcing candidates for elections to 
appear at Rome, but in the clause whereby he excluded absentees from candidacy for office he 
had forgotten to make a special exception in Caesar’s case. Suetonius states that Pompey 
hereafter corrected this, but only after the law had been inscribed on a bronze tablet and 
deposited in the treasury250. Furthermore, he is not cynical of Pompey’s motives. Suetonius 
subsequently focuses on Caesar’s will to ultimate power; as Caesar already believed himself 
the first man in the state251, and had wished for despotism his entire life252. Pompey’s motives 
aren’t mentioned in the text. Suetonius, however, does record his opinion of Caesar prior to the 
civil war, wherein he stated that Caesar’s means were insufficient and that he desired a state of 
                                                 
247 Suet. Caes. 19.2. “Thereupon Caesar, especially incensed by this slight, by every possible attention courted the 
goodwill of Gnaeus Pompeius, who was at odds with the senate because of its tardiness in ratifying his acts after 
his victory over king Mithridates. He also patched up a peace between Pompeius and Marcus Crassus, who had 
been enemies since their consulship, which had been one of constant wrangling. Then he made a compact with 
both of them, that no step should be taken in public affairs which did not suit any one of the three.” Trans. J.C. 
Rolfe. 
248 Suet. Caes. 21. “And after this new alliance he began to call upon Pompey first to give his opinion in the senate, 
although it had been his habit to begin with Crassus, and it was the rule for the consul in calling for opinions to 
continue throughout the year the order which he had established on the Kalends of January.” 
249 Suet. Caes. 24.1. “Caesar compelled Pompeius and Crassus to come to Luca, a city in his province, where he 
prevailed on them to stand for a second consulship, to defeat Domitius; and he also succeeded through their 
influence in having his term as governor of Gaul made five years longer.” 
250 Suet. Caes. 28. “…since Pompeius subsequent action [i.e., in correcting the bill after it had been passed and 
filed, as explained in the following sentence] had not annulled the decree of the people. And it was true that 
when Pompeius proposed a bill touching the privileges of officials, in the clause where he debarred absentees 
from candidacy for office he forgot to make a special exception in Caesar’s case, and did not correct the 
oversight until the law had been inscribed on a tablet of bronze and deposited in the treasury.” 
251 Suet. Caes. 29. “Greatly troubled by these measures, and thinking, as they say he was often heard to remark, 
that now that he was the leading man of the state, it was harder to push him down from the first place to the 
second than it would be from the second to the lowest…” 
252 Suet. Caes. 30. “It was openly said too that if he was out of office on his return, he would be obliged, like Milo 
[who had been accused and tried for the murder of Publius Clodius], to make his defence in a court hedged 
about by armed men. The latter opinion is the more credible one in view of the assertion of Asinius Pollio, that 
when Caesar at the battle of Pharsalus saw his enemies slain or in flight, he said, word for word: “They would 
have it so. Even I, Gaius Caesar, after so many great deeds, should have been found guilty, if I had not turned 
to my army for help.” Some think that habit had given him a love of power, and that weighing the strength of 
his adversaries against his own, he grasped the opportunity of usurping the despotism which had been his heart’s 
desire from early youth.” 
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general unrest and turmoil253. The first comment may have been a miscalculation on Pompey’s 
behalf, but the second comment proved true by the ensuing political turmoil in Rome. 
  
Suetonius’ closing comments about Pompey are underwhelming in their brevity. The events of 
the civil war are summarised in the space of a few paragraphs, while the battle of Pharsalus is 
mentioned in a mere sentence. He mentions that Caesar travelled to Macedonia and blockaded 
Pompey for four months before finally routing him at Pharsalus. The vanquished then travelled 
to Egypt and was slain254. The passage is unceremonious, as Suetonius was not interested in 
outlining the political and military history of the period. He instead perpetuated a sense of 
Caesar’s character, which was not necessarily defined by his great military exploits.  
 
1.12. Lucius Annaeus Florus 
Lucius Annaeus Florus was a Roman historian who lived during the reigns of Trajan and 
Hadrian (AD 98-138). Little is known about Florus’ personal life and career. Consequently, he 
is often identified as Publius Annius Florus, the Roman poet, rhetorician, and friend of Hadrian. 
Florus’ surviving history, Epitome of Roman History, provides a brief sketch of Roman history 
from the founding of the city to the closing of the temple of Janus (25 BC) and is based on 
Livy’s history - the full title being: The Two Books of the Epitome, Extracted from Titus Livius, 
of All the Wars of Seven Hundred Years (Epitomae De Tito Livio Bellorum Omnium Annorum 
DCC Libri II). The work is written in rhetorical style as a panegyric to Rome’s greatness and 
its representation of Rome’s past is thus frequently exaggerated. As well as this, it frequently 
contains chronological errors, which further diminish the work’s integrity as unquestionable 
historic evidence. Despite these flaws, the history preserves several important references to 
Pompey, particularly in relation to his campaigns in the East and against the pirates. Florus 
employs a confusing chronological order throughout the work, which reflects Appian’s 
approach, and places Pompey’s commands against the pirates and Mithridates in book one, 
before his efforts in the Sullan civil war, against Sertorius in Spain, and the civil war against 
Caesar in book two. He thus separates the history between wars fought against foreign enemies 
and those fought against Roman commanders. Rather than follow this thematic framework, 
this chapter will discuss Pompey’s representation according to the chronological order of his 
commands.  
 
Florus’ commentary on the Marian Civil War is long, but only alludes to Pompey’s 
involvement once. Florus references Carbo’s insulting end (ludibrio fata – fata is in the plural 
because it refers to both Carbo and Soranus) at the chapter’s conclusion, though abstains from 
giving further detail because it would be ‘tedious’ (longum) after relating so miserable a civil 
                                                 
253 Suet. Caes. 30. “Gnaeus Pompeius used to declare that since Caesar’s own means were not sufficient to 
complete the works which he had planned, nor to do all that he had led the people to expect on his return, he 
desired a state of general unrest and turmoil.” 
254 Suet. Caes. 35. “Returning thence to Rome, he crossed into Macedonia, and after blockading Pompeius for 
almost four months behind mighty ramparts, finally routed him in the battle at Pharsalus, followed him in his 
flight to Alexandria, and when he learned that his rival had been slain, made war on King Ptolemy…” 
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war255. While Florus does not mention Pompey, he acknowledges that Carbo’s end was 
insulting, thereby illustrating awareness of the criticism Pompey received for executing Carbo.  
 
The Sertorian war is given little attention in Florus’ history. It is situated after Florus’ account 
of the Sullan civil war and was deemed an inheritance from the Sullan proscriptions256. Florus 
mentions Pompey twice throughout the brief chapter. Firstly, he comments that Pompey was 
sent to assist Metellus. The ensuing passage lacks flattery because Florus recognises Sertorius’ 
ability as a general, which resulted in an extended struggle for victory257 and entailed several 
military disasters258. Furthermore, he hints that Pompey and Metellus’ victory was only 
accomplished because Sertorius was treacherously murdered by his followers259. However, 
Florus admits that both generals forced this political outcome with their attrition tactics 
whereby one laid the country to waste while the other destroyed its cities260.  
 
In the passage concerning the Mithridatic war, Florus emphasises Mithridates’ political and 
military significance as a threat to Rome’s expanding empire in a rhetorical and laudatory 
manner. Mithridates is cited as the greatest of Pontus’ rulers, who resisted Roman domination 
for forty years until “he was brought to nought by the good fortune of Sulla, the valour of 
Lucullus and the might of Pompeius.”261 Pompey is thus recognised as the final victor over 
Rome’s greatest military threat. More importantly, Florus does not mention the political dispute 
between Lucullus and Pompey over the accession of the command. He subsequently outlines 
the details of the military campaign, focusing on Pompey’s good fortune262 in the battle which 
saw Mithridates’ final defeat263. Florus then summarises Pompey’s other Eastern exploits, 
                                                 
255 Flor. Epit. 2. 21.9.26. “It would be tedious after this to relate the insulting end of Carbo and Soranus…” 
(Longum post haec referre ludibrio habita fata Carbonis et Sorani…) Trans. E.S. Forster. 
256 Flor. Epit. 2. 22.10.1. “What was the war with Sertorius except an inheritance from the Sullan proscription?” 
257 Flor. Epit. 2. 22.10.6. “The fighting continued for a long time, always with doubtful result; and his defeat was 
due not so much to operations in the field as to the crime and treachery of his own followers.” 
258 Flor. Epit. 2. 22.10.7. “The first engagements were fought by lieutenant-generals, Domitius and Thorius 
commencing operations on one side and the Hirtulei on the other. After the defeat of the latter at Segovia and 
of the former at the River Ana, the generals (Pompey and Metellus) themselves tried their strength in combat 
and suffered equal disasters at Lauro and Sucro.” 
259 Flor. Epit. 2. 22.10.6. “Gnaeus Pompeius was therefore sent to help Metellus. They wore down his forces, 
pursuing him over almost the whole of Spain. The fighting continued for a long time, always with doubtful 
result; and his defeat was due not so much to operations in the field as to the crime and treachery of his own 
followers.” 
260 Flor. Epit. 2. 22.10.8-9. “Then one army devoting itself to laying waste the country and the other to the 
destruction of the cities, unhappy Spain was punished for Rome’s quarrels at the hands of the Roman generals, 
until, after Sertorius had been brought low by treachery in his own camp and Perperna had been defeated and 
given up, the cities also of Osca, Termes, Ulia, Valentia, Auxuma and Calagurris (the last after suffering all the 
extremities of starvation) themselves entered in allegiance with Rome. Thus Spain was restored to peace.” 
261 Flor. Epit. 1. 40.5.1-3. “inde Mithridates, omnium longe maximus. Quippe cum quattuor Pyrrho, tredecim anni 
Annibali suffecerint, ille per quadraginta annos restitit, donec tribus ingentibus bellis subactus felicitate Sullae, 
virtute Luculli, magnitudine Pompei consumeretur.” 
262 Flor. Epit. 1. 40.5.22. “…and coming up with the king as he was fleeing through the middle of Armenia, 
defeated him, with his usual good luck (quanta felicitas viri), in a single battle.” 
263 Flor. Epit. 1. 40.5.23-4. “…and the moon took sides in it (the battle); for when the goddess, as if fighting on 
Pompeius side, had placed herself behind the enemy and facing the Romans, the men of Pontus aimed at their 
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wherein he pacified the restless remnants of Asia: defeating the Armenians and Iberians, 
pardoning the Albanians, passing undisturbed through Syria, and finally defeating the Jews264. 
The fast-paced narration emphasises the decisiveness and swiftness of Pompey’s victories. 
Finally, Florus summarises these successes and directly attributes them to Pompey. He also 
refers to Pompey’s notable and lasting reorganisation of these provinces265.  
 
Florus’ subsequent chapter, ‘The war against the Pirates’ (Bellum Piraticum), erroneously 
places Pompey’s command against the pirates after that of Mithridates266. This is 
chronologically incorrect. The Gabinian law, which granted Pompey his command against the 
Pirates, was passed in 67BC, while the Manilian law, which granted Pompey the Mithridatic 
command, was passed the following year. Despite this glaring error, Florus offers a flattering 
account of Pompey’s campaign. He stresses the monumentality of Pompey’s task, which was 
achieved in forty days267 - a superhuman (divino quodam) effort by any standards268. 
Importantly, Florus does not solely attribute this victory to fortune, but also praises Pompey’s 
generalship and clemency269. Finally, he mentions Pompey’s disagreement with Metellus, who 
was then proconsul of Crete, over the surrender of the Cretans to Pompey in 67. The account 
lacks context and ignores the political hostility between the two commanders, but rightly 
concludes with Metellus’ decision to ignore Pompey’s demand270. In sum, Florus’ depiction of 
this dispute is more positive than in other accounts271.  
                                                 
own unusually long shadows, thinking that they were the bodies of their foes. That night saw the final defeat of 
Mithridates; for he never again effected anything…” 
264 Flor. Epit. 1. 40.5.30. “The Jews attempted to defend Jerusalem; but this also he entered and saw the great 
secret of that impious nation laid open to view, the heavens beneath a golden vine.” 
265 Flor. Epit. 1. 40.5.31. “Thus the Roman people, under the leadership of Pompeius, traversed the whole of Asia 
in its widest extent and made what had been the furthest province into a central province;2 for with the exception 
of the Parthians, who preferred to make a treaty, and the Indians, who as yet knew nothing of us, all Asia 
between the Red and Caspian Seas and the Ocean was in our power, conquered or overawed by the arms of 
Pompeius.” 
266 Flor. Epit. 1. 41.6.7. “Cilicia was, therefore, deemed worthy of being conquered by Pompeius and was added 
to his sphere of operations against Mithridates.” 
267 Flor. Epit. 1. 41.6.15. “In this victory what is most worthy of admiration? Its speedy accomplishment—for it 
was gained in forty days—or the good fortune which attended it—for not a single ship was lost—or its lasting 
effect—for there never were any pirates again?” 
268 Flor. Epit. 1. 41.6.8. “Pompeius, determining to make an end once and for all of the pest which had spread over 
the whole sea, approached his task with almost superhuman measures.” 
269 Flor. Epit. 1. 41.6.13-4. “However, they did no more than meet the first onslaught; for as soon as they saw the 
beaks of our ships all round them, they immediately threw down their weapons and oars, and with a general 
clapping of hands, which was their sign of entreaty, begged for quarter. We never gained so bloodless a victory, 
and no nation was afterwards found more loyal to us. This was secured by the remarkable wisdom of our 
commander, who removed this maritime people far from the sight of the sea and bound it down to the cultivation 
of the inland districts, thus at the same time recovering the use of the sea for shipping and restoring to the land 
its proper cultivators.” 
270 Flor. Epit. 1. 42.7.5-6. “So severe were the measures which he (Metellus) took against the prisoners that most 
of them put an end to themselves with poison, while others sent an offer of surrender to Pompeius across the 
sea. Pompeius, although while in command in Asia he had sent his officer Antonius outside his sphere of 
command to Crete, was powerless to act in the matter, and so Metellus exercised the rights of a conqueror with 
all the greater severity and, after defeating the Cydonian leaders, Lasthenes and Panares, returned victorious to 
Rome.” 
271 Plut. Pomp. 29.1. “Well, then, his maligners found fault with these measures, and even his best friends were 
not pleased with his treatment of Metellus in Crete.” 
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This is not the case with Florus’ account of the Civil War against Caesar, which sees Pompey 
given a position of subsidiary importance unlike the earlier sections. Florus identifies the 
formation of the ‘triumvirate’ as the origin of the conflict and thus begins his account here. He 
considers Pompey’s allegiance with Caesar and Crassus a necessity born from the envy of his 
peers272, who did not accept his new excessive power or the good fortune which caused it. He 
then briefly summarises the elements of the ‘triumvirate’, and its downfall, which was 
inevitable with the political motives of absolute power and control guiding each triumvir273. 
Florus subsequently states that the balance of power was destroyed with the deaths of Crassus 
and Julia, which eradicated any cause for allegiance between Pompey and Caesar. Hence, the 
growing power of Caesar “inspired the envy of Pompey, while Pompey’s eminence was 
offensive to Caesar”274. Furthermore, “Pompey could not brook an equal or Caesar a 
superior”275. This is Florus’ perspective throughout the account, which he strengthens by 
consistently exhibiting Pompey’s military inferiority to Caesar. For example, Pompey’s 
decision to flee Italy is “shameful”276 and is dramatically emphasised with Florus’ description 
of Pompey’s battered and storm-beaten ship277. Furthermore, Pompey only marginally saved 
himself from defeat without any bloodshed278, whereby Florus implies that Pompey’s 
disorganisation was so great that he nearly failed to meet Caesar’s challenge all together. Florus 
places Caesar at the centre of the work279 and follows his decisive victories in Italy, Marseille, 
                                                 
272 Flor. Epit. 2.13.8-9. “The cause of this great calamity was the same which caused all our calamities, namely, 
excessive good fortune. In the consulship of Quintus Metellus and Lucius Afranius, when the majesty of Rome 
held sway throughout the world and Rome was celebrating in the theatres of Pompeius her recent victories and 
her triumphs over the peoples of Pontus and Armenia, the excessive power enjoyed by Pompeius excited, as 
often happens, a feeling of envy among the ease-loving citizens… Metellus, because his triumph over Crete 
was shorn of its splendour, and Cato, who always looked askance upon those in power, began to decry Pompeius 
and clamour against his measures. Annoyance at this drove Pompeius into opposition and induced him to seek 
support for his position.” 
273 Flor. Epit. 2.13.10-11. “…but Pompeius occupied a higher position than either of them. Caesar, therefore, 
being desirous of winning, Crassus of increasing, and Pompeius of retaining his position, and all alike being 
eager for power, readily came to an agreement to seize the government.” (Pompeius tamen inter utrumque 
eminebat. Sic igitur Caesare dignitatem conparare, Crasso augere, Pompeio retinere cupientibus, omnibusque 
pariter potentiae cupidis de invadenda re publica facile convenit.) 
274 Flor. Epit. 2.13.14. “Iam Pompeio suspectae Caesaris opes et Caesari Pompeiana dignitas gravis.” 
275 Flor. Epit.  2.13.14. “Nec ille ferebat parem, nec hic superiorem.” 
276 Flor. Epit. 2.20. 
277 Flor. Epit. 2.20.  
278 Flor. Epit. 2.19-21. “The war would have terminated without bloodshed if Caesar could have surprised 
Pompeius at Brundisium; and he would have captured him, if he had not escaped by night through the entrance 
of the beleaguered harbour. A shameful tale, he who was but lately head of the senate and arbiter of peace and 
war fleeing, in a storm-beaten and almost dismantled vessel, over the sea which had been the scene of his 
triumphs. The flight of the senate from the city was as discreditable as that of Pompeius from Italy.”(et peractum 
erat bellum sine sanguine, si Pompeium Brundisii opprimere potuisset. Et ceperat; sed ille per obsessi claustra 
portus nocturna fuga evasit. Turpe dictu: modo princeps patrum, pacis bellique moderator, per triumphatum a 
se mare lacera et paene inermi nave fugiebat. Nec Pompei ab Italia quam senatus ab urbe fuga turpior…) 
279 Flor. Epit. 2.13.37-8. “…he (Caesar) was so impatient that, though a gale was raging at sea, he attempted to 
cross in the depth of the night alone in a light reconnoitring boat to keep them off. His remark to the master of 
the vessel, who was alarmed at the greatness of the risk, has come down to us: “Why are you afraid? You have 
Caesar on board.”  
This passage, aside from outlining the boldness of Caesar, clearly echoes a determinist reading of the late republic, 
wherein Caesar was destined to claim victory.  
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and Spain, before recounting the battles of Dyrrachium and Pharsalus. Some credit is given to 
Pompey’s war of attrition tactics, which were “salutary”280. However, circumstances did not 
allow this approach to become the defining factor in the war, as Florus cites the complaints of 
the soldiers, allies, and nobles as the reason for the ill-advised battle at Pharsalus. The account 
of the battle also focuses on, and mythologises, Caesar’s movements. Florus states that 
Pompey’s superiority in cavalry should have resulted in a comprehensive victory, but that 
Caesar’s genius tactics reversed this, thereby allowing his troops to surround Pompey281. The 
battle culminates in a resounding victory for Caesar, and a disgraceful defeat for Pompey. The 
latter suffers even greater disgrace with his survival from the battlefield, as he is eventually 
executed on the orders of a most ‘contemptible’ king, with the advice of a eunuch, and the 
sword of a deserter from his own army282. Florus thus pities Pompey’s demise and is disdainful 
toward the Egyptians who caused it. He is equally clear, however, that Caesar deserved to win 
the war. Florus’ account of Pharsalus reflects Caesar’s narration of events and thus rejects other 
readings which favoured Pompey. This is significant, because Florus’ account is usually 
thought to follow Livy’s history, which appears to have been favourable for Pompey. Hence, 
Florus’ account either reflects Livy’s hostility toward Pompey in this section of his history, or, 
it follows Caesar’s narrative for this section of the civil war narrative. 
 
                                                 
280 Flor. Epit. 2.13.43. “But Pompeius salutary plan did not avail him very long; the soldiers complained of his 
inactivity, the allies of the length of the war, the nobles of the ambition of their leader.” (Nec diutius profuit 
ducis salutare consilium. Miles otium, socii moram, principes ambitum ducis increpabant.) 
281 Flor. Epit. 2.13.47. “Nor was the issue of the campaign less wondrous; for although Pompeius had such a 
superiority in cavalry that he thought he could easily surround Caesar, he was himself surrounded.” 
282 Flor. Epit. 2.13.52. “As it was, Pompeius survived his honours, only to suffer the still greater disgrace of 
escaping on horseback through the Thessalian Tempe; of reaching Lesbos with one small vessel; of meditating 
at Syedra, on a lonely rock in Cilicia, an escape to Parthia, Africa or Egypt; and finally of dying by murder in 
the sight of his wife and children on the shores of Pelusium, by order of the most contemptible of kings and by 
the advice of eunuchs, and, to complete the tale of his misfortunes, by the sword of Septimius, a deserter from 
his own army.” 
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Chapter Two: The Ancient Evidence (Greek Authors)  
 
2.1. Diodorus Siculus 
Diodorus Siculus (80-20BC) was a Greek historian from Agyrium in Sicily. He was an 
uncritical compiler of evidence, but used good sources and recreated them faithfully1. He wrote 
forty books of world history, titled Library of History, in three volumes. These covered the 
mythical history of Greeks and non-Greeks up to the Trojan War, history to Alexander’s death 
(323 BC), and history to 54 BC. The books covering Roman history survive in a heavily 
fragmented state, but offer some information on Pompey’s early career.  
 
Diodorus references Pompey in book thirty-eight during a fragmentary commentary on the 
Sullan civil war. He first praises Pompey’s exemplary inurement to the hardships of warfare 
and commitment to developing his abilities in war from an early age2. He also emphasises 
Pompey’s restraint from luxuries, which subsequently garnered the respect of the soldiery and 
allowed Pompey to raise an army quickly despite his young age3. This allowed him to actively 
participate in the civil war and curry Sulla’s favour. Diodorus hereafter comments on Sulla’s 
admiration for Pompey, who had just defeated M. Junius Brutus4 in his first battle, maintained 
the trust of his army despite his age, and had proven his commitment to Sulla’s cause5.  
 
                                                 
1 Charles Muntz, ‘The Roman Civil Wars and the Bibliotheke’, Diodorus Siculus and the World of the Late Roman 
Republic, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2017). 
2 Diod. Sic. 38.9. “Gnaeus Pompeius devoted himself to a military life, and inured himself to the hardships and 
fatigues of war, so that in a short time he was acknowledged as an expert in military matters. Casting off all 
sloth and idleness, he was always, night and day, doing something or other that was useful for the conduct of 
the war.” 
3 Diod. Sic. 38.9. “He was very sparing in his diet, ate his food sitting, and altogether refrained from baths and 
other such luxurious activities. He allotted fewer hours for sleep than nature demanded, and spent the rest of the 
night in the concerns of a general, relating to the problems that he faced during the day; so that, by his habitual 
planning for the uncertain events of war, he became most accomplished in military activities.” 
4 Diod. Sic. 38.9.  
5 Diod. Sic. 38.10. “Gnaeus Pompeius got a fine reward for his virtue, and gained distinction for his valour. He 
continued to act in accordance with his previous achievements, and informed Sulla by letter of the increase in 
his power. Sulla admired the youth for many other reasons, and berated the senators who were with him, both 
reproaching them and urging them to be equally zealous. Sulla said that he was amazed that Pompeius, who 
was still extremely young, had snatched such a large army away from the enemy, but those who were far superior 
to him in age and reputation could hardly keep even their own servants in a dependable alliance.” 
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Diodorus outlines Pompey’s involvement in the dispute between Aristobulus and Hyrcanus in 
book forty.6 The account closely resembles Josephus’ depiction of the same events. Diodorus 
also lists Pompey’s victories and achievements in the East7.  
 
Diodorus’ work offers a positive portrayal of Pompey’s early career, as well as his political 
acumen and ability to command. Moreover, it contrasts with Pliny’s account of Pompey’s 
opulence, highlighting his sparing diet and restraint from luxuries. 
 
2.2. Strabo 
Strabo (BC 64/63 – 24 AD) was a Greek geographer, philosopher, and historian, who lived 
during the transitional period from the Roman republic to Empire. His most notable work was 
the Geographica which was composed in Greek and outlined the history of various known 
regions of the world in his era. Fortunately, much of the Geographica survives today. Pompey 
features frequently throughout the work, due to his successful Eastern conquests which 
fundamentally altered Rome’s interactions with and influence on the region.  
 
Strabo’s references to Pompey are typically fleeting and do not reflect any facet of Pompey’s 
character. Instead, they outline the wide scope of Pompey’s military commands across three 
theatres of war. Strabo does, however, reference several major political occurrences. For 
instance, he mentions Pompey and Lucullus’ conference in Galatia, on Pompey’s assumption 
of the Eastern command, though Strabo’s account is entirely void of the hostility mentioned in 
other sources8. Furthermore, he notes that Pompey’s reorganisation of the East was largely 
                                                 
6 Diod. Sic. 40.2. “While Pompeius was staying near Damascus in Syria, he was approached by Aristobulus the 
king of the Jews and his brother Hyrcanus, who were in dispute over who should be king. The most eminent of 
the Jews, more than two hundred in number, met the imperator and explained that their ancestors, when they 
rebelled from Demetrius, had sent envoys to the senate. In response, the senate granted them authority over the 
Jews, who were to be free and autonomous, under the leadership not of a king but of a high priest. But their 
current rulers, who had abolished their ancestral laws, had unjustly forced the citizens into subjection; with the 
help of a large number of mercenaries, they had procured the kingship through violence and much bloodshed. 
Pompeius postponed a decision about their dispute until later; but he strongly rebuked Hyrcanus and his 
associates for the lawless behaviour of the Jews and the wrongs they had committed against the Romans. He 
said that they deserved a stronger and harsher reprimand, but in conformity with the traditional clemency of the 
Romans, if they were obedient from now onwards, he would grant them forgiveness.” 
7 Diod. Sic. 40.4. “Pompeius Magnus, son of Gnaeus, imperator, freed the coasts of the world and all the islands 
within the Ocean from the attacks of pirates. He rescued from siege the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, Galatia and 
the territories and provinces beyond there, Asia and Bithynia. He protected Paphlagonia, Pontus, Armenia and 
Achaïa, also Iberia, Colchis, Mesopotamia, Sophene and Gordyene. He subjugated Dareius king of the Medes, 
Artoles king of the Iberians, Aristobulus king of the Jews, and Aretas king of the Nabataean Arabs, also Syria 
next to Cilicia, Judaea, Arabia, the province of Cyrenaica, the Achaei, Iozygi, Soani and Heniochi, and the other 
tribes that inhabit the coast between Colchis and Lake Maeotis, together with the kings of these tribes, nine in 
number, and all the nations that dwell between the Pontic Sea and the Red Sea. He extended the borders of the 
empire up to the borders of the world. He maintained the revenues of the Romans, and in some cases he 
increased them. He removed the statues and other images of the gods, and all the other treasure of the enemies, 
and dedicated to the goddess {Minerva} 12,060 pieces of gold and 307 talents of silver.” 
8 Strab. 12.5.2. “…and third, Danala, where Pompey and Lucullus had their conference, Pompey coming there as 
successor of Lucullus in command of the war, and Lucullus giving over to Pompey his authority and leaving 
the country to celebrate his triumph.” 
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effective9 and freed the peoples of the East from tyranny10. Strabo’s account of Pompey’s siege 
of Jerusalem, also mentioned by Josephus11, focuses on Pompey’s astute generalship12.  
 
Though the Geographica avoids moralising Roman political history, Strabo abandons his 
neutral tone when outlining the place of Pompey’s burial13. He uses evocative language to 
intensify the injustice of Pompey’s death. Strabo’s use of the passive reinforces his indignation 
that Pompey was slain (ἐσφάγη) by the Egyptians, which he immediately reiterates with the 
passive participle having been treacherously murdered (δολοφονηθεὶς).  
 
Finally, Strabo references Pompey’s authoritative demeanour while recounting the renowned 
natives of Ionia. In this passage, Pompey exiled Aeschines the orator for speaking freely before 
him14. Strabo stresses that Aeschines spoke beyond moderation (πέρα τοῦ μετρίου), thereby 
implying that his punishment was merited. This contrasts with Valerius Maximus’ story, 
wherein Pompey tolerated calumny from his inferiors15.  
 
2.3. Josephus 
Titus Flavius Josephus, born Joseph ben Matityahu, was a first-century Romano-Jewish 
scholar, historian, and historiographer, who was born in Jerusalem. He originally led Jewish 
forces in Galilee which resisted Roman occupation, though subsequently defected to the 
Roman side and was kept as a slave and interpreter by the emperor Vespasian. He later received 
his freedom under Titus and assumed the emperor’s family name of Flavius. Several of 
Josephus’ works survive today. Two of these works, Jewish Antiquities and Jewish Wars, 
reference Pompey.  
 
Both the Jewish Antiquities and Jewish Wars recount Pompey’s exploits in Judea after he 
defeated Mithridates. Their portrayals are similar but emphasise different aspects of Pompey’s 
                                                 
9 Strab. 12.3.28. “For as a whole the mountainous range of the Paryadres has numerous suitable places for such 
strongholds, since it is well-watered and woody, and is in many places marked by sheer ravines and cliffs; at 
any rate, it was here that most of his fortified treasuries were built; and at last, in fact, Mithridates fled for refuge 
into these farthermost parts of the kingdom of Pontus, when Pompey invaded the country, and having seized a 
well-watered mountain near Dasteira in Acilisenê (nearby, also, was the Euphrates, which separates Acilisenê 
from Lesser Armenia), he stayed there until he was besieged and forced to flee across the mountains into Colchis 
and from there to the Bosporus. Near this place, in Lesser Armenia, Pompey built a city, Nicopolis, which 
endures even to this day and is well peopled.”  
10 Strab. 16.2.18. “Now Byblus, the royal residence of Cinyras, is sacred to Adonis; but Pompey freed it from 
tyranny by beheading its tyrant with an axe…” 
11 Joseph. BJ. 7.1-4. 
12 Strab. 16.2.40. “Pompey seized the city, it is said, after watching for the day of fasting, when the Judaeans were 
abstaining from all work; he filled up the trench and threw ladders across it; moreover, he gave orders to raze 
all the walls and, so far as he could, destroyed the haunts of robbers and the treasure-holds of the tyrants.” 
13 Strab. 16.2.33. “Casius is a sandy hill without water and forms a promontory; the body of Pompey the Great is 
buried there; and on it is a temple of Zeus Casius. Near this place Pompey the Great was slain, being 
treacherously murdered by the Aegyptians.” 
14 Strab. 14.1.7. “…in my time, Aeschines the orator, who remained in exile to the end, since he spoke freely, 
beyond moderation, before Pompey the Great.” 
15 Val. Max. 6.2.8. 
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time in Judea. In the Jewish Antiquities, Josephus prioritises Pompey’s piety as illustrated by 
his respect for Jewish culture and religious observances, and cites Strabo, Nicolas of Damascus 
and Livy as sources for these events16. He comments that Pompey committed a great sin when 
he entered the sanctuary of the temple in Jerusalem, a place only accessible to the high priest, 
and witnessed its many sacred riches. However, he atoned for this when he left everything 
undisturbed17 and demanded that the temple’s servants cleanse the temple “in a manner worthy 
of his virtuous character” (ἀλλὰ κἀν τούτῳ ἀξίως ἔπραξεν τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν ἀρετῆς)18. The Jewish 
Antiquities also outlines how deeply the Jews respected Pompey’s military capabilities. The 
Nabatean leader Aristobulus submitted to Pompey’s demands19, despite wishing to maintain 
independence, because his advisers warned of the Romans’ wrath and abilities in warfare20. 
Aristobulus’ subsequent war-mongering, against the advice of his inferiors, brought defeat, as 
Pompey successfully led the Romans against the Jews and captured Jerusalem21.  
 
The Jewish Wars also chronicles these events, but portrays Pompey more favourably. This 
work emphasises Pompey’s importance as an active political and military agent, who wrought 
change with his decisions, rather than associating Roman success to the vague threat of the 
Romans22 - as in the Jewish Antiquities. Pompey’s military capacities are central to this 
portrayal. As in the Jewish Antiquities, Aristobulus fears Pompey23 and willingly submits to 
his demands24. Josephus shows that Pompey exhibited sound generalship by pursuing 
Aristobulus to Jerusalem, which was spurred on by mistrust for his motives25. These are 
subsequently justified by Aristobulus’ displays of cowardice and trickery in an attempt to fulfil 
                                                 
16 Joseph. JA. 14.4.3. “And that this is not merely a story to set forth the praises of a fictitious piety, but the truth, 
is attested by all those who have narrated the exploits of Pompey, among them Strabo and Nicolas and, in 
addition, Titus Livius, the author of a History of Rome.” 
17 Joseph. JA. 14.4.4. “But though the golden table was there and the sacred lampstand and the libation vessels 
and a great quantity of spices, and beside these, in the treasury, the sacred moneys amounting to two thousand 
talents, he touched none of these because of piety…” 
18 Joseph. JA. 14.4.4. 
19 Joseph. JA. 14.3.4. “Pompey, however, commanded him to deliver up his strongholds and give the orders 
therefor to his garrison commanders in his own handwriting—for they had been forbidden to accept orders in 
any other form,—and so he obeyed, but retired resentfully to Jerusalem and set about preparing for war.” See 
also Joseph. JA. 14.4.1. “And Aristobulus, thinking better of his plan, came to Pompey and promising to give 
him money and admit him into Jerusalem, begged him to stop the war and do as he liked peaceably.” 
20 Joseph. JA. 14.3.4. “Thereupon Aristobulus, whom many of his men urged not to make war on the Romans…” 
21 Joseph. JA. 14.4.2-3. 
22 Joseph. JA. 14.3.4. 
23 Joseph. JA. 1.6.3. “Three hundred talents offered by Aristobulus outweighed considerations of justice; Scaurus, 
having obtained that sum, dispatched a herald to Hyrcanus and the Arabs, threatening them with a visitation 
from the Romans and Pompey if they did not raise the siege.” See also: Joseph. JA. 1.6.6. “Terrified at his 
approach, Aristobulus went as a suppliant to meet him, and by the promise of money and of the surrender of 
himself and the city pacified Pompey’s wrath.” 
24 Joseph. BJ. 1.6.5. “He (Aristobulus) gave way, came down to Pompey, and after making a long defence in 
support of his claims to the throne, returned to his stronghold… Torn between hope and fear, he would come 
down determined by importunity to force Pompey to deliver everything to him, and as often ascend to his 
citadel, lest it should be thought that he was prematurely throwing up his case. In the end, Pompey commanded 
him to evacuate the fortresses and knowing that the governors had orders only to obey instructions given in 
Aristobulus’ own hand, insisted on his writing to each of them a notice to quit. Aristobulus did what was required 
of him, but indignantly withdrew to Jerusalem and prepared for war with Pompey.” 
25 Joseph. BJ. 1.6.6. “Pompey, allowing him no time for these preparations, followed forthwith.” 
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his ambitions. Josephus also illustrates Pompey’s clemency throughout the sequence of events. 
He allowed Aristobulus several chances to submit to his will without punishment, though 
finally grew indignant at Aristobulus’ treacherous treatment and besieged Jerusalem26. 
Pompey’s military capabilities are further stressed in the ensuing siege. After some initial 
indecision27, Pompey recognised the military advantage offered by Jewish religious practice. 
He noted that the Jews abstained from all manual work on the Sabbath, including offensive 
countermeasures28, and thus ordered his troops to avoid combat on these days and complete 
the siege’s earthworks instead. This arduous task was thus completed without hindrance and 
eventually led to the capture of the temple district29. Josephus emphasises Pompey’s capacity 
for military ingenuity, which differed to his portrayal in the Jewish Antiquities where the 
advantage was instead apparent to all the Romans30. Finally, the Jewish War represents 
Pompey’s respectfulness toward Jewish culture similarly to the Jewish Antiquities. Pompey 
entered the holy sanctuary within the temple and witnessed its treasures, but left its contents 
untouched and insisted that the temple be cleansed and the customary sacrifices resume31.  
 
2.4. Plutarch 
Plutarch, called Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus after receiving his Roman citizenship, was a 
historian, essayist, and biographer who lived during the first and early second centuries 
(approximately AD 46-120). Details concerning Plutarch’s formative years are sparse and can 
only be inferred from allusions made throughout his various works32. He was, however, born 
into a wealthy equestrian family in Chaeronea (Greece) and received a good education. 
Plutarch taught philosophy in Chaeronea and became a well-respected writer in his lifetime. 
Towards the end of his life, under Trajan and Hadrian, he received notable honours, including 
the insignia of a consul (which was a great distinction for an eques) and a post as procurator of 
Greece, whereby he was nominally in charge of all imperial properties in the province. His 
reputation as a charming and engaging writer, alongside his immense corpus, left him a well-
respected philosopher and scholar in his times. His reputation grew after his death, as attested 
by his immense popularity among Byzantine scholars and subsequently the Renaissance era.  
                                                 
26 Joseph. BJ. 1.6.6. “Indignant at this treatment (Πρὸς ταῦτα ἀγανακτήσας), Pompey kept Aristobulus under 
arrest and, advancing to the city, carefully considered the best method of attack.” 
27 Joseph. BJ. 1.7.2. “However, during his long period of indecision, sedition broke out within the walls; the 
partisans of Aristobulus insisting on a battle and the rescue of the king, while those of Hyrcanus were for 
opening the gates to Pompey.” 
28 Joseph. BJ. 1.7.3. “…for on the sabbaths the Jews fight only in self-defence.” 
29 Joseph. BJ. 1.7.3. “Indeed, the labours of the Romans would have been endless, had not Pompey taken 
advantage of the seventh day of the week, on which the Jews, from religious scruples, refrain from all manual 
work, and then proceeded to raise the earthworks, while forbidding his troops to engage in hostilities; for on the 
Sabbaths the Jews fight only in self-defence.” 
30 Joseph. JA. 14.3.3. “Of this fact the Romans were well aware, and on those days which we call the Sabbath, 
they did not shoot at the Jews or meet them in hand to hand combat, but instead they raised earthworks and 
towers, and brought up their siege-engines in order that these might be put to work the following day.” 
31 Joseph. BJ. 1.7.6. “Pompey indeed, along with his staff, penetrated to the sanctuary, entry to which was 
permitted to none but the high priest, and beheld what it contained… However, he touched neither these nor 
any other of the sacred treasures and, the very day after the capture of the temple, gave orders to the custodians 
to cleanse it and to resume the customary sacrifices.” 
32 R. Lamberton, Plutarch, Yale University Press (New Haven, 2001), 4. 
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Plutarch lived in a dualistic society, split between its Greek heritage and the strong Roman 
influences occasioned by Greek cultural adherence to the Roman Empire, and this shaped his 
conception of the world and the past. As noted by Lamberton, Plutarch lived in a society where 
Roman military dominance was long acknowledged. Octavian was the last Roman general that 
consolidated Roman power in Greece through violence and this was some seventy years before 
Plutarch’s birth. Thus, it was clear for families like Plutarch’s that living under Roman 
hegemony could be prosperous and that this stable social system need not be overturned33. 
Despite the established importance of Roman culture in his lifetime, Plutarch did not learn 
Latin until later in life34. Furthermore, he did not enjoy Latin literature as much as its Greek 
counterparts, a circumstance partially attributable to his immersion and interaction with Greek 
literature from an early age. These realities affected his approach to, and understanding of, 
Roman history. Plutarch wrote exclusively in Greek, as exhibited by his two surviving works 
the Moralia and Parallel Lives. Despite this, his works were written for both Roman and Greek 
intellectuals, who were almost always bilingual and thus equally capable of accessing the 
material in this period.  
 
Plutarch’s contextual backdrop, within which the confines of Empire were long established, 
highlights an apparent paradox within his works. Plutarch frequently admires leaders and 
statesman of the past, whose lives determined entire ages, and yet, his own period was devoid 
of politics and only allowed for military excellence in remote theatres of the empire – places 
in which he himself had little interest. This paradox, however, is explicable by Plutarch’s aims 
as a writer. He believed that history’s role was didactic and his various works reflect this with 
their protreptic and moral frameworks. Thus, Plutarch’s strong moralistic themes, underpinned 
by Platonic philosophy, aimed to inspire the betterment of their audience35. While this is blatant 
in the Moralia, a collection of essays and philosophical treatises reflecting Plutarch’s beliefs 
and world outlook, it is equally central to his biographical writings. These works, collectively 
known as the Parallel Lives, are a collection of biographical writings which comparatively 
portray the lives of great Greeks and Romans. Thus, each Greek politician, statesman, and/or 
general, has a Roman counterpart with whom Plutarch believed had shared characteristics. 
These were general themes, including: wisdom as lawgivers, courage, perseverance, 
eloquence, a period of exile, or a great fortune36. For example, Alexander’s life parallels 
Caesar’s, as both men fundamentally altered the geo-political landscape of their societies. 
Likewise, Pompey is compared to the Spartan king Agesilaus, as each were successful generals 
                                                 
33 R. Lamberton, Plutarch, 1-2. 
34 Plut. Dem. 2.2. “But as for me, I live in a small city, and I prefer to dwell there that it may not become smaller 
still; and during the time when I was in Rome and various parts of Italy I had no leisure to practice myself in 
the Roman language, owing to my public duties and the number of my pupils in philosophy. It was therefore 
late and when I was well on in years that I began to study Roman literature. And here my experience was an 
astonishing thing, but true.” Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. 
35 Plut. Per. 1-2. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. See also: T. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice, 
Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1999), 45-9. 
36 Donald Russell, ‘The Arts of Prose: The Early Empire’ in The Oxford History of the Classical World, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 1986), 668. 
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that extended their cultural sovereignty into the East. However, Plutarch also seems to have 
considered comparing Pompey and Alexander’s lives, but decided against this because of 
Pompey’s demise37.  
 
Plutarch’s biographies highlight some of the virtues and vices of great figures, not merely to 
inform in a historical fashion, but to educate and inspire his audience38. Hence, Plutarch was 
not interested in giving a continuous history of events39, but wished to analyse the fundamental 
character40 (ethos) of Greek and Roman figures as exhibited by their actions – conspicuous or 
not. This is made clear in his introduction to the Parallel lives of Alexander and Caesar, where 
he outlines the methodology of the biographies41. Thus, Plutarch’s Parallel Lives are valuable 
as they focus on the details of character, thereby illuminating elements and events of each life 
which would otherwise be ignored by historians.  
 
The Parallel Lives, particularly those concerning the last years of the Republic, are crucial for 
this thesis. They record Plutarch’s interpretation of Pompey’s character, life, context, and 
achievements. Consequently, they lay the foundations for subsequent interpretations of 
Pompey’s character, which are routinely central in modern political and military histories of 
the Late Republic. Naturally, the Life of Pompey is most relevant for this thesis, but Plutarch’s 
biographies concerning Pompey’s contemporaries also offer important perspectives and points 
of contrast. Thus, Plutarch’s Life of Pompey, while uniquely crucial for understanding Pompey, 
is most valuable when considered in the wider schema of Plutarch’s biographies.  
 
Plutarch’s source material has long been debated by modern scholarship. There are some 
instances where he directly cites works, but they otherwise remain fairly elusive. Plutarch 
directly cites two sources, namely Gaius Oppius42 and Theophanes of Mytilene43, throughout 
the Life of Pompey44. The former was a close political ally of Caesar, thus hostile to Pompey, 
while the latter was Pompey’s close confidant and personal historian.  
 
Plutarch’s portrayal of Pompey is generally favourable throughout the biography. For example, 
Plutarch’s depiction of the Carbo incident, which receives harsh treatment in other sources, 
                                                 
37 Plut. Pomp. 46.1. 
38 T. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1999), 17. “Plutarch presents 
himself as, like a painter, shaping the biographies he is writing, through careful attention to details. But life 
(βίος) also refers to the real lives of Plutarch’s readers, whom he hope (sic) to influence and morally improve 
(‘shape’) by his work.”  
39 C. Pelling, Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies, The Classical Press of Wales (Swansea, 2002), 102. 
“Plutarch feels no responsibility to give a continuous history of events, which the reader can find elsewhere.”  
40 Plut. Nic. 1. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. 
41 Plut. Alex. 1. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. 
42 Plut. Pomp. 10. 
43 Plut. Pomp. 37. 
44 I have refrained from speculating on this debate, which has polarised modern scholarship, and instead 
commented on works which Plutarch cites. One major disagreement concerns Asinius Pollio’s supposed 
influence, but this work was lost to posterity and cannot be verified as a source. See: C. Pelling, Plutarch and 
History, 13. 
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was shaped by favourable evidence and stood against a more negative tradition45. Modern 
scholars are more certain about the basis of this positive reading. Plutarch cites Theophanes of 
Mytilene’s history of Pompey’s campaigns, thereby asserting that it contributed a favourable46 
reading for Pompey’s career. Plutarch stresses that Theophanes was favourably disposed 
toward Pompey as they were personally intimate. This relationship is also attested in Cicero’s 
letters47. While this modern theory is flawed, namely that it relies on the supposition that one 
citation represents Theophanes’ influence throughout the entire biography, it does explain 
Plutarch’s favourable portrayal of Pompey. I have thus subscribed to this theory in the absence 
of any other evidence. Plutarch’s Life of Pompey treats each historical tradition equally, which 
results in a rounded depiction. However, Plutarch’s other lives modify these views, as they 
focus on different aspects of Pompey which result from his subsidiary importance. They are 
thus important as supplementary evidence for the Life of Pompey. 
 
The ensuing analysis considers key aspects of Plutarch’s presentation of Pompey, which 
demonstrably shape modern interpretations. An in-depth analysis of Plutarch’s Pompey 
unfortunately is not possible, as this is a large topic which justifies more space than this work 
affords. The key aspects which are included focus on defining moments in Pompey’s career. 
These include his role in the Sullan civil war, his commands against Sertorius, the Pirates, and 
Mithridates, and the civil war against Caesar. These notable events embody Plutarch’s 
conceptualisation of Pompey, as filtered from the ancient historiographic tradition. Plutarch 
supplements these depictions with detailed descriptions of Pompey’s character throughout the 
work. The most notable of these are found in the biography’s introduction. As a result, this 
section also requires some consideration.  
 
Plutarch’s Life of Pompey, Sections: 1-45 
Plutarch’s Life of Pompey opens with a dramatic and powerful contrast between Pompey and 
his father Strabo. He derides Strabo as a despicable figure, feared for his military prowess, but 
despised for his insatiable appetite for wealth. Pompey, on the other hand, was adored by the 
populace, through prosperity and adversity, to a degree unlike any other Roman48. Plutarch 
                                                 
45 Herbert Heftner, Plutarch und Der Aufstieg des Pompeius, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenshaften (Frankfurt 
am Main, 1995), 106. “Eine Kurzfassung desselben Vorwurfes bringt Argument, mit dem die 
pompeiusfreundliche Uberlieferung jene Tat zu entschuldigen versuchte: [Pompeius wird direkt angeredet] 
(See: Val. Max. 5.3.5.) “. 
46 Plut. Pomp. 37.2-3. “Moreover, Theophanes says there was found here an address of Rutilius, which incited the 
king to the massacre of the Romans in Asia. But most people rightly conjecture that this was a malicious 
invention on the part of Theophanes, perhaps because he hated Rutilius, who was wholly unlike himself, but 
probably also to please Pompey, whose father had been represented as an utter wretch by Rutilius in his 
histories.” 
47 Cic. Att. 2.17. “But if you do come as you say you will, would you kindly fish out of Theophanes how our 
Arabian Prince (Pompey) is disposed towards me? You will of course make your inquiries as a relative, and 
bring me a prescription as it were from him on how to conduct myself. We shall be able to get some inkling of 
the general situation from what he says.”    
48 Plut. Pomp. 1.1-3. See too Plut. Regum. 89. “Gnaeus Pompeius was as much beloved by the Romans as his 
father was hated. When he was young, he wholly sided with Sulla, and before he had borne many offices or was 
chosen into the senate, he enlisted many soldiers in Italy. When Sulla sent for him, he returned answer that he 
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outlines numerous praise-worthy traits which constituted Pompey’s character, including his 
modesty, skill in warfare, trustworthiness, honest countenance49, and generosity without 
arrogance50. This portrait is subsequently maintained throughout Pompey’s early career, as he 
leaves his father’s shadow and exceeds all political and military expectations. Various 
anecdotes pre-empt Pompey’s ensuing greatness; Pompey is granted a command and labelled 
‘Imperator’ by the dictator Sulla - despite not being a senator51, he receives a triumph despite 
not being a praetor or consul52, and finally received the consulship without holding any 
preceding offices53. 
 
Plutarch ensures that several facets of Pompey’s early career are recorded, including those with 
which he does not agree. For instance, he outlines frequent criticisms Pompey faced under 
Sullan hegemony, particularly when dealing with Carbo who was an important political enemy 
captured during the civil war. Pompey’s morally questionable actions are recorded in the 
passive voice throughout the passage to exonerate Pompey from the decisions54. Plutarch 
distances himself from the hostile tradition by alluding to inferences made against Pompey55. 
Furthermore, he stresses instances where Pompey showed kindness to the vanquished56. Where 
Plutarch cannot openly defend Pompey’s actions, he attributes them to circumstance. Thus, 
Pompey’s seemingly cruel gesture, where he dragged the former consul Carbo to trial, while 
being contrary to usual practice, was not done with malicious intent. Plutarch stresses that the 
events were perceived poorly by its audience, but that Pompey was following legal precedent 
and offering Carbo a chance to be acquitted57. As it transpired, this was not granted and Carbo 
was subsequently led away to execution58. Plutarch’s dissociation with the anti-Pompeian 
tradition is increasingly evident with the ensuing reference, whereby Gaius Oppius’ account 
                                                 
would not muster his forces in the presence of his general, unbloodied and without spoils; nor did he come 
before that in several fights he had overcome the captains of the enemy.” 
49 Plut. Pomp. 2.1-2. 
50 Plut. Pomp. 1.3. “…his modest and temperate way of living, his training in the arts of war, his persuasive speech, 
his trustworthy character, and his tact in meeting people, so that no man asked a favour with less offence, or 
bestowed one with a better mien. For, in addition to his other graces, he had the art of giving without arrogance, 
and of receiving without loss of dignity.” 
51 Plut. Pomp. 8.1-3. 
52 Plut. Pomp. 14.1-6. 
53 Plut. Pomp. 22.1-3. 
54 Plut. Pomp. 10.1. “Against these men Pompey was sent with a large force.” 
See too: 10.2. “For if it was necessary, as perhaps it was, to put the man to death, this ought to have been done as 
soon as he was seized, and the deed would have been his who ordered it.” 
55 Plut. Pomp. 10.3. “Moreover, he was thought to have treated Carbo in his misfortunes with an unnatural 
insolence.” 
56 Plut. Pomp. 10.2. “Perpenna at once abandoned Sicily to him, and he recovered the cities there. They had been 
harshly used by Perpenna, but Pompey treated them all with kindness except the Mamertines in Messana. These 
declined his tribunal and jurisdiction on the plea that they were forbidden by an ancient law of the Romans, at 
which Pompey said: “Cease quoting laws to us that have swords girt about us!”“  
57 Plut. Pomp. 10.3. “But as it was, Pompey caused a Roman who had thrice been consul to be brought in fetters 
and set before the tribunal where he himself was sitting, and examined him closely there, to the distress and 
vexation of the audience.” 
58 Plut. Pomp. 10.3. 
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for Pompey’s cruelty is summarily dismissed59. He compounds this with his summation of the 
period, whereby Pompey’s clemency is illustrated through the kindness he showed to all but 
Sulla’s most eminent enemies60. Finally, it is important to note how Plutarch introduces Carbo 
to the Life. Plutarch treats Carbo with great contempt, portraying Carbo’s ascendance over the 
deceased Cinna as an act where one tyrant was replaced by another more capricious tyrant61. 
He thus establishes a negative portrayal of Pompey’s victim from the outset which softens, 
though does not excuse, Pompey’s actions. Moreover, Plutarch emphasises in the Life of 
Sertorius that Pompey’s deeds under Sulla were valiant, and fairly earned him the cognomen 
Magnus62. 
 
Plutarch continues to perpetuate a favourable Pompeian reading with his account of Pompey’s 
numerous commands, which included the war against Sertorius in Spain, the war against the 
pirates, and the campaign against Mithridates in the East. He outlines the Sertorian war by 
giving contextual information which explains Pompey’s extraordinary appointment to 
command. He states that Sertorius, the leader of the revolt in Spain, was among Rome’s most 
competent generals and exhibited his prowess by defeating several armies sent against him. He 
became an increasingly threatening presence in Italy during and after the Sullan civil wars 
which required an immediate resolution by the mid 70’s BC. Pompey assumed the command 
in 76 after Lucius Philippus proposed the motion to the senate, who duly agreed. Plutarch 
outlines the war’s arduous nature and exhibits Pompey’s success after great turmoil63. 
Interestingly, Plutarch stresses that this was only possible because Sertorius was treacherously 
murdered by his inferiors. Pompey’s feat was noteworthy nonetheless, particularly because it 
had long remained unaccomplished by various predecessors, including Metellus. Plutarch 
concludes that this victory was unquestionably Pompey’s64, unlike his successful involvement 
in the third servile war65, wherein he claimed victory over the remnants of Spartacus’ forces 
and demanded a victory.  
  
                                                 
59 Plut. Pomp. 10.5.  
60 Plut. Pomp. 10.5. 
61 Plut. Pomp. 5.2. “When Cinna had come to such an end, Carbo, a tyrant more capricious than he, received and 
exercised authority.” 
62 Plut. Sert. 18.2. 
63 Plut. Pomp. 18-21. 
64 Plut. Pomp. 21.2. 
65 Plut. Pomp. 21.1-2. “…he (Pompey) led his army back to Italy, where, as chance would have it, he found the 
servile war at its height. For this reason, too, Crassus, who had the command in that war, precipitated the battle 
at great hazard, and was successful, killing twelve thousand three hundred of the enemy. Even in this success, 
however, fortune somehow or other included Pompey, since five thousand fugitives from the battle fell in his 
way, all of whom he slew, and then stole a march on Crassus by writing to the senate that Crassus had conquered 
the gladiators in a pitched battle, but that he himself had extirpated the war entirely. And it was agreeable to the 
Romans to hear this said and to repeat it, so kindly did they feel towards him…” 
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During his next command, Plutarch states that Pompey was decisive and swiftly concluded the 
war against the pirates through ingenious planning, clemency66, and meticulous organisation67. 
Yet these are not Plutarch’s main focus. Instead, he concentrates on Pompey’s dispute with 
Metellus on Crete. The altercation is treated in some detail and reflects Plutarch’s educational 
modus operandi. It highlights two Pompeian vices, namely his jealousy and lust for power. 
Plutarch used these to shape his account for this period and consequently overshadowed 
Pompey’s achievements against the pirates. His outward disapproval is founded on the 
unanimity of the evidence against Pompey’s mistreatment of Metellus, as even Pompey’s 
closest friends were supposedly displeased with his actions68.  
 
Likewise, Pompey’s inheritance of the Eastern command against Mithridates is set amidst the 
backdrop of his power-mongering tendencies. Pompey joyously receives the command at the 
behest of popular opinion, despite a feigned attempt to modestly decline69. Plutarch’s account 
of Pompey’s Eastern campaigns is lengthy and deservedly occupies twelve chapters of the Life. 
It displays a basic outline of Pompey’s administrative prowess alongside various military 
successes, wherein he displays sound judgement. Like the preceding chapters, this section 
primarily focuses on Pompey’s demeanour. The political scuffle between Pompey and Lucullus 
in the East typifies this. Plutarch reports that Pompey’s accession to the Eastern command 
unfairly appropriated Lucullus’ impending success70. Neither is offered a flattering portrayal 
and each is characterised by respective vices, Pompey for his love of power (φιλαρχία), 
Lucullus with this love of money (φιλαργυρία)71. Plutarch’s characterisation highlights 
Pompey’s innate cutthroat ambitions and the spiteful measures used to realise them. In 
particular, Pompey belittles Lucullus’ war effort, deeming his successes up to that point as lazy 
efforts against ‘mimic and shadowy kings’ (σκιαγραφίαις πεπολεμηκέναι βασιλικαῖς)72. In 
retaliation, Lucullus describes Pompey as a carrion-bird feeding on the remnants of scattered 
                                                 
66 Plut. Pomp. 27.4. “Some of the pirate bands that were still rowing at large begged for mercy, and since he 
treated them humanely, and after seizing their ships and persons did them no further harm, the rest became 
hopeful of mercy too, and made their escape from the other commanders, betook themselves to Pompey with 
their wives and children, and surrendered to him. All these he spared, and it was chiefly by their aid that he 
tracked down, seized, and punished those who were still lurking in concealment because conscious of 
unpardonable crimes.” 
67 Plut. Pomp. 28.2. “The war was therefore brought to an end and all piracy driven from the sea in less than three 
months, and besides many other ships, Pompey received in surrender ninety which had brazen beaks.” 
68 Plut. Pomp. 29.1. “Well, then, his maligners found fault with these measures, and even his best friends were not 
pleased with his treatment of Metellus in Crete.” 
69 Plut. Pomp. 30.6. “Alas for my endless tasks! How much better it were to be an unknown man, if I am never to 
cease from military service, and cannot lay aside this load of envy and spend my time in the country with my 
wife! As he (Pompey) said this, even his intimate friends could not abide his dissimulation; they knew that his 
enmity towards Lucullus gave fuel to his innate ambition and love of power, and made him all the more 
delighted.” 
70 Plut. Pomp. 31.2-3. “And since both were very great and very successful generals, their lictors had their rods 
alike wreathed with laurel when they met; but Lucullus was advancing from green and shady regions, while 
Pompey chanced to have made a long march through a parched and treeless country. Accordingly, when the 
lictors of Lucullus saw that Pompey’s laurels were withered and altogether faded, they took some of their own, 
which were fresh, and with them wreathed and decorated his rods. This was held to be a sign that Pompey was 
coming to rob Lucullus of the fruits of his victories and of his glory.” 
71 Plut. Pomp. 31.4. 
72 Plut. Pomp. 31.6. 
 
58 
 
wars (εἰθισμένον ἀλλοτρίοις νεκροῖς, ὥσπερ ὄρνιν ἀργόν, ἐπικαταίρειν καὶ λείψανα πολέμων 
σπαράσσειν)73 which Plutarch explicitly links to various other ‘Pompeian’ successes74. This 
portrayal clearly stems from a hostile source tradition as it is inconsistent with Plutarch’s 
depiction of the Sertorian war, where he declared Pompey the deserving victor75. This 
discrepancy reflects Plutarch’s ambition to moralise events and thereby educate his audience.  
 
Plutarch’s tendency to focus on character rather than historical events76, i.e. his concerns as a 
biographer, results in a critical depiction through this peak period of Pompey’s career. All three 
commands exhibited Pompey’s vices despite other ancient evidence77 deeming this the 
pinnacle of his abilities and achievements. This contrast reveals the flaws Plutarch deemed 
most significant through Pompey’s career, namely his incessant desire for power and 
indifference toward using dishonest means to achieve dominance. It is thus surprising that in 
the ensuing chapter Plutarch retrospectively summarised this period of Pompey’s life as his 
greatest. He laments that Pompey enjoyed the good fortune of Alexander up to this point, but 
henceforth succumbed to the illegal interests of those around him78. This comparison 
acknowledges a tradition within which Pompey was likened to Alexander. Plutarch actively 
dismisses these views79 and the methods he uses to refute these claims consequently 
acknowledges its prevalence in his contemporary thought. Consequently, Pompey’s Eastern 
successes echo Alexander’s achievements because Plutarch frames them within this context. 
Hence, while Pompey’s vices remain the primary focus, Plutarch certainly accepts the 
magnitude of Pompey’s successes at this time in his life.  
 
Plutarch’s Life of Pompey, Sections: 46-80 
Plutarch thematically divided Pompey’s Life into two parts and distinguished these by his 
subject’s marked turn in fortunes. The first section, chapters 1-45, reflect Pompey’s most 
successful period. Pompey has a position of primacy with a combination of fortune and ability 
thereby becoming the most powerful man in Rome. Plutarch purposefully separates this section 
from the next, chapters 46-80, with the use of retrospect. Pompey’s changing fortunes are 
dramatically stated as Plutarch reflects on the immense successes and contrasts them with his 
impending failures and immoral victories80. This establishes a shift in the moralistic focus of 
the Life. Pompey’s desire to achieve dominance was henceforth fulfilled and, for Plutarch, it 
would have been better that Pompey’s death occur here rather than be followed by failure and 
                                                 
73 Plut. Pomp. 31.6. 
74 Plut. Pomp. 31.7. “For it was in this way that he had appropriated to himself the victories over Sertorius, 
Lepidus, and the followers of Spartacus, although they had actually been won by Metellus, Catulus, and 
Crassus.” 
75 Plut. Pomp. 21.2. 
76 Plut. Alex. 1.1-2.  
77 Cic. leg.Man. 
78 Plut. Pomp. 46.1-2. 
79 Plut. Pomp. 46.1. “His age at this time, as those insist who compare him in all points to Alexander and force 
the parallel, was less than thirty-four years, though in fact he was nearly forty.” 
80 Plut. Pomp. 46.1. “How happy would it have been for him if he had ended his life at this point, up to which he 
enjoyed the good fortune of Alexander! For succeeding time brought him only success that made him odious, 
and failure that was irreparable.” 
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misfortune. Pompey becomes an increasingly tragic figure. The detriments to his career came 
from passivity. He became increasingly reliant on political allies to achieve success and they 
increasingly manipulate his power to enhance their own political statuses. Moreover the 
consequences of this dependence could not be known until it was too late. In sum, Pompey 
becomes a victim to the whims of contemporaries rather than a force imposing his will upon 
others81. He is a man to whom things happen82. 
 
Plutarch initiates the second section dramatically by forecasting Pompey’s demise through 
metaphor. Pompey’s power is shown as collapsing like a city whose strongest defences fall to 
an enemy and thereby add their strength to the victor83. The ensuing chapter fulfils this 
portrayal as Caesar briefly becomes the text’s primary focus and Pompey is relegated to a 
position of secondary importance. Caesar, the intriguer84, manipulated the political context to 
his benefit by bringing Crassus and Pompey together in a bid to control the Roman political 
sphere. Plutarch stresses that this political alliance, later known as the ‘first triumvirate’, was 
injurious to Pompey’s cause and character85. It inconspicuously subverted Pompey’s 
dominance making him the victim of Caesar’s ambitions.  
 
Plutarch introduces two key themes in chapter 47 which occupy the rest of the Life. Firstly, he 
foretells Pompey’s demise and dramatizes its inevitable occurrence. He achieves this by 
foreshadowing the eventual political dissolution of the ‘triumvirate’, long before its occurrence, 
thus breaking his otherwise chronological schema. Secondly, he outlines a shift in Pompey’s 
character which is directly imposed on him by the newly formed allegiance with Caesar. For 
example, Pompey displays a vulgarity and arrogance toward the senate previously 
unheralded86. The significance of this moment is not realised until Pompey’s fateful87 defeat at 
Pharsalus much later in the Life. Pompey’s vanity disappears at this point and he behaves like 
                                                 
81 Pompey’s treatment of Clodius perfectly typifies this shift. See: Plut. Pomp. 46.4-5. 
82 C. Pelling, Plutarch and History, 100.  
83 Plut. Pomp. 46.2. “That political power which he had won by his own legitimate efforts, this he used in the 
interests of others illegally, thus weakening his own reputation in proportion as he strengthened them, so that 
before he was aware of it he was ruined by the very vigour and magnitude of his own power. And just as the 
strongest parts of a city’s defences, when they are captured by an enemy, impart to him their own inherent 
strength, so it was by Pompey’s power and influence that Caesar was raised up against the city, and Caesar 
overthrew and cast down the very man by whose aid he had waxed strong against the rest. And this was the way 
it came about.” 
84 Plut. Pomp. 47.1-3. 
85 Plut. Pomp. 47.1. “At this time Caesar had returned from his province and had inaugurated a policy which 
brought him the greatest favour for the present and power for the future, but proved most injurious to Pompey 
and the city.” 
86 Plut. Pomp. 47.4-5. “And when he was opposed by his colleague Bibulus, and Cato stood ready to support 
Bibulus with all his might, Caesar brought Pompey on the rostra before the people, and asked him in so many 
words whether he approved the proposed laws: and when Pompey said he did, “Then,” said Caesar, “in case 
any resistance should be made to the law, will you come to the aid of the people?” “Yes, indeed,” said Pompey, 
“I will come, bringing, against those who threaten swords, both sword and buckler.” Never up to that day had 
Pompey said or done anything more vulgar and arrogant, as it was thought, so that even his friends apologized 
for him and said the words must have escaped him on the spur of the moment.” 
87 Plut. Pomp. 66.5. See; Christopher Pelling, Plutarch: Caesar, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2011). 353.  
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a man who had utterly forgotten that he was Pompey the great88. Plutarch thus culminates the 
deteriorating depiction of Pompey by giving it form through this act of madness89. Upon 
regaining his senses, Pompey soberly reflects on his defeat and flight from battle90. He is cast 
as a pitiful subject; a portrayal garnered by his absolute subjection to those around him. 
Plutarch moralises this shift by lamenting the power of fate which in a moment can destroy a 
lifetime of work91. More importantly, he outlines how the fundamental changes in Pompey’s 
character during the ‘triumvirate’ were a precursor to his demise. Plutarch’s description of 
Caesar’s march into Italy is a poignant example of this moral trope. Pompey’s mind was 
infected (ἀναπίμπλημι)92 by the fear-mongering multitude of magistrates that confided in him. 
The use of the passive voice emphasises that, although he was voted the highest office, he was 
prevented from acting of his own accord93. Amidst the chaos, Pompey was a puppet-ruler: one 
who was elected to the highest political power but, in reality, was manipulated by the fears of 
those he was leading. Despite this, Plutarch stresses that Pompey retained the goodwill of his 
peers94, including those who refused his judgements. This literary reprise conveys Plutarch’s 
appreciation for Pompey’s persona, his sympathy for the impossible circumstances, and overall 
conception of the period. These closing comments embody Plutarch’s characterisation of 
Pompey. Plutarch illustrates that Pompey’s defeat was the result of the tumultuous 
circumstances around him and that these were ultimately created by Caesar. 
  
Plutarch’s dramatic recreation of Pompey’s demise closes with his flight to Egypt. Pompey 
acts commendably in a telling dialogue with his wife95, Cornelia, before setting out to Egypt. 
He encouraged her to join him so that he might achieve greatness once again96 rather than 
lament his decline in fortune. Plutarch emphasises Pompey’s resolve and resilience at this low-
point, which vividly highlights his virtues against his impending death, an event of which the 
                                                 
88 Plut. Pomp. 72.1. 
89 Plut. Pomp. 72.1. “After his infantry was thus routed, and when, from the cloud of dust which he saw, Pompey 
conjectured the fate of his cavalry, what thoughts passed through his mind it were difficult to say; but he was 
most like a man bereft of sense and crazed, who had utterly forgotten that he was Pompey the Great, and without 
a word to any one, he walked slowly off to his camp…” 
90 Plut. Pomp. 73.1-2. “But Pompey, when he had gone a little distance from the camp, gave his horse the rein, 
and with only a few followers, since no one pursued him, went quietly away, indulging in such reflections as a 
man would naturally make who for four and thirty years had been accustomed to conquer and get the mastery 
in everything, and who now for the first time, in his old age, got experience of defeat and flight; he thought how 
in a single hour he had lost the power and glory gained in so many wars and conflicts, he who a little while ago 
was guarded by such an array of infantry and horse, but was now going away so insignificant and humbled as 
to escape the notice of the enemies who were in search of him.” 
91 Plut. Pomp. 73.1-2. 
92 Plut. Pomp. 61.2. “For it was impossible to check the reigning fear, nor would any one suffer Pompey to follow 
the dictates of his own judgement, but whatever feeling each one had, whether fear, or distress, or perplexity, 
he promptly infected Pompey’s mind with this.” 
93 Plut. Pomp. 61.2.  
94 Plut. Pomp. 61.4. “But even amid the actual terrors of the hour Pompey was a man to be envied for the universal 
good will felt towards him, because, though many blamed his generalship, there was no one who hated the 
general. Indeed, one would have found that those who fled the city for the sake of liberty were not so numerous 
as those who did so because they were unable to forsake Pompey.” 
95 Plut. Pomp. 75. 
96 Plut. Pomp. 75.1.  
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work’s audience was certainly aware. This portrayal is continued with Pompey’s dignity in the 
closing moments of his life. He was honourable as he enters the small welcoming party’s boat, 
quoting Sophocles97, and retained nobility even whilst his treacherous enemies, who were 
formerly former comrades, murdered him98. Finally, Plutarch outlines Pompey’s obsequies to 
reiterate his popularity and military success. In the powerful anecdote, an old Roman who had 
served with Pompey in his early campaigns helps Philip, Pompey’s freedman, build Pompey’s 
funerary pyre. The old Roman’s justification for helping Philip reflects Plutarch’s conception 
of Pompey:  
But thou shalt not have this honour all to thyself; let me too share in a pious privilege 
thus offered, that I may not altogether regret my sojourn in a foreign land, if in requital 
for many hardships I find this happiness at least, to touch with my hands and array for 
burial the greatest of Roman imperators (μέγιστον αὐτοκράτορα Ῥωμαίων).99  
 
Plutarch consolidates this portrayal in his evaluative comparison between the parallel lives of 
Pompey and Agesilaus, wherein Pompey receives much praise. Plutarch commends Pompey’s 
conduct throughout his early career, as he achieved fame and power in a righteous manner 
while Sulla was freeing Italy of her tyrants100. Pompey showed Sulla immense respect, both in 
life and after his death, whilst giving back equal to that which he received from the dictator. 
Furthermore, Plutarch attributes Pompey’s demise to the ill-fortune which overtook him101. 
This turn of events was unanticipated by all Romans, which somewhat alleviates Pompey’s 
missteps and dramatizes his demise. Despite these positive aspects, Plutarch also outlines 
several flaws. He comments that posterity remembers Pompey’s errors in the civil war above 
all else, wherein he failed to achieve the task of a good general, i.e. “to force his enemies to 
give battle when he is superior to them.”102 This refers to Pompey’s helpless situation in the 
civil war, where he was defined by his colleagues’ actions. Plutarch, however, states that a 
great general wouldn’t allow himself to become subject to inferior commanders103.  
 
                                                 
97 Plut. Pomp. 78.4. 
98 Plut. Pomp. 79.3-4. “But at this point, while Pompey was clasping the hand of Philip that he might rise to his 
feet more easily, Septimius, from behind, ran him through the body with his sword, then Salvius next, and then 
Achillas, drew their daggers and stabbed him. And Pompey, drawing his toga down over his face with both 
hands, without an act or a word that was unworthy of himself, but with a groan merely, submitted to their 
blows…” 
99 Plut. Pomp. 80.3.  
100 Plut. Comp. Ages. Pomp. 1.1. 
101 Plut. Comp. Ages. Pomp. 2.1. 
102 Plut. Comp. Ages. Pomp. 4.1.  
103 Plut. Comp. Ages. Pomp. 4.2-3. “For that a youthful commander should be frightened by tumults and outcries 
into cowardly weakness and abandon his safest plans, is natural and pardonable; but that Pompey the Great, 
whose camp the Romans called their country, and his tent their senate, while they gave the name of traitors and 
rebels to the consuls and praetors and other magistrates at Rome, — that he who was known to be under no 
one’s command, but to have served all his campaigns most successfully as imperator, should be almost forced 
by the scoffs of Favonius and Domitius, and by the fear of being called Agamemnon, to put to the hazard the 
supremacy and freedom of Rome, who could tolerate this? If he had regard only for the immediate infamy 
involved, then he ought to have made a stand at the first and to have fought to the finish the fight for Rome, 
instead of calling the flight which he then made a Themistoclean stratagem and afterwards counting it a 
disgraceful thing to delay before fighting in Thessaly.” 
 
62 
 
In summary, Plutarch’s Life of Pompey propagates a highly complex, yet undeniably relatable 
figure, who was driven by personal motives but determined by the actions of his peers104. 
Pompey’s relatability stems from his humanising weaknesses which outline his frailty as a 
mere mortal105. This sympathetic aspect of Pompey’s depiction adds a tragic element to his 
inevitable demise106. Importantly, Plutarch also critically evaluated Pompey’s flaws with his 
usual moralising undertones. He thus perpetuated an even-handed depiction of Pompey’s life, 
where virtues and vices are given equal standing. This is quite unlike some of the surviving 
evidence which preceded Plutarch. Sallust, for instance, reports that Pompey was treacherous 
by nature and made this an unredeemable flaw. On the contrary, Plutarch omits this 
representation, instead considering Pompey a lenient conqueror who through clemency alone 
transformed pirates, a most detestable group, into respectable citizens107. Plutarch is, however, 
critical of other Pompeian traits. He references Pompey’s arrogance and tendency to transgress 
the law. Similar negative traits were displayed by Cicero108, Caesar109, and Sallust110 at various 
points in Pompey’s career. Thus, Plutarch in some way engaged with this tradition, though it 
is unclear whether he directly engaged with these works or not. Irrespective of this, Plutarch 
differentiated his portrayal from these sources. These undesirable traits were purposefully 
assigned to the latter part of Pompey’s career, after the formation of the ‘triumvirate’, where 
he was shaped by external influences. This allowed Plutarch to blame Pompey’s questionable 
actions on his familial connections, who manipulated his decisions for their own benefit111.  
 
Pompey in Plutarch’s other Late Republic Lives 
Pompey’s portrayal in Plutarch’s other Lives widely range between outright hostility and 
favour. The greatest contrast between Pompey’s Life and those of his contemporaries, 
particularly Caesar, Cato, Cicero, and Lucullus, is Pompey’s passivity in his own biography. 
In the lives of Caesar and Cato, for instance, Pompey is not a passive political force but works 
toward getting himself appointed dictator, despite feigning reluctance112. Likewise, Pompey is 
active throughout the Life of Lucullus. He successfully commands in Spain and demands the 
                                                 
104 C. Pelling, Plutarch and History, 101. “He (Pompey) is, indeed, a man to whom things happen, and he lets 
them.” 
105 Plut. Pomp. 75.1. 
106 C. Pelling, Plutarch and History, 100. “It is a powerful and sympathetic psychological portrait, and the other 
Lives accounts of the fifties have little hint of it.” 
107 Plut. Comp. Ages. Pomp. 3.2. 
108 Cic. Att. 4.9.7. (SB 174) 
109 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.86.2-4. 
110 Sall. Hist. 3.84. “From his earliest youth, Pompeius had been persuaded by the flattery of his supporters to 
believe that he was the equal of King Alexander. Therefore he tried to rival Alexander’s achievements and 
plans.” 
111 Plut. Comp. Ages. Pomp. 1.3. “…Pompey’s transgressions of right and justice in his political life were due to 
his family connections, for he joined in most of the wrongdoings of Caesar and Scipio because they were his 
relations by marriage…”. 
See also: C. Pelling, Plutarch and History, 101. “In all this there is a pervasive contrast with Caesar. Pompey is 
politically inert; Caesar is always at work, even when men do not realize. His furtive, awful cleverness 
undermines Roman politics, even when he is absent in Gaul; he shows a deviousness quite alien to Pompey’s 
simple and generous nature…” 
112 Plut. Caes. 28.7; Cat. Mi. 45.7. 
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senate’s assistance113, wins the support of the populace to receive the Eastern command114, and 
schemes against the Optimates to control the balance of senatorial power115. This is linked to 
the other significant difference between Pompey’s portrayals in the two Lives. Pompey’s active 
agency eradicates Plutarch’s tragic portrait in the Pompey where he passively endures his peers’ 
decisions and fatefully suffers the consequences. In the Life of Lucullus, this manifests in 
Pompey’s persona having sinister aspects. For example, he organises an assassination plot 
against himself and then forces the alleged perpetrator, Vettius, to falsely charge Lucullus with 
masterminding the plot before the senate116. This opposes Plutarch’s version of events in the 
Life of Pompey. Pompey’s depiction in Plutarch’s Life of Cato is also negative. In one episode, 
Plutarch describes Pompey insincerely emphasising Cato’s many respectable virtues for self-
interest’s sake, rather than friendship’s sake. Plutarch stresses that Pompey’s praise was 
disingenuous and that Pompey was actually glad when Cato went away117. On one hand, this 
episode highlights Pompey’s political aptitude and ability to manipulate his peers. This 
contradicts the trope of Pompey’s political impotence as suggested by other sources. On the 
other hand, it supports the treacherous aspect of Pompey’s character. Plutarch later stresses 
Pompey’s dishonesty in 55, when he shamefully dissolved the senate by falsely claiming that 
he had heard thunder during Cato’s candidacy for praetorship. Pompey thus dishonestly used 
the thunder, which was an inauspicious portent, to postpone proceedings and prolonged the 
voting process, which thereafter allowed him to bribe senators and ensure that Vatinius won 
the praetorship over Cato118.  
 
In the Life of Caesar, Plutarch suggests that the failing Republic mistakenly identified Pompey 
as a cure for its maladies119, when Caesar would instead prove Rome’s saviour. Moreover, he 
states that both men were equally culpable for the war120. Plutarch thus builds on his earlier 
comment, wherein he asserted the civil war was not caused by a quarrel between Pompey and 
Caesar, but by their friendship121. In doing so, Plutarch marginalises the treacherous aspect of 
Pompey’s deceit122 which was mirrored by Caesar. However, he emphasises other of Pompey’s 
vices, particularly his vanity throughout the civil war period. For example, Plutarch describes 
                                                 
113 Plut. Luc. 5.2-3. 
114 Plut. Luc. 35.7. 
115 Plut. Luc. 42.5. 
116 Plut. Luc. 42.7. 
117 Plut. Cat. Mi. 14.1-2. “However, Pompey himself put to shame the men who were thus neglectful of Cato 
through ignorance. For when Cato came to Ephesus and was proceeding to pay his respects to Pompey as an 
older man, one who was greatly superior in reputation, and then in command of the greatest forces, Pompey 
caught sight of him and would not wait, nor would he suffer Cato to come to him as he sat, but sprang up as 
though to honour a superior, went to meet him, and gave him his hand… And indeed it was no secret that 
Pompey’s attentions to him were due to self-interest rather than to friendship; men knew that Pompey admired 
him when he was present, but was glad to have him go away.” 
118 Plut. Cat. Mi. 42.1-4. 
119 Plut Caes. 28.5-6. See also: Christopher Pelling, ‘Plutarch’s tale of two cities: do the Parallel lives combine as 
global histories?’, In Plutarch’s Lives: Parallelism and Purpose, ed. Noreen Humble, 217-35.  
120 Plut. Caes. 28.1 
121 Plut. Caes. 13.4-5.  
122 Plut. Caes. 29. 
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how Pompey’s vanity prevented him from preparing for the conflict123 because of the damaging 
rumours which circulated about Caesar124. Plutarch criticises both Pompey125 and Caesar’s126 
generalship during the battle of Dyrrachium, though Caesar receives a worse portrayal127. 
Hereafter Plutarch elides Pompey’s decision to ignore his colleagues128 as given in the Life of 
Pompey. Here Pompey’s peers suggested that his forces should return to Italy, the greatest prize 
of the war129. Plutarch instead dramatically outlines how Pompey was goaded130, against his 
will131, into the decisive battle at Pharsalus. Plutarch is later critical of Pompey’s momentary 
madness, wherein he fled the battlefield “and awaited what was to come”132, but does not offer 
much detail. Plutarch thus realised Caesar’s defining achievement, namely his destruction of 
Pompey, which was presented in the introduction to Alexander and Caesar’s Lives133. 
Moreover, Pompey was framed as Caesar’s political and military inferior against whom he was 
destined to succumb.  
 
Plutarch’s Life of Sertorius illustrates important positive Pompeian characteristics. In the 
opening paragraph, Plutarch emphasises Pompey’s daring134 against Sertorius. He later reckons 
Pompey as an intimidating military presence, whose impending arrival in Spain struck fear into 
Perpenna’s forces135. Plutarch hereafter references various Pompeian defeats to Sertorius 
which counterbalance this portrayal, but these were intended to highlight Sertorius’ abilities 
rather than demonstrate Pompey’s inadequacies. Finally, Plutarch emphasises Pompey’s 
military capacity and maturity when he burned Sertorius’ letters which incriminated several 
senators, thereby saving Rome from “revolutionary terrors”136. Moreover, Pompey’s execution 
of Perpenna’s fellow conspirators was treated as an act of justice, which further challenges 
Pompey’s cruel portrayal137.  
                                                 
123 Despite ambiguity in the Greek, Pelling suggests that Pompey was really misled by the rumours at Plut. Caes. 
29.6. See: C. Pelling, Plutarch: Caesar, 301. 
124 Plut. Caes. 29.5-6. 
125 Plut. Caes. 39.8. “…Caesar said to his friends as he left them: “To-day victory had been with the enemy, if 
they had had a victor in command.” 
126 Plut. Caes. 39.9. “Then going by himself to his tent and lying down, he (Caesar) spent that most distressful of 
all nights in vain reflections, convinced that he had shown bad generalship. For while a fertile country lay 
waiting for him, and the prosperous cities of Macedonia and Thessaly, he had neglected to carry the war thither, 
and had posted himself here by the sea, which his enemies controlled with their fleets, being thus held in siege 
by lack of provisions rather than besieging with his arms.” 
127 Pelling convincingly argues that this scene reflects the distraught Pompey (Plut. Caes. 45.7). See C. Pelling, 
Plutarch: Caesar, 352. 
128 Plut. Pomp.  66.5.  
129 Plut. Pomp.  41.4. 
130 Plut. Caes. 41. 
131 Plut. Caes. 42.1. 
132 Plut. Caes. 45.7-9. 
133 Plut. Alex. 1.1. See: C. Pelling, Plutarch: Caesar, 275. 
134 Plut. Sert. 1.5. 
135 Plut. Sert. 15.2. 
136 Plut. Sert. 27.3. “Pompey, then, did not act in this emergency like a young man, but like one whose 
understanding was right well matured and disciplined, and so freed Rome from revolutionary terrors. For he got 
together those letters and all the papers of Sertorius and burned them…” 
137 Plut. Sert. 27.4. 
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Plutarch’s portrayal of Pompey in the Life of Cicero is mixed. It stresses Pompey’s greatness138 
and close friendship with Cicero. However, the most memorable passage highlights Pompey’s 
betrayal of his friendship with Cicero, which saw Cicero exiled and Pompey politically 
compromised139. This portrayal is damning, as Plutarch’s description of Pompey and Cicero’s 
reconciliation hardly moderates this view. This passage supports the anti-Pompeian paradigms 
of treachery, coldness, and political incompetence. 
 
Despite their antithetical differences, each of Plutarch’s Lives that references Pompey are 
important. They all highlight the fundamental attributes and characteristics Plutarch deemed 
essential to recreate any particular event. Moreover, Plutarch’s methodology always prioritised 
each Life according to the characteristics of its protagonist. While this occasionally caused 
historical inconsistencies140, a wider understanding of the political and social aspects of each 
Life usually reveals a dominant picture. The Lives of Caesar, Cicero, Sertorius, Lucullus, and 
Cato have each revealed aspects of Pompey, which weren’t apparent in his own Life. They also 
demonstrate the different views of Pompey Plutarch encountered in his sources, thereby 
indicating a highly contested memory and a divided response, which likely originated from 
prejudiced treatments.  
  
2.5. Appian 
Appian was a Roman historian of Greek origin, who was born in the late first century in 
Alexandria, Egypt. Little is known about his personal life, though he was a Greek official of 
the equestrian class in Alexandria, and later became a Roman citizen and advocate. He wrote 
twenty-four books on Roman affairs in Greek, which covered many of Rome’s greatest military 
conquests. Eleven of these survive today, including a history of the Mithridatic wars and five 
books on Rome’s various civil wars. These outline Pompey’s most important military 
campaigns and personal traits.  
 
Appian divided his history according to Rome’s conquests of geographical landmasses, rather 
than a chronological schema. Therefore, Appian first references Pompey in his history of the 
Mithridatic wars, despite this command occurring later than that in Spain. I will not follow 
Appian’s framework in this section because it would run contrary to the rest of the thesis. This 
sub-chapter will instead chronologically trace Pompey’s career and representation throughout 
Appian’s history. Appian presages Pompey’s greatness during his commentary on the Sullan 
civil war. He emphasises Pompey’s importance with an anecdote stating that he was the only 
man Sulla rose to greet upon entrance141. Furthermore, he illustrates Pompey’s astronomical 
rise, as he became Sulla’s right-hand man during the civil war and received a triumph over the 
                                                 
138 Plut. Cic. 8.6-7. 
139 Plut. Cic, 31.2-4. 
140 Note that in Plut. Cat. Mi. 31.1-3, Plutarch forgets to include Crassus as a part of the ‘triumvirate’.  
141 App. Bell. Civ. 1.9.80. “So Sulla held him (Pompey) in honour, though still very young; and they say he never 
rose at the entrance of any other than this youth.” Trans. Horace White. 
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Numidians, despite being under age and still in the equestrian order142. These origins are cited 
as the reason for Pompey’s subsequent commands against Sertorius in Spain and Mithridates 
in Pontus and his ultimate greatness143. This favourable representation is not persistent and 
shifts with Appian’s account of the Sullan proscriptions. Here, Pompey was despatched to 
follow Carbo, who “weakly fled to Africa with his friends” (ἀσθενῶς ἔφευγε σὺν τοῖς φίλοις 
ἐς Λιβύην), and execute the proscribed. He achieves this, but receives Appian’s ire for his 
treatment of Carbo. Appian stresses that Pompey treated Carbo harshly, bringing the three 
times former consul in chains before a public assembly (ἐπεδημηγόρησε144), and having him 
executed145. He thus insinuates that Pompey had cruel tendencies. This differs from Plutarch’s 
Life of Pompey, wherein Plutarch highlighted that Pompey treated all political captives with 
these formalities, before showing the majority clemency146.  
 
Appian also describes Pompey’s Spanish command in relation to the Sullan civil war, as 
Sertorius, the commander of the Spanish forces, was previously allied with Marius and Cinna. 
Pompey’s portrayal is mixed throughout this chapter, as he repeatedly suffers defeats to 
Sertorius147, who was one of Rome’s greatest generals148. Sertorius’ assassination by Perpenna, 
however, promptly leads to the end of the Spanish war. Without Sertorius’ leadership, 
Perpenna’s forces were unable to resist Pompey’s forces in battle. Appian subsequently raises 
his prudent decision to execute Perpenna, who had startling revelations about the factions at 
Rome. Pompey thus avoided further civil strife, which “added to his high reputation” (εἰς δόξαν 
ἀγαθήν)149.  
 
                                                 
142 App. Bell. Civ. 1.9.80. “When the war was nearly finished Sulla sent him to Africa to drive out the party of 
Carbo and to restore Hiempsal (who had been expelled by the Numidians) to his kingdom. For this service Sulla 
allowed him a triumph over the Numidians, although he was under age, and was still in the equestrian order.” 
143 App. Bell. Civ. 1.9.80. “From this beginning Pompeius achieved greatness, being sent against Sertorius in 
Spain and later against Mithridates in Pontus.” 
144 Horace White translates ἐπεδημηγόρησε as harangued, which promotes a particularly negative reading. I have 
followed the more common reading that Carbo was brought before a popular assembly, as this retains the 
shameful aspects of the display, but does not amplify the negative force of the portrayal.  
145 App. Bell. Civ. 1.11.96. “While the affairs of Italy were in this state, Pompey sent a force and captured Carbo, 
who had fled with many persons of distinction from Africa to Sicily and thence to the island of Cossyra. He 
ordered his officers to kill all of the others without bringing them into his presence; but Carbo, “the three times 
consul,” he caused to be brought before his feet in chains, and after making a public harangue at him, murdered 
him and sent his head to Sulla.” 
146 Plut. Pomp. 10.5.  
147 App. Bell. Civ. 1.13.109. “Directly Pompey arrived in Spain Sertorius cut in pieces a whole legion of his army, 
which had been sent out foraging, together with its animals and servants.” 
See also: App. Bell. Civ. 1.13.110. “On the other hand, Sertorius defeated Pompey, who received a dangerous 
wound from a spear in the thigh, and this put an end to that battle.”  App. Bell. Civ. 3. 1.13.112. 
148 Plut. Sert. 1.4-5. 
149 App. Bell. Civ. 1.13.115. “He (Perpenna) was seized by some horsemen and dragged towards Pompey’s 
headquarters, loaded with the execrations of his own men, as the murderer of Sertorius, and crying out that he 
would give Pompey information about the factions in Rome. This he said either because it was true, or in order 
to be brought safe to Pompey’s presence, but the latter sent orders and put him to death before he came into his 
presence, fearing, it seemed, lest some startling revelation might be the source of new troubles at Rome. Pompey 
seems to have behaved very prudently in this matter, and his action added to his high reputation.” 
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Appian details Pompey’s ensuing command against the Pirates prior to his account of the 
Mithridatic command150. The war’s massive scope and difficulty is outlined in some detail151 
and contrasts with the swiftness of Pompey’s decisive victory152. Appian emphasises Pompey’s 
fear-inspiring disposition153 which caused a war of supposedly great difficulty to be completed 
in a few days154. Furthermore, the passage highlights Pompey’s clemency towards the pirates, 
who were forced into a piratical lifestyle because of their poverty-stricken circumstances155. 
 
This narrative leads into Appian’s favourable account of the Mithridatic war, which was 
granted to him while he was still in Cilicia156. Appian contemplates whether Pompey’s 
command, which granted him unprecedented powers throughout the entire Roman world, was 
the origin of the epithet the great (Magnus)157. There are two issues with this comment in 
                                                 
150 App. Mith. 12.14.91. “But when this was accomplished, and while Pompey, the destroyer of the pirates, was 
still in Asia, the Mithridatic war was at once resumed and the command of it also given to Pompey. Since the 
campaign at sea, which preceded his war against Mithridates, was a part of the operations under his command, 
and does not find a fitting place in any other portion of my history, it seems well to introduce it here and to run 
over the events as they occurred.” 
151 App. Mith. 12.14.94. “When the Romans could no longer endure the damage and disgrace they made Gnaeus 
Pompey, who was then their man of greatest reputation, commander by law for three years, with absolute power 
over the whole sea within the Pillars of Hercules, and of the land for a distance of 400 stades from the coast. 
They sent letters to all kings, rulers, peoples and cities, that they should aid Pompey in all ways. They gave him 
power to raise troops and to collect money from the provinces, and they furnished a large army from their own 
muster-roll, and all the ships they had, and money to the amount of 6000 Attic talents,—so great and difficult 
did they consider the task of overcoming such great forces, dispersed over so wide a sea, hiding easily in so 
many nooks, retreating quickly and darting out again unexpectedly. Never did any man before Pompey set forth 
with so great authority conferred upon him by the Romans. Presently he had an army of 120,000 foot and 4000 
horse, and 270 ships, including hemiolii. He had twenty-five assistants of senatorial rank, whom they call legati, 
among whom he divided the sea, giving ships, cavalry and infantry to each, and investing them with the insignia 
of praetors, in order that each one might have absolute authority over the part entrusted to him, while he, 
Pompey, like a king of kings, should move to and fro among them to see that they remained where they were 
stationed, lest, while he was pursuing the pirates in one place, he should be drawn to something else before his 
work was finished, and in order that there might be forces to encounter them everywhere and to prevent them 
from forming junctions with each other.” 
152 App. Mith. 12.14.97. “For this victory, so swiftly and unexpectedly gained, the Romans extolled Pompey 
greatly…” 
153 App. Mith. 12.14.96. “The terror of his name and the greatness of his preparations had produced a panic among 
the robbers. They hoped that if they did not resist they might receive lenient treatment…” 
154 App. Mith. 12.14.96. “Thus the war against the pirates, which it was supposed would prove very difficult, was 
brought to an end by Pompey in a few days.” (ὧδε μὲν ὁ λῃστρικὸς πόλεμος, χαλεπώτατος ἔσεσθαι νομισθείς, 
ὀλιγήμερος ἐγένετο τῷ Πομπηίῳ) 
155 App. Mith. 12.14.96. “Those pirates who had evidently fallen into this way of life not from wickedness, but 
from poverty consequent upon the war, Pompey settled in Mallus, Adana, and Epiphaneia, or any other 
uninhabited or thinly peopled town in Cilicia Tracheia. Some of them, too, he sent to Dyme in Achaia.” 
156 App. Mith. 12.14.97. “For this victory, so swiftly and unexpectedly gained, the Romans extolled Pompey 
greatly and while he was still in Cilicia they chose him commander of the war against Mithridates, giving him 
the same unlimited powers as before, to make war and peace as he liked, and to proclaim nations friends or 
enemies according to his own judgment. They gave him command of all the forces beyond the borders of Italy.” 
157 App. Mith. 12.14.97. “All these powers together had never been given to any one general before; and this is 
perhaps the reason why they call him Pompey the Great, for the Mithridatic war had been already finished by 
his predecessors.” 
This likely stemmed from a pro-Lucullan source tradition. See: App. Bell. Civ. 2.2.9. “In the meantime Pompey, 
who had acquired great glory and power by his Mithridatic war, was asking the Senate to ratify numerous 
concessions that he had granted to kings, princes, and cities. Most Senators, however, moved by envy, made 
opposition, and especially Lucullus, who had held the command against Mithridates before Pompey, and who 
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Appian’s text. Firstly, it contradicts his earlier introduction of Lucullus’ Mithridatic war. Here 
he stated that Lucullus’ campaigns “came to no fixed and definite conclusion” (ἐς οὐδὲν 
βέβαιον οὐδὲ κεκριμένον τέλος ἔληξεν)158 and that Lucullus, who was at that time Proconsul 
of Asia, was being criticised for unnecessarily prolonging the war for his own benefit. 
Secondly, the remark runs contrary to Appian’s ensuing narrative, wherein he outlines 
Pompey’s completion of the war through military and tactical genius. Appian’s comment thus 
does not fit within his narrative. Furthermore, it propagates an anti-Pompeian sentiment which 
provides selective modern readings with hostile evidence.  
 
The subsequent passages outline Pompey’s manoeuvres in the East, stressing his military 
competence159 (which struck fear into Mithridates), clemency160, and respect for senatorial 
mandates161. Appian emphasises Pompey’s greatness several times during this narrative. He 
labels Pompey one of the greatest generals of the time162, presents in great detail the many 
lands Pompey conquered and administered163, and reflects on how Pompey’s successes were 
                                                 
considered that the victory was his, since he had left the king for Pompey in a state of extreme weakness. Crassus 
co-operated with Lucullus in this matter. Pompey was indignant and made friends with Caesar and promised 
under oath to support him for the consulship.” 
See also discussion above, concerning Plutarch’s account of the dispute between Pompey and Lucullus in Galatia 
in section 2.4. Plut. Pomp. 31.2-3. 
158 App. Mith. 12.14.91. 
159 App. Mith. 12.14.99. “He (Pompey) passed round to the eastward of Mithridates, established a series of 
fortified posts and camps in a circle of 150 stades, and drew a line of circumvallation around him in order to 
make foraging no longer easy for him. The king did not oppose this work, either from fear, or from that mental 
paralysis which afflicts all men on the approach of calamity.” 
See also: App. Mith. 12.14.103. 
160 App. Mith. 12.15.104. “As Pompey drew near, this young Tigranes, after communicating his intentions to 
Phraates and receiving his approval (for Phraates also desired Pompey’s friendship), took refuge with Pompey 
as a suppliant; and this although he was a grandson of Mithridates. But Pompey’s reputation among the 
barbarians for justice and good faith was great, so that trusting to it Tigranes the father also came to him 
unheralded to submit all his affairs to Pompey’s decision and to make complaint against his son.” 
161 App. Mith. 12.16.106. “Those of Tigranes asked Pompey to aid one who was his friend, while those of the 
Parthian sought to establish friendship between him and the Roman people. As Pompey did not think good to 
fight the Parthians without a decree of the Senate, he sent mediators to compose their differences.” 
162 App. Mith. 12.16.112. “He (Mithridates) fought with the greatest generals of his time. He was vanquished by 
Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey, although several times he got the better of them also.” 
163 App. Mith. 12.17.114. “Pompey, having cleared out the robber dens and prostrated the greatest king then living, 
in one and the same war, and having fought successful battles, besides those of the Pontic war, with Colchians, 
Albanians, Iberians, Armenians, Medes, Arabs, Jews and other Eastern nations, extended the Roman sway as 
far as Egypt.” 
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received by contemporaries164. Finally, he asserts that Pompey deserved his credit for these 
exploits165, which resonated in Appian’s times166.  
 
Appian treats the civil war between Pompey and Caesar in greatest detail, outlining the intricate 
political causes for the war and their eventual outcomes. His history does not greatly differ 
from the narrative of Plutarch’s account. However, it is worth explaining Appian’s specific 
references to Pompey’s character in the lead up to and throughout the civil war. This portrait 
is of greatest significance to this thesis as certain depictions are prominent throughout modern 
scholarship. Before recounting the civil war, Appian cites the hostile political climate in the 
late 60s as the backdrop and origin for the eventual formation of the ‘triumvirate’. Furthermore, 
this coalition is recognised as a defining political phenomenon, the disintegration of which 
gave the civil war impetus167. Appian henceforth develops Pompey’s portrayal in relation to 
the struggle for political dominance between two equal competitors168, while also 
deterministically anticipating the conflict. His ensuing Pompeian portrait is somewhat 
balanced. He praises Pompey’s administrative prowess for his management of the grain 
commission in 57 BC, which was necessitated by grain shortage in the capital. Furthermore, 
he stresses that Pompey’s conduct was praiseworthy throughout and enhanced his reputation 
and power169. However, Appian also cites numerous negative Pompeian characteristics. He 
focuses on Pompey’s deceitful tendencies and frequently remains sceptical of Pompey’s 
                                                 
164 App. Mith. 12.17.116. “Then he (Pompey) marched to Ephesus, embarked for Italy, and hastened to Rome, 
having dismissed his soldiers at Brundisium to their homes, a democratic action which greatly surprised the 
Romans. As he approached the city he was met by successive processions, first of youths, farthest from the city, 
then bands of men of different ages came out as far as they severally could walk; last of all came the Senate, 
which was lost in wonder at his exploits, for no one had ever before vanquished so powerful an enemy, and at 
the same time brought so many great nations under subjection and extended the Roman rule to the Euphrates. 
He was awarded a triumph exceeding in brilliancy any that had gone before, being now only thirty-five years 
of age.” 
165 App. Mith. 12.17.121. “Thus, since their dominion had been advanced, in consequence of the Mithridatic war, 
from Spain and the Pillars of Hercules to the Euxine sea, and the sands which border Egypt, and the river 
Euphrates, it was fitting that this victory should be called the great one, and that Pompey, who accompanied the 
army, should be styled the Great.” 
166 App. Mith. 12.17.118. “Most of these people, who did not pay them tribute before, were now subjected to it. 
For these reasons especially I think they considered this a great war and called the victory which ended it the 
Great Victory and gave the title of Great (in Latin Magnus) to Pompey who gained it for them (by which 
appellation he is called to this day); on account of the great number of nations recovered or added to their 
dominion, the length of time (forty years) that the war had lasted, and the courage and endurance of Mithridates, 
who had shown himself capable of meeting all emergencies.” 
167 App. Bell. Civ. 2.2.9. “Most Senators, however, moved by envy, made opposition, and especially Lucullus, 
who had held the command against Mithridates before Pompey, and who considered that the victory was his, 
since he had left the king for Pompey in a state of extreme weakness. Crassus co-operated with Lucullus in this 
matter. Pompey was indignant and made friends with Caesar and promised under oath to support him for the 
consulship. The latter thereupon brought Crassus into friendly relations with Pompey. So these three most 
powerful men pooled their interests.” 
168 Eleanor Cowan highlights how Pompey and Caesar are characterised by their ύπόκρισις, in ‘Deceit in Appian’, 
in Appian’s Roman History: Empire and Civil War, ed. Kathryn Welch, 188-94. 
169 App. Bell. Civ. 2.3.18. “As the Romans were suffering from scarcity, they appointed Pompey the sole manager 
of the grain supply and gave him, as in his operations against the pirates, twenty assistants from the Senate. 
These he distributed in like manner among the provinces while he superintended the whole, and thus Rome was 
very soon provided with abundant supplies, by which means Pompey again gained great reputation and 
power.” 
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political intentions in the years leading to the civil war. Firstly, Appian highlights Pompey’s 
desire for a dictatorship, which he discountenanced in words but secretly wanted170, amid the 
backdrop of political turmoil after Crassus’ and Julia’s deaths171. This deceptive streak 
continues in several other instances. Pompey later “pretended to be indignant at the mention of 
Caesar’s name”172 (ὁ Πομπήιος ἀμφὶ μὲν τοῦ Καίσαρος ἠγανάκτει) when confronted about his 
anti-corruption bill, which to many seemed to be directed against Caesar173. Furthermore, 
Appian is sceptical of Pompey even when he acts in Caesar’s favour. For example, he states 
that Pompey only blocked Marcellus’ proposal, which demanded Caesar relinquish his 
command immediately in place of another commander, in an attempt to be “making a pretence 
of fairness and good-will”174 (ὁ Πομπήιος εὐπρεπείᾳ τε λόγου καὶ εὐνοίας ὑποκρίσει). He thus 
was not acting in the interests of rightfulness. Appian later stresses Pompey’s cunning and 
manipulative facets, outlining his elaborate ruse to weaken Caesar’s forces. The senate 
demanded that two legions, one each from Caesar and Pompey, should be recalled and sent to 
Syria to defend the province after Crassus’ disastrous defeat. Pompey thus “artfully” 
(τεχνάζων) recalled the legion he previously lent to Caesar, while also receiving another of 
Caesar’s legions. This consequently bolstered the forces in Italy, because the two legions 
weren’t sent to the East175. Finally, Appian outlines Pompey’s true intentions, the attainment 
of sole command, with a carefully structured anecdote. Appian notes that Pompey attained the 
command against Caesar amid the political disorder caused by Caesar’s march into Italy. 
Pompey then promises to obey the orders of the consuls, adding the snarky comment: “unless 
we can do better”176. Appian thus frames the account to emphasise Pompey’s trickery and 
                                                 
170 App. Bell. Civ. 2.3.23. “The expectation of a dictatorship Pompey discountenanced in words, but in fact he did 
everything secretly to promote it, and went out of his way to overlook the prevailing disorder and the anarchy 
consequent upon the disorder.” See also: E. Cowan, ‘Deceit in Appian’, 188-94. 
171 App. Bell. Civ. 2.3.18-9. 
172 App. Bell. Civ. 3. 2.3.23. 
173 App. Bell. Civ. 2.3.23. “Pompey then proposed the prosecution of offenders and especially of those guilty of 
bribery and corruption, for he thought that the seat of the public disorder was there, and that by beginning there 
he should effect a speedy cure. He brought forward a law, that any citizen who chose to do so might call for an 
account from anybody who had held office from the time of his own first consulship to the present. This 
embraced a period of a little less than twenty years, during which Caesar also had been consul; wherefore 
Caesar’s friends suspected that he included so long a time in order to cast reproach and contumely on Caesar, 
and urged him to straighten out the present situation rather than stir up the past to the annoyance of so many 
distinguished men, among whom they named Caesar. Pompey pretended to be indignant at the mention of 
Caesar’s name, as though he were above suspicion, and said that his own second consulship was embraced in 
the period, and that he had gone back a considerable time in order to effect a complete cure of the evils from 
which the republic had been so long wasting away.” 
174 App. Bell. Civ. 2.4.26. “Moreover, he (Metellus) proposed to send successors to take command of Caesar’s 
provinces before his time had expired; but Pompey interfered, making a pretence of fairness and good-will, 
saying that they ought not to put an indignity on a distinguished man who had been so extremely useful to his 
country, merely on account of a short interval of time; but he made it plain that Caesar’s command must come 
to an end immediately on its expiration.” 
175 App. Bell. Civ. 2.4.30. “As the expected danger did not show itself in Syria, these legions were sent into winter 
quarters at Capua.” 
176 App. Bell. Civ. 2.4.31. “Pompey promised to obey the orders of the consuls, but he added, “unless we can do 
better,” thus dealing in trickery and still making a pretence of fairness.” 
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manipulation of the senate. However, this changes during the events of the civil war, where 
Appian instead portrays Pompey as a victim of Caesar’s deception177. 
 
Appian never expresses doubts about Pompey’s military capabilities, despite his cynicism 
toward Pompey’s political dealings. His account of the battle of Dyrrachium, for example, 
flatters Pompey178. The battle’s aftermath also promotes a favourable Pompeian depiction. 
Here, Pompey’s charge against Caesar’s defeated troops caused them to fall into a panic, 
neither letting them make a stand, nor enter the camp in good order, nor obey any of Caesar’s 
commands179. Furthermore, the troops completely ignored Caesar’s desperate reproaches. 
These circumstances further adulate Pompey, who remained far distant from their position, yet 
caused Caesar’s disciplined legions to throw down their standards and flee against their 
commander’s wishes180. Appian likewise portrays Pompey favourably in defeat throughout the 
civil war. Contrary to the calculating and power-mongering portrayal outlined before the civil 
war, Pompey heeds the advice of his senatorial counterparts and underlings. Appian frames 
these decisions as the work of divine forces181, which result in Pompey’s defeats. For instance, 
Appian states that the battle of Dyrrachium was not the civil war’s final because Pompey 
adhered to Labienus’ poor advice182. Yet he also implicates Pompey, who suspected a 
Caesarian trap and thus hesitated. This criticism is paltry, however, as it is only possible in 
retrospect183 and would not have been apparent to Pompey at the time. Appian also suggests 
that Pompey’s vanity was a possible cause for this hesitation184. This comment, in conjunction 
with Caesar’s derogatory remark about Pompey’s leadership185, suggests that Appian’s account 
                                                 
177 E. Cowan, ‘Deceit in Appian’, 194-200. 
178 App. Bell. Civ. 2.9.61. “Nevertheless, they fought one great battle in which Pompey defeated Caesar in the 
most brilliant manner and pursued his men in headlong flight to his camp and took many of his standards.” 
179 App. Bell. Civ. 2.9.62. “After this remarkable defeat Caesar brought up other troops from another quarter, but 
these also fell into a panic even when they beheld Pompey still far distant. Although they were already close to 
the gates they would neither make a stand, nor enter in good order, nor obey the commands given to them, but 
all fled pell-mell without shame, without orders, without reason.” 
180 App. Bell. Civ. 2.9.62. “Caesar ran among them and with reproaches showed them that Pompey was still far 
distant, yet under his very eye some threw down their standards and fled…” 
181 Tom Stevenson comments on Appian’s emphasis on the influence of divine forces throughout the Roman 
History. At Dyrrachium, he comments that Appian emphasises how Caesar’s τὐχη (fortuna, fortune) failed him, 
but that Pompey was also let down by poor advice and decision making which Appian considered equally divine 
forces. See T. Stevenson, ‘Appian on the Pharsalus Campaign: Civil Wars 2.48-91’, in Appian’s Roman History: 
Empire and Civil War, ed. Kathryn Welch, The Classical Press of Wales (Swansea, 2015), 259. 
182 App. Bell. Civ. 2.9.62. “All precautions were neglected and the fortification was left unprotected, so that it is 
probable that Pompey might then have captured it and brought the war to an end by that one engagement had 
not Labienus, in some heaven-sent lunacy, persuaded him to pursue the fugitives instead. Moreover Pompey 
himself hesitated, either because he suspected a stratagem when he saw the gates unguarded or because he 
contemptuously supposed the war already decided by this battle… It is reported that Caesar said, “The war 
would have been ended to-day in the enemy’s favour if they had had a commander who knew how to make use 
of victory.” 
183 App. Bell. Civ. 2.9.62. 
184 App. Bell. Civ. 2.9.62. “Moreover Pompey himself hesitated, either because he suspected a stratagem when he 
saw the gates unguarded or because he contemptuously supposed the war already decided by this battle…” 
185 App. Bell. Civ. 2.9.62. “It is reported that Caesar said, “The war would have been ended to-day in the enemy’s 
favour if they had had a commander who knew how to make use of victory.”“ 
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for this period was supported by a hostile source tradition. This remains conjectural because 
Appian failed to cite his source. 
 
Appian outlines Pompey similarly in his account of the battle of Pharsalus. Pompey is portrayed 
as a wise commander, who strayed from his strategy because divine forces continue to work 
against him186. These divine forces manifest in the immense pressure of Pompey’s colleagues 
to meet Caesar’s challenge187. Appian stresses that Pompey’s adherence to them was contrary 
to his nature, thereby asserting that Pompey was normally measured in command. While this 
portrayal is somewhat sympathetic, it nevertheless questions Pompey’s leadership. Appian is 
critical of his need for approval, which moved him from his own purpose and led him astray 
throughout the entire war188. He thus became, “contrary to his nature, sluggish and dilatory in 
all things, and prepared for a battle against his will, to both his own hurt and that of the men 
who had persuaded him”189. Appian subsequently highlights Pompey’s grim countenance 
before the battle to intensify the narrative. Pompey was a commander under command, whose 
entire reputation was threatened by a battle he did not wish to fight, which Appian knew would 
cost Pompey everything190. Furthermore, Pompey remarks that the battle would bring great 
                                                 
186 T. Stevenson, ‘Appian on the Pharsalus Campaign’, 260. “Thus, on the most prudent calculation, Pompeius 
decides to protract the war. Yet he is under the same divine infatuation which has been leading him astray during 
the whole of this war. The θεός of BC 2.62 continues to operate against him, it seems, and even though his 
strategy is prudent, it will be undermined by the divine elements and poor advisers.”  
187 App. Bell. Civ. 2.10.66-7. “So on the most prudent calculation he decided to protract the war and drive the 
enemy from famine to plague, but he was surrounded by a great number of senators, of equal rank with himself, 
by very distinguished knights, and by many kings and princes. Some of these, by reason of their inexperience 
in war, others because they were too much elated by the victory at Dyrrachium, others because they 
outnumbered the enemy, and others because they were quite tired of the war and preferred a quick decision 
rather than a sound one—all urged him to fight, pointing out to him that Caesar was always drawn up for battle 
and challenging him. Pompey endeavoured to shew them from this very fact that just as Caesar was compelled 
to do so by his want of supplies, so they had the more reason to remain quiet because Caesar was being driven 
on by necessity. Yet, harassed by the whole army, which was unduly puffed up by the victories at Dyrrachium, 
and by men of rank who accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order to prolong his 
authority over so many men of his own rank—and who for this reason called him derisively “king of kings” and 
“Agamemnon,” because he also ruled over kings while the war lasted—he allowed himself to be moved from 
his own purpose and gave in to them, being even now under that same divine infatuation which led him astray 
during the whole of this war.” 
188 App. Bell. Civ. 2.10.67. “Yet, harassed by the whole army, which was unduly puffed up by the victories at 
Dyrrachium, and by men of rank who accused him of being fond of power and of delaying purposely in order 
to prolong his authority over so many men of his own rank—and who for this reason called him derisively “king 
of kings” and “Agamemnon,” because he also ruled over kings while the war lasted—he allowed himself to be 
moved from his own purpose and gave in to them, being even now under that same divine infatuation which led 
him astray during the whole of this war.” 
189 App. Bell. Civ. 2.10.67. “νωθής τε γὰρ καὶ βραδὺς παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἐν ἅπασι γεγονὼς παρεσκευάζετο 
ἄκων ἐς μάχην ἐπὶ κακῷ τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν αὐτὸν ἀναπειθόντων.” 
190 App. Bell. Civ. 2.10.69. “Pompey, being experienced in military affairs, turned away from these follies with 
concealed indignation, but he remained altogether silent through hesitancy and dread, as though he were no 
longer commander but under command, and as though he were doing everything under compulsion and against 
his judgment; so deep the dejection which had come over this man of great deeds (who, until this day, had been 
most fortunate in every undertaking), either because he had not carried his point in deciding what was the best 
course, and was about to cast the die involving the lives of so many men and also involving his own reputation 
as invincible; or because some presentiment of approaching evil troubled him, presaging his complete downfall 
that very day from a position of such vast power.” 
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evils to Rome for all future time, thus expressing his desire to maintain supreme power191. This 
comment reveals Appian’s conception of Pompey’s ambitions and the war’s imminent negative 
outcome. Although this likely reflects a wider second century perception of the civil war. 
Appian hereafter outlines the battle sequence and Caesar’s military genius. This concludes with 
a dramatic Pompeian depiction, wherein he is likened to the hero Ajax who acted like a 
madman bereft of his senses192.  
 
Appian’s portrayal of Pompey concludes with his unfortunate death in Egypt193. Appian 
emphasises Pompey’s greatness, contrary to the negative elements highlighted throughout the 
civil war. Pompey was a statesman who had made the greatest additions to the Roman Empire, 
fought in the greatest wars and thus earned the epithet ‘great’194. Furthermore, he had never 
faced defeat, nor ceased to exercise power as an autocrat. Most importantly, Appian contrasts 
Pompey’s autocratic powers with Caesar’s, stating that Pompey’s were democratic by 
contrast195.  
 
2.6. Cassius Dio 
Dio Cassius was a Roman statesman and historian, who was born at Nicaea in Bythinia in AD 
150. He entered the senate in AD 180 and was a close friend to several emperors, a fact which 
granted him several significant political roles, including the consulship of AD 220 and a 
subsequent proconsulship in Africa. His surviving legacy, The Roman History, was a 
monumental work comprised of eighty books, which covered up to fourteen hundred years of 
Roman history and took twenty-two years to complete. Today twenty-four of these survive, 
books 36-60, though several remain in a fragmentary condition. These lacunae are partly 
supplied by the Byzantine scholar Zonaras, whose later work relied closely on Dio’s history. 
Pompey figures prominently in several of the surviving books. Books 36 and 37 outline 
Pompey’s commands against the Pirates and Mithridates, while books 40-2 outline the origins, 
                                                 
191 App. Bell. Civ. 2.10.69. “Remarking merely to his friends that whichever should conquer, that day would be 
the beginning of great evils to the Romans for all future time, he began to make arrangements for the battle. In 
this remark some people thought his real intentions escaped him, involuntarily expressed in a moment of fear, 
and they inferred that even if Pompey had been victorious he would not have laid down the supreme power.” 
192 App. Bell. Civ. 2.11.81. “When Pompey saw the retreat of his men he became bereft of his senses and retired 
at a slow pace to his camp, and when he reached his tent he sat down speechless, resembling Ajax, the son of 
Telamon, who, they say, suffered in like manner in the midst of his enemies at Troy, being deprived of his 
senses by some god.” 
193 T. Stevenson, ‘Appian on the Pharsalus Campaign’, 262. “Pompeius meets a ship by chance, sails to Mitylene 
and there joins Cornelia, before deciding - another fateful decision – to head for Egypt. Through the intervention 
of δαίμων, the wind carries Pompeius to Ptolemy, who is at Casium.”  
194 App. Bell. Civ. 2.11.87. “Such was the end of Pompey, who had successfully carried on the greatest wars and 
had made the greatest additions to the empire of the Romans, and had acquired by that means the title of Great.” 
195 App. Bell. Civ. 2.11.87. “He had never been defeated before, but had remained unvanquished and most 
fortunate from his youth up. From his twenty-third to his fifty-eighth year he had not ceased to exercise power 
which as regards its strength was that of an autocrat, but by the inevitable contrast with Caesar had an almost 
democratic appearance.” See also: App. Bell. Civ. 2.11.72. “We are contending for liberty and country. On our 
side are the laws and honourable fame, and this great number of senators and knights, against one man who is 
piratically seizing supreme power.” 
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events, and result of the civil war. Unfortunately, the books relating Pompey’s role in the Sullan 
civil war and the Spanish command have been lost.  
 
Dio’s history is expansive and a complete dissection of its narrative is beyond the scope of this 
work. This sub-chapter thus focuses on several key areas, which address facets of Pompey’s 
character, particularly those otherwise lacking in the ancient evidence. These passages mainly 
comprise Dio’s summaries throughout the work, wherein he reflects on previously narrated 
events and offers his own opinion. They add enlightening details about Pompey’s perception 
in the second century Roman world, as well as in Dio’s source material, and thus deserve 
consideration. 
 
Dio’s account of Pompey’s command against the pirates is brief, but his lengthy anecdote 
concerning Pompey’s inheritance of the command reveals much about Pompey’s character. 
Dio outlines Pompey’s speech before the general assembly, wherein he made a great effort to 
refuse the command against the pirates. He stresses that Pompey’s reluctance was a ruse196, 
and that Gabinius’ passionate response, which exalted Pompey as the worthy successor of the 
command before the general assembly197, was arranged to ensure Pompey’s accession. This 
episode highlights Pompey’s trickery and ambition while simultaneously reporting his 
popularity among the people. Although it criticises aspects of Pompey’s character, the passage 
also highlights Pompey’s influence and his nous for political strategy. Dio further emphasised 
these traits when Pompey later received the Mithridatic command198. Pompey’s war against the 
Pirates is given brief treatment, but the account stresses the emphatic nature of the victory and 
Pompey’s clemency throughout199.  
 
                                                 
196 Dio. Cass. 36.24.5-6. “Pompey, who was very eager to command, and because of his own ambition and the 
zeal of the populace no longer now so much regarded this commission as an honour as the failure to win it a 
disgrace, when he saw the opposition of the Optimates, desired to appear forced to accept. He was always in 
the habit of pretending as far as possible not to desire the things he really wished, and on this occasion did so 
more than ever, because of the jealousy that would follow, should he of his own accord lay claim to the 
leadership, and because of the glory, if he should be appointed against his will as the one most worthy to 
command.” See also: Dio. Cass. 36.25-26.4 for Pompey’s speech beseeching the people to send another 
commander to the East. 
197 Dio. Cass. 36.27-29.3. 
198 Dio. Cass. 36.45.1-2. “Pompey was at first making ready to sail to Crete against Metellus, and when he learned 
of the decree that had been passed, pretended to be annoyed as before, and charged the members of the opposite 
faction with always loading tasks upon him so that he might meet with some reverse. In reality he received the 
news with the greatest joy, and no longer regarding as of any importance Crete or the other maritime points 
where things had been left unsettled, he made preparations for the war with the barbarians.” 
199 Dio. Cass. 36.37.3-5. “So, after making preparations as the situation and as his judgment demanded, Pompey 
patrolled at one time the whole stretch of sea that the pirates were troubling, partly by himself and partly through 
his lieutenants; and he subdued the greater part of it that very year. For not alone was the force that he directed 
vast both in point of fleet and infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land, but his leniency 
toward those who made terms with him was equally great, so that he won over large numbers by such a 
course; for those who were defeated by his troops and experienced his clemency went over to his side very 
readily. Besides other ways in which he took care of them he would give them any lands he saw vacant and 
cities that needed more inhabitants, in order that they might never again through poverty fall under the necessity 
of criminal deeds.” 
 
75 
 
Dio relates Pompey’s inheritance of the command after introducing the Mithridatic war. His 
account contrasts with other ancient evidence, namely Plutarch200, as Pompey is blameless in 
the political dispute that arose with Lucullus201. As with most of Dio’s Pompeian portrait, 
however, this portrayal is multi-faceted. On the one hand, Pompey is dismissive of Lucullus’ 
wishes which highlights his vanity. On the other, Pompey does not acknowledge this petty 
dispute, but nobly wishes to undertake the task for his country’s benefit. Therefore, it is neither 
a strictly favourable nor negative reading which is open to interpretation. Dio concludes the 
anecdote by outlining Pompey’s praiseworthy conduct. His respectful attitude and popularity 
earned him the respect of Lucullus’ mutinous troops, a feat which further highlights Pompey’s 
capabilities as a commander202.  
 
Dio praises Pompey’s successes and ability to command in his summary of the Mithridatic war. 
Here, he emphasises the enduring achievements of Pompey203, unrivalled by any earlier 
Roman. More importantly, he praises Pompey’s admirable decision to disband his forces upon 
reaching Brundisium, despite being able to gain all of Rome’s power204. While noble, Dio 
stresses that this decision later haunted Pompey, who incurred his peers’ envy from this former 
authority but received no benefit from it205. This shaped the political climate and forced 
                                                 
200 Plut. Pomp. 31.4. 
201 Dio. Cass. 36.46.1. “Pompey, therefore, having decided that he must needs fight, was busy with his various 
preparations; among other things he re-enlisted the Valerians. When he was now in Galatia, Lucullus met him 
and declared the whole conflict over, claiming there was no further need of an expedition, and that for this 
reason, in fact, the men sent by the senate to arrange for the government of the districts had arrived. Failing to 
persuade him to retire, Lucullus turned to abuse, stigmatizing him as officious, greedy for war, greedy for office, 
and so on. Pompey, paying him but slight attention, forbade anybody longer to obey his commands and pressed 
on against Mithridates, being eager to join issue with him as quickly as possible.” 
202 Dio. Cass. 36.16.3. “Hence the soldiers, as long as they prospered and got booty that was a fair return for their 
dangers, obeyed him (Lucullus); but when they encountered trouble and fear took the place of their hopes, they 
no longer heeded him at all. The proof of this is that Pompey took these same men — for he enrolled the 
Valerians again — and kept them without the slightest show of revolt. So much does one man differ from 
another.”  
203 Dio. Cass. 37.20.2. “Thus he had won many battles, had brought into subjection many potentates and kings, 
some by war and some by treaty, he had colonized eight cities, had opened up many lands and sources of revenue 
to the Romans, and had establish and organized most of the nations in the continent of Asia then belonging to 
them with their own laws and constitutions, so that even to this day they use the laws that he laid down.” 
204 Dio. Cass. 37.20.2-6. “…but the act for which credit particularly attaches to Pompey himself — a deed forever 
worthy of admiration — I will now relate. He had enormous power both on sea and on land; he had supplied 
himself with vast wealth from the captives; he had made numerous potentates and kings his friends; and he had 
kept practically all the communities which he ruled well-disposed through benefits conferred; and although by 
these means he might have occupied Italy and gained for himself the whole Roman power, since the majority 
would have accepted him voluntarily, and if any had resisted, they would certainly have capitulated through 
weakness, yet he did not choose to do this. Instead, as soon as he had crossed to Brundisium, he dismissed all 
his forces on his own initiative, without waiting for any vote to be passed in the matter by the senate or the 
people, and without concerning himself at all even about their use in the triumph. For since he understood that 
men held the careers of Marius and Sulla in abomination, he did not wish to cause them any fear even for a few 
days that they should undergo any similar experiences.”  See also: Dio. Cass. 37.21.1. “Consequently he did not 
so much as assume any additional name from his exploits, although he might have taken many.” 
205 Dio. Cass. 37.49.5-6. “Pompey, therefore, when he could accomplish nothing because of Metellus and the rest, 
declared that they were jealous of him and that he would make this clear to the plebs. Fearing, however, that he 
might fail of their support also, and so incur still greater shame, he abandoned his demands. Thus he learned 
that he did not possess any real power, but merely the name and envy resulting from his former authority, while 
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Pompey into a compromising allegiance with Caesar and Crassus, the former subsequently 
masterminding this ‘triumvirate’ to obtain absolute control of Rome, according to Dio206. This 
passage marks a turning point for Dio’s historical narrative. The self-serving and cut-throat 
ambitiousness of this period207 becomes a theme central to Dio’s interpretation of the 
‘triumvirate’, alongside the growing dominance of Caesar. Pompey hereafter plays an 
increasingly subordinate role in affairs, wherein he is firstly manipulated by Caesar, and 
ultimately controlled by his colleagues in the lead up to and during the civil war. Dio’s 
explanation of the final political break between Pompey and Caesar typifies this. He blames 
Marcellus, the consul of 49, and Curio, the tribune of the same year, for causing their final rift. 
However, there is a stark contrast between each side’s political actions in these passages, which 
highlights Pompey’s diminishing political control. According to Dio’s account, Marcellus 
placed Pompey in command against Caesar without adhering to any legal formalities208. There 
is not any suggestion that Pompey plotted for this command. Dio does, however, criticise his 
unjust acquisition of these forces from Caesar under false pretences209, but this does not imply 
that he was preparing for war. Dio’s conceptualisation of Caesar and Curio’s relationship 
directly contrasts with Pompey and Marcellus’. Caesar manipulated the political climate in so 
far as Curio’s demand that both men should disband their forces was the desired outcome. This 
forced a political impasse and succeeded in making Pompey appear the wrongdoer. Caesar is 
thus portrayed in control of his political destiny, whilst Pompey is not. The latter is 
characterised by his powerlessness as a political figure who “could affect nothing in any other 
way, and proceeded without any further disguise to harsh measures and openly said and did 
everything against Caesar; yet failed to accomplish anything”210. 
 
Caesar’s growing dominance remains central to Dio’s depiction of the civil war and is 
contrasted with Pompey’s diminishing political control and significance. For example, Dio 
asserts that Pompey feared Caesar’s influence among the people and thus avoided his final 
                                                 
in point of fact he received no benefit from it; and he repented of having let his legions go so soon and of having 
put himself in the power of his enemies.” 
Burden-Strevens notes Dio’s emphasis on Caesar’s decision and how it intentionally undermined Pompey’s 
position. See: C. Burden-Strevens, Cassius Dio’s Speeches and the Collapse of the Roman Republic, 
unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow (2015), 119. “Caesar supported Pompeius because he wanted 
to make him envied for his success and thus destroy him more quickly (τὸν Πομπήιον καὶ ἐπιφθονώτερον καὶ 
ἐπαχθέστερον ἐκ τῶν διδομένων οἱ ποιῆσαι).” 
206 Dio. Cass. 37.56.1. “These considerations led Caesar at that time to court their favour and later to reconcile 
them with each other. For he did not believe that without them he could ever gain any power or fail to offend 
one of them some time, nor did he have any fear, on the other hand, of their harmonizing their plans and so 
becoming stronger than he. For he understood perfectly that he would master others at once through their 
friendship, and a little later master them through each other. And so it came about.” 
207 Dio. Cass. 37.57.1. “For no man of that day took part in public life from pure motives and free from any desire 
of personal gain except Cato. Some, to be sure, were ashamed of the things done, and others who strove to 
imitate him took a hand in affairs now and then, and displayed some deeds similar to his; but they did not 
persevere, since their efforts sprang from cultivation of an attitude and not from innate virtue.” 
208 Dio. Cass. 40.66.2. “These proceedings took place near the close of the year and were destined not to remain 
long in force, since they had been approved neither by the senate nor by the people.” 
209 Dio. Cass. 40.64.4-65.4.  
210 Dio. Cass. 40.63.1. “Ὁ οὖν Πομπήιος ἐπεὶ μηδὲν ἄλλως πράττων ἤνυτε, πρός τε τὸ τραχὺ ἀπαρακαλύπτως 
ὥρμησε, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς πάντα καὶ ἔλεγε καὶ ἐποίει κατὰ τοῦ Καίσαρος. οὐ μέντοι καὶ κατέπραξέ τι.” 
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peace overtures211. There are, however, several issues with this representation. Firstly, it is 
contrary to Pompey’s widely acknowledged rapport with the people, who were the backbone 
of his political influence212. Secondly, it seems unlikely that Pompey’s support had evaporated 
so quickly when we consider his numerous acts for the people. These included his eradication 
of piracy in the Mediterranean and the restoration of Rome’s grain supply, which contributed 
to his widely-acknowledged popularity. Lastly, Dio establishes a pre-emptive depiction of 
Pompey centred on his declining rationality. This portrayal anticipates Pompey’s madness after 
his defeat at Pharsalus213, which is only attested by much later Greek sources, namely Plutarch 
and Appian. Dio’s historical inconsistencies highlight the historiographic issues with his 
rationalisation of the period, which were founded on a concise knowledge of how the events 
transpired. The work is thus moving toward an endpoint, wherein Caesar defeated Pompey at 
the battle of Pharsalus and eventually claimed sole leadership of the Roman world. However, 
this conclusion was not apparent to Pompey or his contemporaries. Consequently, narrating 
these events necessitates assumptions which marginalise Pompey’s political and military 
abilities for the sake of simplifying the narrative.  
 
Dio’s narrative framework of the civil war centres on Caesar’s military movements. It thus 
places the Senate’s forces, led by Pompey, as subjects forced to react against Caesar’s 
aggression. This perspective likely originated with Caesar’s Civil War as the crucial 
contemporary literary evidence for Dio’s understanding of this period. Importantly, it does not 
greatly shape Dio’s portrayal of Pompey. As stated previously, Pompey’s representation was 
characterised by his diminishing influence. Yet, Dio also frequently praises his successes 
throughout the war and does not criticise Pompey’s failures. For example, Pompey is 
commended for emerging victorious at the battle of Dyrrachium, particularly because he 
showed immense respect and restraint to his opponent214. Likewise, Pompey’s defeat at 
Pharsalus is not framed as a tactical error on behalf of the commander. Dio instead attributes 
defeat to the foreign composition of Pompey’s army215. This positive approach shifts as Dio 
reflects on the battle’s aftermath. Pompey is criticised for his lack of preparation in the event 
                                                 
211 Dio. Cass. 41.6.1-2. “Pompey was frightened at this, knowing well that he would be far inferior to Caesar if 
they should both put themselves in the power of the people, and accordingly set out for Campania before the 
envoys returned, with the idea that he could more easily carry on war there.” 
212 Dio. Cass. 41.6.3. “For practically all the cities of Italy felt such friendliness for him (Pompey) that when, a 
short time before, they had heard he was dangerously ill, they had vowed to offer public sacrifices for his safety.” 
213 Dio. Cass. 42.1.1. “Such was the general character of the battle. As a result of it Pompey straightway despaired 
of all his projects and no longer took any account of his own valour or of the multitude of troops remaining to 
him or of the fact that Fortune often restores the fallen in a moment of time; yet previously he had always 
possessed the greatest cheerfulness and the greatest hopefulness on all occasions of failure.” 
214 Dio. Cass. 41.52.1. “Pompey did not pursue him, for he had withdrawn suddenly by night and had hastily 
crossed the Genusus River; however, he was of the opinion that he had brought the war to an end. Consequently 
he assumed the title of imperator, though he uttered no boastful words about it and did not even wind laurel 
about his fasces, disliking to show such exultation over the downfall of citizens.” 
215 Dio. Cass. 41.61.1. ”At last, after they had carried on an evenly-balanced struggle for a very long time and 
many on both sides alike had fallen or been wounded, Pompey, since the larger part of his army was Asiatic 
and untrained, was defeated, even as had been made clear to him before the action.” 
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of defeat, as this is ultimately the commander’s error216. However, Dio also moderates this by 
tentatively blaming Pompey’s colleagues. He remarks that Pompey had always meticulously 
planned his forces in the past and that this had earned him numerous victories. As such, Pompey 
was unlikely to change this method without external pressure. Dio thus suggests that Pompey’s 
associates forced the lack of preparation, as they were advocates for joining battle rather than 
enduring a war of attrition217. This passage is, however, open to interpretation. Dio also 
comments that Pompey was possibly overconfident of victory after Dyrrachium and that this 
clouded his judgement218. In either case, the account is not flattering219. 
 
Finally, Dio laments Pompey’s demise in Egypt while generally praising his character. The 
account didactically illustrates the fickleness of fortune in Pompey’s demise. Dio juxtaposes 
the lofty heights of Pompey’s career against his death, highlighting that a man who was once 
in charge of a thousand ships died in a tiny boat in Egypt. The entire passage is instilled with 
Rome’s outrage towards Ptolemy and his advisors, who were duly cursed for their impious plot 
against Pompey220. Dio thus emphasises contemporary sentiments of Pompey’s popularity both 
in Rome and among the Egyptians221. Importantly, Dio’s Pompey was dignified in death and 
did not utter a word or complaint against his assassins. This noble Pompeian depiction contrasts 
with the earlier madman who fled Pharsalus. It thus redeemed Pompey, whose increasingly 
unfavourable portrayal later in his career was balanced against Dio’s reiteration of Pompey’s 
earlier achievements. Dio emphasises this, citing the divided nature of Pompey’s career, 
wherein he first achieved the greatest successes and finally suffered the most grievous fate222. 
                                                 
216 Dio. Cass. 42.1.2. “The reason for this was that on those occasions he had usually been evenly matched with 
his foe and hence had not taken his victory for granted; but by reflecting beforehand on the two possible issues 
of events while he was still cool-headed and was not yet involved in any alarm he had not neglected to prepare 
for the worst. In this way he had not been compelled to yield to disasters and had always been able easily to 
renew the conflict; but this time, as he had expected to prove greatly superior to Caesar, he had taken no 
precautions.” 
217 Dio. Cass. 42.1.3. “And whereas he might have delayed action and so have prevailed without a battle, — since 
his army kept increasing every day and he had abundant provisions, being in a country for the most part friendly 
and being also master of the sea, — nevertheless, whether of his own accord, because he expected to conquer 
in any event, or because his hand was forced by associates, he joined issue.” 
218 Dio. Cass. 42.1.2. “In this way he had not been compelled to yield to disasters and had always been able easily 
to renew the conflict; but this time, as he had expected to prove greatly superior to Caesar, he had taken no 
precautions.”  
219 Dio. Cass. 42.2.1-2. “Hence Pompey, also, having considered none of the chances beforehand, was found 
naked and defenceless, whereas, if he had taken any precautions, he might, perhaps, without trouble have quietly 
recovered everything. For large numbers of the combatants on his side had survived and he had other forces of 
no small importance. Above all, he possessed large sums of money and was master of the whole sea, and the 
cities both there and in Asia were devoted to him even in his misfortune. But, as it was, since he had fared ill 
where he felt most confident, through the fear that seized him at the moment he made no use of any one of these 
resources, but left the camp at once and fled with a few companions toward Larissa.” 
220 Dio. Cass. 42.3.3-4. “(the Egyptians) came in the guise of friends; but they impiously plotted against him and 
by their act brought a curse upon themselves and all Egypt.” 
221 Dio. Cass. 42.4.4. “ Now when they drew near the land, fearing that if he met Ptolemy he might be saved, 
either by the king himself or by the Romans who were with him or by the Egyptians, who regarded him with 
very kindly feelings, they killed him before sailing into the harbour. ” 
222 Dio. Cass. 42.4.5-6. “Thus Pompey, who previously had been considered the most powerful of the Romans, so 
that he even received the nickname of Agamemnon, was now butchered like one of the lowest of the Egyptians 
themselves, not only near Mount Casius but on the anniversary of the day on which he had once celebrated a 
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Dio’s tragic recreation of Pompey’s death summarises both his overall conception of Pompey 
and source material. He summarises, stating that Pompey’s foresight and preparedness had 
earned him victories across all known continents and this raised him to the greatest heights. 
Despite these victories, he was defeated without apparent reason223.  
 
This investigation has highlighted two key aspects of Pompey’s representation in the ancient 
evidence. Foremost, there is a contested memory of Pompey in the ancient evidence. Plutarch’s 
more favourable description of the Carbo incident typifies this, as it highlights how there is a 
divergence between Pompey’s portrayal in Gaius Oppius’ accounts and Plutarch’s other 
unnamed evidence. It is also clear that the ancient evidence repeats the same stories about 
Pompey, but each author emphasises different aspects of Pompey’s character. Pompey’s death 
in Egypt exemplifies this issue, as it is referenced by Cicero, Strabo, Valerius Maximus, 
Velleius Paterculus, Lucan, Suetonius, Lucius Annaeus Florus, Plutarch, Appian, and Cassius 
Dio. As a contemporary to the events, Cicero laments his friend’s death in a letter to Atticus224. 
By contrast, Strabo’s Geographica references Pompey’s death in relation to his place of burial 
and thereafter emphasises the treachery of the Egyptians who killed him225. Likewise, Valerius 
Maximus226 and Lucius Annaeus Florus227 moralise Pompey’s death by focusing on the 
treachery of the Egyptians. Velleius Paterculus and Cassius Dio emphasise the role of fate in 
Pompey’s death. Velleius Paterculus228 laments how different Pompey’s legacy would be had 
he died from illness in Italy two years earlier, while Dio moralises Pompey’s death as a 
demonstration of humanity’s weakness and its dependence on fortune229. Meanwhile, Lucan230 
and Plutarch’s231 more favourable readings of Pompey rendered his death a tragedy and 
reiterated his great achievements. By contrast, Suetonius’ Life of Caesar disregards Pompey’s 
death and comments that once Caesar “learned that his rival had been slain, made war on King 
Ptolemy.”232 
                                                 
triumph over Mithridates and the pirates. So even in this respect the two parts of his career were utterly 
contradictory: on that day of yore he had gained the most brilliant success, whereas he now suffered the most 
grievous fate...” 
223 Dio. Cass. 42.5.1-2. “Such was the end of Pompey the Great, whereby was proved once more the weakness 
and the strange fortune of the human race. For, although he was not at all deficient in foresight, but had always 
been absolutely secure against any force able to do him harm, yet he was deceived; and although he had won 
many unexpected victories in Africa, and many, too, in Asia and Europe, both by land and sea, ever since 
boyhood, yet now in his fifty-eighth year he was defeated without apparent reason.”  
224 Cic. Att. 11.6.3-4 (SB 217). “As to Pompey’s end I never had any doubt, for all rulers and peoples had become 
so thoroughly persuaded of the hopelessness of his case that wherever he went I expected this to happen. I 
cannot but grieve for his fate. I knew him for a man of good character, clean life, and serious principle.” 
225 Strab. 16.2.33. 
226 Val. Max. 5.1.5. 
227 Flor. Epit. 2.13.52. 
228 Vell. Pat. 2.48.2. 
229 Dio. Cass. 42.5.1-2. 
230 Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.689-91. 
231 Plut. Pomp. 80.  
232 Suet. Caes. 35. 
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Chapter Three: Mommsen’s Historical Context and Influences 
 
3.1. Prussia (1789-1848) 
As explained in the introduction, this thesis focuses on Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte and 
its portrayal of Pompey. This task requires an exploration into both the nature of the ancient 
evidence, as given in the previous chapter, and contemporary circumstances which shaped 
Mommsen’s view of history and society. This exercise emphasises the importance of 
contemporary political and philosophical thought within Mommsen’s work, thereby outlining 
the primary factors determining his historical output. This is particularly important as 
nineteenth century Prussian history is not widely familiar to modern audiences. This sub-
chapter thus briefly considers the political, social, and philosophical contexts underpinning 
both Niebuhr1 (1776-1831) and Mommsen’s (1817-1903) lives and works. It comprises three 
intertwined constituents: Firstly, Prussia’s political context, including its international relations 
with the French and Danish, the nature of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and Militarism. Secondly, 
Prussia’s social composition and climate, particularly the significance of the Junker class, the 
emerging Bildungsbürgertum, and the environmental conditions which shaped contemporary 
social concerns. Finally, the general philosophical trends which influenced the historical and 
literary output throughout the period, including Hegel, Historicism, Determinism, and 
Nationalism. Unfortunately, the scope of this work only allows for brief insights into each 
thinker and movement. I will accordingly provide further reading for topics which cannot be 
fully explored.  
 
The General Historical Background 
The state of Prussia was the largest and most influential of the German states prior to the 
unification of Germany. It was ruled by the Hohenzollern house during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries as a monarchical government, but became increasingly bureaucratised 
with the growing significance and influence of Prussia’s middle-class. Hohenzollern monarchs 
were characterised by their enlightened authoritarianist grip on society, also known as 
enlightened absolutism2. Their governments had a propensity for expenditure on the 
development of the military which resulted in a uniquely efficient military organisation among 
the Germanic states, and in turn promoted the state’s aggressive militaristic tendencies and 
successful expansion3. The Hohenzollern dynasty maintained absolute control throughout this 
entire period, despite a serious defeat to Napoleon’s forces at the battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 
                                                 
1 It must be noted that Niebuhr himself also helped develop several crucial changes to mid-nineteenth century 
historical practice. 
2 This form of rulership originated with Frederick the Great, who introduced a civic code, abolished torture, and 
established the principle that the crown would not interfere in matters of justice. Consequently, their leadership 
wasn’t traditional in its authoritarianism. It did, however, adhere to other totalitarian tropes. See: Matthew 
Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-48, Oxford 
University Press, (Oxford, 2000). 
3 This included numerous bordering territories such as modern Poland, Belgium, Denmark, and Russia. 
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18064, which saw Prussian national confidence crushed as the French seized all territories until 
the war of the sixth coalition in 1813-4.  
 
Prussia’s militaristic ventures throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries caused 
enduring political rifts with its geo-political neighbours, which were further fuelled by 
Prussia’s imperialistic aspirations in the early nineteenth century. However, their defeat to 
Napoleon damaged faith in Prussia’s military. This caused a logistical change, wherein 
subsequent hostilities were resolved through diplomacy and often forced compromising losses. 
The ‘Schleswig-Holstein question’ exemplifies this and is particularly relevant for Niebuhr and 
Mommsen who were personally tied to this geo-political region5. Such conflicts fuelled 
widespread resentment against the governing authorities and incited the German unification 
movement and revolutionary actions of 18486. They also led many liberals to believe that a 
fractured Germany, which, comprised of numerous states, could not justly protect the German 
people who all shared cultural and social conventions. After failing to successfully resolve the 
‘Schleswig-Holstein question’ in Prussia’s favour, many believed that Prussia’s government 
couldn’t adequately protect its people. The locals, including Mommsen himself, attributed 
these failures to weak governmental leadership and a lack of patriotism. This belief was further 
strengthened by the widespread philosophical doctrine of militarism, which dictated Prussian 
attitudes to external threats more generally. These militaristic tendencies also fed nationalist 
ideals, wherein many Prussians felt that only a unified German state could successfully resist 
external incursion. This heightened political tensions throughout the region, and Europe more 
widely, and influenced the composition of Prussia’s political landscape. Prussian society was 
thus characterised by its conservative rejection of external political ideologies, particularly 
from France, after the Napoleonic wars. Its primary concern was to preserve the sanctity of 
German cultural sovereignty and ensure that all Germanic states continued along their destined 
path (Sonderweg).  
 
                                                 
4 The Hohenzollern dynasty’s rule remained stable through its close ties Prussia’s elite class, the Junkers, who 
were a wealthy landed minority that controlled the majority of Prussia’s workforce. These two orders dominated 
Prussia throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
5 The Schleswig-Holstein region was contested territory between Prussia and the kingdom of Denmark throughout 
the nineteenth century. The two duchies were traditionally deemed Danish lands but contained a predominantly 
Prussian population whose first language was German and increasingly identified with Prussian nationalist 
sentiments. The dispute came to open conflict in 1848 and lasted until 1851 when the Danes successfully 
retained control of the region. Prussia thus failed in its ambitions to seize control of the region, a loss which had 
immense cultural and symbolic significance to all Prussians. See: Bernard Montague, The Schleswig-Holstein 
Question Considered in a Lecture Delivered March 9, 1864, John Henry and James Parker (1864), 1-64. 
6 The French revolution (1789-1799) empowered the lower echelons of French society and proved that traditional 
elitist power structures could be overturned. This caused much excitement amongst early nineteenth century 
Prussian thinkers (including Niebuhr), who eagerly awaited the long-term results of the French revolutionary 
movement to determine its viability for social change. However, any hopes for lasting and unquestionable 
benefits were soon crushed by the liberated French government’s expansionist mentality, soon leading to war. 
Despite this, the French revolution set a lasting example for the potential of revolutionary action, and, by the 
middle of the nineteenth century much of Europe was in a state of revolutionary frenzy. See: M. Levinger, 
Enlightened Nationalism, (2000); Phillip G. Dwyer, The Rise of Prussia, 1700-1830, Routledge Press (London, 
2014); Martin Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000, Blackwell Publishing (Oxford, 2006); 
Manfred Botzenhart, Reform, Restauration, Krise, Deutschland, 1789-1847, Neue Historische Bibliothek 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1985). 
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Nineteenth century Prussia was also renowned for its highly developed and successful 
educational system. It had become an intellectual powerhouse throughout this period with 
increased funding to the university system, which was overhauled by Alexander von Humboldt 
in 1809-10 upon Baron von Stein’s recommendation. Humboldt’s changes saw new fields of 
specialisation, including philosophy and history, which were added to the available studies at 
the University of Berlin. These became progressively more specialised and elite as a result, 
placing Prussia at the forefront of scholarly endeavours. This had a particularly drastic effect 
on historical studies, which developed rapidly because of the increased funding. Furthermore, 
the professionalization of history and the new intellectual context that universities afforded, 
saw an increase in ideological debate and the circulation of ideas. This further increased with 
the growing accessibility of literature throughout the nineteenth century. In sum, Prussian 
scholars were increasingly encouraged to engage with their counterparts and this further 
increased the quality of Prussia’s academic output.  
 
These reforms had wider social repercussions. They encouraged the growth of an intellectual 
middle-class (Bildungsbürgertum) which became increasingly influential in politics, alongside 
the growing opportunities the Prussian government offered toward the middle of the nineteenth 
century. It also allowed liberal ideologies to flourish against traditional conservatism, which in 
turn influenced the revolutionary movements in 1848 and shaped German history hereafter. 
Most intellectuals, however, particularly more moderate historicists like Humboldt, remained 
faithful to the Hohenzollern dynasty because of the benefits they reaped from the educational 
reforms. They accordingly justified Hohenzollern authoritarianism7 with a unique 
conceptualisation of the state8 as a central tenet of all human achievement. According to this 
ideology, a strong state embodied humanity’s uppermost potential: politically, militarily and 
socially. Hence, authoritarianism did not stifle individual rights, as liberty9 was achievable 
through the increased accessibility of education and social mobility. The realities of this 
postulation are questionable, as they reflect only the concerns of the learned who rejoiced at 
their intellectual emancipation, but these freedoms weren’t extended to the lower class.  
 
                                                 
7 G.G. Iggers, ‘The Intellectual Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Scientific History’, in Oxford History of 
Historical Writing, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2016), 10. “They (Prussian intellectuals) viewed 
themselves as liberals who wanted political reforms in the direction of a parliamentary monarchy, but after the 
failure of the 1848 revolution they compromised their liberalism in support of a strong Hohenzollern monarchy 
and later of Otto von Bismarck’s blood and iron policy.” 
8 G.G. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to 
the Present, 2nd ed, Wesleyan University Press (Connecticut, 1983), 8. “In place of the utilitarian concept of 
the state, as an instrument of the interests and welfare of its population, German historiography emphatically 
places the idealistic concept of the state as an individual, an end in itself, governed by its own principles of life.” 
9 G.G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, 16. “Confident in the meaningfulness of the historical process, 
German historians and political theorists from Wilhelm von Humboldt to Friedrich Meinecke almost a century 
later were willing to view the state as an ethical institution whose interests in the long run were in harmony with 
freedom and morality.”  
G.G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, 20. “The young Wilhelm von Humboldt’s definition of Freedom 
in terms of “the highest and most proportionate development of one’s resources into one whole...” [“Ideen zu 
einem Versuch, die granzen der Wirksamkeit des staats zu bestimmen”, in Gesammelte Schriften, I (Berlin, 
1903-36), 106.] 
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The Composition of Prussian Society 
Prussian society was composed of three general orders10 (or classes), which were further 
subdivided variously across the state. Firstly, the ruling class (the Hohenzollern dynasty), who 
controlled the State’s affairs internationally and nationally. Secondly, the Junkers11 (the land-
owning nobility), who oversaw the maintenance of regional and district areas and ensured the 
maintenance of order. Finally, the working class, which was broken up into several groups 
whose conditions varied across the Prussian state, but were widely oppressed and generally 
had few civil liberties12. This last group existed in feudal-like conditions and were totally 
dependent on the elite ruling class for subsistence. In some regions, particularly in the East13 
and outside of the state’s city-centres, their conditions were largely indistinguishable from 
slavery. This gradually changed during the nineteenth century with the emergence of an 
identifiable middle-class, which rose alongside the increasing accessibility to higher education 
and elevated social status in Prussian society.  
 
The growing cohort of middle-class citizenry (Bildungsbürgertum) hardly impacted the vast 
numbers that remained contained in the lowest class in Prussian society. However, they did 
increasingly challenge traditional ideologies upheld by the conservative elements in society, 
particularly by the Junkers. This saw an improvement in social conditions for both middle and 
lower class citizens over time. This process was aided by increased access of the middle-class 
to higher education and generally allowed Prussian thinkers greater access to the libertarian 
doctrines prevalent in France and England. The middle of the nineteenth century thus saw many 
Prussian academics rally against the traditional social hierarchy for increased civil liberties. 
These varied across the Prussian state, though commonly included: the emancipation of the 
landless peasantry, freedom of the press, and an increase in the direct political input of the 
learned middle-class citizens. These concerns became increasingly important as social 
conditions deteriorated throughout the state in the 1830s and 1840s. Prussia was slow to 
industrialise compared to other European states, and this shift caused great strain on the lower 
classes and its society’s feudal-like structure. These issues were further intensified by natural 
                                                 
10 Huerkamp argues that Prussian society throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were segmented 
as a result of eighteenth century corporate society, rather than classes. See: Claudia Huerkamp, ‚Aufstieg Der 
Ärzte im 19. Jahrhundert, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 68, Verlag Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
(Göttingen, 1985), 23. 
11 Niebuhr and Mommsen’s depictions of the late republic reflected contemporary concerns with the Junker class 
in Prussia. For example, the Roman optimates (literally ‘best men’) were thought to reflect Prussia’s Junkers, 
particularly in the Prussian empire’s easternmost regions. Both groups maintained strict control and dominance 
over the financial situation of their inferiors, whilst utilising their power to influence political proceedings for 
their own benefit. Their contexts offer numerous distinctions, which make their comparisons questionable. For 
example, the Roman system of patronage allowed some financial mobility and freedom, which was lacking in 
Prussia’s lower classes.  
12 David Blackbourn, The History of Germany 1780-1918: The Long Nineteenth Century, Second Edition, 
Blackwell Publishing (Oxford, 2003), 6. “Urban dwelllers were further divided into full citizens, who exercised 
all the rights possessed by the community, residents such as Schutzbürger (denizens), who enjoyed some rights, 
and the rest, who had no rights.” 
13 David Blackbourn, The History of Germany, 4. “In Prussia east of the river Elbe, under the so-called 
Gutsherrschaft system, the lord enjoyed direct control over the peasant. In exchange for the land they worked, 
peasants provided labour services the lord could prescribe where they milled their grain or sold their own 
produce; they were not free to move without his permission.” 
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conditions throughout the 1840s. Poor growing conditions resulted in severe crop shortages 
and widespread famine14. These strains consequently forced Prussia’s middle and lower orders 
to question their society’s social framework and challenge outdated concepts like the 
Gutsherrschaft system. Over time these growing social pressures forced the upper echelons of 
Prussian society to adapt and loosen Prussia’s rigid social framework.  
 
3.2. The Period’s Major Philosophical and Historical Movements 
 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel  
Hegel (1770-1831) was unquestionably the most influential thinker of this period. He produced 
numerous important philosophical works and fundamentally altered the ideological climate, 
previously dominated by Immanuel Kant. In relation to historical studies, The Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History15 (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte) is Hegel’s 
most significant work. It was published posthumously from his students’ lecture notes in 1837 
by the editor Eduard Gans. The work influenced common perceptions of historical inquiry and 
their wider social significance throughout the 1830s and 1840s. It presented world history in 
terms of Hegelian philosophy, highlighting that all history follows the dictates of reason and 
that the natural development of history is a result of the outworking of the absolute spirit. More 
generally, the concept of the absolute spirit (Geist) was prevalent throughout Hegelian 
philosophy. Hegel asserted that in order for a thinking subject to comprehend any object (this 
can be any literal or abstract thing, including the world or history), there must be in some sense 
an identity of thought and being. Regarding history, this identity could be a historical figure 
who embodied the fundamental nature of its historical context. In Hegel’s terms, the Weltgeist, 
a means of philosophizing history, were thus effected in Volksgeister (‘national spirits’). 
Hence, these select Volksgeister, or great men of history, were central to comprehending any 
historical period. This thesis will demonstrate the importance of this ideology in Mommsen’s 
Römische Geschichte, which places Caesar as the central political figure around whom all Late 
Republican Roman history revolved.  
  
Historicism 
Historicism flourished alongside Hegel’s philosophy and was a watershed moment in the 
development of modern historical thought. It pushed a relativist notion of the world in which 
context was crucial to understanding the past. The historicist movement originated as a reaction 
against enlightenment thought, and increasingly rejected universal history, the universality of 
human values16, and the natural order of life which the enlightenment movement advocated. 
                                                 
14 D. Blackbourn, The History of Germany, 104-5.  
15 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Dover Press (London, 2004). G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, ed. Eduard Gans and Karl Hegel, Decker und Humblot (Berlin, 1848). 
16 The absolute rejection of the universality of human values was a fundamental trait unique to the Prussian 
nationalist-historicist tradition. However, Prussian historicists did not reject human values outright. They 
believed values were ever-present in human society, but were not innately transportable across different 
contexts. This was because beliefs were born from highly specific circumstances which could not be replicated. 
Nevertheless, they could be studied, understood and rationalised. This was equally relevant to the values of an 
individual within society, as it was the social and cultural groups themselves. On this larger scale then, the state 
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The main catalysts for this ideological shift were: Johan Gottfried Herder (1744 – 1803), 
Alexander von Humboldt (1767 – 1835) and Leopold von Ranke (1795 - 1886). Each 
contributed different elements to this historiographical movement and deserve a brief analysis.  
 
Johann Gottfried Herder 
Herder introduced the concepts of context and cultural relativism to western thought, 
particularly in his brief ‘Older Critical Forestlet’ [excerpt on history]17 and the more refined 
Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit18 (‘This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of 
Humanity’), which was written in 1784-1791. These ideas were fundamental to both Hegelian 
philosophy and the historicist movement. They allowed historians to conceive of the past in 
relation to a wider political and social framework, which many romanticists and historicists 
subsequently adapted to consider the ‘great men’ of the past in their times. Most importantly, 
he conceived of history as a science and instrument of the most genuine patriotic spirit.  
 
Wilhelm von Humboldt  
Humboldt adapted Herder’s ideals and postulated that people were almost completely confined 
within their political, social and ideological framework. Change was thus only possible when 
the minds of the people were prepared for transformations. This was achieved through gentle 
psychological directives, which defied the contemporary status quo. Any drastic changes 
forced upon a context, however, would end in disastrous consequences19. Thus, Humboldt also 
laid the groundwork for a determinist reading of history, wherein society was bound by its 
framework and its subjects were powerless to bring about or resist change. Later thinkers, 
including Mommsen, conflated this idea with romanticist sentiments of the individual, thereby 
allowing only the greatest individuals to bring about change, but at a great cost.  
 
                                                 
was an individual entity which exercised its will to achieve its requirements as seen fit. Hence, the use of military 
force could not be considered an outright evil, so long as it actively benefited the state. This resulted from the 
relativist aspects of historicism, whereby no act can be immoral because all decisions originate from the 
innermost, individual character of a being. Ironically, this fundamental relativist notion ultimately destroyed the 
tenability of historicism because it logically proceeded to both post-modernist and nihilist perspectives. The 
former marginalised historical studies with perspective becoming the quintessentially defining force in 
historical narratives, while the latter rejected the significance of knowledge outright. See: Friedrich Engels-
Janosi, The Growth of German Historicism, John Hopkins Press (Baltimore, 1944). 
17 Johann Gottfried Herder, (Older Critical Forestlet [excerpt on history]), in Herder: Philosophical Writings, Ed. 
D.M. Clarke and M.N. Forster, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge, 2002), 258. “If history [Geschichte] 
in its simplest sense were nothing but a description of an occurrence, of a production, then the first requirement 
is that the description be whole, exhaust the subject, show it to us from all sides.” 
18 Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit (A Philosophy of History for the Formation of 
Humanity), F.A. Brockhaus, (Leipzig, 1869). 
19 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen (Ideas 
on an Attempt to Define the Limits of the State’s Sphere of Action), Verlag von Eduard Trewendt (Breslau, 
1851), 239. This text was originally written in 1791.  
Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Sphere and Duties of Government (The Limits of State Action), Trans. Joseph 
Coulthard, John Chapman (London, 1854), 239. 
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Importantly, Humboldt later saw the state as a metaphysical reality, which rested on “manners 
and customs, language and literature”20, thus emphasising the concept of Volk (the people) as 
a historical force whose only aim was to attain cultural individuality and sovereignty. This 
consequently resonated in historical and social studies throughout the nineteenth century. Later 
in his career, Humboldt deemed history a study of living and not dead matter. In this 
schematisation of history, a physical historical reality was comprehensible when the living’s 
inner essence was understood in its totality. To accomplish this, one must view a historical 
figure under fixed conditions at a certain point in time (i.e. context)21. This idea was 
fundamental to all historicist works. A few later historians merged these ideas with Hegel’s 
social construct, wherein an individual could embody the collective spirit of a society. 
Mommsen’s Caesar, for example, perfectly typifies this process (see below). 
 
Leopold von Ranke 
Finally, Ranke popularised the methodological framework, which dictated historicist and all 
subsequent approaches to history. In a critical appendix within his Geschichte der romanischen 
und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514 (Histories of the Romantic and Germanic Peoples 
from 1494 to 1514) titled Zur Kritik neurer Geschichtsschreiber22 (On the Critique of Recent 
Historians) Ranke took Niebuhr’s critical principles23, wherein primary evidence was 
scrutinised for its veracity, and applied them to a discussion of modern sources. He thus 
developed the concepts of peer review and literary criticism, which underpin modern academic 
discourse. This further promoted historical discourse as a scientific discipline which recorded 
events of the past ‘as they really were’ (wie es eigentlich gewesen)24. 
 
Historicism was the dominant discourse of Germanic historical writing throughout the middle 
and latter portions of the nineteenth century. Its dominance originated in the political and social 
contexts of its progenitors, who predominantly resided in and around Prussia. It developed the 
concept of history as an impartial discipline, which enhanced the social significance of 
historical thinkers. It thus influenced Niebuhr and Mommsen, despite neither of their histories, 
at least those considered in this thesis, being strictly historicist readings of Rome.  
 
Determinism 
Determinism was a methodological offshoot of historicism’s impartial and objectivist reading 
of history. It is, by definition, a philosophical doctrine that espouses the idea that all events in 
history are guided by the virtue of necessity, and therefore inevitability. It thus relies on strict 
notions of causality and diminishes the significance of the past being dictated by the actions of 
                                                 
20 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Denkschrift über die Deutsche Verfassung (Memorandum on the German constitution), 
in Gesammelte Schriften, XI, (Berlin, 1813), 97. [95-112] 
21 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Über die Aufgabedes Geschichtsschreibers (On the Historian’s Task), in Gesammelte 
Schriften, IV, (Berlin, 1821), 2. 
22 Leopold von Ranke, Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtschreiber, G. Reimer (Berlin, 1824). 
23 G.G. Iggers, The German Conception of History. “When Ranke applied critical methods to modern historical 
texts, he was consciously indebted to Barthold Georg Niebuhr’s critical approach to Roman History.” 
24 H.B. Adams, Leopold von Ranke, In American Historical Association Papers, III (Indiana, 1888), 104-5. 
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rational agents. In short, it assumes that free will cannot exist and that all events are essentially 
an unbroken chain of circumstances of which no single link can be altered. 
 
Nationalism  
Nationalism was an important ideal for many European states throughout the middle of the 
nineteenth century25. This was particularly true in Prussia, where the Romanticist movement 
had strengthened the notion of German social and cultural unity and fuelled German national 
sentiments since the late eighteenth century. Its popularity soared after Napoleon’s invasion of 
Prussia in 1806, which threatened German cultural sovereignty, and was potent in 1848 when 
Prussia was engulfed in revolutionary action. These were ultimately fuelled by fears of external 
incursion, as discussed previously. 
 
Nationalist thinkers identified several key components for any unified social group. These were 
language, cultural practices, and social beliefs, which marginalised Germany’s prior fixation 
on political boundaries. This deduction was aided by the metaphysical conceptualisation of 
society as an individual entity unto itself; a conception which stemmed from Romanticism’s 
fixation on the importance of the individual. Nationalist intellectuals thus likened the state to 
the human body, as both were comprised of several constituent elements, which all needed to 
work in harmony for its survival. The state (and on a larger scale the nation) was thereby a 
conglomeration of entities26, which, if left unprotected, would perish to external ideologies. 
This promoted a personal connection between citizens and state and fuelled xenophobic and 
militaristic tendencies. Mommsen himself was not immune to these ideologies, despite his 
ardent liberalism.  
 
                                                 
25 Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum Und Nationalstaat: Studien Zur Genesis Des Deutschen Nationalstaates, 
R. Oldenbourg (Munich, 1922); Frank Lorenz Müller, ‘The Spectre of a People in Arms: The Prussian 
Government and the Militarisation of German Nationalism, 1859-1864’, in English Historical Review, Vol. 
122, No. 495. (2007), 82-104; Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, 
Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914, Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 2014). 
26 These idiosyncrasies were prevalent throughout historicist projections of the world, irrespective of subject 
matter. For example, representational similarities have long been noted between Mommsen’s Roman world, 
Von Ranke’s fifteenth century Italian society, and Von Sybel’s revolutionary France. See: A. Guilland, Modern 
Germany and Her Historians, Jarrold & Sons (London, 1915). 
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3.3. Barthold Georg Niebuhr 
Barthold Georg Niebuhr1 (1776 - 1831) was Germany’s most prominent Roman historian prior 
to Theodor Mommsen. His most significant work was the Römische Geschichte2, wherein he 
created a structural framework for the study of Rome’s earliest history through an inductive 
analysis of Livy. Niebuhr also received wide praise for his critical methodology3, which was 
considered the forebear to the true study of the classics. He was born in Copenhagen in 1776, 
the son of the prominent German geographer Carsten Niebuhr. The family moved to the 
kingdom of Denmark in search of work, a decision common amongst middle-lower class 
Prussian families living on the border between Prussia and Denmark. The nature of Prusso-
Danish interaction and constitutional law during this period made this a great opportunity for 
educated Prussians to join the ranks of the Danish bureaucracy, thereby increasing their social 
status. Due to Niebuhr’s childhood circumstances, his affections were divided between Prussia 
and Denmark (see above). This was typical throughout the region and was not culturally 
divisive until the middle of the nineteenth century when Prussian society was engulfed by a 
nationalist driven revolution. Niebuhr’s early education was provided by his father. By 1794 
he was already a classical scholar proficient in several languages (including Latin, Greek, 
German, English, French and Danish). Niebuhr was influenced by enlightenment ideology as 
evidenced by his reverence for the classical past, which was a product of his eighteenth-century 
education4. Niebuhr was a key historical thinker who promoted the notion that the study of the 
past is a process of rationalising the evidence (or lack thereof), thence formulating the likeliest 
conclusions. He was also considered a leader in Germany’s Romantic Movement and a symbol 
of the national spirit in Prussia after the battle of Jena in 18065.  
 
In the wake of Herder’s development of the historicist method, the notion of contexts and 
contextualisation soared in popularity. This posed a major threat to the principles of universal 
history as a means of understanding the past. The historicist movement became increasingly 
significant throughout Niebuhr’s life, although he grew progressively less comfortable with its 
inherent relativism. Niebuhr was also troubled by the effect that the contextualisation of the 
ancient past had on historical studies. He believed that it required increased specialisation, 
which isolated the discipline and made it inaccessible to all but the literary intelligentsia. He 
considered works of classicists overly critical and progressively less relatable, which detracted 
from the charms of studying the ancient past. By the end of his life, he felt alienated by the 
                                                 
1 Robert James Niebuhr Tod, Barthold Georg Niebuhr, 1776-1831: an Appreciation in Honour of the 200th 
Anniversary of his Birth, Printed by Nicholas Smith at the University Library (Cambridge, 1977), 1-14; Francis 
Lieber, Reminisces of an Intercourse with George Berthold Niebuhr the Historian of Rome, Richard Bentley 
(London, 1835); Barthold G. Niebuhr, The Life and Letters of Barthold Georg Niebuhr. With Essays on his 
Character and Influence, Harper and Brothers Publishers (New York, 1852). 
2  Barthold G. Niebuhr, Römische Geschichte, Verlag von G. Reimer (Berlin, 1836). 
3 Mommsen himself admitted this. Theodor Mommsen, Reden und Aufsätze von Theodor Mommsen, 
Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung (Berlin, 1905), 198. “…historians, at least those who deserve the title, are all 
Niebuhr’s students, not the least being those who do not belong to his school.”  
4 Peter Hanns Reill, ‘Barthold Georg Niebuhr and the Enlightenment Tradition’, in German Studies Review 
(1980), 9-26. 
5 J.L. Talmon, Romanticism and Revolt: Europe 1815-1848, Thames and Hudson (London, 1967), 121-34. 
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direction that the classics had taken within Prussia, despite being considered one of its founding 
fathers.  
 
The Lectures on the History of Rome 
Much like Niebuhr’s general ideological stance, the Lectures on the History of Rome 
exemplifies the crossover of the enlightenment tradition with those of Romanticism and 
Historicism. It was an enlightenment work in its scope, which spanned a thousand years of 
Roman history, wherein only the most notable events are fleetingly analysed. It also has 
Romanticist characteristics, as it focused on the great individuals of Roman history and how 
Caesar shaped the Late Republic. Additionally, it foreshadowed historicist thought with its 
source criticism and rationalised extrapolations in the absence of evidence. These later became 
the cornerstones of ancient historical inquiry.  
 
The Lectures on the History of Rome exhibits Niebuhr’s distinct methodological approach. 
However, its composition was not typical. The work is an assemblage of transcribed lectures 
collected from the notes of his pupils, which Niebuhr gave between 1828-9 whilst professor of 
Roman history at the University of Berlin. Thus, its aims are immediately different to any of 
Niebuhr’s other works. The Lectures on the History of Rome were posthumously published as 
a testament to Niebuhr’s immense knowledge. It thus aimed to preserve his legacy by offering 
an informative overview of Roman history when he was considered Prussia’s most 
accomplished scholar in this field. This has further implications. Because it was published in 
his honour, the work preserves remarks, which Niebuhr may have removed had he himself 
published the collection. This is particularly evident in Leonard Schmitz’s English edition, 
wherein he stressed the importance of maintaining the work’s authentic feel and character 
through an honest rendition of the original lectures. Niebuhr’s opinions are thus preserved with 
all their controversy. The work has other textual flaws. For instance, it was compiled from the 
lecture notes of Niebuhr’s students, whose attentiveness and individualised interests remain a 
prominent variable in regards to what has survived. This issue is somewhat mitigated by the 
vast collection of notes. However, doubts remain in regards to the depth of the sources, which 
Schmitz himself confesses in the work’s introduction6. Finally, the editor’s control over the 
surviving text, including its arrangement and organisation of the sources, are important. After 
all, the work exhibits Schmitz’s interpretation of Niebuhr as much as it preserves Niebuhr’s 
understanding of Rome. The interpretive onus ultimately rests on him7.  
 
                                                 
6  B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Rome, From the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Western Empire, 
Vol. 2, Ed. and Trans. Dr. Leonard Schmitz, Published by Taylor, Walton and Maberly (London, 1849), viii 
(preface). “It is, however, not impossible that this brevity (of the last chapters) may arise from the fact, that the 
students on whose notes they are based, were less anxious to take down every remark of Niebuhr, and noticed 
only the principal events mentioned by the lecturer. Few students, moreover, were present during the concluding 
part of the course, so that the manuscript notes collated by the German editor, were much fewer in number than 
those relating to the earlier history.”  
7  B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Rome  ¸Vol. 2, viii (preface) “…I have divided the additional portion 
of the history into eight lectures, without, however, being able to answer for the correctness of that division, 
which will appear the more doubtful when we consider the extreme brevity of those last lectures.”  
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Despite these anomalies, a brief glimpse into Niebuhr’s conception of the late Roman republic 
survives in this text. Yet it is substantial enough to signify Niebuhr’s opinion, methodology, 
and the origin of the anti-Pompeian paradigm.  
 
Niebuhr’s Pompey 
Niebuhr’s Lectures on the History of Rome was the first Roman history to perpetuate an anti-
Pompeian reading of the late republic. Its perspective was fuelled by Niebuhr’s Caesar-centric 
reading of the late Republic8, which stemmed from contemporary Prussian politics and social 
concerns9. Caesar, more than any other Roman figure, embodied Prussia’s answers to 
numerous contemporary social issues in Prussia (see section 2.1-3.). He represented Prussian 
liberal ideals as a populist politician, who sought to redress the injustices of his country’s ailing 
political system and ensure that it achieved its potential. Furthermore, he was a perfect 
statesman. According to Niebuhr, Caesar was intelligent, pragmatic, and a highly skilled 
commander who through force advanced Rome’s cause without impunity10. The Gallic war 
proved this, as Caesar had vanquished Rome’s remaining greatest military threat and expanded 
the borders. These too reflected Prussia’s hyper-nationalistic sentiments during the early-mid 
nineteenth century. Finally, Caesar also destroyed traditional Roman power structures and his 
successes led Rome into a golden age. These ambitions were fundamental to all Prussian 
liberals, including Niebuhr and Mommsen, who sought to overthrow the Junker system and 
promote governmental growth and meritocracy. Accordingly, Caesar’s representation is 
fundamental to understanding Pompey within Prussian works of Roman history. They are 
without exception intertwined.  
 
Niebuhr is brutal in his analysis of Pompey. He briefly praises Pompey’s early achievements, 
which included the Sullan civil war, Sertorian, piratic, and Mithridatic wars, conceding that 
certain aspects of these were admirable11. Yet he also emphasises Pompey’s luck in each 
                                                 
8 B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures On Roman History, Vol. 3. 32. “Among the features which are particularly characteristic 
in Caesar, I must mention his great openness, lively disposition, and love of friendship…Great qualities and 
talents alone were sufficient to attract him, and this circumstance led him to form friendships with persons 
whose characters were diametrically opposed to his, and who injured his reputation.”  
9  Hegel first determined Caesar as the embodiment of Rome’s destiny. He placed Caesar as the central figure for 
this period. See Hegel: Philosophy of History, 313. “His (Caesar’s) position was indeed hostile to the republic, 
but, properly speaking, only to its shadow; for all that remained of that republic was entirely powerless. Pompey, 
and all those who were on the side of the senate, exalted their dignitas auctoritas – their individual rule – as the 
power of the republic, and the mediocrity, which needed protection, took refuge under this title. Caesar put an 
end to the empty formalism of this title, made himself master, and held together the Roman world by force, in 
opposition to isolated factions.” 
10 Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, Thames & Hudson (London, 1983), for explanations on the 
modern constructs of Caesarism and its popular derivation, Bonapartism.  
11 B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Rome, Vol. 2, 403. “There can be no doubt that he had distinguished 
himself very much in the social war under Sulla... The war against the pirates was well planned and speedily 
concluded; that against Mithridates was not difficult indeed, but Pompey showed himself resolute and active in 
employing the means which he had at his command.”  
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exploit, which undermined any positive aspects. Henceforth he is critical of Pompey’s 
numerous faults12 and suggests that these negatively affected his career. He states:  
I will not deny that I have a dislike for Pompey; for I know that, from weakness and 
vanity, he was a different man at different periods of his life, and that in his later years 
there was a great falling off in his character, which cannot have been the consequence of 
old age, since, at the time of his death, he was not above fifty-six or fifty-seven years 
old.13 
 
Niebuhr subsequently uses this platform to deride Pompey’s every flaw, while creating 
foundational negative paradigms. These representations frequently transcend and manipulate 
the ancient tradition beyond recognition. Moreover, they maintain a falsely logical consistency 
by selectively reading the evidence. For instance, Niebuhr highlights Pompey’s jealousy of 
Caesar, his cowardly fear of the Clodian faction, his ineptitude at being a loyal friend, and his 
potential for cruelty14. Yet each comment ignores positive portrayals of Pompey, which exist 
in the evidence15. For example, Niebuhr relies on Lucan16 and Lucius Annaeus Florus’ 
evidence17 for his portrayal of Pompey and Caesar’s friendship, but ignores Lucan’s positive 
representation of Pompey18. Otherwise, he substantiates this argument through a selective 
reading of circumstantial evidence. We saw in the previous chapter that the ancient record 
highlights Pompey and Caesar’s mutual respect. It thus stressed the importance of external 
political factors, which saw the civil war, which Pompey and Caesar both wished to avoid, 
become reality19. These discrepancies, between the ancient evidence and Niebuhr’s reading, 
render the Lectures on the History of Rome entirely subjective. Moreover, they highlight how 
Niebuhr’s fundamentally Prussian preconceptions20, wherein Caesar was an ideal statesman, 
determined the entire late republic period. Niebuhr accordingly marginalised Pompey as an 
                                                 
12 B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Rome, Vol. 2, 403. “It is very difficult to pronounce a decided opinion 
upon Pompey: he is not one of those characters whose outlines are clear and indisputable, as in the case of 
Marius, Sulla, Sertorius, and Caesar; and it is even difficult to say whether he was a great general or not: he was 
one of those men who, in order to be great, must be favoured by fortune, if not throughout, at least up to a certain 
point. He did not possess sufficient strength and greatness to act consistently throughout life, in good as well as 
in evil days, and to be the same under all circumstances.” 
13 B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Roman History, Vol. 2, 404. 
14 B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Roman History, Vol. 2, 403. “If, on the other hand, we consider him in his civil 
proceedings, especially during the period from his triumph until the war against Caesar, it cannot be denied that 
he had a cowardly fear of the Clodian faction, and that he had a mean jealousy of Caesar, whom he designedly 
wished to keep down, and to whose superiority he would be blind, although he knew it. In the accusation of 
Cicero, he behaved in a cowardly way; he was in fact, never a trustworthy friend. In the time of Sulla, when he 
was yet a young man, he was cruel, and Cicero himself does not doubt that, if the civil war had taken a different 
turn, Pompey would have displayed the same cruelty as Sulla.”  
15 For example, Niebuhr ignores numerous positive commentaries on Pompey’s achievements. See: Cic. leg. Man; 
Val. Max. 8.15.8; Vell. Pat. 2.29.5; Plin. NH. 7.26.96-8; Front. Strat. 1.4.8; Flor. Epit. 41.6.13-4; Plut. Pomp. 
28.2; 31.2-3; App. Mith. 14.96; Dio Cass. 37.20.2. 
16 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.125-6. “Caesar could no longer endure a superior, nor Pompey an equal.” 
17 Flor. Epit. 2.13.14. “(Caesar’s growing power) inspired the envy of Pompey, while Pompey’s eminence was 
offensive to Caesar”. 
18 He later comments that Lucan’s poems are bad. See: Niebuhr, Lectures On Roman History, Vol. 3, 32. 
19 See: App. Bell. Civ. 28.1. 
20 The right of the militarily strong over the weak was natural to a Prussian historian who wrote during a period 
of increased social militarisation, governmental authoritarianism, and paranoia. 
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inferior statesman and considered him foolish for attempting to resist Rome’s destiny. He 
remained consistent throughout the work by emphasising Pompey’s weaknesses, which in turn 
explained his inevitable defeat to Caesar. However, Niebuhr’s reading is inherently flawed and 
unabashed in its prejudices. Niebuhr successfully removed political agency from all but Caesar 
and conveniently ignored the simple fact that Rome’s politicians could not foresee the future21. 
He thus created a lasting tradition of the Roman past which flourished both because of Caesar’s 
popular appeal and the spread of Romanticist sentiments.  
 
Niebuhr also used physiognomics to illustrate how Pompey’s physical form reflected his 
intellectual inferiority to Caesar. He states:  
His head in statues and busts, which we have no reason to consider spurious, shews a 
considerable degree of vulgarity and rudeness, whereas Caesar’s head displays all his 
great intellectual activity.22 
 
This representation is both subjective and logically flawed per modern historical standards. 
There are several issues with this kind of subjective attack. Firstly, Niebuhr ignores the busts 
original context, wherein it was a favourable reproduction of Pompey which was intended for 
public display. Consequently, it needed to reflect common perceptions of Pompey’s physique. 
Plutarch states that Pompey was both attractive and charming23, and these characteristics 
reflected in the bust24. Niebuhr equally disregards how this piece exemplifies Pompey’s fame, 
and successes, while also exhibiting Roman concepts of virtue. Instead he imposes his notion 
of ‘Romanness’25, which invariably reflects both his Prussian context and appreciation for 
Caesar. In sum, Niebuhr failed to contextualise this bust and its purpose. While Niebuhr worked 
before modern practices were fully developed, his failure to include the relevant ancient 
evidence proves the prejudiced nature of his account. This methodology cannot be excused, as 
he was the progenitor of modern source criticism and analysis.  
 
Niebuhr demonstrates his Caesar-centric perspective and how this affected Pompey during his 
preamble to the civil war. He states:  
He (Caesar) was perfectly free from the jealousy and envy of Pompey, but he could not 
tolerate an assumed superiority which was not based upon real merit. Bad as Lucan’s 
poems are, the words in which he describes this feature in Caesar’s character are truly 
great. Pompey could not bear to see Caesar standing beside him, and Caesar could not 
endure the pretension of Pompey to stand above him, for he knew how infinitely inferior 
he was.26  
 
                                                 
21 Cic. Fam. 15.15.2. (SB 174). 
22 B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Roman History, Vol. 2, 403-4  
23 See: Plut. Pomp. 2. 
24 Pliny makes a similar comment. See: Plin. NH. 37.6. 
25 Hegel succinctly summarises Prussian preconceptions of Rome in his Philosophy of History. See: G.W.F. Hegel, 
Philosophy of History, 306-15. 
26 Niebuhr, Lectures On Roman History, Vol. 3, 32.  
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Here Niebuhr illustrates several underlying facets of his reading of the late republic. He 
highlights his determinist tendencies, wherein he maintained Caesar above his peers and 
marginalised Pompey, “who knew how infinitely inferior he was”27. As discussed previously, 
this perspective originated from Niebuhr’s inability to read this period without working toward 
a determined ending (i.e. Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus). Niebuhr also reveals that his polarised 
reading, which separated the just and unjust, was the product of a selective methodology. In 
sum, Niebuhr was unwilling to consider all the ancient evidence. This consequently fuelled his 
hostile treatment of Pompey. Moreover, Niebuhr’s harsh criticism of Lucan’s poetry supports 
this. Here Niebuhr subjectively criticises the poetry without any extrapolation, while also 
selecting passages within the work to support his argument. As mentioned previously, Lucan 
was relatively sympathetic to Pompey28 and his poem somewhat counterbalanced other pro-
Caesarian evidence. Niebuhr thus distorted this evidence to imply that Lucan considered 
Pompey an inferior general.  
 
Niebuhr further exemplifies these historiographic issues with his depiction of Pompey’s 
cruelty, wherein he states: 
In the time of Sulla, when he (Pompey) was yet a young man, he was cruel, and Cicero 
himself does not doubt that, if the civil war had taken a different turn, Pompey would 
have displayed the same cruelty as Sulla.29 
 
This is a disputable claim on which the ancient evidence is polarised. Firstly, Niebuhr is 
selective in his use of the ancient evidence. He correctly cites Cicero’s letter to Atticus in 4930, 
but ignores other letters which highlight Pompey’s amiability and kindliness31. Niebuhr’s 
allusion to the Sullan civil wars is also removed from its context, which was characterised by 
its universal brutality32. Moreover, we have already examined the complicated picture which 
Plutarch presents of Pompey and Sulla during the civil war33. It was clarified that Plutarch 
dismissed the claims of cruelty, stating that Pompey allowed as many of Sulla’s political 
enemies to escape as possible34. Plutarch also questioned one source, Gaius Oppius, whose 
veracity was disputable because of his allegiance with Caesar35. The other areas of Pompey’s 
career provide mixed portrayals of his cruelty. The rest of Pompey’s career attempts to redeem 
                                                 
27 Niebuhr, Lectures On Roman History, Vol. 3, 32. 
28 See Section 1.11. 
29 B.G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Roman History, Vol. 2, 403.  
30 Cic. Att. 9.7 (SB 174) “For our Gnaeus is marvellously covetous of despotism on Sullan lines. Experto crede; 
he has been as open about it as he ever was about anything.” 
31 See: Cic. Fam. 1.1.2. (SB 12) and 1.8.1. (SB 19); Cic. Att. 1.16.11. (SB 16).  
32 For an example of Marius’ cruelty toward political adversaries, see: App. Bell. Civ. 1.10.88. 
33 Note Plutarch’s use of the passive to distance himself from this view. See: Plut. Pomp. 10.3. For discussion, 
see: section 2.4. Compare Val. Max. 4.5.5, 5.1.10 and 5.3.5. For discussion, see section 1.4.  
34 Plut. Pomp. 10.5. 
35 Plut. Pomp. 10.4-5. “Furthermore, Gaius Oppius, the friend of Caesar, says that Pompey treated Quintus 
Valerius also with unnatural cruelty. For, understanding that Valerius was a man of rare scholarship and 
learning, when he was brought to him, Oppius says, Pompey took him aside, walked up and down with him, 
asked and learned what he wished from him, and then ordered his attendants to lead him away and put him to 
death at once. But when Oppius discourses about the enemies or friends of Caesar, one must be very cautious 
about believing him.” 
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his errors under Sulla, as these likely resonated throughout his political career. For instance, 
Pompey treated the pirates with clemency when he resettled rather than executed them. On his 
return from the East, he allayed Rome’s fears by immediately disbanding his forces. Even 
during the civil war, he shows Roman hostages mercy and ensured that Romans only died on 
the battlefield36.  
 
This evidence suggests that Pompey suffered immensely from the accusations of cruelty 
levelled against him in his youth. These criticisms plainly followed him throughout his career, 
despite his continued attempts to prove his clemency. Nevertheless, Niebuhr’s characterisation 
of Pompey as cruel is stagnant. It neither accounts for his attempts to change throughout his 
career, nor for the full breadth of ancient evidence. Niebuhr thus overstated Pompey’s cruelty 
and relayed a simplistic reading which was blatantly hostile and didn’t account for 
discrepancies in the ancient evidence.  
  
Summary 
Niebuhr’s Lectures on the History of Rome created an influential approach for modern readings 
of late republican history. We have seen that Niebuhr’s views were both inherently favourable 
to Caesar and vitriolic to Pompey. Moreover, his methodology was questionable throughout, 
as he was selective with the evidence and consequently perpetuated questionable readings. 
These practices remain inexcusable, even when posterity factors in the work’s unusual 
publication process and Niebuhr’s contextual differences. Despite its flaws, Niebuhr remains 
known as ‘the father of the classics’ and his opinion shaped generations of Prussian scholarship 
throughout the nineteenth century. Most importantly, Niebuhr laid the groundwork for 
Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte. The two were certainly familiar, as Mommsen refuted 
Niebuhr’s theory on early Republican agrarian law in his Römische Geschichte. Moreover, 
Mommsen famously proclaimed Niebuhr’s importance to classical studies, stating that any 
‘historian’ who deserves that title was a student of Niebuhr37. 
                                                 
36 Plut. Pomp. 65.1. Note: Pompey should not be held accountable for Juba’s (the king of Numidia) decision to 
slaughter Caesar’s defeated forces in North Africa. This decision was taken without either the Senate or 
Pompey’s authority. 
37 T. Mommsen, Reden und Aufsätze von Theodor Mommsen, Weidmann’sche Buchhandlung (Berlin, 1905), 198. 
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Chapter Four: Theodor Mommsen  
 
When apparently the last eminent guest had long ago taken his place, again those three 
bugle-blasts rang out, and once more the swords leaped from their scabbards. Who might 
this late-comer be? Nobody was interested to inquire. Still, indolent eyes were turned 
toward the distant entrance, and we saw the silken gleam and the lifted sword of a guard 
of honor plowing through the remote crowds. Then we saw that end of the house rising 
to its feet; saw it rise abreast the advancing guard all along like a wave. This supreme 
honor had been offered to no one before. There was an excited whisper at our table—
MOMMSEN! —and the whole house rose. Rose and shouted and stamped and clapped 
and banged the beer mugs. Just simply a storm! Then the little man with his long hair and 
Emersonian face edged his way past us and took his seat. I could have touched him with 
my hand—Mommsen!—think of it!...I would have walked a great many miles to get a 
sight of him, and here he was, without trouble or tramp or cost of any kind. Here he was 
clothed in a titanic deceptive modesty which made him look like other men. 
Mark Twain, Mark Twain: A Pictorial Biography, (reprint 2002) 
 
Mark Twain’s anecdote is a striking example of the peak of Mommsen’s influence in 1892 
when he was Prussia’s most celebrated Classicist and scholar. From his first history, the 
Römische Geschichte which was published from 1854-1856, until his last, Mommsen 
dominated the fields of Classics and Ancient History and defined scholarly methodologies 
along with significant areas of study1. His fame and influence are demonstrated by the 
Römische Geschichte receiving the Nobel Prize for literature in 19022, some forty-eight years 
after the original publication of the first volume. Consequently, his career redefined 
fundamental conceptions of Roman history.  
  
Christian Matthias Theodor Mommsen was born to German parents in Garding in the duchy of 
Schleswig in 1817, which was ruled by the king of Denmark (see section 2.1.)3. He was raised 
in the town of Bad Oldesloe in Holstein, which was ruled by Prussia’s monarchy. Mommsen 
was born into a Lutheran family, his father being a Lutheran minister, but he renounced this 
faith later in life. Despite this, the Lutheran faith fundamentally shaped his work ethic. 
Throughout his career he was immensely productive and produced some 1500 scholarly works 
which varied across numerous historical periods, cultures, and disciplines. Mommsen’s 
education was comparatively modest as he was primarily home schooled during his youth, 
                                                 
1 I have used William Purdie Dickson’s translation of Mommsen’s text throughout, unless otherwise stated. 
Theodor Mommsen, History of Rome, Vols. 4 & 5, Macmillan and Co. (New York, 1901). For the German 
edition, I have used T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, Dritte Auflage, Dritter Band, Wiedmannsche 
Buchhandlung (Berlin, 1862). 
2  C.D. auf Wirsén, ‘Mommsen’s Award Ceremony Speech’, in Nobel Lectures: Literature 1901-1967, ed. Horst 
Frenz, Elsevier Publishing Company, (Amsterdam, 1969). 
3 For a brief but comprehensive catalogue of Mommsen’s early life and career see Francis W. Kelsey, ‘Theodore 
Mommsen’, in The Classical Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4, The Classical Association of the Middle West and South, 
Inc. (Jan, 1919), 224-236. See too Rebenich (2002); A. Demandt Theodor Mommsen: 30 November 1817-1 
November 1903 in W.W. Briggs and W. Calder III (eds) Classical Scholarship: A Biographical Encyclopaedia, 
Garland Publishing (New York & London, 1990): 285-309; William Warde Fowler (ed.) ‘Theodor Mommsen: 
His Life and Work’ in Roman Essays and Interpretations, Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1920): 250-68. 
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though he attended the Gymnasium Christianeum from 1833-7 where he studied Greek and 
Latin. Later, he studied jurisprudence at the University of Kiel from 1838 to 1843 and 
completed with a doctorate in Roman law. Because of his role in the political unrest in 1848, 
Mommsen was exiled from both Prussia and later Saxony, before he assumed a professorial 
position at the University of Zurich in Switzerland, where he was first approached about writing 
a narrative history of Rome. This work, the Römische Geschichte (‘History of Rome’), thrust 
him into the foreground of contemporary historical thought.  
 
4.1. The Römische Geschichte 
Niebuhr’s brief portrayal of Pompey was scathing. It was formed more by Niebuhr’s own 
context and opinion than by the ancient evidence upon which it was based, but his reputation 
as a teacher and intellectual enabled it to thrive in the succeeding generations. Mommsen’s 
Römische Geschichte adapted, modified, and popularised Niebuhr’s treatment of the late 
republic. His reading of the late republican political landscape resembles Niebuhr’s although 
it is less polarised and mythologised. However, his view of Pompey was also the result of his 
selective reading of the ancient evidence, the ambivalence of which Mommsen similarly failed 
to acknowledge. As attested by the previous chapter’s catalogue of ancient literary evidence, 
Pompey was a complex figure who was an authoritative and adept politician who was neither 
foolish, nor inept, despite evidence for errors and flaws.  
 
The Römische Geschichte outlines the early history of Rome until the battle of Thapsus in 46 
BC. It comprises three volumes, which were first published between 1854 and 1856. The work 
is a wide-ranging and vivid historical account, which focuses primarily on Rome’s political 
and military development and considers its dynamic social elements. Mommsen’s analysis of 
the late republican period led to a particular view of Pompey and Caesar. Put simply, his belief 
in the greatness of Caesar4, along with his own socio-economic, political and personal 
background, led him to see Pompey only as Caesar’s adversary. Consequently, Pompey was, 
for Mommsen, always the figure who was defeated at Pharsalus and who fell miserably on the 
sands of Egypt. This meant that Mommsen understated Pompey’s achievements, and ignored 
the nuanced reading of his character that we have noted in the ancient source tradition. The 
result is an awkward figure, which is more the product of Mommsen’s bias than a balanced 
reading of the ancient authors.  
 
The Römische Geschichte was generally well received and popular when it was first published5. 
It soon became a foundational Roman history for students, and remained so for more than a 
                                                 
4 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 305. “The new monarch of Rome, the first ruler over the whole domain 
of Romano-Hellenic civilization, Gaius Julius Caesar, was in his fifty-sixth year when the battle of Thapsus, 
the last link in a long chain of momentous victories, placed the decision as to the future of the world in his 
hands. Few men have had their elasticity so thoroughly put to the proof as Caesar – the sole creative genius 
produced by Rome, and the last produced by the ancient world…” 
5 Francis W. Kelsey, ‘Theodore Mommsen’, 225. 
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century after its original publication6. This shaped both contemporary and later impressions of 
the Roman past at a fundamental level7. However, it received some criticism for its lack of 
citations and footnotes which went against the historicist methodology prevalent at the time8. 
He was also criticized for his failure to mention points about which other historians took a 
different view9. Mommsen’s method was to offer his own view of things in an authoritative 
voice and omit opposing reconstructions. His opinions are thus thoroughly integrated into the 
narrative of the Römische Geschichte10. This was not apparent to his audiences unless they had 
conducted wider research or developed a specialised understanding of the period. Conflicting 
traditions were not considered equal in the Geschichte. The impact of the work ensured that 
this partial perspective survived beyond its immediate context.  
 
Contemporaries criticised Mommsen’s portrayal of individual political figures. Most notably, 
his epigraphist colleague Wilhelm Henzen questioned his portrayal of Pompey soon after the 
release of the first edition. In a letter to Henzen in 1856, Mommsen addressed this criticism, 
admitting that it was well founded; he needed to control the mood that the ‘supernumerary’ 
(Pompey) fired in him11. Importantly, he made no excuses for his disdainful opinion of Pompey 
and accepted that his portrayal was imbalanced. Moreover, although he claimed that the 
problem had been addressed in later editions of the work, the portrayal of Pompey remained 
blatantly hostile in the third edition, which was published in 1861.  
 
Mommsen also faced increased scrutiny in the years following the publication of the Römische 
Geschichte. Academic circles criticised his analysis of the fall of the republic as too simple. He 
was especially criticised for his blatantly pro-Caesar stance which bordered on ‘Caesarism’12. 
Furthermore, his affinity for Caesar was widely mistaken as a pro-monarchical statement13. 
                                                 
6 E.G. Sihler, ‘The Tradition of Caesar’s Gallic Wars from Cicero to Orosius’, in Transactions of the American 
Philological Association (1869-1896) Vol. 18 (1887), 20. 
7 J.L. Hilton, ‘Thedor Mommsen and the Liberal Opposition to British Imperialism at the time of the Second South 
African War of Independence (1899-1902)’, in Classical Receptions Journal Vol. 6 (2014): 48-73. 
8 A.N. Sherwin-White, ‘Violence in Roman Politics’, 2. 
9 A. Guilland, ‘Theodore Mommsen’, 143. 
10 A. Guilland, ‘Theodore Mommsen’, 138. “Knowledge with Mommsen is as objective as his judgements are 
subjective. In all the latter we can feel the influence of the ideas of his time. We find everywhere the National 
Liberal of 1848 with his wrath and rancour, his complaints and hopes.” 
11 L. Wickert, Theodor Mommsen: Eine Biographie, Vol. 3, Trans. Brian Croke (Frankfurt, 1969), 641-2. “Your 
rebuke of the first two books is perfectly founded; you will no longer recognise them in the new edition… You 
are quite right about Pompey and I will seek to control strictly the annoying mood which this supernumerary 
always fires in me.”  
12 H. Kloft and J. Köhler, ‘Caesarism’, in Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes edited by: Hubert Cancik and, 
Helmuth Schneider. Consulted online on 10 February 2015 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-
9347_bnp_e1306730>, first published online: 2006. “In the third edition of his Römische Geschichte, Mommsen 
attempted to correct and distance himself from this widespread impression (Caesarism) by inserting a passage 
[3. 477f.] that insists upon the uniqueness of the classical instance; where Caesarism develops under other 
circumstances, it is simultaneously a farce and a usurpation (Röm. Geschichte, vol. 3, 478). Nevertheless, 
Mommsen’s picture of a powerful and democratic king who founded a Mediterranean monarchy upon the ruins 
of decayed aristocratic rule (Röm. Geschichte, vol. 3, 567f.) had a great effect, not only in France, where 
Napoleon III himself produced a literary tribute to the brilliant general Caesar (Histoire de Jules César, I-II, 
1865/6), but also, and to an equal extent, in Italy and in the rest of Europe.” 
13 A. Guilland, ‘Theodore Mommsen’, 162. 
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These concerns were not, however, widespread and nor did they result in absolute rejections of 
Mommsen’s hypotheses. In fact, Prussian academic practice during the nineteenth century 
aided Mommsen’s enduring influence. German Professors (sing. Ordinarius) traditionally 
controlled the research of their subordinates, whilst also having the power to select like-minded 
scholars to act as their peers. This process of selection consequently marginalised academics 
who held differing views leading to their ostracism from German universities. The alienated 
were consequently forced abroad in search for work. This conservative system saw the 
Historicist tradition dominate in Germany far longer than was the case in the rest of continental 
Europe and Britain14. Mommsen, as a professor of Roman history at the University of Berlin 
from 1861-87, used this system to his advantage. He selected and subsequently moulded his 
pupils to foster similar historical views and practices. His cause was further aided by the 
University of Berlin’s prestige, alongside the high regard given to the German university 
system throughout America, England, and continental Europe at that time15.  
 
Eduard Meyer’s Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius was the only work in the 
early twentieth century, which denounced Mommsen’s reading of the late republic. However, 
it was poorly received when it was published in 1918 and thus barely influenced contemporary 
thought16. Within this work, Meyer postulated that Pompey was a crucial political precursor 
for Augustus’ principate. Meyer wished to moderate Mommsen’s portrayal of the ‘stupid’ 
Pompey and instead postulate that Pompey was a significant political force who shaped the 
eventual development of the Principate. The work would have an interesting afterlife in 
scholarship, but at the time Meyer found it very hard to keep a job in an academic landscape 
dominated by Mommsen and his school. 
 
                                                 
14 G.G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, 24. “Highly decisive for the relative lack of development of 
German historiographical theory was the manner in which the academic profession was recruited. No basic 
reform of the German university system had taken place since the establishment of the University of Berlin in 
1810. Only in very recent years have there been attempts at such reforms, which have so far had very limited 
success. The academic profession remained a closed caste. The Ordinarius retained not only an extremely high 
degree of control over the teaching and research activities of his subordinates, but in concert with his colleagues 
was able to restrict admission to the profession. The painful process of Habilitation, by which a candidate to be 
admitted to university teaching had to be adopted by an Ordinarius under whose direction he composed his 
Habilitationsschrift effectively, especially after 1871, restricted the admission of historians whose outlook or 
background did not conform with the academic establishment.”  
15 G.G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, 26. 
16 Matthias Gelzer, review of Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius, by Eduard Meyer, 
Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial und wirtschaftsgeschichte, 15 (1919), 522. “Caesars Monarchie und das Principat 
des Pompeius by Eduard Meyer which first appeared in 1918 is a dreadful book. In layout it is ugly and 
disjointed; its style is cumbersome and its length excessive. Furthermore the tone of the work is unnecessarily 
polemical, and it was unwise of the author to devote so much time castigating Mommsen’s interpretation of 
Caesar when he so obviously ignores other more recent research relevant to his subject.” (Trans. Brian Croke); 
Tenney Frank, ‘Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius (Book Review)’, in Classical Philology, 
Vol. 16, No. 2, (1921), 205-6. “This second edition contains a score of minor corrections of the first edition, 
which, published in 1918, reached but a few of our libraries… However, it would be unfair to imply that 
Professor Meyer has to any extent pressed his facts into the service of an argument.” See also: B. Croke, ‘Eduard 
Meyer’s Caesars Monarchie and its English Riposte’, in Athenaeum, Vol. 80 (1992), 219-32. 
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4.2. The Römische Geschichte: Influences and Method 
Mommsen’s world outlook (Weltanschauungen) shaped his perception of and approach to 
Roman history. The Römische Geschichte reflected its contextual philosophical, intellectual, 
and ideological movements which influenced Mommsen’s notions of history and society. 
Historical inquiry was first popularised throughout the Enlightenment period which idealised 
the Classical world as pure and worthy of emulation17. This had both a literary and an artistic 
impact on the Romanticist tradition as it developed in the nineteenth century18. Romanticist 
approaches differed from the Enlightenment tradition in that they avoided simply praising and 
idealising the Classical world. Instead, however, they stated that history recorded events which 
had consequences for the modern world. This resulted in a perception that history was 
relatable19, that is, able to reflect contemporary issues and even able to provide a road-map for 
the present. Narrative histories consequently became the most popular form of historical 
inquiry. This process was amplified by the increasing accessibility and affordability of books. 
Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte demonstrates this through his allusions to contemporary 
literature20, as well as to contemporary Prussian political and social concerns21. Consequently, 
Mommsen’s work spoke to its times and appeared at a moment that allowed it to become 
incredibly popular. It was an engaging and powerfully written insight into the Roman world, a 
world which seemed to offer a way forward for the present rather than a simple summary of a 
distant, if famous, era. 
 
Mommsen’s declaration that the unity of Rome was the binding source of its strength echoed 
and reinforced contemporary aspirations for a unified Germany22. Its engagement with German 
                                                 
17  Dan Edelstein, Enlightenment: A Genealogy, Chicago University Press (Chicago, 2010), 109. 
18 Tim Blanning, The Romantic Revolution, Hatchett (United Kingdom, 2012); James Engell, The Creative 
Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA, 1981). 
19 Nicola Kaminski, Romanticism, In Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes edited by: Hubert Cancik and Helmuth 
Schneider. Consulted online on 21 February 2015 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e15207950>, 
First published online: 2006. “Subsequently, it (F. Schlegel’s Studium) tended rather to channel the potential of 
ancient tradition into an integrative and per definitionem infinitely expandable concept of a Romantic “universal 
poetry” [2. 182]. Instead of a respectful distance which left the normative model unscathed, a model of 
performative interaction was introduced, which could develop both in the mode of “radical deformation” and 
of “creative instrumentalisation” [26. 249]. In any case, this model (Romanticism) involved Antiquity, until 
then absolutely separated from all other traditions, relativised as they were in their historicity, in a de-
hierarchising process of mixed traditions. Hand in hand with this went a breakdown of conceptual barriers that 
took place in a similarly process-oriented way. Thus, in the preface to his pre-Romantic Studium essay, F. 
Schlegel still formulated his goal relationally (“to determine the relationship of ancient poetry to modern, and 
the purpose of the study of Classical poetry in general and for our age in particular” [1. 207]), whereas Novalis, 
already a Romantic theoretician, transcendentally condensed the relation between ancient and modern around 
1798…” 
20 Theodor Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol.4, 454. “…Marcus Porcius Cato, a man of the best intentions and of 
rare devotedness, and yet one of the most Quixotic and one of the more cheerless phenomena in his age so 
abounding in political caricatures.” 
21 Zwi Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, Thames & Hudson (London, 1983), 20. “(Mommsen’s Rome 
resembled) London with the slave population of New Orleans, the police of Constantinople, the lack of industry 
of present-day Rome, and agitated by politics like the Paris of 1848.” 
22 Mommsen postulated that Roman unity was bound up in its military might which protected it from external 
incursion. These tenets were imperative for a highly militarised state like Prussia, which was wary of its 
neighbours’ military intentions. It was an aptitude common to most of the German-speaking peoples of the 
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Nationalism separated the Römische Geschichte from the historical practices of the 
Enlightenment tradition. Mommsen’s concept of Rome’s socio-political structure was shaped 
by Hegelian ideals of nationhood (see section 2.3.1.). Hegel saw society as a pyramidal 
structure beginning with the individual, who was then subsumed into a small community, such 
as a town, which was itself better off as part of a larger socio-political group united by social 
custom, language and political system23. Thus, individuals make up communities which 
themselves comprise nations. Mommsen considered Rome as an ancient example, indeed the 
ideal version, of the type of nation state that Prussia would do well to emulate. Thus, Rome 
and Prussia were temporally and geographically separated but, for Mommsen, they were bound 
by shared ideologies. Moreover, Rome was, above all, a lesson in what Prussia had the potential 
to achieve if it could replicate the genius of Rome - and of Caesar, the man who had 
underpinned the transformation of Roman history. 
 
Mommsen’s role as a political activist and writer during the 1848 revolutionary movements 
allowed him to use the liberal-minded Schleswig-Holsteinischen Zeitung as a platform for 
expressing his Prussian nationalist ideals within the Schleswig-Holstein region and specifically 
to advocate for a forceful settlement of the regional dispute with Denmark (See Section 3.1.). 
His rhetoric was effective yet so controversial that he was exiled from Prussia. Mommsen’s 
early career as a journalist was formative in more than one way. Along with enabling him to 
refine his political stance, it also taught him to write gripping prose for a wide audience. Both 
these aspects underpinned the later popularity of the Römische Geschichte. 
 
Mommsen’s history, however, was also shaped by the intellectual aspects and methods of the 
Prussian Historicist tradition. His methodological approach throughout the Geschichte was 
based on Historicist ideals despite being concerned with more general historical themes24. His 
approach was also shaped by an ardent faith in Militarism. As previously stated in the 
commentaries on Ranke (section 3.2.) and the chapter on Niebuhr, the Historicist school 
emphasised that historical practice must begin with a particular understanding of a context25. 
Thereafter, wider truths of a historical period would reveal themselves to a historian and their 
audience. Historicist studies were also characterised by their detailed analyses and criticisms 
                                                 
nineteenth century, who were anxious of their place within a rapidly changing industrialised world which 
teemed with superpowers on the verge of conflict. 
23 Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization, The Macmillan Company, (New York, 1966), 
46. “German romanticism deepened the study of language and speech. Its concern with the basic character of 
the organic community brought recognition that language was not just a useful vehicle for communication but 
that it was the repository of the deepest emotions and traditions of a people. Language is the vehicle of thought, 
hence the uniqueness of national languages.” 
24 This subverted historicist practice, and more closely resembled Hegel’s approach to history. See: G.G. Iggers, 
‘The Intellectual Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Scientific History’, in Oxford History of Historical Writing 
1800-1945, ed. S. Macintyre, J. Maiguashca, and A. Pók, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2016), 47. “He 
(Ranke) distinguished himself from G. W. F. Hegel, who attempted to proceed from the general to the particular, 
by insisting that the historian proceed from the particular.” See also: Leopold von Ranke, A Dialogue on Politics 
(1836), in The Theory and Practice of History, Trans. G.G. Iggers and Konrad Moltke, Published by Bobbs-
Merrill (Indianapolis, 1973), 63-4. “From the particular, perhaps, you can ascend with careful boldness to the 
general. But there is no way leading from the general theory to the particular.” 
25 G.G. Iggers, The Intellectual Foundations of Scientific History, 47. 
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of relevant contemporary evidence. While Mommsen used this framework to understand the 
nuances of the Roman world, he does not follow this methodology throughout the Römische 
Geschichte. For example, the work is entirely void of citations to either modern sources or the 
ancient evidence. Moreover, its authoritative tone and method assumed that its audience would 
accept Mommsen’s representation of the world unconditionally. Its conclusions were thus 
taken as fact rather than established by direct reference to the source material. The lack of 
critical review is astounding for a modern audience whose historical practice is dictated by 
methodical and careful citation and acknowledgement of theoretical frameworks and 
methodologies. However, it was considered an acceptable practice in the nineteenth century 
where the intellectual climate deemed historians among societies’ most respected, influential, 
and authoritative thinkers. Mommsen was thus considered a trustworthy expert on Rome, 
whose ancient and foreign history and customs were made comprehensible through his diligent 
research and accessible prose26.  
 
4.3. The Römische Geschichte: Notable Historical Themes:  
 
Law 
Mommsen’s training and education as a law student also shaped his approach to the socio-
political events explored in the Römische Geschichte. His earlier academic research in Roman 
jurisprudence at the University of Kiel between 1838 and 1843 focused on the early Republic’s 
agrarian laws. While this study does not relate directly with the late republic period covered in 
the Geschichte, it demonstrates his early interest in law as the very basis for Roman 
civilisation27. Mommsen conceived of the law as the embodiment of the State: an entity 
ideologically distinct from the political figures who enacted its enforcement and 
development28. The State, however, was a product of its laws. Furthermore, laws attest to 
Roman individual, social, and cultural perceptions. This was because the Roman legal system 
required the broad consensus of the populace to change the law. Mommsen saw this inclusivity 
a great strength in the Early-Middle Republic. Laws and the legal system thus offered 
Mommsen insight into each law’s contemporary socio-political movements and the methods 
that the senatorial elite used to adapt and subvert their dynamic political landscapes. Mommsen 
also recognised the flexibility of Roman law and its receptiveness to important changes and 
amendments. Legal, and by proxy, social change, helped Rome reach its ideal form, which, for 
Mommsen, was the moment that the Republic collapsed and was replaced by imperial rule. 
The Römische Geschichte frames these changes as an inevitable process towards Imperial 
Rome. This resonates throughout Mommsen’s documentation and interpretation of the late 
republic whereby he favours evidence and individuals that aided this outcome and treats the 
era’s more conservative and traditional elements with hostility. In sum, Roman law in the late 
                                                 
26 E. G. Sihler, ‘The Tradition of Caesar’s Gallic Wars from Cicero to Orosius’ in Transactions of the American 
Philological Association (1869-1896), Vol. 18 (1887), 20 best typifies Mommsen’s authoritative legacy: “It is 
hardly necessary to say in advance that none of the accounts, in point of fidelity and precision, can be compared 
to Merivale, or Mommsen, or Ranke.” 
27 Francis W. Kelsey, ‘Theodore Mommsen’, in The Classical Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4, The Classical Association 
of the Middle West and South, Inc. (Jan, 1919), 237. 
28 Francis W. Kelsey, ‘Theodore Mommsen’, 238. 
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republic provided a legally-verified record of socio-political factors which led invariably 
towards Rome’s imperial destiny.  
 
Military Glory 
Mommsen’s contemporary political views and his analysis of Rome in the Römische 
Geschichte were interrelated and influenced by his status as a member of the 
Bildungsbürgertum (educated middle-class) and his tendency towards Prussian liberalism29. 
Various other perspectives are apparent throughout his history. His approval of Rome’s militant 
aggression, particularly his glorification of Caesar’s destructive conquests in Gaul is 
particularly relevant30. This pro-militaristic attitude shocked foreign scholars in particular, 
especially among the French, who were more sympathetic to the vanquished and praised the 
more passive resolutions to conflict31. In Prussia, however, Mommsen’s outlook became 
increasingly common. Prussian scholars considered world history as an epic contest for 
political dominance and power. Nations and social orders were thus seen as embroiled in a 
struggle for survival, wherein the weakest was destroyed or subjugated without impunity32. In 
presenting Caesar and Pompey as polarised constructions, Mommsen reflected his 
contemporary anxieties instead of the Roman context. Pompey was accordingly presented as a 
conservative politician seeking continuity in a world that required change; he was a fool who 
                                                 
29 Prussian liberalism was starkly different from its British and French counterparts. Mommsen, like many of his 
Prussian intellectual contemporaries, regarded the emancipation of the landed peasantry from the Junker elites 
essential. This was because the subjugated peasantry was offered little social mobility and was used as tools to 
strengthen the position of the elite. Furthermore, Mommsen sought freedom of the press and increased political 
influence for fellow academic middle class citizens. Unlike British liberals, Mommsen and his contemporaries 
were against the notion of universal suffrage, which they believed would empower a class of unworthy and 
uneducated individuals. In his opinion, the Prussian state ought to be led by its greatest minds, not on the 
authority and guidance of the Hohenzollern dynasty or at the behest of the uneducated. Any inferior form of 
governance would disrupt Prussia’s sonderweg (special path), wherein every state/nation was an individual 
entity comprising unique characteristics and ideals (from culture, language and social customs), moving from 
the renaissance into and through the industrialist age. Mommsen and his contemporaries were thus precariously 
placed, appreciating the significance of authoritative government, yet undermining its power with demands for 
a greater share in political influence for a select group. 
30 For Caesar’s effect in Gaul see Plut. Caes. 15. “For although he fought in Gaul for somewhat less than ten years, 
he took over 800 cities and towns by storm, subdued 300 tribes, and in successive pitched battles against a total 
of 3,000,000 men he killed 1,000,000 and took the same number of prisoners.” 
31 A. Guilland, Modern Germany and Her Historians, Jarrold & Sons (London, 1915), 147. “This work is nothing 
but the glorification of force, even when it has been used against what is right. To Mommsen the vanquished is 
always wrong. He sides with Julius Caesar, that deceitful and cunning man, against what he calls the honest 
mediocrities of the senate. But even that is not enough, he must needs season his remarks with sarcasm. Nothing 
pleased him better than to ridicule the virtue of these honest but dense people.”  
A. Guilland, Modern Germany and Her Historians, 149. “That lack of generosity towards the small is one of the 
characteristics of Mommsen in his History of Rome. He is full of haughtiness when dealing with the peoples 
who were overcome by the Romans. All this typically German superior feeling is revealed in certain descriptions 
of his.”  
32 A. Guilland, Modern Germany and Her Historians, 144-5. “Mommsen’s philosophy of history is that of the 
struggle for life: internal struggles for the formation of political unity, external struggles to affirm the nation’s 
greatness: the whole history of Rome consists to him of a series of immense struggles... Then follow internal 
struggles : political struggles between patricians, plebeians, and those who had no citizen-rights, the first trying 
to lessen individual power for the advantage of the central power, the plebeians trying to win equality of power 
with the patricians, and those without citizen-rights and strangers struggling to obtain equal rights with the 
citizens.”  
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sought unwarranted power and respect. Caesar, on the other hand, embodied Rome’s greatness 
and virtuosity33. His intellect, diplomacy, political acumen, and ability to command were of 
the highest order and were all traits that modern Prussian intellectuals demanded from their 
leaders. Furthermore, Caesar proved that force could be justified if it was effective and for the 
greater good. By focusing on the immense hegemonic benefits Caesar’s Gallic wars brought to 
Rome rather than considering the destruction and mass casualties that the invasion brought 
with it, Mommsen was really saying that Prussia needed to act similarly if it was to assert its 
dominance in a nineteenth century world.  
 
Politics and Factions 
Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte promotes a forceful reading of Rome’s political parties, 
which have been either adopted or challenged by modern scholarship34. These also reflect his 
context. For example, he perceived the senate as a collection of the Roman elite formed into 
two distinct and ideologically opposed political parties (or factions). These two parties were 
the conservative Ultras (or Optimates in Anglophone scholarship) and Demokraten (lit. 
democrats, the Latin populares). For Mommsen, each senator was stringently confined to either 
group35. Most importantly, Mommsen postulated that senators who displayed shifting political 
allegiances were condemned by both groups. As a liberal Prussian, Mommsen naturally 
sympathised with the popularis cause, particularly when it was spearheaded by Caesar in the 
late republic. The Ultras, however, were depicted as doddering conservatives who were 
incapable of accepting or adapting to a changing political landscape. Mommsen’s assessment 
of Roman politics through the lens of modern Prussian parliamentary discourse is 
methodologically flawed as the Prussian concept of a parliament is linguistically and 
philosophically inapplicable to the Roman world36. Accordingly, Pompey’s complex political 
decisions throughout the ancient literary record fit into Mommsen’s rigid interpretation of 
Rome’s social elite poorly. Although Pompey was frequently a progressive political figure, he 
was ultimately defined in Mommsen’s record by his allegiance to the ‘Optimate’ cause during 
the Civil War. Mommsen uses Pompey’s political fluidity to exemplify the consequences of 
political indecision. This is particularly evident in the lead up to the civil war where Pompey 
betrays his popularis allegiances by deceptively cutting political ties with Caesar.  
 
Mommsen’s reading of political factions contributes to his negative characterisation of Pompey 
because he defied categorisation. Mommsen deemed Pompey an anomaly only driven by 
ambition and the need for adoration. This is why Pompey lost the civil war. His lack of political 
acumen meant that he obtained a position with which he was neither comfortable nor deserving.  
 
                                                 
33 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 305. “Few men had had their elasticity so thoroughly put to the proof 
as Caesar - the sole creative genius produced by Rome, and the last produced by the ancient world, which 
accordingly moved on in the path that he marked out for it until its sun went down.”  
34 Lily Ross-Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar, University of California Press (Berkeley, 1949). 
35 A.N. Sherwin-White, ‘Violence in Roman Politics’, in The Journal of Roman Studies Vol. 46 (1956), 1-2 argues 
that Mommsen attempted explain the conflict between Optimates and Populares by assimilating them to 
nineteenth century parliamentary terms, “parties, programmes, even democrats and conservatives were brought 
in”. This implies that seeing Rome in terms of a parliament by Prussian standards.  
36 A.N. Sherwin-White, ‘Violence in Roman Politics’, 1. 
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4.4. Mommsen’s Pompey 
This sub-chapter investigates Mommsen’s Pompey as a historical figure and how this relates 
to the ancient evidence. It is divided into four sections, which were selected according to 
Mommsen’s delineation of Pompey’s career. These are: Pompey’s early career (The Sullan 
civil war and Sertorian war), the peak of Pompey’s career (The war against the pirates and 
Mithridates), the latter stages of his career (The period of the so-called first triumvirate and 
civil war with Caesar), and his death. Furthermore, it traces the thematic elements of 
Mommsen’s characterisation of Pompey in the political, military, and social spheres.  
 
Mommsen employs various methods of selecting the ancient evidence to propagate his own 
views. He uses three key techniques in particular to construct Pompey. Firstly, Mommsen 
displays a selectivity whereby he omits ancient evidence that contradicts his portrayal of 
Pompey’s life. For example, he never references Cicero’s positive comments about Pompey in 
the Pro lege Manilia. Although Cicero’s evidence is no less problematic than others, it still 
offers an important insight into the positive aspects of Pompey’s reception among his 
contemporaries. This selectivity is present throughout the work, which actively garners a 
negative portrayal of Pompey. Secondly, Mommsen distorts the ancient evidence. His handling 
of the evidence varies from the subtle to the extreme: from removing it from its context entirely 
to more covertly adjusting its contents to suit his narrative.  
 
These instances are not accidental misinterpretations but are part of a calculated method for 
diminishing Pompey’s legacy. This, most seriously, leads to Mommsen fabricating aspects of 
Pompey’s character, investing him with faults which even the hostile elements of the source 
tradition do not emphasise. This is the most pernicious aspect of Mommsen’s Römische 
Geschichte. It is partially attributable to Niebuhr’s reading of Pompey, where the tropes of 
‘foolish’, ‘cruel’, and ‘weak’ Pompey originated. Mommsen refined these and, through this 
technique, invented a ‘stupid’ Pompey, which took root in scholarship and is still perceptible 
in recent treatments. 
 
Mommsen believed that Pompey epitomised the vices of the Late Roman Republican elite. 
Pompey was born into great wealth and blessed with immense luck37. According to Mommsen, 
it was these circumstances alone, which allowed him to be a leading political figure in the Late 
Republic38. Pompey thus symbolised the decay and the subsequent need for a transformative 
figure who could renew the vigour of the system. Hence, Pompey’s well-attested military 
achievements and position at the senate’s helm were contrasted against a timidity that 
prevented him from seizing sole authority over the state, a development that Mommsen 
considered not only necessary but inevitable. Mommsen’s Pompey was thus pusillanimous. He 
                                                 
37 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 273. “A good officer, but otherwise of mediocre gifts of intellect and of 
heart, fate had with superhuman consistency for thirty years allowed him to solve all brilliant and toilless tasks; 
had permitted him to pluck all laurels planted and fostered by others; had brought him face to face with all the 
conditions requisite for obtaining the supreme power - only in order to exhibit in his person an example of 
spurious greatness, to which history knows no parallel.” 
38 Cic. leg.Man. 52. 
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craved the acceptance and worship of his peers, rather than what was best for his country. 
Furthermore, he was a mediocre general and a poor politician39. Fortune granted him Lucullus’ 
command against Mithridates, thereby fostering his ambitions and filling his coffers with the 
East’s immense resources. Pompey was also a hypocrite who defied social conventions. He 
was routinely granted titles and political power before tradition permitted, and received 
commands without precedence. This included the command against the pirates, which handed 
Pompey unprecedented control of the entire Mediterranean and its territory fifty miles inland.  
 
Mommsen ultimately believed that Pompey’s career was a paradox. Pompey had the Roman 
world at his beckoning, yet neither capitalised on, nor cemented his dominance40. Furthermore, 
he was insincere in his ambitions and defined by his vanity. He thus typified the Republic’s 
problems and justified Caesar’s usurpation of traditional conventions. It is unsurprising then, 
that Mommsen considered him the single greatest detriment to Rome’s social, political, and 
military development41. Moreover, his ambivalence between conservative and radical positions 
made him untrustworthy and highlighted that his sole ambition was to dominate under the 
acceptance of his peers. Caesar, on the other hand, fought for noble reasons. He wished to both 
preserve his dignity and nobly advance Rome’s cause until the end. Consequently, Mommsen’s 
Roman political figures cannot be understood within a stagnant reading of their political and 
social standing. Rather, he imposed a deterministic reading of their respective ideological 
perceptions of Rome and its ultimate direction. He thereby simplified the history as a conflict 
of social ideologies, wherein the past was manufactured to appear as though it was moving 
down a special path (Sonderweg) toward an ultimate goal. This finale was Caesar’s conquest 
over his amoral enemies. Mommsen’s reading reduced key figures to a few core values and 
traits, which thereafter represented entire characters. These traits were selected to perpetuate 
his reading. As was illustrated in the opening chapter, Pompey was a multi-faceted figure in 
the ancient evidence and defies reductionist readings. Therefore Mommsen marginalised 
Pompey’s virtues and simplified his portrayal in defiance of the ancient evidence. 
 
Pompey’s Early Career 
Mommsen’s introduction to Pompey is a somewhat restrained prelude to subsequent themes. 
It outlines Pompey’s political impotence, his lack of leadership skills, his propensity for 
treachery, cruelty, vanity, his weakness, and stupidity. Mommsen remarks that Pompey was a 
                                                 
39 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 495-6. “It is probable that Pompeius, who was at a great distance and 
occupied with other things, and who besides was wholly destitute of the gift of calculating his political bearings, 
by no means saw through, at least at that time, the extent and mutual connection of the democratic intrigues 
contrived against him; perhaps even in his haughty and shortsighted manner he had a certain pride in ignoring 
these underground proceedings”.  
40 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 111. “The exceptional position of Pompeius even under the Gabinian, 
and much more under the Manilian, law was incompatible with a republican organization. He had been, as even 
then his opponents urged with good reason, appointed by the Gabinian law not as admiral, but as regent of the 
empire; not unjustly was he designated by a Greek familiar with eastern affairs King of Kings.”  
41 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 109. “Men were living in an interregnum between the ruin of the 
aristocratic, and the rise of the military rule; and, if the Roman commonwealth has presented all the different 
political functions and organizations more purely and normally than any other in ancient or modern times, it has 
also exhibited political disorganisation - anarchy - with an unenviable clearness.”  
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capable soldier42, who had physical prowess in youth and soundness of his mind, but goes on 
to say that Pompey’s mental endowments did not correspond with his unprecedented 
successes43, thereby suggesting his stupidity and already looking forward to the mental 
breakdown he would suffer at Pharsalus44. He then asserts that Pompey was neither a bad nor 
an incapable man, but thoroughly ordinary, stating that circumstances demanded he become a 
general and statesman when he was more suited to being a sergeant45. Even his description of 
Pompey as an excellent, intelligent, brave, and experienced soldier does not save a portrait of 
one of Rome’s most successful commanders from being underwhelming. Nevertheless, this is 
an underwhelming portrait of one of Rome’s most exemplary commanders. This passage 
highlights how Mommsen selects the evidence to manipulate and undermine Pompey’s 
portrayal and perpetuate his pro-Caesar reading.  
 
Mommsen’s representation of Pompey’s moral character also demonstrates negative 
undertones. He praises Pompey’s discretion regarding his wealth, stating that he was both too 
rich and cold to incur special risks when making money. However, he adds that Pompey’s 
disinterest in the disgraceful moneymaking schemes of his times was not an inherent personal 
virtue. Rather, his lack of interest in seizing others possessions was only admirable if it was 
compared to the greed typical of his times. He praises Pompey’s moral character and honest 
countenance, highlighting both his modesty in wealth and his decision to abolish the execution 
of captive generals after triumphs46. This is the only time that Mommsen praises Pompey and 
it is inconsistent with the rest of the discourse.  
 
Mommsen, having dealt with the commendable aspects of Pompey’s character, then moves to 
distances himself from them. The use of the passive voice is especially notable. For example, 
Pompey was “esteemed as a worthy and moral man”47 (Sein ehrliches Gesicht ward fast 
sprichwörtlich und noch nach seinem Tode galt er als sein würdiger und sittlicher Mann).  
 
Mommsen then turns to the recurring themes of treachery and coldness, stating that Pompey 
blindly followed Sulla’s orders during the civil war and unblinkingly administered the 
                                                 
42 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 272. “Sound in body and mind, a capable athlete, who even when a 
superior officer vied with his soldiers in leaping, running, and lifting, a vigorous and skilled rider and fencer, a 
bold leader of volunteer bands, the youth had become imperator and triumphator at an age which excluded him 
from every magistracy and from the senate, and had acquired the first place next to Sulla in public opinion…” 
43 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 272. “Unhappily, his mental endowments by no means corresponded 
with these unprecedented successes.”  
44 Plut. Pomp. 72.1. 
45 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 272. 
46 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 272-3. “His honest countenance became almost proverbial, and even 
after his death he was esteemed as a worthy man and moral man;  he was in fact a good neighbour, who did not 
join in the revolting schemes by which the grandees of that age extended the bounds of their domains through 
forced sales or measures still worse at the expense of their humbler neighbours, and in domestic life he displayed 
attachment to his wife and children : it redounds moreover to his credit that he was the first to depart from the 
barbarous custom of putting to death the captive kings and generals of the enemy, after they had been exhibited 
in triumph.” 
47 T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, Dritte Auflage, Dritter Band (Fünftes Buch), Wiedmannsche 
Buchhandlung (Berlin, 1862), 11. 
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execution orders for his allies. Pompey becomes cold, calculating, and driven by self-ambition. 
Moreover, he was “unimpassioned in either good or evil acts”48. Mommsen claims that this 
was more despicable than is stated in the ancient evidence, which only accused him of cruelty 
towards Carbo. He thus admits that he is distorting the ancient evidence. Mommsen then 
addresses Pompey’s political acumen, emphasising all weaknesses mentioned in the ancient 
record, but omitting positive assessments. He stresses Pompey’s tendency to blush at the 
slightest provocation, which he took as a sign of shyness, and his generally stiff, awkward 
demeanour on display at his public appearances49. Mommsen thereby manufactures a Pompey 
who was unfit for statesmanship or a political career. He then presents him as a pliant tool for 
those who knew how to manage him and specifically references his freedmen and clients. These 
comments all undermine Pompey’s authority. Mommsen then summarises his overall position 
with a scathing assessment:  
For nothing was he (Pompey) less qualified than for a statesman. Uncertain as to his aims, 
unskilful in the choice of his means, alike in little and great matters shortsighted and 
helpless, he was wont to conceal his irresolution and indecision under a solemn silence, 
and, when he thought to play a subtle game, simply to deceive himself with the belief 
that he was deceiving others.50 
 
Pompey was thus a stupid fool, incapable and unqualified for his role in contemporary politics. 
Mommsen reaches this judgement through a comparison with his peers, namely Caesar and 
Marius, concluding that Pompey was the most intolerable, tiresome, and starched of all 
artificial ‘great men’, whose political position was ‘utterly perverse’51. For the rest of the 
narrative, Pompey is likened to an inordinately mediocre third century BC Optimate, and as a 
delusional dreamer who believed in an innate greatness, which wasn’t apparent in reality. 
Accordingly, Pompey was: 
Thus constantly at fundamental variance with, and yet at the same time the obedient 
servant of, the oligarchy, constantly tormented by an ambition which was frightened at 
its own aims, his (Pompey’s) much-agitated life passed joylessly away in a perpetual 
inward contradiction.52 
 
Mommsen thus undermines his positive commentary and introduces key themes, which 
resonate throughout the Römische Geschichte. He highlights Pompey’s flawed character and 
his methodology for amplifying these vices, which were contested in the ancient evidence. 
 
The Sertorian Command 
Mommsen’s outline of the Sertorian war reveals the underlying idiosyncrasies of his 
conception of Roman society, its political figures, and their relation to his Prussian context. It 
                                                 
48 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 273. 
49 Quint. 11.1.36. refutes this portrayal. Mommsen substantiates this argument with one Ciceronian letter, Cic. 
Att. 2.21.4. (SB 41) and Velleius Paterculus’ account (Vell. Pat. 2.29.2-3), which he removes from its context. 
He thus distorts the ancient evidence. 
50 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 273. 
51 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 275. 
52 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 275. 
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is clear that Mommsen was not sympathetic toward traditionalist sentiments, either in the 
Roman world or in his own times. He saw the value in political and social change, which when 
combined with genius, bettered society. His determinist reading of history supported this 
conclusion with hindsight. After all, Mommsen perpetuated the belief that all civilizations were 
invariably moving toward an end, wherein societies rose, peaked, and then fell. Conversely, 
Mommsen’s attitude towards demagoguery was largely positive53. Mommsen’s Sertorius 
typifies this. He was a heroic figure who could have positively changed the Roman world in 
the right situation. Mommsen thus considered the destructive elements of Sertorius’ war 
essential for the liberation of the Roman people from the oligarchy, which dominated them. 
Sertorius’ failure was a precursor to Caesar’s later success, which saw Rome’s destiny realised. 
The theme of the extraordinary individual as an agent for social development is central 
throughout this sub-chapter and the Römische Geschichte generally.  
 
Mommsen’s account of the Sertorian war typifies his ‘great men’ reading of Roman history. 
Like his introduction for Pompey (see above) and Crassus, Mommsen outlines Sertorius’ 
character as a representative element of Roman society immediately after Sulla’s death. While 
Mommsen’s Pompey symbolised luck, stupidity, vanity, and self-serving politics, Crassus 
embodied greed and the absolute pursuit of economic dominance in this period. By contrast, 
Mommsen’s Sertorius was praiseworthy for his fight against the prevailing Sullan constitution, 
which had eroded the social conditions and advances granted to the wider populace. Sertorius 
was thus an agent for progress, who alone54 challenged conservative ideologies after Sulla’s 
proscriptions55. Mommsen substantiates this portrayal from his reading of Sertorius’ 
achievements and character. Firstly, Sertorius was the only capable ‘democratic’ officer at the 
time who could prepare and execute a war. Secondly, he was a genius who exceeded his peers 
in spirit, mind, and achievements. Finally, he was the only ‘democratic’ statesman “who 
opposed the insensate and furious doings of his party”56. Mommsen deduced this from 
Sertorius’ governorship of Spain57 and astounding success against Metellus58. Mommsen’s 
introductions for Sertorius and Pompey are thereby polarised between the ideal and the unjust. 
This distinction continues throughout his rendition of the Sertorian war. Conversely, the 
ancient record states that this war saw Pompey thrive as a military commander.  
 
                                                 
53 Clodius was the only major exception to this rule. Mommsen used him to illuminate the negative aspects of 
demagoguery. 
54 Mommsen disregards Lepidus, a former Sullan, who changed sides and fought for the democratic cause when 
it suited him. See: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 280. “Thus the leadership of the democracy, in the 
absence of a man with a true vocation for it, was to be had by any one who might please to give himself forth 
as the champion of oppressed popular freedom; and in this way it came to Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, a Sullan, 
who from motives more than ambiguous deserted to the camp of the democracy.”  
55 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 280. “But Caesar could only be the object of hopes for the future; and 
the men who from their age and their public position would have been called now to seize the reins of the party 
and the state were all dead or in exile.”  
56 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 282. 
57 Mommsen praises Sertorius’ governorship of Spain throughout the section. See: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, 
Vol. 4, 284-7. 
58 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 284. 
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Mommsen undermines Pompey’s acquisition of the Sertorian command by questioning the 
quality of the senate. He concedes that Pompey was as efficient and capable as any other 
senator despite his unconventional youth and political inexperience. Yet, this diminishes 
Pompey’s achievement because he was only an adequate choice among a pedestrian selection 
of senators. Mommsen acknowledges that Pompey’s demands were bold59 considering the 
extraordinary concessions the senate had already granted Pompey during the Lepidian revolt60. 
Pompey thus undermined Sulla’s constitution and set a political precedent almost immediately 
after Sulla’s death. In addition, he had elevated his political status, not having held civil office 
previously, and demanded an important provincial governorship and military command despite 
the opposition of the Optimates61. Mommsen’s pragmatic sensibilities respected this aspect of 
Pompey’s career, despite his active marginalisation of Pompey’s accession to the command.  
 
Mommsen diametrically opposes Sertorius and Pompey during the Spanish civil war. Within 
this construct, Sertorius’ position was defined by his military capabilities and organisation, 
which were undone by a lack of provisions. While Pompey enjoyed limitless resources and 
extorted further assistance, he was cautious throughout the war. For example, Mommsen 
highlights Sertorius’ decisive offensives against Celtiberian towns in which he quelled 
Metellus’ forces. Pompey, in the meantime, was slow to support and wilfully ignored the pleas 
from towns that needed his assistance62. Mommsen emphasises that Pompey’s actions were 
underpinned by a deliberate rationale, explaining that Pompey was conditioning his raw troops 
to the hardship of warfare, while also discouraging the Spanish forces who dreaded his arrival. 
However, Mommsen stresses that this was a foolish and vain self-overestimation on Pompey’s 
behalf, because the Spanish forces resisted his intimidation as can be seen from Pompey’s 
failed attempt to cross the Ebro63. Mommsen characterises this war as a struggle and 
accentuates Pompey and Metellus’ setbacks at the rivers Sucro64 and Turia where defeat was 
narrowly avoided. He attributes this to Sertorius’ genius guerrilla warfare tactics, which 
protracted the war for over five years and cost Rome immense manpower and resources65. 
                                                 
59 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 292. 
60 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 291. 
61 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 292. 
62 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 293. 
63 These events centred on the town of Lauro which itself supported the Roman cause. The ebb and flow of this 
battle sequence in the Römische Geschichte is significant because Mommsen credits Pompey’s soldierly 
abilities at a critical juncture. He emphasises that even Pompey’s great abilities were unable to salvage the 
battle, thereby foreshadowing Pompey’s ultimate victory over Sertorius. However, it is also mixed with 
criticism as Pompey’s innate cut-throat ambitiousness saw the battle take place before Metellus could arrive 
with reinforcements. Mommsen thus explains that Pompey unwisely sought the glory of victory for himself. 
See: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 295. “Pompeius offered battle beforehand to the main army of the 
enemy, with a view to wipe out the stain of Lauro and to gain the expected laurels, if possible, alone.”  
64 Pompey suffered a serious wound at this battle, and Mommsen duly comments on this. See: T. Mommsen, 
History of Rome, Vol. 4, 295-6.  
65 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 298. “In the main, however, it was neither their (the senate) fault nor 
the fault of the generals that a genius so superior as that of Sertorius was able to carry on this guerrilla war year 
after year, despite of all numerical superiority, in a country so thoroughly favourable to insurrectionary and 
piratical warfare.”  
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Accordingly, Mommsen refers to Pompey’s letter of ultimatum to the senate66, wherein he 
threatened to abandon the war and leave Italy unprotected if his call for assistance went 
unnoticed. Yet, Mommsen does not frame Pompey’s setbacks negatively and instead stresses 
Sertorius’ abilities67.  
 
This episode marks a contrast between Mommsen’s hyper-critical reading of Pompey’s actions 
during the civil war, where Mommsen knew that Pompey was destined for defeat. This leads 
him to assert that the only way the war could have been concluded was by internal division, 
because neither Pompey nor Metellus could defeat him. Mommsen postulates that Sertorius’ 
demise came about not because of them but from the gradual loss of his best officers during 
the conflict, alongside his inability to change the unpredictable and unreliable nature of the 
Spanish forces. Furthermore, Spain became progressively tired of the war and its costs68, along 
with the failure to achieve immediate results. Mommsen thus highlights that Sertorius’ only 
failure was the protraction of the war and disenfranchisement of the Spanish provinces, which 
were circumstances he could not control. Importantly, Perpenna’s assumption of command 
soon afterward led to Pompey’s victory. Mommsen thus emphasises Sertorius’ importance and 
ability as a commander69, while diminishing Pompey’s success as a victory over an inferior. 
 
Pompey’s Gabinian and Manilian Commands  
Even Mommsen struggles to fault Pompey’s commands against the Pirates and Mithridates. 
He accepts that these commands were legally exceptional70 and granted Pompey almost 
uninhibited and entirely unprecedented control of the Roman military and navy. Moreover, he 
stresses that Pompey was decisive in these wars.  
 
However, Mommsen’s treatment of the pirate command is brief. He outlines the Gabinian laws 
legal parameters as well as the social and political conditions which demanded it. This includes 
a brief commentary on Pompey’s popularity at this time, because there was an immediate drop 
in the price of grain when the Gabinian law was passed, which reflected the hopes attached to 
                                                 
66 Sall. Hist. 2.82.1. 
67 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 298. “Generals and soldiers carried on the war with reluctance. The 
generals had encountered an opponent far superior in talent (Sertorius), a tediously pertinacious resistance, a 
warfare of very serious perils and of successes difficult to be attained and far from brilliant; it was asserted that 
Pompeius was scheming to get himself recalled from Spain and entrusted with a more desirable command 
elsewhere.”  
68 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 299-300. 
69 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 302-3. “So ended one of the greatest men, if not the very greatest man, 
that Rome had hitherto produced – a man who under more fortunate circumstances would perhaps have become 
the regenerator of his country – by the treason of the wretched band of emigrants whom he was condemned to 
lead against his native land. History loves not the Coriolani; nor has she made any exception even in the case 
of this the most magnanimous, most gifted, most deserving to be regretted of them all.”  
70 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 105. “These measures of a man, who had just given so striking proofs 
of his vacillation and weakness, surprise us by their decisive energy (i.e. his conduct against piracy). 
Nevertheless the fact that Pompeius acted on this occasion more resolutely than during his consulate is very 
capable of explanation. The point at issue was not that he should come forward at once as monarch, but only 
that he should prepare the way for the monarchy by a military exceptional measure, which, revolutionary as it 
was in its nature, could still be accomplished under the forms of the existing constitution...”  
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the “expedition and its glorious leader”71. Mommsen adds that Pompey didn’t merely fulfil, 
but surpassed these expectations by clearing the seas of piracy within three months72. However, 
he omits any mention of Pompey’s clemency to the vanquished pirates, thus ignoring a well-
attested and widely praised Pompeian decision. This selective use of the ancient evidence 
assists his portrayal to remain in negative territory even at the moment when he acknowledges 
Pompey’s greatest success.  
 
Mommsen’s outline of Pompey’s Mithridatic war is long and, at least on the surface, neutral. 
Surprisingly, Mommsen supports Pompey’s decision to aid the Cretans73, which undermined 
Metellus’ proconsular power in Crete74. However, this approval springs more from 
Mommsen’s views about Roman politics than approbation for Pompey’s decision. Metellus 
was affiliated with the Optimates, while Pompey was at that time aligned with the Populares, 
or ‘democrats’75. Hence, Pompey’s positive portrayal reflects Mommsen’s disdainful opinion 
of the Optimates rather than any tenderness toward Pompey. Mommsen goes on to highlight 
Pompey’s abilities as a general at Nicopolis, where he bested Mithridates in Pontus, stressing 
that he achieved what Lucullus did not76. Yet, once again, Mommsen has an opportunity to 
disparage an Optimate, in this case, Lucullus77. Finally, Mommsen does praise Pompey’s 
generalship78 and administrative abilities79, but peppers his comment with an overlay of critical 
remarks80. 
 
Above all, this chapter of the Römische Geschichte reinforces the Mommsenian trope of 
Pompey’s luck. The theme has the effect of marginalising Pompey’s successes, so that his later 
definition of him as a failure can make better sense. It is luck which brings Pompey’s success 
                                                 
71 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4. 395. 
72 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 399. 
73 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 403. “This proceeding was, no doubt, not like that of a colleague; but 
formal right was wholly on the side of Pompeius, and Metellus was most evidently in the wrong when, utterly 
ignoring the convention of the cities with Pompeius, he continued to treat them as hostile.”  
74 The Cretans were begging for Pompey’s merciful intervention to avoid Metellus wrath, an issue in which 
Pompey could legally intervene. Mommsen stresses that Pompey denounced Metellus actions against the Cretan 
people, further stating that the entire episode proved Rome’s disorganisation at that time. 
75 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 404. 
76 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 409. 
77 Mommsen largely omits the political scuffle with Pompey in the East. See: Plut. Pomp. 31; Luc. 34; Dio Cass. 
36.46; App. Bell. Civ. 14.90-1. For example: Plut. Pomp. 31.4. “…but in the conferences which followed they 
could come to no fair or reasonable agreement, nay, they actually abused each other, Pompey charging Lucullus 
with love of money, and Lucullus charging Pompey with love of power…” See also T. Mommsen, History of 
Rome, Vol. 4, 407. 
78 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 415. “Pompeius was too experienced and too discreet an officer to stake 
his fame and his army in obstinate adherence to so injudicious an expedition...” 
79 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 428. “To create order amidst the chaos did not require either brilliance 
of conception or a mighty display of force, but it required a clear insight into the interests of Rome and of her 
subjects, and vigour and consistency in establishing and maintaining the institutions recognized as necessary.”  
80 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 446. “Lucullus reaped their (the East’s) fruits himself; when his 
imprudent conduct wrested from him all the results of his victories; Pompeius left it to his successors to bear 
the consequences of his false policy towards the Parthians. He might have made war on the Parthians, if he had 
the courage to do so, or have maintained peace with them and recognized, as he had promised, the Euphrates as 
boundary; he was too timid for the former course, too vain for the latter…” 
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over Mithridates81, and it is luck which brings Tigranes to surrender unconditionally82. 
Mommsen emphasises the importance of Phraates’ invading force, weakening Tigranes’ 
position, implying that fortune had aided Pompey, who was actually occupied with Mithridates 
at the time. Mommsen also underlines how the flimsy dynamic of Tigranes’ household aided 
Pompey. This weakened the Armenian position and Mithridates’ faith in his ally Tigranes, who 
suspected Roman involvement83.  
 
Mommsen’s conclusion to this chapter reflects his attitude to Pompey and forecasts his failures. 
Mommsen states:  
It was no miraculous work, either as respects the difficulties attained; nor was it made so 
by all the high-sounding words, which the Roman world of quality lavished in favour of 
Lucullus and the artless multitude in praise of Pompeius. Pompeius in particular 
consented to be praised, and praised himself, in such a fashion that people might almost 
have reckoned him still more weak-minded than he really was.84 
 
He thereby reinforces the theme of luck, while also stressing Pompey’s vanity, weakness, and 
stupidity or weak-mindedness. This paragraph typifies how Mommsen distorts the ancient 
evidence and sullies Pompey’s portrayal. Mommsen thus emphasises Pompey’s flaws after 
recounting the most successful period of his life, rather than outlining his efficient 
administration and command. In this way, Mommsen upholds his consistently anti-Pompeian 
portrait. 
 
Pompey’s Gradual Demise: Der Gesammtherrscher and Civil War Period 
This section of the Römische Geschichte is shaped by the impending civil war between Caesar 
and Pompey, which Mommsen artfully anticipates during their ‘triumviral’ (der 
Gesammtherrscher) period85 from 59-50. Mommsen foreshadows Pompey’s failures from the 
chapter’s beginning86 and demonstrates his adoration for Caesar87. Pompey’s representation is 
                                                 
81 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 409. “During the rest at noon the Roman army set out without the enemy 
observing the movement, made a circuit, and occupied the heights, which lay in front and commanded a defile 
to be passed by the enemy, on the southern bank of the river Lycus... the following morning the Pontic troops 
broke up in their usual manner, and, supposing that the enemy was as hitherto behind them, after accomplishing 
the day’s march they pitched their camp in the very valley whose encircling heights the Romans had occupied.”  
82 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 410. 
83 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 405-6. 
84 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 443. 
85 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 115. “Caesar was now the hero of the day and the master of the most 
powerful roman army; Pompeius was an ex-general who had once been famous. It is true that no collision had 
yet occurred between father-in-law and son-in-law, and the relation was externally undisturbed; but every 
political alliance is inwardly broken up, when the relative proportions of the power of the parties are materially 
altered.” 
86 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 108. “But when Pompeius was appointed by the coalition to be ruler of 
the capital, he undertook a task far exceeding his powers. Pompeius understood nothing further of ruling than 
may be summed up in the word of command.” 
87 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 508. “If we still after so many centuries bow in reverence before what 
Caesar willed and did, it is not because he desired and gained a crown (to do which is, abstractly, as little of a 
great thing as the crown itself) but because his mighty ideal - of a free commonwealth under one ruler - never 
forsook him, and preserved him even when monarch from sinking into vulgar royalty.”  
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increasingly unfavourable as the coalition’s demise approaches and reaches its zenith 
throughout the civil war period. Importantly, this section of the Römische Geschichte exhibits 
Mommsen’s selectivity whereby he picks and chooses ancient evidence to perpetuate an 
unfavourable portrait of Pompey. Often, the evidence that Mommsen uses is not from the 
specific circumstance he is examining. 
 
Mommsen uses Pompey’s political dispute with Clodius88 in 58 to demonstrate his political 
ineptitude. He reiterates several fundamental Pompeian flaws which explain the longevity of 
the dispute89. Pompey’s coldness is foremost. He was unperturbed by Cicero’s exile and 
allowed it to be passed without any resistance, despite all former ties of friendship and 
goodwill. Mommsen stresses that this freed Clodius from Cicero, who was his greatest political 
adversary and restraint. Consequently, Clodius wreaked political havoc throughout Rome. 
Mommsen is critical of Pompey’s inaction and inability to counteract Clodius90, because his 
sluggishness compromised the credibility of the ‘triumvirate’91. The passage’s vocabulary 
aptly exhibits his frustration toward Pompey’s inaction, wherein Pompey’s predicament is 
                                                 
Caesar’s portrayal determined all of Mommsen’s representation of late Republic Roman political figures. See: T. 
Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 510. “Without deviating far from the truth, Caesar could tell the multitude 
that the senate had scornfully rejected most rational and most necessary proposals submitted to it in the most 
respectful form, simply because they came from the democratic consul... the aristocracy, with the obstinate 
weak creature Bibulus and the unbending dogmatical fool Cato at their head, in reality intended to push the 
matter to open violence.” This is drastically different to Plutarch’s account. See: Plut. Caes. 1-4. “Caesar, 
however, encompassed and protected by the friendship of Crassus and Pompey, entered the canvass for the 
consulship; and as soon as he had been triumphantly elected, along with Calpurnius Bibulus, and had entered 
upon his office, he proposed laws which were becoming, not for a consul, but for a most radical tribune of the 
people; for to gratify the multitude he introduced sundry allotments and distributions of land. In the senate the 
opposition of men of the better sort gave him the pretext which he had long desired, and crying with loud 
adjurations that he was driven forth into the popular assembly against his wishes, and was compelled to court 
its favour by the insolence and obstinacy of the senate, he hastened before it, and stationing Crassus on one side 
of him and Pompey on the other, he asked them if they approved his laws. They declared that they did approve 
them, whereupon he urged them to give him their aid against those who threatened to oppose him with swords.” 
88 Mommsen illustrates Clodius’ actions as destructive demagoguery which profited none other than himself. T. 
Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 111. “The principal performer in this theatre of political rascality was that 
Publius Clodius, of whose services, as already mentioned, the regents availed themselves against Cato and 
Cicero.” see also: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 113. “Even a man of Caesar’s genius had to learn by 
experience that democratic agitation was completely worn out, and that even the way to the throne no longer 
lay through demagogism.”  
89 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol 5, 114. “Little as Pompeius liked and understood taking the initiative, he 
was yet on this occasion compelled by the change of his position towards both Clodius and Caesar to depart 
from his previous inaction. The irksome and disgraceful situation to which Clodius had reduced him, could not 
but at length arouse even his sluggish nature to hatred and anger.” 
90 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 112. “At all these things Pompeius looked on without stirring. If he did 
not perceive how seriously he thus compromised himself, his opponent perceived it. Clodius had the hardihood 
to engage in a dispute with the regent of Rome on a question of little moment, as to the sending back of a captive 
Armenian prince; and the variance soon became a formal feud, in which the utter helplessness of Pompeius was 
displayed.”  
91 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 119. “The helplessness of Pompeius in presence of these daring 
demonstrations, as well as the undignified and almost ridiculous position into which he had fallen with reference 
to Clodius, deprived him and the coalition of their credit; and the section of the senate which adhered to the 
regents, demoralised by the singular inaptitude of Pompeius and helplessly let to itself, could not prevent the 
republican-aristocratic party from regaining completely the ascendancy in the corporation.”  
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variously ‘irksome’ (verdrieβlich92), ‘disgraceful’ (schimpfliche93), ‘undignified’ 
(unwürdige94), and ‘ridiculous’ (lächerlich95).96 Mommsen further highlights Pompey’s 
political ineptitudes with reference to the requests for a grain commission in 57.97 This passage 
reiterates familiar tropes introduced earlier in the work, including Pompey’s transparent 
cunningness, feigned modesty, and foolishness. It also contrasts with Caesar’s political 
prowess, which was so marvellous that “even Publius Clodius was induced to keep himself and 
his pack quiet”98. These portrayals anticipate Mommsen’s representation of the ‘triumvirate’ 
from 56-50. He emphasises that Caesar was politically dominant at the conference at Luca in 
56 and thereafter, adding that Pompey’s career was “politically annihilated”99 (politischen 
vernichtet100). 
 
The months preceding the civil war emphasise Pompey’s worst traits. Mommsen highlights his 
dallying indecisiveness and reinforces this with Pompey’s veiled subversion of his allegiance 
with Caesar101. These typify his cowardliness. Mommsen deems Pompey the cause of the 
political fracture with Caesar, which was further aided by both Julia and Crassus’ deaths. In 
his reading, Pompey is a bitter opponent who idly undermined Caesar and agitated for war, but 
was too afraid to instigate open conflict102. The political split eventually occurred because 
Pompey rejected Curio’s decree, wherein both Caesar and Pompey had to resign their 
proconsular titles and return to Rome as citizens, after which the senate was to elect their 
successors. Mommsen emphasises Pompey’s unwillingness to adhere to this proposal, as well 
as Curio’s plight as he was forced to flee Rome for safety. He blames the allegiance’s collapse 
on Pompey’s unwillingness to accept Caesar’s terms103. More importantly, Pompey is 
                                                 
92 T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, Dritte Band, 310. 
93 Ibid. 
94 T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, Dritte Band, 314. 
95 Ibid. 
96 These comments appear over a few pages in T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 114-9. 
97 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 122. “…Pompeius himself attributed or professed to attribute primarily 
the failure of his plan; the antipathy of the republican opposition in the senate to any decree which really or 
nominally enlarged the authority of the regents; lastly and mainly, the incapacity of Pompeius himself, who 
even after having been compelled to act could not prevail on himself to acknowledge his own action, but chose 
always to bring forward his real design as it were in incognito by means of his friends, while he himself in his 
well-known modesty declared his willingness to be content with even less.”  
98 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 126. 
99 Ibid. 126. “That this whole settlement of the pending questions proceeded, not from a compromise among 
independent and rival regents meeting on equal terms, but solely from the good will of Caesar, is evident from 
the circumstances. Pompeius appeared at Luca in the painful position of a powerless refugee, who comes to ask 
aid from his opponent. Whether Caesar chose to dismiss him and to declare the coalition dissolved, or to receive 
him and to let the league continue just as it stood – Pompeius was in either view politically annihilated.” 
100 T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, Dritte Band, 320. 
101 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 177. “Where Pompeius, therefore, might have simply kept by the law, 
he had preferred first to make a spontaneous concession, then to recall it, and lastly to cloak this recall in a 
manner most disloyal.” 
102 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 178. “The pitiful dissimilation and procrastinating artifice of Pompeius 
are after a remarkable manner mixed up, in these arrangements, with the wily formalism and the constitutional 
erudition of the republican party.” 
103 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 185. 
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lambasted for failing to prepare for the conflict immediately thereafter104. Mommsen focuses 
on Pompey’s ego through his demand for control and outlines how he ultimately failed his 
subjects. It is a further allusion to the tropes of selfishness, ambition, and ineptitude. 
 
Mommsen’s selectivity has questionable outcomes for his narrative which the ancient evidence 
contradicts. Appian, for example, suggests that both parties and the general political anarchy 
were liable for the ensuing hostilities. He states that Pompey provoked Caesar by recalling his 
legion at an inopportune time under a pretext which ensuing events proved disingenuous105, 
while Caesar sought hostilities but only if Pompey was deemed the perpetrator. This reading 
also appears in Plutarch’s Lives of Pompey106 and Caesar107, wherein this anarchy prevented a 
mutual agreement despite Pompey’s willingness to comply. Mommsen avoids these traditions, 
despite their contextual relevance, because he wished to place Pompey as the primary catalyst 
for the civil war. These sources are later used to denounce the Optimates, though this does not 
aid Pompey’s representation. This is one method that Mommsen uses to mould his history and 
produce favourable outcomes. He also focuses on evidence that favours his reading. He favours 
Caesar’s Civil War, select Ciceronian letters, and Cassius Dio’s Roman History, which are, at 
various times, hostile to Pompey. This results in an imbalanced reading of the civil war period. 
For example, Mommsen fails to mention the importance of the consuls in 49, Gaius Claudius 
Marcellus Maior and Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus, as well as the interference of Scipio and 
Cato, who prevented any effort to salvage their allegiance. Moreover, Pompey’s willingness to 
come to terms with Caesar108 is not referenced. Instead, Mommsen takes the most hostile 
reading whereby Pompey was the primary cause of the hostilities109. This suited Mommsen’s 
civil war narrative, wherein Pompey was the greatest threat to Caesar’s dignitas. Pompey is 
also presented as an indecisive dullard110 and disloyal fool111.  
 
Mommsen’s representation of the coalition between Pompey and the Optimates is inconsistent. 
Contrary to his introduction to the civil war, he states that the Optimates instigated the war on 
                                                 
104 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 185. “Their leaders had to listen in their conferences to the bitterest 
reproaches from Pompeius; he pointed out emphatically and with entire justice the dangers of the seeming 
peace; and, though it depended on himself alone to cut the knot by rapid action, his allies knew very well that 
they could never expect this from him, and that it was for them, as they had promised, to bring matters to a 
crisis.”  
105 App. Bell. Civ. 2.4.29. 
106 Plut. Pomp. 59. 
107 Plut. Caes. 30-1. 
108 App. Bell. Civ. 28.1.  
109 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 168-9. See also: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 184-5. 
“Pompeius was thus recalled by the senate no less than Caesar, and while Caesar was ready to comply with the 
command, Pompeius positively refused obedience.”  
110 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 173. “That Pompeius was not quite in earnest with his fidelity to the 
constitution, could indeed escape nobody; but, undecided as he was in everything, he had by no means arrived 
like Caesar at a clear and firm conviction that it must be the first business of the new monarch to sweep off 
thoroughly and conclusively the oligarchic lumber.” See also: Ibid, 181. 
111 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 177. 
 
116 
 
Pompey’s behalf112 and prevented Pompey and Caesar’s peace overtures. Mommsen attacks 
the entire senate, especially the Optimates113, and temporarily sets aside Pompey. He splits the 
senate into two factions, which is made up of either senators with lukewarm political 
sentiments114 or those with ultra-conservative views115. Each is denounced at great length. 
Mommsen criticises Pompey’s political position in relation to these factions. He established 
this argument early in the chapter when he condemned Pompey’s alliance with the 
conservatives, which compromised his military and political position116. Consequently, 
Pompey’s political dilemma was entirely of his own making. In short, Mommsen is critical of 
Pompey’s decision to align himself with the Optimates over Caesar, whom he treated with 
great injustice.  
 
Mommsen’s conclusions underline his greatest hate: conservatism117. He shows frustration and 
contempt toward Pompey’s dallying throughout, but is most critical of the Optimates who 
upheld traditional and outdated social structures118. Pompey, who was not from an ancient gens 
and was predominantly a progressive politician throughout his career, was thus separated from 
this attack. Yet Pompey’s ultimate allegiance with this sanctimonious faction resulted in a 
damaging portrayal, which Mommsen reinforced with Pompey’s weak resolve and inability to 
assume total command. These were flaws that a great statesman could not possess. In sum, 
Mommsen actively contrasts the senate and Caesar’s forces, placing Pompey, an already 
                                                 
112 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 171. “It was characteristic of Pompeius, even when he had formed a 
resolve, not to be able to find his way to its execution. While he knew perhaps how to conduct war but certainly 
not how to declare it, the Catonian party, although assuredly unable to conduct it, was very able and above all 
ready to supply grounds for the war against the monarchy on the point of being founded.” See also: T. 
Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 185. 
113 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 191. 
114 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 238-9. “Far worse traits were the indifference of the luke-warm and 
the narrow-minded stubbornness of the ultras. The former could not be brought to act or even to keep silence. 
If they were asked to exert themselves in some definite way for the good, with the inconsistency characteristic 
of weak people they regarded any such suggestion as a malicious attempt to compromise them still further, and 
either did not do what they were ordered at all or did it with half a heart… their daily work consisted in 
criticising, ridiculing, and bemoaning every occurrence great and small, and in unnerving and discouraging the 
multitude by their own sluggishness and hopelessness.”  
115 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 239. “…the ultras on the other hand exhibited in full display its 
exaggerated action. With them there was no attempt to conceal that the preliminary to any negotiation for peace 
was the bringing over of Caesar’s head; every one of the attempts towards peace, which Caesar repeatedly made 
even now, was tossed aside without being examined, or employed only to cover insidious attempts on the lives 
of the commissioners of their opponent.”  
116 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 172. “Of the countless evils involved with this coalition (Pompey and 
the Optimates), there was developed in the meantime only one – but that already a very grave one – that 
Pompeius surrendered the power of commencing hostilities against Caesar when and how he pleased, and in 
this decisive point made himself dependant on all the accidents and caprices of an aristocratic corporation.” 
117 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 238. “This Roman Coblenz (the senate organised in Macedonia during 
the civil war) displayed a pitiful spectacle in the high pretensions and paltry performances of the genteel world 
of Rome, their unseasonable reminiscences and still more unseasonable recriminations, their political 
perversities and financial embarrassments. It was a matter of comparatively slight momenta that, while the old 
structure was falling to pieces, they were with the most painstaking gravity watching over every old ornamental 
scroll and every speck of rust in the constitution…” 
118 T. Mommsen, the History of Rome, Vol.5, 169. “The impending war was not a struggle possibly between 
republic and monarchy – for that had been virtually decided years before – but a struggle between Pompeius 
and Caesar for the possession of the crown of Rome.” 
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detestable figure, within the ranks of an even more detestable faction. This strengthens his 
juxtaposition of Caesar and Pompey and results in a civil war narrative defined by opposites. 
Thus, while Caesar shows clemency119, Pompey’s coalition is cruel120 and punishing121. In 
addition, Mommsen juxtaposes Caesar’s decisiveness and energy122 with Pompey’s 
cowardliness and awkwardness123. Finally, Mommsen’s Caesar controlled his forces and was 
an active agent for social and political change124, while Pompey was subjugated by the wills of 
his ‘inferiors’125. 
 
Continuing this trend, Mommsen defends Pompey’s actions and preparations in Macedonia 
and reports that his ‘inferiors’ considered their misfortunes his fault126. He stresses that this is 
unjust and emphasises Pompey’s difficult situation. Instead, he blames two Optimates, Lucius 
Cornelius Lentulus Crus and Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, for the Republican force’s 
misfortunes127. Nevertheless, Mommsen emphasises Pompey’s inferiority to Caesar, stating: 
…from the moment when Pompeius took the head of the army, he had led it with skill 
and courage, and had saved at least very considerable forces from the shipwreck; that he 
was not a match for Caesar’s altogether superior genius, which was now recognized by 
all, could not be fairly made matter of reproach to him.128  
                                                 
119 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 226. “Caesar granted to officers and soldiers their life and liberty, and 
the possession of the property which they still retained as well as the restoration of what had been already taken 
from them, the full value of which he undertook personally to make good to his soldiers; and not only so, but 
while he had compulsorily enrolled in his army the recruits captured in Italy, he honoured these old legionaries 
of Pompeius by the promise that no one should be compelled against his will to enter Caesar’s army.” See also: 
T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 213-4. 
120 Mommsen refrains from labelling Pompey cruel, but deems his allies reckless in their desire for the death of 
their enemies. 
121 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 239-40. “But they (the coalition) did not confine themselves to words. 
Marcus Bibulus, Titus Labienus, and others of this coterie carried out their theory in practice, and caused such 
officers or soldiers of Caesar’s army as fell into their hands to be executed en masse…” 
122 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 212. “In a campaign of two months, without a single serious 
engagement, Caesar had so broken up an army of ten legions, that less than the half of it had with great difficulty 
escaped in a confused flight across the sea… Not without reason did the beaten party bewail the terrible rapidity, 
sagacity, and energy of the monster.” 
123 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 240. “The better men in the Pompeian camp were in despair over this 
frantic behaviour. Pompeius, himself a brave soldier, spared the prisoners as far as he might and could; but he 
was too pusillanimous and in too awkward a position to prevent or even to punish all atrocities of this sort, as it 
became him as commander-in-chief to do.”  
124 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 197. “Above all things Caesar as a true commander understood how to 
awaken in every single component element, large or small, of the mighty machine the consciousness of its 
befitting application. The ordinary man is destined for service, and he has no objection to be an instrument, if 
he feels a master guides him.”  
125 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 207-8. “The unity of leadership, which resulted of itself and by necessity 
from the position of Caesar, was inconsistent with the nature of a coalition; and although Pompeius, too much 
of a soldier to deceive himself as to its being indispensable, attempted to force it on the coalition and got himself 
nominated by the senate as sole and absolute generalissimo by land and sea, yet the senate itself could not be 
set aside nor hindered from a preponderating influence on the political, and an occasional and therefore doubly 
injurious interference with the military, superintendence… the opponents of Caesar (were) a reluctant and 
refractory co-operation, which formed the saddest contrast to the harmonious and compact action on the other 
side.”  
126 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 241. 
127 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 241. 
128 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 241. 
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Mommsen’s uncritical representation of Titus Labienus’ defection from Caesar is another 
important aspect, which highlights his distortion of the ancient evidence. Mommsen does not 
portray Labienus negatively, which is a by-product of his former affiliation with Caesar. He 
acknowledges that Labienus was Caesar’s second-in-command and thus important to his war 
effort129. He states that Labienus fought against Caesar with “unparalleled bitterness”130, but 
that we know little about either the circumstances of Labienus’ defection or his general 
character. Despite this, Mommsen criticises Labienus for his lack of political acumen131. He 
blames Labienus for the political break with Caesar and speculates that he aspired to higher 
political office but was blocked by Caesar. Mommsen thus makes the circumstances suit Caesar 
by labelling Labienus’ decision as selfish and unreasonable. The reality, however, was far more 
damning for Caesar’s cause. He had lost his second-in-command and closest political ally, who 
had fought by his side throughout the Gallic war. 
 
The battles of Brundisium and Pharsalus highlight several other key issues in the Römische 
Geschichte. Mommsen outlines Pompey’s failure to sufficiently prepare for the conflict in the 
East in great detail, and states that he made “what was already bad worse” (was an sich schon 
verdorben war, nach Kraften weiter verdarb) with his “characteristic perversity” (eigenen 
Verkehrtheit)132. Mommsen’s account of the siege of Brundisium favours Caesar’s forces, who 
valiantly won most skirmishes between the combatants133. He distorts the series of events 
recorded by the ancient evidence, which highlighted the indecisive and fierce nature of the 
skirmish134. Mommsen states that Pompey fortuitously overcame Caesar’s forces when ‘Celtic 
deserters’ (keltische Ueberläufer135) revealed a weakness in his defences. This fortuitous act of 
treachery aided Pompey, whose troops overcame Caesar’s position. His troops subsequently 
fled. Here, Mommsen emphasises that Pompey was incapable of grasping a total victory. He 
stresses Caesar’s superior intellect by highlighting Pompey’s fear of a Caesarian stratagem, 
which caused him to hold his troops back136. This perspective originates in Caesar’s Civil 
War137 and is thus partial.  
 
Mommsen introduces the battle of Pharsalus by emphasising Caesar’s obvious disadvantage 
before the battle. He states that Caesar had far fewer infantry (approximately half that of 
Pompey) and cavalry (approximately one seventh of Pompey’s forces) and that his army was 
                                                 
129 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 194. 
130 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 194. 
131 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 194. “To all appearance Labienus was one of those persons who 
combine with military efficiency utter incapacity as a statesman, and who in consequence, if they unhappily 
choose or are compelled to take part in politics, are exposed to the strange paroxysms of giddiness…”  
132 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 242. See also: . T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, fünftes buch, 412. 
133 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 252.  
134 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.70; Plut. Pomp. 65.5; Caes. 39.4-11; App. Bell. Civ. 29.62; Flor. 2.13; Dio Cass. 41.61.1.  
135 T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, Fünftes Buch, 419. 
136 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 253. 
137 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.70.1.  
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reeling from the recent defeat at Brundisium138. Meanwhile, Pompey’s army and its attendants 
were confident that the war would soon conclude in their favour. Mommsen, however, 
highlights Pompey’s hesitance to confront Caesar. This reiterates Pompey’s cowardliness and 
fear of Caesar, which is cited throughout the text. Mommsen questions Pompey’s control of 
his forces, whose indignant protests toward his hesitation successfully forced him to engage 
Caesar on the field of Pharsalus. He thus suggests that Pompey’s command was superficial. 
The battle sequence itself is outlined in little detail. Mommsen unreservedly praises Caesar’s 
stroke of tactical genius, wherein his best legionaries overcame Pompey’s cavalry by using 
their pila as spears rather than projectiles. He juxtaposes this with Pompey’s distrust of his 
infantry. This perspective is only offered in hostile ancient evidence139. Mommsen’s summary 
of the battle’s outcomes exceeds the information within the ancient evidence. He rationalises 
Pompey’s defeat because of his ‘inferior soul’ (dürftige Seele) contrasted to Caesar’s ‘grander 
nature’140 (großartiger Natur). Mommsen exhibits partiality with his inclusion of certain pieces 
of evidence, stating that Pompey’s capitulation to Caesar was fundamental to his character. He 
likens this to Pompey’s threats to abandon the Sertorian war141, which was previously 
unmentioned in his account.  
 
Pompey’s Flight and Death  
Mommsen treats Pompey’s flight from Pharsalus with contempt. He highlights Pompey’s 
vague and indecisive nature as the cause of his defeat and adds that Pompey’s vanity and 
distrustfulness prevented him from seeking Caesar’s clemency142. Thereafter, he deduces that 
Pompey wished to continue the war against Caesar, who quickly pursued Pompey to nullify 
this threat. Pompey’s dithering cost him the chance to flee to Parthia, where he might have 
found sufficient assistance. This left Egypt as Pompey’s only remaining hope. Mommsen 
propagates a scenario where Pompey’s indecision was to blame for his inevitable and fatal 
arrival in Egypt. The Römische Geschichte diminishes the dramatic and providential aspects of 
Pompey’s demise, widely attested in the ancient record143. In contrast, Mommsen highlights 
Caesar’s decisiveness and drive to eradicate Pompey as a threat144. He acknowledges that 
                                                 
138 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 260.  
139 Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.86.2-4.  
140 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 262. “But while Caesar in the vicissitudes of his destiny had learned 
that fortune loves to withdraw herself at certain moments even from her favourites in order to be once more 
won back through their perseverance, Pompeius knew fortune hitherto only as the constant goddess, and 
despaired of himself and of her when she withdrew from him; and, while in Caesar’s grander nature despair 
only developed yet mightier energies, the inferior soul of Pompeius under similar pressure sank into the infinite 
abyss of despondency.”  
141 This perspective is largely supported by hostile evidence, particularly Pompey’s letter to the senate which is 
found in Sallust’s Histories and is comprised of many Sallustian literary features. See: Sall. Hist. 2.82. For the 
argument that it is Sallustian see Laistner, Roman Historians, 52. 
142 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 267. 
143 Caes. Civ. War. 3.104; Val. Max. 5.1.10; Vell. Pat. 2.53.2. 
144 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 271. 
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Caesar respected Pompey: the cornerstone of the republic’s forces, whose defeat was essential 
for the cessation of the civil war145. 
 
Mommsen briefly summarises Pompey’s life and career after recounting the events, which led 
to his assassination in Egypt. His final portrayal draws together Pompey’s representation 
throughout the history. It reiterates the introductory passage for Pompey’s representation in the 
gesammtherrscher period onwards. Mommsen’s obituary for Pompey emphasises his isolation 
by contrasting a past greatness with ultimate failure:  
 On the same day, on which thirteen years before he had entered the capital in triumph 
over Mithridates the man, who for a generation had been called the Great and for years 
had ruled Rome, died on the desert sands of the inhospitable Casian shore by the hand of 
one of his old soldiers.146 
 
Mommsen stresses that Pompey was murdered by his former soldier. He denigrates Pompey’s 
achievements, stating that he was a good - though not great – officer and was a man of mediocre 
intellect who lived his life beyond his mental capacity. Mommsen asserts that luck guided 
Pompey to the pinnacle of Roman society and allowed him to reap the rewards of others’ 
successes147. His argument promotes Pompey as an undeserved successor to Sulla, as each had 
“ruled Rome”148. Mommsen labels Pompey’s achievements ‘brilliant’, because they were 
‘toilless’, however, this is pejorative as it alludes to Pompey’s theft of others’ commands. 
Mommsen bemoans Pompey’s greatest weaknesses: his cowardice and inability to seize 
supreme power. The latter comment highlights Mommsen at his most presumptive. There is 
little evidence that Pompey ever sought solitary rule in Rome. Cicero, in a letter to Atticus in 
49, mentions that Pompey sought a dictatorship149, but this is a mercurial comment, which was 
later redressed. The other evidence supporting Mommsen’s claim comes from later sources, 
who wrote during the imperial period and formulated a portrayal of Pompey in hindsight. 
Lucius Annaeus Florus150, for example, comments that the civil war started because Pompey 
could not accept an equal, nor Caesar a superior. This sentiment is common among first and 
second century evidence151, which rationalised Pompey’s aggression as an act of maintaining 
                                                 
145 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 271. “While the remnant of the defeated party thus allowed themselves 
to be helplessly driven about by fate, and even those who had determined to continue the struggle knew not how 
or where to do so, Caesar, quickly as ever resolving and quickly acting, laid everything aside to pursue Pompeius 
– the only one of his opponents whom he respected as an officer, and the one whose personal capture would 
probably have paralysed a half, and that perhaps the more dangerous half, of his opponents.” 
146 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 272. 
147 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 273. “A good officer, but otherwise of mediocre gifts of intellect and 
of heart, fate had with superhuman consistency for thirty years allowed him to solve all brilliant and toilless 
tasks; had permitted him to pluck all laurels planted and fostered by others; had brought him face to face with 
all the conditions requisite for obtaining the supreme power - only in order to exhibit in his person an example 
of spurious greatness, to which history knows no parallel. Of all pitiful parts there is none more pitiful than that 
of passing for more than one really is;  and it is the fate of monarchy that this misfortune inevitably clings to it, 
for barely once in a thousand years does there arise among the people a man who is a king not merely in name, 
but in reality.”  
148 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 272. 
149 Cic. Att. 9.7. (SB, 174). 
150 Flor. Epit. 2. 13.14. 
151 Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.125-6. 
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solitary dominance. Mommsen concludes with a damning commentary on Pompey’s legacy. 
He states that Pompey’s existence was pitiful because he always passed for more than he really 
was. Moreover, he comments that Pompey’s greatness was so spurious that it “knows no 
parallel”152. Finally, he laments that the “disproportion between semblance and reality has 
never perhaps been so abruptly marked as in Pompeius, the fact may well excite grave 
reflection that it was precisely he who in a certain sense opened the series of Roman 
monarchs”153. 
 
Mommsen’s summary of Pompey’s life denounced him for all his failings and offered little 
praise. This subsequently became a standard method for representing Pompey’s death 
throughout nineteenth and early twentieth century works. However, the ancient evidence, even 
when selectively used, does not substantiate these severe views. Most sources, including: 
Seneca, Appian, Plutarch, and Velleius Paterculus, condemn Pompey’s assassination and 
depict the Egyptians as treacherous. Mommsen fails to preserve the outrage of the ancient 
sources and instead imposes his own selective reading of Pompey.  
 
This survey demonstrates that Mommsen constructed Pompey both as a political and personal 
figure by manipulating the evidence, which resonated in subsequent scholarship. It has also 
highlighted Mommsen’s three techniques: ‘Selection’, ‘Distortion’, and ‘Fabrication’, which, 
independently and as a whole, determined Pompey’s portrayal depending on which context 
best suited his overall depiction. These techniques allowed Mommsen to perpetuate a 
consistent construction of Pompey, which diminished his significance in Mommsen’s 
narrative. Moreover, Mommsen’s reading of Pompey was determined and shaped by his 
specific historical context, scholarly approaches, and methodologies.  
 
This legacy endured through his renowned influence and popularity. Therefore, the 
aforementioned techniques, coupled with Mommsen’s legacy, and Caesar’s fame in both 
ancient and modern popular culture and historical scholarship, have all contributed to a 
widespread anti-Pompeian tradition. This is testified by the pro-Caesar sentiments of writers 
                                                 
152 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 273. 
153 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 273  
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like Nietzsche154 and Burckhardt155, as well as Marx’s harsh anti-Pompeian reading of 
Appian156, which variously engaged with and perpetuated Mommsen’s tradition and ideal157.  
                                                 
154 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn of Day, 594, Trans. John McFarland Kennedy, The Macmillan Company (New 
York, 1911), 381. “And should the desire for performing great deeds really be at bottom nothing but a flight 
from our own selves?—as Pascal would ask us. And indeed this assertion might be proved by considering the 
most noble representations of this desire for action: in this respect let us remember, bringing the knowledge of 
an alienist to our aid, that four of the greatest men of all ages who were possessed of this lust for action were 
epileptics—Alexander the Great, Cæsar, Mohammed, and Napoleon; and Byron likewise was subject to the 
same complaint.” See also: F. Nietzsche, ‘Skirmishes of an Untimely Man’, 31, Twilight of the Idols, Trans. 
Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, 32. “Another problem of diet. — The means by which Julius Caesar 
defended himself against sickliness and headaches: tremendous marches, the most frugal way of life, 
uninterrupted sojourn in the open air, continuous exertion — these are, in general, the universal rules of 
preservation and protection against the extreme vulnerability of that subtle machine, working under the highest 
pressure, which we call genius.” F. Nietzsche, ‘Gay Science’ (Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft), 98, Cambridge 
University Press, Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge, 2001), 93-4. 
155 Jacob Burckhardt, ‘Rome and Its Mission in World History’, 14-5, Judgments on History and Historians, 
Trans. Harry Zohn, Liberty Fund (Indianapolis, 1929), 27. “At length the First Triumvirate is formed. It includes 
Caesar, the greatest of mortals. First he saves the Empire by conquering Gaul and securing it against the 
Germani, then he takes possession of it through his victories at Pharsalus, Thapsus, and Munda, and gives the 
tormented provinces a foretaste of government instead of mere desultory plundering by optimates.” 
156 Andrew G. Bonnell, ‘A ‘very valuable book’: Karl Marx and Appian’, in Appian’s Roman History: Empire 
and Civil War, ed. Kathryn Welch, Classical Press of Wales (Swansea, 2015), 19. “Marx’s characterisation of 
personalities from the history of the Roman Republic (for example, his negative assessment of Pompeius) 
throws up the question of whether he may have been influenced by the recent appearance of Theodor 
Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte, volumes 1-3 (1854-1856). From London, Marx wrote to Engels in 
Manchester in April, 1857, asking him if he had heard anything about a new ‘Römische Geschichte’, that had 
just appeared, and that was said to contain much new material (MEW 29.131.). By March 1858, Engels was 
quoting Mommsen in a letter to Marx…” 
157 W. Wolfgang, ‘Pompeius’. “F. Nietzsche and J. Burckhardt, who declares Caesar the greatest of mortals 
(Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen), consider Pompey not worth mentioning. Karl Marx (with regard to his 
reading of Appianus) expresses himself emphatically: “Pompey [appears to be] a complete swine; acquiring 
spurious fame only by misappropriating, as Sulla’s young man, etc, Lucullus successes …, then Sertorius’ 
(Spain), etc..” (Letter of 27 February 1861).” 
123 
 
Chapter Five: First Wave of Scholarship After Mommsen’s 
Römische Geschichte 
 
Niebuhr and Mommsen’s views on the late republic offer interesting and valuable insights into 
Prussian conceptualisations of society, culture, and politics. However, their fundamental 
importance to this study lies in understanding how they shaped the works of subsequent 
historians. As previously mentioned, they achieved this through their popularity, high esteem, 
and widespread accessibility. This was particularly true for Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte, 
which became a standard textbook of Roman history throughout Germany and abroad, thereby 
influencing perceptions of Roman history from a foundational level. This process is traceable 
through succeeding generations of scholarly output within both the German and Anglophone 
academic contexts. Demonstrating this requires an analysis of several key historical works, 
encompassing various modes of historical writing, contexts, and literary schools. Thus, military 
histories such as J.A. Froude’s Caesar: A Sketch, are as significant as broad historical narratives 
of Roman history, as exemplified by W.W. Fowler’s History of Rome and H.H. Scullard’s 
From the Gracchi to Nero. Naturally, works which shared Mommsen’s thematic interests, 
contexts and broad literary convictions display the greatest tendency to reproduce the Pompey 
of the Römische Geschichte. This sample of works will suffice to show Mommsen’s 
importance to and influence over the common narrative. Histories written after the ‘cultural 
turn’ in the 1970s, wherein social aspects replaced politico-military features as a primary 
concern for historical study, however, fundamentally oppose Mommsen’s methodology, but 
maintain important features of his characterisation. 
 
The impact of Mommsen’s portrait of Pompey was aided by different factors. Firstly, the innate 
conservatism of historical discourse, which increasingly relied on prior scholarship after the 
advent of historicism, scorned radical historical thought, and limited change. This is not to 
accuse historians of a deliberate attempt to distort or to maintain a questionable reading. It 
simply means that historians inherit and refine the conceptions of their predecessors. Secondly, 
scholars in the generation following Mommsen accepted his views or they risked being 
ostracised by their peers. This is why Eduard Meyer’s Caesars Monarchie und das Principat 
des Pompejus, which was the first scholarly work to challenge his propositions, appeared over 
a decade after his death and his academic career suffered because of his different point of view.1 
Thirdly, although scholars filled increasingly specialised niches, they accepted entrenched 
                                                 
1 Matthias Gelzer, review of Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius, by Eduard Meyer, 
Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial und wirtschaftsgeschichte, 15, (1919), 522. “Caesars Monarchie und das Principat 
des Pompeius by Eduard Meyer which first appeared in 1918 is a dreadful book. In layout it is ugly and 
disjointed; its style is cumbersome and its length excessive. Furthermore the tone of the work is unnecessarily 
polemical, and it was unwise of the author to devote so much time castigating Mommsen’s interpretation of 
Caesar when he so obviously ignores other more recent research relevant to his subject.” (Trans. Brian Croke); 
Tenney Frank, review of Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius, by Eduard Meyer, Classical 
Philology, Vol. 16, No. 2, (1921), 205-6. “This second edition contains a score of minor corrections of the first 
edition, which, published in 1918, reached but a few of our libraries… However, it would be unfair to imply 
that Professor Meyer has to any extent pressed his facts into the service of an argument.” See also: B. Croke, 
‘Eduard Meyer’s Caesars Monarchie and its English Riposte’, Athenaeum, Vol. 80, (1992), 219-32.  
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historical perspectives from the preceding generation. In sum, these phenomena highlight not 
only the conservatism of the historical tradition, but also the profound influence early modern 
scholars had in shaping the discipline.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is separated into three chapters, which reflect the influence of 
Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte in different ways. The first concerns historians who wrote 
between 1860 and 1910 and thus engaged directly with Mommsen’s work. These took on 
Mommsen’s structural approach, namely the narrative histories popular at the time. The second 
focuses on subsequent scholarship (1910 and after), which no longer directly referenced 
Mommsen’s work, but maintained his overall representation of Pompey. The third examines 
biographies of Pompey which in one way or another react to Mommsen’s portrait even though 
Mommsen is not an obvious presence.  
 
The works cross several historical genres. These include: narrative history, military history and 
political biography. These genres offer a convenient set of tools to observe the history of a 
characterisation. There are a plethora of other subdivisions and genres of historical writing 
which would be fruitful, not least the standard portrayal of Pompey in popular historical fiction. 
However, the chosen sample serves to illustrate the point within the scope of a limited project 
such as this.  
 
5.1. Wilhelm Ihne 
Wilhelm Ihne was a Bavarian scholar, who was born in Fürth in 1821. He undertook his studies 
at the University of Bonn, completing his doctorate in 1843. He spent much of his early career 
as a teacher in Germany, from 1847-9, and in Liverpool, England, from 1849-63. While Ihne’s 
teaching career delayed scholarly output, his passion for teaching earned him a tutoring 
position at the University of Heidelberg from 1863, where he was later appointed to a 
professorial position in 1873. Ihne offers an opportunity to see how a contemporary of 
Mommsen who shared his world view intensified his antipathy to Pompey as Mommsen’s 
influence grew. 
 
Like Mommsen, Ihne was caught up in the revolutionary frenzy that gripped Bavarian society 
in 18482. He was deeply concerned by contemporary social and political issues in both England 
and Germany, particularly before Bismarck’s unification of Germany in 1871. This chaotic 
period caused Ihne’s immigration to England for 14 years (from 1849) before his eventual 
return to Germany in 1863. Ihne’s work reflects these issues through his portrayal of Roman 
social, political, and military frameworks, as well as his characterisation of Rome’s notable 
individuals. In particular he shared Mommsen’s view that Caesar was an ideal statesman and 
an example to be followed in modern Germany. 
 
Historical Method 
                                                 
2 K.S. Pinson, ‘The Revolution of 1848’, in Modern Germany, 80-109. 
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Ihne’s eight volume Römische Geschichte (1868-90) covered Rome’s earliest history down 
until Augustus’ victory at Actium in 31. The first five volumes were published in both German 
and English between 1868-79, while the last three volumes, covering the period from Tiberius 
Gracchus until the battle of Actium, were only published in German from 1879-90. Pompey is 
treated in the fifth volume and so Ihne’s interpretation could be read by both German and 
English students. 
 
Ihne’s methodology combined both Historicist and German Romanticist practices. It is 
Historicist in that it referenced a wide range of contemporary scholarly works and critically 
analysed the ancient source material seeking to outline the history of the period ‘as it really 
was’ (wie es eigentlich gewesen). However, its Romanticist tendencies can be seen in the 
comparisons between Roman historical events and contemporary Germany3. The inclination 
towards the Romanticism brought him closer to both Niebuhr and Mommsen in so far as it 
encouraged bold assertions that transcended the ancient evidence.  
Ihne also showed a disposition towards the ‘Great Men’ view of late republican Rome, and 
that, of course, drew him to Caesar4. It rejected the more Positivist approach popular in 
England. This mixture of intellectual approaches demonstrates his greater adherence to the 
German academic system rather than the English system, even though he taught in England for 
many years. As mentioned previously, the German system was dominated by a small group of 
esteemed intellectuals who dictated scholarly trends and formed ideological schools of like-
minded peers5. Ihne also engaged with social and political concerns current in the Germany of 
his day. His English contemporaries and critics stressed that the work’s themes were equally 
relevant to an English audience6.  
 
Ihne taught at a school in Liverpool for fourteen years. This lengthy tenure ensured his skill in 
condensing history into manageable, accessible, and relatable material. Accordingly, his work 
was well received in both England and Germany, thus allowing his historical reconstruction to 
take root in both countries at a foundational level.  
 
Ihne’s treatment of the ancient record is, thus, at first glance, generally laudable. He references 
a large variety of sources and displays an acumen for critically reading some of this evidence. 
Furthermore, he shows awareness of discrepancies between sources and usually favours the 
most plausible evidence. However, he is not evenly critical of the ancient evidence and as a 
default prioritises ‘contemporary’ evidence over later sources. This is most apparent during the 
battle of Pharsalus. Here, he accepts Caesar’s account and ignores, or at least does not explain, 
how it was tendentious. He thereby diminishes the significance of Plutarch’s more positive 
                                                 
3 ‘Ihne’s History of Rome’, Examiner, eds. Leigh Hunt, Albany William Fonblanque, and John Forster, no. 3287, 
(London, 1871), 99. “Herr Ihne’s work, though unconsciously, is a most instructive comment on the facts of 
today. It shows us how first, as far as we can understand, arose those ideas of military supremacy and national 
aggrandisement which are wasting away two great nations and squandering the resources of civilisation in our 
own time.” 
4 'History of Rome', The Athenaeum, no. 2862, J. Frances, (1882), 298. “He (Ihne) takes a liking for certain 
characters and certain notions, and his judgements are influenced by this special interest.” 
5 G.G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, 24. 
6 ‘Ihne’s History of Rome’, Examiner, no. 3287, (1871), 99.  
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account solely because Caesar was a first-hand witness. This historical method is questionable 
and is most apparent when Ihne focuses on Caesar. It thus highlights his pro-Caesar reading. 
Moreover, it reflects how his negative portrait of Pompey fundamentally resembles 
Mommsen’s determinist reading.  
 
Ihne’s Pompey 
Ihne’s Römische Geschichte prioritises Pompey’s vices and leaves little room for his virtues. 
It thereby resembles Niebuhr and Mommsen’s approaches to the Late Republic, constructs 
which he proves himself to be familiar with7. Moreover, Ihne does not evenly criticise each 
facet of Pompey’s character, but instead selects the vices which he considered most 
problematic. He references three recurring Pompeian vices within the two works, his 
‘coldness’, his ‘vanity’, and his reputation for ruthless political ambition.  
 
Pompey’s cold and reserved manner features throughout Ihne’s Römische Geschichte and 
manifests from his cruel nature. Ihne emphasises this facet with Pompey’s actions against the 
ex-consul Carbo8. In the fifth volume of the Römische Geschichte, published in 1882, he writes: 
Carbo and a number of his friends were surprised on the island of Cossyra, halfway 
between Carthage and Sicily; he was taken prisoner and brought to Lilybaeum before 
Pompeius. On this occasion Pompeius showed that he was at bottom mean, selfish, and 
the slave of his ambition. In order to gain the approbation of Sulla he subjected Carbo to 
the indignity of being examined like a vulgar offender... This harsh treatment was all the 
more surprising, as Pompeius was by nature not inclined to cruelty, and on the present 
occasion in particular acted on the whole with mildness, allowing even many proscribed 
men to escape, if he could manage to do so quietly. But Carbo was a person of too much 
importance. In his treatment Pompeius thought he must show his devotion to Sulla.9  
 
Pompey’s power-mongering is evident in the ancient record. However, his emphasis suggests 
that his reading was selective. Moreover, the Carbo incident is well documented as an act of 
cruelty in the ancient evidence, but the wider scope of the ancient record contests this Pompeian 
vice10. Ihne’s reading takes the worst portrayal of Pompey. This aspect of Ihne’s portrayal is 
significant because it picks up on Mommsen’s reading of the events, rather than Niebuhr’s.  
 
The other notable Pompeian flaws are vanity and power mongering. Ihne remarks that 
Pompey’s vanity and inability to accept an equal forced the civil war and led in turn to his 
                                                 
7 Ihne proves his familiarity with Mommsen’s scholarship during the work’s preface. See: Wilhelm Ihne, 
Römische Geschichte, iv “The present edition has been advised throughout. In two points considerable changes 
have been made. 1. The author has been persuaded, by the arguments of Mommsen, to relinquish the attempt to 
reconcile the account given by Livy of the battle of the Trebia with that given by Polybius.”  
8 W. Ihne, Römische Geschichte, 520. See also: Plut. Pomp. 10; W. Ihne, Op. Cit. 594. “In youth he (Pompey) 
was cold, calculating, and hard-hearted, covetous of military fame and not slow to appropriate what belonged 
to others.”  
9 W. Ihne, Römische Geschichte, Vol. 5, Longmans & Green (London, 1882), 368-9. 
10 For example, it ignores Cicero’s glowing praise for Pompey, Plutarch’s emphasis on Pompey’s modesty and 
charity10, and Valerius Maximus praise for Pompey’s upstanding character. See: Cic. leg. Man; Sest. 15-6; Fam. 
19.1; Plut. Pomp. 1.1-3. See also: Diod. Sic. 38.9. Val. Max. 8.15.8. 
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ultimate demise. He suggests that if Pompey had a more modest conception of himself and 
‘realistic’ ambitions, he could have avoided this fate and better aided the republic’s cause11. 
Pompey’s innate selfishness and delusions of grandeur also led to his downfall. This view rests 
on Ihne’s belief in Caesar’s superiority. The reading closely echoes Mommsen, who stressed 
that Pompey’s life was ‘joyless’12 because of his futile delusions13. Ihne likewise reflects 
Mommsen when he states that Pompey was “unsuited for command and wished only for a 
position above the senate, which required no responsibility”14. These judgements emphasise 
Pompey’s indolence, delusion, ineptitude, and vanity15. 
 
Ihne emphasises Caesar’s political centrality. In book nine (which was not translated in to 
English), the civil war period and Caesar’s dictatorship, are bundled together and collectively 
titled Caesars Dictatur (‘Caesar’s Dictatorship’). Moreover, the titles of chapters mention only 
the geographic locations of Caesar’s important military victories rather than any other political 
or military episode. For example, chapter five is simply titled Pharsalus and chapter six, Der 
Krieg in Aegypten (‘The war in Egypt’). Any reference to Pompey’s death therein is omitted. 
Ihne marginalises Pompey’s significance at a fundamental titular level throughout these 
sections by basing each chapter on Caesar’s whereabouts. The hostility continues in the 
narrative itself. Ihne emphasises Pompey’s cowardliness at Pharsalus when he deserted his 
                                                 
11 W. Ihne, Römische Geschichte, Vol. 5, 370. “Pompeius would have been a man of more than ordinary modesty 
and self-control, if after such extraordinary marks of public approval he had been satisfied with the republican 
equality of ordinary mortals, and if his ambition had not led him on to aspire to an exceptional position and rule 
instead of serving the state.”  
12 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 275. 
13 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 272.  
14 W. Ihne, Ibid. 77-8. “Was die politische Seite seines Charakters betrisst, so war es blosser Zufall, dass er als 
Vertreter der republikanischen Verfassung auftrat. Niemand konnte weniger als Pompeius von dem Geiste 
republikanischer Gleichberechtigung der Bürger durchbrungen sein, und das Recht und die Bflicht des 
abwechselnden Regierens und Gehorchens anertennen, woraus die Republik sich gründet. Er konnte nich 
ertragen zu gehorchen, und verstand das Gebieten ebenso wenig. Seiner innersten Gemüthsart nach war er nur 
geeignet einen erblichen Thron einzunehmen, wo er als allgemein anerfannter Fürst nicht berufen gewefen 
wäre, seine Stellung täglich zu vertheidigen und die Regierungsforgen und Rühen Anderen hätte übertragen 
können. Sein Ehrgeiz ging nicht dahin, wie der Caesars, in eigner Person den Staat zu lenden, die Regierung 
anszuuben, seinen Willen geltend zu machen, sondern ohne personliche Anfrengung die Ehren und 
Anszeichmungen des herrschers zu geniessen.” Translation: “As to the political aspect of his character, it was 
mere coincidence that he appeared as a representative of the Republican constitution. No one could be less 
permeated by the spirit of republican equality of citizens, the law and (an) obligation and obeisance to the 
government, from which the republic is based, than Pompey. He could not bear to obey, and likewise understood 
little about (how to) command. According to his innermost soul, he wanted only to appropriate a heritable 
throne, where as a universally acknowledged prince, he would not have been called upon to defend his position 
on a daily basis and could transfer the consequences of government to others. His ambition was not the same as 
Caesar’s, to make a government in his own person, but his will was to enjoy the honors and nominations of a 
ruler without personal exertion.” See also: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, 272. 
15 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 275 
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troops16 and when he does come to Pompey’s death in Egypt he treats it with little sensitivity17. 
Crucially, he questions Pompey’s legacy, suggesting that both contemporary and later writers 
romanticised his successes18.  
 
Ihne’s work adapts and perpetuates Mommsen’s Pompey’s vanity, power mongering, and 
delusion. These characteristics are by-products of a methodology which combined Historicist 
and Romanticist theories and approaches to the ancient evidence. Ihne’s work is crucial for 
Anglophone approaches because it succinctly promulgated German traditions and readings of 
Rome to an English audience. It achieved this by presenting German philosophical and 
historical inquiry written in a remarkably English manner. Indeed, one review remarked: 
As a mere linguistic exercise the work is remarkable. No living Englishman could have 
produced a book much more thoroughly English in phrase and thought. It comes to us as 
a genuine product of German industry in historical and philosophical research; yet in 
style and form it appears as a good English classic. This fortunate circumstance will 
commend it to many readers who would find it difficult to master the work in its original 
form.19 
 
This begs the question why the last three volumes were not translated and published into 
English. 
 
5.2. William Warde Fowler 
William Warde Fowler was born at Langford Budville in Somerset in 1847 and entered New 
College, Oxford, in 1866. He subsequently won a scholarship at Lincoln College, where he 
studied from 1866-70. Fowler tutored at Oxford for the remainder of his career and published 
various works. He is best known for his work on Roman religion in the late republic, but also 
wrote monologues reflecting broader opinions about the period that focused on the political 
and military spheres. Moreover, Fowler worked extensively on German scholarship, a passion 
that he shared with the then-rector of Lincoln College, Mark Pattison. This profoundly 
                                                 
16 W. Ihne, Römische Geschichte, Siebenter Band, Verlag Von Wilhelm Engelmann (Leipzig, 1890), 66. “Sobald 
Pompeius die flucht seiner Reiterei und die gefahrdete Lage seines linken Flugels sah, gab er Alles verloren. 
Es flingt sast unglaublich, aber es ist vollgultig bezeugt, dass er alsbald die noch tapfer kampfenden truppen 
verliess, wie es scheint, ohne vertalhungsbefehle und ohne einen Stellvertreter zu ernennen, und in sein Lager 
eilte.” Translation: “As soon as he saw the situation of his cavalry on the left wing he fled, making everyone 
despair. It was incredible, but fully testified that he immediately left the still brave fighting troops, as it seems, 
without first giving commands and without appointing a deputy, and rushed into his camp.” 
17 W. Ihne, Ibid. 75-6. “Die Göttin und die Freunde, der ängstliche Blide dem Boote gefolgt waren, sahen die 
Unthat sich vor ihren Augen Vollsiehnund wie die Mörder den Kopf von kumpfe trennten und die Leich auf den 
Strand warfen.”  Translation: “The goddess and friends, who had fearfully and blindly followed the boats, saw 
the deed before their eyes, and how the murderers separated the head from the body, and threw the corpse on 
the beach.”  
18 W. Ihne, Ibid. 76-7. “Der Charakter des Pompeius ist von seinem Zeitgenoffen und den unmittelbar folgenden 
Schriftstellern viel zu günstig beurtheilt worden, zum Theil weil seine Kriegszuge und Erfolge ihn als einen 
römischen Helden erscheinen liessen, an dessen Grosse man sich aus Nationalstolz erhante, zum Theil weil er 
als der leste hervorragende Kämpfer für die dahinschwindende Republik galt, der man noch lange nachtrauerte 
unter der monarchie.” Translation: “The character of Pompey has been judged too favourably by his 
contemporaries and by the immediate writers (after his life), partly because his campaigns and successes made 
him appear as a Roman hero, whose greatness was derived from the nationality, partly because he was the first 
among outstanding of fighters in the vanishing republic, which was still long mourned under the monarchy.” 
19 ‘Ihne’s History of Rome’, Examiner, no. 3287, (1871), 99. 
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influenced his approach to Roman history. Fowler’s works consequently subvert the positivist 
approach then popular among his Oxbridge peers and instead bear closer resemblance to the 
Prussian Historicist school of thought.  
 
Julius Caesar and the Foundation of the Roman Imperial System 
Fowler’s most accessible and popular work was Julius Caesar and the Foundation of the 
Roman Imperial System, which was first published in 1892. It received wide critical acclaim 
and was Fowler’s only ancient political biography, which also included broader narrative 
themes on Roman late republican history. Its publication coincided with a popular scholarly 
movement in England, wherein increased emphasis was placed on the role of the individual in 
Roman history. Fowler adapted this approach to emphasise Caesar’s political and military 
centrality to the narrative of the late republic. Yet his methodology resulted in a history that 
frequently exceeds the platitudes of its scholarly counterparts. For example, Fowler presents 
Caesar as a semi-heroic figure who reconfigured Roman politics and ushered the golden age of 
Roman history. This glowing favouritism is obvious on to all. For instance, the title Julius 
Caesar and the Foundation of the Roman Imperial System (hereafter Julius Caesar) stresses 
Caesar’s achievements, naming him as the forefather of an entire political and social 
framework. Moreover, the British Empire was then at its height, so labelling Caesar the 
‘Founder of the Roman Imperial System’ is especially high praise. The pro-Caesar sentiments 
are furthered by the work’s publication by G. P. Putnam’s Sons Publishers in the series Heroes 
of the Nations20. This series of monographs was widely accessible, published for broad 
audiences, and promoted the ‘great men’ approach to history. Consequently, they entrenched 
the centrality of men like Caesar, who defined their own epochs along with Western history. 
Yet such readings are by their nature misleading. Fowler’s adherence to this framework 
demonstrates this, as it marginalised Rome’s political traditions and deterministically 
advocated Caesar’s superiority. Moreover, the publisher’s framework encouraged Fowler to 
prioritise the ancient evidence that favoured Caesar. This resulted in a skewed reading of the 
late republic, which was inherently unfavourable to Pompey. This is because Fowler rendered 
Pompey as Caesar’s main political opponent for Rome’s inevitable transition into the Imperial 
system. The history’s wide accessibility and popularity extended its influence to the largest 
possible readership group and thereby amplified the problems of method and evidence21. The 
numerous illustrations orientated non-specialist readers to a particular view of the Roman 
world. In addition, Fowler sparsely references ancient evidence or modern accounts and instead 
prioritises continuity and accessibility. This replicated Mommsen and Ihne’s historical method, 
which likewise gave prominence to narrative continuity over factuality and depth of research. 
The few references in Fowler’s work cite the ancient evidence rather than modern scholarship. 
                                                 
20 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar and the Foundation of the Roman Imperial System, G.P. Putnam’s and Sons 
Publishers (London, 1892), i. “Heroes of the Nations: A series of biographical studies presenting the lives and 
work of certain representative historical characters, about whom have gathered the traditions of the nations to 
which they belong, and who have, in the majority of instances, been accepted as types of the several national 
ideals.” 
21 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, preface, v “In this volume I have tried to meet the wishes of the publishers, by 
explaining to those who are comparatively unfamiliar with classical antiquity the place which Caesar occupies 
in the history of the world.”  
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They rarely offer contradictory perspectives for further investigation. In form, Fowler’s history 
resembles Mommsen. This is not coincidental as Fowler cites him on four occasions even 
expressing his gratitude to Mommsen in the preface:  
I need hardly mention, in a book not primarily intended for scholars, the many modern 
works, from that of Drumann downwards, which have been of use to me. But in any 
biography of Caesar it is impossible not to allude with gratitude and reverence to the 
great genius and learning of Professor Mommsen; for even if they venture to dissent from 
some of his conclusions, all students of classical antiquity will allow that his life-long 
labours have wrought as great a change in the study of Roman history, as the work of his 
great hero brought about in the Roman state itself.22 
 
Fowler offers insight to Mommsen’s universal significance in the nineteenth century. He even 
wrote a biography about Mommsen23. Furthermore, he replicates Mommsen’s vision of Rome 
and its history. His characterisation of Pompey reflects this influence. 
 
Fowler’s Pompey 
Fowler’s view of Caesar as Rome’s definitive genius is clear from his opening paragraph: 
 …Julius Caesar, personifying the principle of intelligent government by a single man, 
had made it possible for the Roman dominion, then on the point of breaking up, to grow 
into a great political union, and so eventually to provide a material foundation for modern 
civilisation.24 
 
Fowler’s grandiose tone powerfully emphasises Caesar’s eternal greatness. He thus introduces 
Caesar’s greatness, which is likewise magnified by Caesar’s popularity in art and literature25. 
For Fowler Caesar is the personification of ‘the principle of intelligent government by a single 
man’. It ignores the consequences of Caesar’s actions, and instead emphasises his politico-
military achievements. Moreover, this passage is determinist in its assumption that Caesar, who 
transcended the restraints of his peers, was ‘destined’ to change Rome’s fortunes. Such a 
perspective reduces Pompey’s significance and achievements by assuming that his victory 
would automatically have been a disaster for Rome. This view provides a basis for Fowler’s 
critical approach to Pompey, which only becomes increasingly hostile as the narrative takes its 
course. Yet, there are traces of hostility even earlier. For instance, Fowler upholds the 
Mommsenian trope of Pompey’s treachery and political impotence during his brief account of 
the Sertorian war26. He also stresses Pompey’s untrustworthiness, vanity, and inexperience in 
                                                 
22 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, preface, vii. 
23 W.W. Fowler W.W. (ed.) ‘Theodor Mommsen: His Life and Work’, in Roman Essays and Interpretations, 
Clarendon Press (Oxford, 1920), 250-68. 
24 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 2. 
25 William Shakespeare, for instance, popularised and romanticised Caesar in his famous play Julius Caesar. 
26 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 44. “…even Pompeius, the youngest and most brilliant (compared to Crassus and 
Lucullus), had been no match for his able enemy in Spain, though he was now wearing him out by superior 
resources and by treachery… All three (Pompeius, Crassus, and Lucullus) were men of ability, but so far had 
shown no conspicuous political skill…”  
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politics especially in relation to Pompey’s consulship in 7027 and his assumption of the 
Gabinian command. Here, Fowler is particularly critical of the senate’s “incapable rule”, which 
then justifies Caesar’s later eradication of the republic28. 
  
The impending reality of the civil war marks a striking change in Fowler’s representation of 
Pompey. Fowler here emphasises Pompey’s faults at every opportunity and contrasts his 
personality with Caesar throughout this section. The two are diametrically opposed on several 
occasions and this results in a hostile portrayal of Pompey, who must assume the antagonist’s 
role. For instance, Fowler describes Pompey’s support for Caesar’s absent nomination for the 
consulship as ‘half-hearted’29. This representation depends on assuming that Pompey is 
treacherous and deceitful, along with being willing to abandon a political ally. Fowler 
distinguishes his reading from Mommsen’s, when he also blames the consuls of 49, Lucius 
Cornelius Lentulus Crus and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, for initiating the war, asserting that 
neither Caesar, nor Pompey, wished to fight but were demanded by political expedience30.  
 
Fowler’s negative representation of Pompey reaches its zenith during the civil war. He 
criticises Pompey’s tactics in the early engagements, again stressing that Caesar was Pompey’s 
intellectual superior31. He further ridicules Pompey’s decision to station an army filled with 
untrustworthy troops at Luceria, a town placed directly along Caesar’s path and emphasises 
Pompey’s miscalculation of the length of time it takes to muster troops in midwinter. He bases 
this claim on the fate of Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, whose frequent requests for aid went 
unheeded and who was eventually defeated by Caesar at Corfinium. The battles of Dyrrachium 
and Pharsalus continue in this vein. Fowler does not credit Pompey’s success at Dyrrachium 
and instead focuses on his failure to achieve total victory32. He emphasises Pompey’s 
willingness to bow to his colleagues as the reason for his defeat, because he abandoned his 
attrition tactics on their account and then engaged Caesar at Pharsalus against his will33. These 
representations reflect Mommsen’s concept of the ‘stupid’ Pompey. They highlight Pompey’s 
foolish decisions throughout the civil war, while also stressing Caesar’s genius.  
 
                                                 
27 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 49. “But he (Pompey) was not a man to be trusted; and to repose trust in someone 
was just what the wearied Roman world was beginning ardently to desire… He might be vain and inexperienced 
in politics; but of all the men then living of assured reputation and power, he was the only one whose character 
was really respected, and whom all parties could by any possibility agree in trusting.”  
28 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 62. “…for it was only the political weakness of the man himself that prevented 
his seizing the opportunity and putting an end to the Senate’s incapable rule, as Caesar did later on.”  
29 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 253. 
30 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 254. 
31 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 264. “He (Pompey) dreaded Caesar’s personal address and persuasiveness as 
much as Caesar himself trusted in it; he had perhaps begun to realise his opponent’s greatness as he had never 
realized it before, and felt that he must now fight or lose his old position as the first citizen of the state .”  
32 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 293-6. 
33 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 298. “The same foolish clamours, the same petty competition and quarrelling, 
which his rival (Caesar) had escaped for ten years in Gaul, distracted him (Pompey) now, and at last induced 
him to fight, against his own better judgement.”  
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In summarising Pompey’s life and character at the moment of his death in Egypt, Fowler 
cements several tropes, which originated in Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte. Fowler admits 
that posterity knows little about Pompey because scarce first-hand evidence survives him34. He 
thereafter outlines Pompey’s character according to the negative descriptions in Cicero’s letters 
as well as Caesar’s Commentaries, stating:  
Probably Pompeius was cold and reserved, except with a very few intimates, and disliked 
the impulsive, pushing cleverness of his would-be friend. But if we may accept the 
general tradition of antiquity, he was a just and honourable man in private life, clean-
handed in a corrupt age, and unwilling by nature to be cruel or treacherous.35 
 
Fowler knows that the ancient tradition is nuanced and contested, but he prefers to accept a 
negative view. Even in admitting that there was another view, however, he shows up the 
assumptions of his earlier comments. For instance, he has already emphasised Pompey’s 
treachery during the Sertorian war36. In those moments, there is no mention of the alternative 
views in our sources. 
 
In examining his political and military career, as opposed to his character, Fowler declares that 
he was of mediocre intellect and oratorical abilities37, and that he was trained only in the arts 
of warfare. Fowler admits that Pompey achieved great things but steadfastly refuses to admit 
his greatness. Fowler’s Pompey was lacking in rapidity, resource, and the ability to inspire the 
men around him with confidence38. By contrast, Fowler’s Caesar “had a magical power in times 
of tumult and revolution”39. In sum, Fowler’s Pompey had no knowledge of men, and could 
not comprehend politics. This made him unsuitable to answer the great questions of 
government. Fowler summarises this eloquently: 
A man without knowledge of men, and without understanding in politics, cannot govern 
events when great questions have to be decided; and though we may feel tenderly towards 
one whose downfall was so sudden and so sad, we must allow that all his history shows 
him incapable of doing the work that the world was then ever more and more earnestly 
demanding.40  
 
Fowler’s harsh pragmatism undermines his sympathy toward Pompey. He highlights Pompey’s 
weaknesses as the cause of his demise, while also stating that this was an inevitability. Fowler 
believed that a feeble-minded Pompey was always fated to succumb to the mighty will of 
Caesar, the ‘perfect statesman’ and what Rome required41.  
                                                 
34 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 306. “But the fact is that of Pompeius real character as a man we know hardly 
anything. Cicero, whose letters at least might have revealed him to us, seems to have never known the man 
intimately, as he knew Caesar, and the result we get from him is an uncertain and negative one.”  
35 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 306. 
36 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 44. 
37 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 306. 
38 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 306. 
39 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 307. 
40 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 307. 
41 W.W. Fowler, Julius Caesar, 307. “Yet in Pompeius there was not the material out of which great rulers are 
made. The recognition of the real nature of the Roman Empire, and the invention of a method of government 
which might solve its many problems, were not within the scope of a mind that moved with an impetus so 
feeble.” 307. 
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Fowler was hyper-critical of Pompey’s decisions throughout the civil war. His predisposition 
towards Caesar made him a willing recipient of Mommsen’s influence. His treatment of 
Pompey was shaped accordingly. Interestingly, only certain features took root. Fowler’s 
historical objective, namely writing a flattering biography on Caesar’s impact on western 
history, required Pompey’s achievements and mental capacity to be diminished. This promoted 
the notion of Caesar’s greatness. Fowler did not need to highlight the ‘cruel’ trope, as it had 
little impact on his characterisation of Caesar.  
 
5.3. James Anthony Froude 
James Anthony Froude (1818-1894) was an English historian whose lengthy career covered 
the mid-late nineteenth century. He was strongly influenced by the Anglo-Catholic Oxford 
movement, which saw a revival of traditional ecclesiastical practices among Oxford’s 
academics. From an early age he intended to become a clergyman and even though he 
abandoned this ambition in 1849, when his work The Nemesis of Faith was deemed scandalous. 
Nonetheless, this movement conditioned his historical perspective. He decided to write 
histories, primarily concentrating on the British Empire and its colonies.  
 
Froude’s writing career was always tinged with controversy. His works were characterised by 
their dramatic, cantankerous, and polemical approach, rather than a strictly scientific treatment 
of history42. They were accordingly ridiculed as exercises in fiction and subjectivity. Yet his 
controversial writing style only increased his popularity and public profile43. He consequently 
became one of England’s most influential historians during the late nineteenth century. 
 
Julius Caesar: A Sketch  
Froude is best known for his History of England (1856-70) and biography on Thomas Carlyle 
(1882-4), both of which became famous in their day44. However, he also wrote a frank political 
sketch on the career of Julius Caesar, a figure with whom he was fascinated from an early age. 
This work was humbly titled Caesar: A Sketch, and was first published in 1879. The 
biography’s methodology resembles his other works, that is, it was unabashedly driven by his 
personal prejudices. The work offered a colourful depiction of one of history’s most famous 
figures. This approach resonated with its broad audience, which celebrated his honest and 
accessible interpretation of Caesar over the frequently dry approach of his peers45.  
 
In the preface, Froude outlines the difficulties he faced during its composition. These included 
a keen awareness to the relative scarcity of available contemporary evidence, which was a stark 
contrast to the volume usually available for his modern histories, the dubious nature of the 
                                                 
42 Herbert Paul, The Life of Froude, Charles Scribner’s and Sons (New York, 1906), 72. 
43 According to Paul, Froude was the most famous living historian in England after the death of Thomas Macaulay. 
See: Paul, The Life of Froude, 110. 
44 Ciaran Brady, James Anthony Froude: An Intellectual Biography of a Victorian Prophet, Oxford University 
Press, (Oxford, 2013). 
45 ‘Mr. Froude’s Caesar’, in Spectator, (London, 3 May, 1879), 18; Paul Revere Frothingham, ‘The Historian as 
Preacher’, in The Harvard Theological Review, Vol.2, No.4. (1909), 481-99.  
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ancient evidence and their lack of reliability. Froude attempted to overcome this by prioritising 
the available contemporary evidence. However, his analysis inadequately covers the various 
historical issues that these works engendered. For example, Froude does not acknowledge that 
Cicero’s letters were dictated by context. Furthermore, he does not address the fundamental 
issue with Caesar’s evidence, namely that it was inherently tendentious. Froude offers little 
reflection on the ancient source material, which is amplified by the work’s minimal use of 
footnotes.  
 
Froude’s Pompey 
Froude’s introduction to Pompey outlines his superficial positive attributes, commenting that 
he was a high spirited and good-willed youth who was loved by those around him. He adds that 
Pompey was a resilient politician who successfully overcame his maligned father’s political 
shadow46. Pompey’s commands against the pirates and Mithridates are also praised47, though 
are presented as examples of his moderation in victory48, rather than his capacity as a general. 
Froude strengthens this portrayal by stating that Pompey faced “no real resistance”49 during 
these campaigns, an opinion which originates from Cato’s sneering remark that Pompey was 
“victorious over women”50. Finally, he marginalises Pompey’s victory, asserting that Pompey 
threw down these ‘buccaneers’ because he refused to be bribed by them. Froude thus believed 
that Lucullus was an equally capable commander as Pompey, but had allowed himself to 
succumb to the East’s fortunes. Froude hereafter perpetuates Pompey’s portrayal as a dullard, 
albeit a moderate one, who stumbled onto victory. He thereby ignores ancient evidence that 
testified Pompey’s military skill51. He also describes Pompey as having ‘no political insight’ 
and suffering from an ‘innocent vanity’52, which resulted in him being the easy ‘dupe of men 
with greater intellect’. Here, Froude adapts Mommsen’s paradigms of Pompey, while 
anticipating Pompey’s demise later in the narrative. He selectively constructs a plausible reality 
in which Caesar’s victory was inevitable, despite ignoring the contested portrayal in the ancient 
evidence, and veils his selectivity by limiting the number of footnotes throughout the passage. 
Moreover, his translation of Cicero’s comment on Pompey’s speech to the senate after his 
return from the east has been corrected by contemporary critics53. Accordingly, even Froude’s 
positive comments about Pompey are buried under the weight of criticism. For example, when 
Froude comments that Pompey ‘practiced strictly the common rules of morality’ and ‘detested 
                                                 
46 J. A. Froude, Caesar: A Sketch, Longmans Green and Co. (London, 1879), 82-3. 
47 J. A. Froude, Caesar, 180. “Pompey meanwhile was at last coming back. All lesser luminaries shone faint 
before the sun of Pompey, the subduer of the pirates, the conqueror of Asia, the glory of the Roman name.” 
48 J. A. Froude, Caesar, 181. “His successes had been brilliant; but they were due rather to his honesty than to his 
military genius.” 
49 J. A. Froude, Caesar, 181. 
50 J. A. Froude, Caesar, 182.  
51 Cic. leg.Man; Val. Max. 8.15.8; Vell. Pat. 2.29.5; Front. Strat. 1.4.8; Plut. Pomp. 28.2. 31.2-3; App. Mith. 
12.14.96; Dio Cass. 37.20.2. 
52 J.A. Froude, Caesar, 182. 
53 ‘Mr. Froude’s Caesar’, 18. “non iucunda miseris, inanis improbis, beatis non grata, bonis non gravis; itaque 
frigebat (Froude translates this as: Pompey gave no pleasure to the wretched; to the bad; he seemed without 
backbone; he was not agreeable with the well-to-do; the wise and good found him wanting in substance. Froude, 
162).”  
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injustice’, he actually wants to imply that Pompey was ill-equipped for politics and thus 
destined to fail. This is a preamble for his assessment of Pompey as ‘stupid’:  
In the age of Clodius and Catiline he (Pompey) was the easy dupe of men of stronger 
intellect than his own, who played upon his inconspicuous integrity.54  
 
Froude uses this platform to criticise Pompey’s decision to disband his army and relinquish 
control of Rome when he returned from the East. This argument reveals two factors that shaped 
his reading. Firstly, Froude believed that Roman history must inevitably succumb to sole 
rulership. Secondly, he accepted Mommsen’s reading, that Caesar was destiny’s cure to 
Rome’s ills. These factors culminated in a hyper-critical analysis of Pompey’s decision to 
disband his forces, which in itself demonstrates a determination not to be another Sulla rather 
than a failure to understand the inevitable march of history.  
 
Froude’s Julius Caesar adopts an impartial tone throughout the ‘triumviral’ and civil war 
periods. However, his reading realigns with Mommsen’s when he comes to describe Pompey’s 
death. Froude briefly alludes to the positive secondary source tradition for Pompey, stating that 
“history had dealt tenderly with him on account of his misfortunes”55. In doing so, he ignores 
his earlier commentary, wherein he selectively sourced evidence that attacked Pompey’s 
character. He stresses Pompey’s noble qualities, commenting that Pompey was honest above 
all and that this was rare in his times56. However, that said, Froude goes on to say that Pompey 
was not an exceptional soldier and that his rise to distinction resulted from his ‘honesty’, read 
simplicity. This ignores the talent which, according to friendly sources, had been on display 
from his extreme youth. Froude goes on to outline Pompey’s weak character and political 
incompetence revealing his implicit view that Pompey’s honesty was pernicious. Eventually 
he states that Pompey “had acquired his position through negative virtues”57. He further asserts 
that Pompey’s vanity, despite being unmentioned previously, was a factor in his demise58. This 
insertion further highlights the intrusion of Mommsen’s Pompeian constructs59. Froude 
afterward demonstrates his Caesar-centric reading, stating that Pompey only maintained his 
honour and authority through his allegiance with Caesar.60 Froude’s summary of Pompey’s 
importance to the narrative summarises his contempt:  
His (Pompey’s) end was piteous, but scarcely tragic, for the cause to which he was 
sacrificed was too slightly removed from being ignominious... He was a weak, good man, 
whom accident had thrust into a place to which he was unequal; and ignorant of himself, 
                                                 
54 J.A. Froude, Caesar, 182. 
55 J.A. Froude, Caesar, 453. 
56 J.A. Froude, Caesar. “So ended Pompey the Great. History has dealt tenderly with him on account of his 
misfortunes, and has not refused him admiration for qualities as rare in his age as they were truly excellent.” 
453. 
57 J.A. Froude, Caesar, 454. 
58 J.A. Froude, Caesar, 454. 
59 While Pompey’s vanity exists in the ancient record, an equal number of sources attests his modesty. The 
emphasis on his vanity began with Niebuhr and was popularised by Mommsen. See sections 2.4.3. Niebuhr’s 
Pompey and 3.3.4. Pompey’s Gabinian and Manilian Commands. 
60 J.A. Froude, Caesar, 454.  
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and unwilling to part with his imaginary greatness, he was flung down with careless 
cruelty by the forces which were dividing the world.61  
 
All the negative readings of Pompey’s character meld together to condemn him. Pompey was 
pitiful, weak, feeble, foolish, and delusional. Even Froude’s suggestion that fate had disposed 
of Pompey with careless cruelty implies that it was an inevitable fate for such a flawed 
character. This view is only justifiable through hindsight. 
 
Froude’s biography of Caesar is unique because it was written by a historian who did not 
specialise in the Classics62. This only increases its importance for this thesis, because Froude’s 
work drew from contemporary narrative histories. Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte was 
almost certainly the most influential of all the narratives he used, given his dominance of the 
field. Froude’s portrayal of Pompey reproduces elements characteristic of Mommsen’s 
Pompeian paradigm, particularly Pompey’s ‘weakness of mind’ and ‘foolishness’63. In 
conclusion, Froude’s work allows us to see how Mommsen’s conceptualisations shaped 
Anglophone scholarship in the late nineteenth century. 
 
5.4. William Everton Heitland 
William Heitland was an esteemed Cambridge scholar who worked extensively on Roman 
history throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His most famous work was 
the History of Rome, published with much acclaim in 1909. It typifies Heitland’s intellectual 
background and the resulting Positivist approach to history, wherein historians strived to 
achieve ‘impartiality’ and preserve the past ‘as it actually happened’. This philosophy 
determined Heitland’s approach to history and is outlined in his essay The Teaching of Ancient 
History,64 which was published in 1901.  
 
Heitland’s History of Rome is less affected by contemporary political and social themes than 
his historicist forebears. This is explained by Heitland’s positivist historical methodology, 
which preserved history for its own sake rather than using it as a platform to comment on 
contemporary politics. Positivism’s rise resulted from the diminishing significance of 
Historicism, Romanticism, and Militarism in late nineteenth century British scholarship. 
Hereafter, only Historicism shaped the practical elements of historical inquiry helped by 
increased use of footnoting and peer review. Meanwhile, Romanticism and Militarism 
dwindled into insignificance against the background of the diminution of British imperialism.  
 
                                                 
61 J.A. Froude, Caesar, 454. 
62 ‘Mr. Froude’s Caesar’, 18. “But Mr. Froude’s historical tact is hardly so sure, and his scholarship is by no 
manner of means so strong, as Mommsen’s. It argues, therefore, great courage in a writer who has so few claims 
to be called a specialist to choose a topic which a real specialist has already made his own.” 
63 Richard Claverhouse Jebb, Essays and Addresses, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1907), 315. “Mr 
Froude paints him (Pompey) in less opposing colours: as a mock-hero who did not even know that he was a 
sham.” 
64 W.E. Heitland, ‘The Teaching of Ancient History’, in Essays on the Teaching of History, Cambridge University 
Press, C.J. Clay and Sons (London, 1901). 
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Historical Positivism 
Positivist histories have certain trademark characteristics which distinguished them from their 
historicist counterparts in Germany. They are characterised most greatly by the passivity of 
their author’s opinions within the text. This process intended to minimise the subjectivity 
within any given work and thereby offer the truest available representation of the past65. 
Heitland, for example, never uses first person and rarely inserts his opinion throughout the 
work. Instead, he offers a condensed record of the past which earnestly attempts to untangle 
the prejudices of the ancient record. This approach bespeaks good scholarly practice, but does 
not in and of itself mean that the resulting analysis is ‘objective’. The preconditions and 
prejudices remain even when they are not openly on display. If inconvenient evidence is 
deemed ‘untrustworthy’, it will not be given its due of attention. Accordingly, the scholar’s 
opinion still affects the outcome, even if it is less obvious. In Heitland’s case, this process has 
predominantly affected his view of Pompey 
 
Heitland’s Positivist intellectual climate had inherent determinist leanings, which already 
predisposed it to Mommsen’s authoritative narrative. As stated previously, Positivist 
historiography sought to recreate the past as it happened in fact, the historian’s recreation of 
what happened66. It saw the past as something separated between two realities: what happened, 
and what was recorded. Accordingly, history was the act of removing the evidence’s prejudices 
to reveal actual events. Hence, Positivist historiography was automatically attracted to 
determinist readings and was underpinned by empiricist practices and cause-and-effect 
relations. For example, Heitland’s rationalisation of the Roman republic traced a series of 
cause-and-effect relations (events) to fixed endpoint (the end of the republic). Moreover, 
Caesar and Cicero, as the most reliable authorities for the period, could be mined for reliable 
information through careful historical investigation. This methodology sat quite comfortably 
with Mommsen’s teleological reading whereby the Principate was the destined and inevitable 
end-point of Roman Republican history. The only difference between these approaches is the 
myth of objectivity. Heitland claimed to be writing objective history, while Mommsen was 
unashamedly subjective.  
 
                                                 
65 This is the crux of the quarrel between Positivist and Historicist histories, as Historicism rejects that history is 
scientifically quantifiable. See: Edwin R. Wallace, ‘Historiography: Medicine and Science’, in History of 
Psychiatry and Medical Psychology: With an Epilogue on Psychiatry and the Mind-Body Relation, eds. E.R. 
Wallace and J. Gach, Springer (New York, 2008). 28. “If under the rubric of ‘science’ one admits only 
disciplines that use predominantly experimental and mathematical models, then history need not apply (though 
statistical models have been usefully applied in many fields of history…). By the very nature of what they study 
historians cannot engage in prospective, controlled experimentation; nor, often, can they provide more than an 
approximate kind of qualification… Their method is essentially idiographic, interpretative, and reconstructive… 
The historian cannot attain (indeed he would not want to) the same degree of observational detachment as the 
natural science. Finally, historical perspectives are to some degree time and culture bound. … If, as I believe, 
much of what history studies is nonquantifiable anyway, then to quantify is to lose, not to gain, precision.”  
66 See: W.E. Heitland, ‘The Teaching of Ancient History’, in Essays on the Teaching of History, Cambridge 
University Press, C.J. Clay and Sons (London, 1901), 31. “Historical study is applied Logic. Reasoning is 
applied (1) to the appraising of evidence, that is, to the extraction of fact, (2) to the appraising of facts, that is, 
to the extraction of their meaning.” See also: W.E. Heitland, The Roman Fate: An Essay in Interpretation, 
Cambridge University Press (London, 1922). 
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Heitland’s Pompey 
Heitland’s History of Rome is measured in its treatment of Pompey throughout the majority of 
the work. These sections hardly reference Pompey’s vices or define his political and ideological 
stance. There are, however, subtle allusions to Mommsen’s Pompeian construct67, which reflect 
his descriptions albeit in a gentler tone. For example, Heitland labels Pompey ‘self-satisfied’ 
when he failed to heed Cicero and Cato’s warnings about Caesar’s growing power68. This 
alludes both to Pompey’s vanity69, which is contested in the ancient evidence, and Mommsen’s 
more problematic construct of Pompey’s delusional self-overestimation70. Heitland emphasises 
Pompey’s demise as pitiful, feeble71, and inevitable72, further reflecting Mommsen’s reading. 
However, Heitland’s attempts at impartiality become even more Mommsenian in his summary 
of Pompey’s overall contribution. Here, he damns Pompey’s character, blaming his vice-filled 
nature as the cause of his inevitable demise. At this point, Heitland describes Pompey as 
slovenly, delusional, vain, jealous, a mere tool in the hands of Caesar73. He adds that Pompey’s 
career reached an early pinnacle74, before his deficiencies became apparent to his peers and 
destructive to his career. Heitland also outlines Pompey’s treachery in taking over Lucullus’ 
command in 67, highlighting Pompey’s belittling behaviour and mean-spirited jealousy, thus 
completely undermining the restraint he had earlier shown when relating this event in its 
                                                 
67 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 310. “We have traced his career, and from time to time noted the 
weaknesses that marred it and that now brought it to a pitiful and feeble close.”  
68 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 225. “Both Cato and Cicero are said to have warned Pompey that he 
was raising Caesar to a height from which he would not be able to dislodge him, but the self-satisfied man took 
no heed.” 
69 See also: W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 15. “It would seem that the Senate had a fair chance of 
keeping Pompey loyal to the existing system by themselves cheerfully making the concessions required by his 
vanity.”  
70 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 273. 
71 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 310. 
72 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 308. “We may call it (The battle of Pharsalus) the military expression 
of the coming political change. The one absolute chief, undistracted by irrelevant considerations and 
irresponsible meddling, could take risks, retrieve errors, and subordinate everything to the attainment of his end, 
without deference to the wishes of others. The head of an aristocratic clique could only feign a position of equal 
freedom by the firm suppression of his own supporters, a course for which Pompey was wholly unfitted.”  
73 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 311. “But when he had earned the name of Great and entered in civil 
life, he could not keep his greatness in repair. Vanity and jealousy impaired his judgement, wavering and 
procrastination grew upon him like a disease. He could neither do what was necessary for keeping his primacy, 
nor endure a rival. So he drifted to ruin, the victim of slovenly delusions. He became a tool in the hands of 
Caesar, who rose at his expense. His later life was that of a solemn dreamer, fancying that he still held a position 
which in truth was long since undermined. The civil war pitilessly exposed his weakness. As leader of the 
Roman aristocrats he was ridiculous, for he was neither their master nor their hero. As champion of the republic 
he was equally ridiculous, for sincere republicans like Cato had no trust in his patriotism and self-denial. Mere 
military skill was not enough for civil war, and Pompey had no other qualification for the post of leader. He had 
never been a man of genius, and he was now stale. He could neither overcome his difficulties nor profit by his 
advantages, and the last scene of the tragic failure was of a piece with the rest.”  
74 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 310-1. “He was at his best in the campaigns of his earlier life, while 
strung up to the point of efficiency by immediate necessities of war. He had to look facts in the face and act 
with energy.” See also: W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 59. “None of his (Pompey’s) later achievements, 
great though they were, will stand comparison with the prompt and thorough suppression of piracy as an 
exhibition of statesmanlike tact and strategic skill.” 
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context75. The tone and view are best explained by Heitland’s familiarity with Mommsen’s 
Römische Geschichte and other works which Heitland references 37 times in his third volume 
alone. Heitland’s reference to volume four of Mommsen’s history is the most important. It 
supports his assertion that “Some one master, corrupt or not corrupt, was to rule the vast empire 
as an empire with an eye to its well-being as a whole, were it only for his own interest”76, while 
afterwards insinuating that the clear and practical intellect of Caesar made him the perfect 
candidate. This directly paraphrases Mommsen’s sentiment77. In sum, Heitland references 
Mommsen far more than any other author. Only certain critical pieces of ancient evidence 
receive more attention. 
 
Heitland further demonstrates how Mommsen’s successors selectively adopted aspects of his 
reading of Pompey. For instance, Heitland was not critical of Pompey’s decision to disband his 
army on returning to Rome from the East78. Moreover, he openly praised Pompey’s military 
abilities79 and claimed that Pompey fairly earned the cognomen ‘the Great’80. Yet, he embraced 
Mommsen’s demonization when he comes to summarise Pompey. The literary trope is 
designed to diminish Pompey’s character and successes. The Mommsenian Pompey’s 
‘stupidity’, ‘delusion’, ‘treachery’, and ‘vanity’ are left to have the final word. 
                                                 
75 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 59. “Pompey lost no time in putting his new powers to use, upsetting 
arrangements made by Lucullus for the punishment or reward of persons whose deserts he knew and Pompey 
did not. We need not doubt that he meanly lowered his predecessor in the eyes of all, and mortified him in every 
way. Jealousy of rivals, and an eagerness to reap where others had sown, were marked features of his character. 
The two proconsuls met in Galatia, but their conference ended in unprofitable bickering.”  
76 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 343. 
77 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 492 (in Macmillan and Co. edition). “For long the development of the 
Roman commonwealth had been tending towards such a catastrophe; it was evident to every unbiased observer, 
and had been remarked a thousand times, that, if the rule of the aristocracy should be brought to an end, 
monarchy was inevitable.” 
78 Though he does emphasise Pompey’s pomposity. See: W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 68.  
79 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 308. “In the battle of Pharsalus efficiency triumphed over numbers, yet 
it was not what is called a soldiers battle. Nor was it in respect of the commanders a victory of the professional 
over the amateur, for no man of the time was better able to handle an army than Pompey.” 
80 W.E. Heitland, History of Rome, Vol. 3, 59. “Even his (Pompey’s) friends regretted his jealousy of Metellus; 
but, setting this aside, we must grant that he had now fairly earned the name of Great.”  
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Chapter Six: Second Wave of Scholarship 
 
 
Mommsen’s Römische Geschichte has been shown as an active influence on the works of late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars. Ihne, Fowler, Froude, and Heitland all worked 
as contemporaries of Mommsen or in the succeeding generation. Their connection to 
Mommsen, especially the Römische Geschichte, is clear from their references to him or open 
admission of his contribution to their reconstructions. However, Mommsen’s influence became 
less obvious throughout the twentieth century. The First and Second World Wars altered both 
historical discourse and its view of the individual in society. The fields of ancient history and 
classical studies consequently moved away from the ‘great men’ reading of history. This shift 
became especially apparent during the 1930s with the rise of totalitarianism in Europe and the 
resulting questions about figures such as Caesar and Augustus1. The ‘great men’ conception, 
however, survived in biographical treatments even if the form and tone were moderated. 
 
There were other wholesale changes to historical method. Early-Mid-twentieth century 
scholarship increasingly rejected the belief that history is about teaching for the present. Rather, 
history was to be studied for its own sake2. Through such movements, the role of the discipline 
was transformed. Naturally, these shifts reflected wider social, philosophical and scientific 
developments.  
 
These changes saw Mommsen’s militaristic and historicist outlook lose favour with later 
generations of scholars. Nevertheless, Mommsen’s anti-Pompeian paradigms remained 
prevalent, albeit in less belligerent guises. This particular tradition survived because it was long 
established within 19th and early 20th century scholarship. Furthermore, its Caesar-centric 
aspects were indirectly aided by the universal centrality of Caesar’s commentaries in the Latin 
and Ancient History syllabus at both school and university levels. Pompey’s depiction 
generally continued to suffer in later 20th century scholarship because Mommsen’s Caesar-
centric readings of the late republic had reinforced the popularisation of the Caesar myth, 
allowing it to endure in narrative histories, political biographies of Caesar, and other genres 
including popular fiction and military history. Yet works were generally less polarised in their 
views of Caesar and Pompey. The late twentieth century even saw an increase in Pompeian 
biographies, which sought to salvage, but not glorify, Pompey. Consequently, Pompey’s 
portrayal became more nuanced throughout the twentieth century and increasingly rejected the 
blatant hostility of late nineteenth century scholarship. Nevertheless, Mommsen’s influence is 
still traceable throughout modern scholarship and continues to define the most prevalent 
characterisation of Pompey. 
 
                                                 
1 See: R. Syme The Roman Revolution, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1939); Mario Attilio Levi, La lotta per 
la successione di Giulio Cesare e l'avvento di Ottaviano Augusto, Vita e pensiero, (Milan, 1939); H. Strasburger, 
‘Caesar im Urteil der Zeitgenossen’ in: Historische Zeitschrift. Band 175 (1953), 225–26, 2.  
2 Collingwood was the most famous advocate for this approach to history. See: R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of 
History, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1946). 
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6.1. Matthias Gelzer 
Matthias Gelzer (1886-1974) was a Swiss-German historian, whose works had a major impact 
on later studies of Roman Republican and Imperial politics and society. Gelzer studied history 
and classical philology at the Universities of Basel and Leipzig. He completed his doctorate at 
the University of Leipzig in 1909 as a student of Ulrich Wilcken,3 who was a disciple of 
Theodor Mommsen. Gelzer later received his Habilitation from the University of Freiburg in 
1912 with a thesis on the nobility of the Roman Republic. This later became a significant book 
for 20th century studies of the late republic. Following the success of this study, he later 
produced influential biographies of Caesar4 (1921), Pompey5 (1949), and Cicero6 (1969).  
 
Gelzer’s Caesar: Politician and Statesman (Caesar: Politiker und Staatsman) 
Matthias Gelzer’s Caesar: Politician and Statesman (Caesar: Politiker und Staatsman) was 
first published to much critical acclaim in German in 1921. An English translation, published 
in 1968, meant that it became equally influential among Anglophone scholars. The work is 
renowned for its clinical approach to Caesar’s life and career, which is read against the complex 
machinations of Roman politics. Gelzer also rejected the mythologising of Caesar’s military 
and political capabilities, common in nineteenth century scholarship. He also realised that 
previous approaches diminished the achievements and abilities of Caesar’s peers. Instead, he 
included the widest available body of ancient evidence. This ensured that Caesar’s career was 
set within the context of his perception in the ancient world. Unfortunately, Gelzer’s ambitions 
were only partially realised. Pompey throughout Caesar retains aspects of Mommsen’s 
negative Pompeian tropes.  
 
Pompey in Caesar: Politician and Statesman  
Gelzer’s representation of Pompey’s early career is favourable. Here, when Caesar was an 
aspiring political figure, Pompey is an exemplary administrator7. Neither does Gelzer criticise 
Pompey’s political and military achievements. In fact, he has little to say about them. Instead, 
he focuses on Caesar’s pragmatism and foresight in supporting Pompey at the peak of his 
powers8. The attacks come later as he begins his treatment of the ‘first triumvirate’:  
The strength of the three confederates was quite uneven: Pompey was much stronger than 
Crassus, and Caesar still a beginner compared with either of them, but as consul the 
tactical initiative rested with him and, since he was also vastly superior intellectually and 
in political skill, the actual leadership fell to him.9 
                                                 
3 Wilcken also succeeded Eduard Meyer as the associate professor of ancient history at the University of Breslau 
in 1889 on Mommsen’s recommendation.  
4 M. Gelzer, Cäsar: der Politiker und Staatsmann, Deutsche verlags-anstalt (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1921); M. 
Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, Trans. P. Needham, Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. (Oxford, 1968). 
5 M. Gelzer, Pompeius: Lebensbild eines Römers, F. Bruckmann, (München, 1949).  
6 M. Gelzer, Cicero: Ein Biographischer Versuch, Franz Steiner (Wiesbaden, 1969). 
7 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 34.  
8 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 34. “Those who did not wish to be crushed by the foreseeable new order had to humour their 
future master (Pompey). Caesar was faced with this bitter necessity. But, since it had to be, he was not content 
to be a mere time-server; rather, he became an enthusiastic supporter of the bill (Gabinian)...”  
9 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 68. 
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Gelzer bases this claim on an understanding of Pompey’s ‘good fortune’, which allowed him 
to ignore Rome’s testing cursus honorum and other political hurdles10. Like Mommsen, he 
stresses that Pompey only got to where he did by luck and not talent, which is contested in the 
ancient evidence11. Moreover, he contrasts Pompey and Caesar’s political career, noting that 
Caesar’s conventional advancement more adequately prepared him for difficult circumstances, 
instead of noting that Caesar was lucky too in having three uncles closely attached to Sulla 
even while he could ‘sell’ his connections to Marius - and even survive Sulla’s proscriptions12. 
 
Gelzer’s portrayal of Pompey in Caesar becomes increasingly negative as he moves through 
the ‘first triumvirate’ period. Pompey is increasingly reduced to the role of antagonist. Within 
his first criticism, he states:  
But the most profound reason for his (Pompey’s) hesitation lay in his caution: he no 
longer dared to undertake any enterprise, the success of which could not be calculated 
beforehand with the maximum of certainty.13 
 
Gelzer thus alludes to the modern trope of Pompey’s ‘incompetence’14, wherein his hesitancy 
was so acute that it paralysed him. This construction also amplifies Caesar’s boldness, thereby 
emphasising his super-human qualities and genius15 in the face of Pompey’s mediocrity. Gelzer 
also focuses on Pompey’s unwillingness to dominate the senate, but rather than reading this as 
a positive attribute, it is interpreted as a sign of ineptitude and weakness16. Pompey’s absorption 
into the oligarchy eroded his relationship with Caesar17, something which Gelzer saw as 
Pompey’s ultimate failure. Gelzer ridicules Pompey’s ambition, stating: 
Furthermore, he had not even mastered the mechanics of politics as managed in the senate 
and popular assembly, with the result that the hopes he entertained in 61 of being from 
then on the first man in the state had been wretchedly frustrated.18 
 
                                                 
10 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 69. “Now his career of defiance of the leges annales caught up with Pompey. Spoiled by 
his good fortune from his youth upwards, he despised the normal activities of the senator in the Curia and 
Forum, and so never learned how to further his own interests there...” 
11 Diod. Sic. 38.9-10; Strab. 12.3.28; Val. Max, 4.5.5; Vell. Pat. 2.29.5; Plut. Pomp. 1.3. App. Bell Civ. 1.9.80; 
Flor. Epit. 41.6.15; Dio Cass. 37.20.2. 
12 Plut. Caes. 1. 
13 M. Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd, (Oxford, 1968), 150-1. 
14 The ancient evidence supports Pompey’s propensity for caution, but stresses that this ensured Pompey his 
numerous victories. In fact, the evidence generally asserts that Pompey’s decision to follow his colleagues’ 
advice for Pharsalus cost him the war and that he would have been better served to protract the war. See: Caes. 
Bell. Civ. 3.86.2-4; Flor. Epit. 2.13.43; App. Mith. 2.10.66-7; Dio Cass. 42.1.3. Velleius Paterculus’ account 
contradicts these accounts and states that Pompey ignored the advice of his peers. See: Vell. Pat. 2.52.2. 
15 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 240. “As soon as he (Caesar) was close enough to their formation he recognized with the 
acuteness of genius that Pompey intended to aim a fatal blow at his right flank...” 
See also: M. Gelzer, Caesar, 332-3. 
16 Gelzer suggests that Pompey was entirely incapable of conceiving any other form of government in Rome, 
alluding to this as a product of Pompey’s dull intellect. See: M. Gelzer, Caesar, 151. 
17 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 151. “In fact Pompey was now abandoning his claim to stand above normal political activity, 
and stepping back into the ranks of the Optimate oligarchy.” 
18 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 151-2. 
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This provides further evidence for Gelzer’s interaction with Mommsen’s Pompeian paradigm. 
As Gelzer’s assumption, that Pompey was incapable of sole leadership, presupposes that this 
was his ultimate aim. There is little proof of this in the ancient evidence19, which instead states 
that Pompey wanted to be first among equals20. This was equally true of Caesar21. However, it 
lies at the heart of Mommsen’s reading22.  
 
Gelzer builds on this negative representation throughout the ensuing chapters, introducing the 
theme of Pompey’s ‘jealousy’ to highlight Caesar’s growing significance throughout the 50s. 
He centralises the importance of Caesar and Pompey’s dignitas in this argument, stating that 
Pompey’s jealous protection of his superiority caused the civil war. There is a precedent for 
this in the ancient evidence23. However, Gelzer has distorted this evidence by ignoring its equal 
criticism of Pompey and Caesar. Instead, Gelzer claims that Caesar’s claim for supremacy is 
justified24. This is reminiscent of Mommsen’s reading, wherein he asserted that Pompey’s 
resistance to Caesar was futile because the latter was clearly superior. In addition, Gelzer 
insinuates that Pompey was delusional and that he should have recognized Caesar’s superiority. 
This prejudice highlights Gelzer’s determinist reading.  
  
Gelzer solidifies the nature of these relations by focusing on Pompey’s ‘treacherous’ deeds 
throughout the work. These highlight Pompey’s insatiable desire to be the first man in the 
republic and the reprehensible lengths he goes to fulfil these ambitions. Gelzer first criticises 
Pompey during the political aftermath of Clodius’ murder. Pompey’s treachery25 left Clodius’ 
supporters seriously undermanned and persecuted by the Optimates. Gelzer also implies that 
Pompey’s attempt to intervene on behalf of a defendant during one trial26 was insincere. He 
supports this by highlighting that Clodius’ ‘squad’ were both Caesar and Pompey’s clients, and 
that Caesar was the only one willing to help. Gelzer thus highlights Pompey’s indifference to 
political allies and contrasts this with Caesar’s charitability.  
 
Gelzer is most critical of Pompey during the civil war. He is unsympathetic to the Optimates, 
among which Pompey is included, and the frantic situation during Caesar’s military incursion 
into Italy. Gelzer emphasises Pompey’s political ineptitude and malleability, which renders 
him ineffective despite his desire to maintain dominance. Furthermore, he suggests that 
Pompey consolidated his unjust dominance by disgracefully ‘stealing’ two legions from 
                                                 
19 Appian suggests Pompey was working toward a dictatorship. See: App. Mith. 2.3.23.  
20 Vell. Pat. 2.29.4, 2.33.3; Luc. Bell. Civ. 7.9-12; Dio Cass. 37.57.1. Tacitus implies that Pompey is one in a long 
line of would-be despots who failed to achieve lasting supremacy. See: Tac. Ann. 1.1.  
21 T. Stevenson, ‘Dignitas: Pompey, Caesar and Relative Rank, 52-49 BC’, in Julius Caesar and the 
Transformation of the Roman Republic, Routledge (London, 2015), 109-23. 
22 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 492. 
23 Flor. Epit. 2.13.14 
24 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 92. “But his (Caesar) claim was more deeply rooted in his certainty that he was the 
intellectual superior of his political opponents.” 
25 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 154. 
26 Plut. Pomp. 55.8-11; Val. Max. 2.6.5; Dio Cass. 40.55; Cic. Fam. 7.2.2. (SB 52). 
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Caesar27 while the latter was in Gaul. This is both a selective and determinist reading of the 
evidence. It ignores that one legion was Pompey’s to begin with and puts the worst possible 
slant on the evidence. Gelzer postulates that Pompey’s recall of his own and one of Caesar’s 
legions was accordingly unjust, because this conflict never eventuated. It is somewhat 
premature to assume that Pompey was bolstering his forces for the impending civil war, when 
he and Caesar had not yet reached a political impasse. Here, Gelzer follows Mommsen’s pro-
Caesar reading28. 
 
Gelzer doesn’t perpetuate the trope of ‘stupidity’, but he stresses Pompey’s ‘treachery’, 
‘jealousy’, and ‘power-mongering’, in a way that reinforces Mommsen’s selective 
interpretations of the ancient evidence. This is only partially the result of Caesar’s 
commentaries on the civil war and Caesar’s centrality to the biography. Gelzer demonstrably 
works beyond the parameters of the ancient evidence to promote an unfavourable depiction of 
Pompey.  
 
Gelzer’s Pompeius: Lebensbild eines Römers 
Matthias Gelzer’s Pompeius: Lebensbild eines Römers was first published in 1944. It was less 
popular than the biography of Caesar, partly because it was never translated into English. 
Despite its lesser influence, it was still seminal to Pompeian scholarship within Germany. 
Gelzer formally rejected both Mommsen and Meyer’s approaches which he saw as either 
underappreciating or over-appreciating Pompey29. However, in fact, he does lean closer to 
Mommsen in that his Pompey exists in Caesar’s shadow30. Consequently, Gelzer assumes some 
of Mommsen’s perspectives of Pompey in the work. Herrmann-Otto, who wrote the work’s 
Forschungsbericht (overview of subsequent scholarship), comments that only in the late 
twentieth century has German scholarship overthrown Mommsen’s characterisation of 
Pompey’s “ridiculous hollow head” (lächerlichen Hohlkopf).31 
 
                                                 
27 M. Gelzer, Caesar, 197. 
28 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 5, 183. “…and the public had once more the opportunity of comparing the 
manifest endeavours of Caesar to avoid a rapture with the perfidious preparation for war by his opponents.” 
29 Lily Ross-Taylor, Review of, Pompeius, by Matthias Gelzer. The Classical Weekly 46. no.2, (1952), 23. “In his 
preface Gelzer declares that he is not trying to rescue Pompey’s reputation, which was underestimated by 
Mommsen and overestimated by Eduard Meyer.” 
30 Elisabeth Hermann-Otto, ‘Forschungsbericht: 1984-2004’, in Pompeius: Lebensbild eines Römers by Matthias 
Gelzer, Franz Steiner Verlag, Neudruck der Ausgabe von 1984, (Stuttgart, 2005), 9. “Selbst die leidenschaftslos-
distanzierte Wertung Matthias Gelzers... kann nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass auch diese mittlere Linie im 
Schatten Caesars konzipiert ist, der, Gelzer zufolge, “das Gebot des Schicksals” - trotz aller persönlichen 
Schwächen - vollstreckt habe.” Translation: “Even the most dispassionate and distanced evaluation of Matthias 
Gelzer… cannot conceal the fact that this middle line (portrayal of Pompey) is also conceived in the shadow of 
Caesar, who, according to Gelzer, had “executed the commandment of destiny” – despite all personal 
weaknesses.” 
See also: Review of, Pompeius, by Matthias Gelzer. The Classical Weekly 46. no.2, (1952), 24. “Still it is Caesar 
whom Gelzer admires, and the best biographies are congenial to the writer.”  
31 Elisabeth Hermann-Otto, ‘Forschungsbericht: 1984-2004’, 9. 
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Pompey in Pompeius: Lebensbild eines Römers 
Gelzer’s Pompeius: Lebensbild eines Römers, hereafter Pompeius, attempted to reproduce 
perceptions of Pompey faithful to the ancient sources and free from the perspectives of modern 
concepts. In practice, he thus seldom cites modern sources and instead focuses on the ancient 
evidence. This results in a more favourable portrait of Pompey, but one that still had its 
problems. Balsdon criticised his approach as a ‘scissors and paste’ method which awkwardly 
joined the ancient evidence into a clunky narrative32. This becomes apparent during sections 
on Pompey’s early career. For example, Gelzer praises Pompey’s military prowess during the 
Sullan civil war33, and refrains from criticising Pompey’s decision to execute Carbo34. Instead, 
he falls back on Plutarch’s account35, which, despite its allusions to cruelty, stresses that 
Pompey’s orders were given by Sulla. Likewise, Gelzer’s portrayal of the war against the 
pirates is positive36 and follows the accounts of Cicero, Plutarch, Appian, and Dio. However, 
Gelzer was critical of Pompey’s first consulship in 70, which he claimed was largely 
ineffective37. Moreover, he criticises Pompey’s Mithridatic war, commenting that Pompey 
didn’t meet any adversary that was his equal throughout38. This results in an underwhelming 
portrait, only salvaged by Gelzer’s praise for Pompey’s organisational abilities39.  
 
Gelzer’s tone changes with the impending civil war. He maintains a positive view of Pompey 
throughout his narrative of the civil war, but the details are determined by context. In situations 
where Pompey challenges the Optimates, Gelzer portrays Pompey positively. For example, he 
comments that criticism of Pompey for his actions in Thessalonika was not fair. Pompey’s 
subsequent decision not to listen to his peers is framed positively, as that they were carelessly 
                                                 
32 J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Review of Pompeius, by Matthias Gelzer, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 1, H. 
2., Franz Steiner Verlag (Wiesbaden, 1950): 297. 
33 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 43. “Den Pompeius behandelte er wiederum mit besonderer Auszeichnung, woraus wir 
schließen können, dass er seinen militärischen Leistungen hohen Wert beimaß.” Translation: “What we can 
conclude is that Pompey was treated specially (literally: ‚with a special marking‘) and that he placed a high 
value on his military performances.“   
34 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 44. “Pompeius gab den befehl, seine Begleiter sogleich niederzumachen, beim Führer 
stellte er die Schuld in einem Verhör in aller Form fest und sandte dann seinen Kopf an Sulla. Es ist klar, dass 
er in diesem Fall dem, ausdrücklichen Willen des Diktators nicht zuwiderhandeln konnte.” Translation: 
“Pompey gave the orders to immediately desist from his (Carbo’s) companions at once. With the leader (Carbo), 
he found guilt after placing him under every form of interrogation and then sent the head to Sulla. It is clear that 
in his (Carbo’s) downfall he (Pompey) was not able to contravene the commands and will of the dictator 
(Sulla).”  
35 Plut. Pomp.10.  
36 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 80. 
37 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 80. 
38 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 106. “...Pompeius habe doch Glück gehabt, daß sein Feldherrnrhum sich vorzüglich auf 
den Sieg über ein so unkriegerisches Volk grunde.” Translation: “…Pompeius was fortunate, however, that his 
conquest (lit. field-domination) was chiefly based on the victory over such an unwarlike nation.”  
39 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 107. “Desto größer war die organisatorische Leistung: Zum ersten Mal in der Römischen 
Geschichte wurde hier die Aufgabe ergriffen, nach einem großgedachten Plan die gesamte Verwaltung neu 
eroberter Länder zu regeln.” Translation: “Even larger was the organisational capacity: for the first time in 
Roman history this task would be accomplished here (in the East) according to his (Pompey’s) large master plan 
which regulated the administration of the whole new conquered are (lands).” 
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throwing caution to the wind40. However, Gelzer is more hostile the moment that Pompey’s 
decisions compromise Caesar. In the chapter on Pompey’s third consulship (Das dritte 
Konsulat), Gelzer closes with an allusion to the impending political break between Pompey 
and Caesar, suggesting that Pompey’s treachery would cause him to drop Caesar and align 
himself with the Optimates. Yet, Gelzer also frames Pompey as a cunning and deceptive 
politician commenting that Pompey “did not misunderstand that the Optimates welcomed him 
as a helper against Caesar”41. He thus implies that Pompey was guided solely by his own 
motives. This passage also alludes to the Mommsenian constructs of ‘stupid’ and ‘treacherous’ 
Pompey, as well as his general amorality while playing both sides of the political divide42. 
Gelzer stresses that this justified Caesar’s political break with Pompey, because he had made 
every effort to reach an agreement with him43. 
 
Gelzer’s concluding remarks bring together features of his mixed judgement of Pompey. Here 
Gelzer admits that Pompey’s demise was tragic44, but does so to emphasise Caesar’s symbolic 
role as Pompey’s destined destroyer45. According to Gelzer, Pompey lost his brilliance over 
the course of the war with Caesar46. He implies that Caesar’s brilliance made the outcome of 
the war inevitable, even if Pompey hadn’t been politically and militarily compromised by 
                                                 
40 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 197. “Im Lager fühlte er sich wieder ganz in seinem Element, nachdem er in Thessallonike 
manche unliebenswürdige Kritik hatte anhören müssen, vor allem eben, daß er nicht rechtzeitig gerüstet und 
die sehr berechtigten Mahnungen der optimatischen principes in den Wind geschlagen habe.” Translation: “In 
camp he felt more himself and completely in his element. Once he was in Thessaly he had to listen to some 
inimical critics and the highly qualified reminders of the optimates, who above all stated that he was not duly 
prepared. These (comments) were ignored (literally ‘beaten into the wind’).”   
41 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 165-6. “Pompeius verkannte gewiss nicht, dass er the Optimates jetzt als Helfer gegen 
Caesar willkommen war.” 
42 M. Gelzer, Pompeius , 166. “Aber ihnen den bisherigen Verbündeten so ans Messer zu liefern, wie sie hofften, 
lag nicht in seinem Interesse, wenn wir einmal vom Moralischen absehen wollen. Er traute sich wohl zu, ihm in 
ein Abhängigkeitsverhältnis zu bringen.” Translation: “But to give them (the optimates) as much to the previous 
allies as they hoped was not in his interest, if we were to ignore morality. He (Caesar) probably dared to put 
him in a relationship of dependency.” 
43 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 166. “Umgekehrt ging auch Caesars Streben dahin, Pompeius festzuhalten.” Translation: 
“Conversely, Caesar’s efforts (to maintain the political allegiance with Pompey) also then went on, but 
Pompeius held firmly (against them).“  
44 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 221. “Die Geschichte des Pompeius endet so mit einem Bilde unsäglichen Jammers; denn 
der Betrachter wird nicht einmal durch die Empfindung erhoben, eine wahrhafte Tragödie mitzuerleben.” 
Translation: “The history of Pompey ends with this, a picture of unspeakable misery; because the observer is 
not raised by the sensation, a true tragedy.” 
45 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 221. “In höchst merkwürdiger Weise ist Caesar sein Schicksal geworden, unter dessen 
genialem Gegenstoß er bei Pharsalos zusammenbrach und der ihn danach durch die dämonische Gewalt seiner 
Verfolgung in den Tod jagte.” Translation: “In a remarkable way, Caesar became his destiny. In the meantime, 
he had collapsed at Pharsalus, and then drove him to death by the demonic force of his persecution.” see also: 
M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 221. “Aber in der Katastrophe waltete ein Verhängnis, das über diese persönlichen 
Beziehungen hinausreichte und auch Caesars Laufbahn bestimmte.” Translation: “But in the catastrophe 
prevailed a doom (fate), which above these personal relationships also extended Caesar’s certain career (path).” 
46 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 221. “So gewiss er im Waffengang mit Caesar dessen Genialität unterlag, indem dieser 
stets wagte, was er für unmöglich hielt, und her, nur auf Sicherheit bedacht, nicht Zugriff, wo sich dieser eine 
Bloße gab, so kann man doch fragen, ob schließlich seiner methodischen Kriegsführung nicht doch der Erfolg 
beschieden gewesen wäre, wenn er bis zuletzt daran festgehalten hatte.” Translation: “As surely as he had lost 
his genius in the course of the war with Caesar, during which he always dared to do what he thought was 
impossible, and was careful not to resort to security, but one could ask whether the war would not have been 
successful if he had drawn it out to the last.”  
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circumstances. He further reinforces this view by disparaging Pompey’s abilities as a 
statesman, abilities which he had previously praised. Pompey becomes a tool in the hands of 
better statesmen, who accepted him only to defeat Caesar47. He thus reveals his Caesar-centric 
perspective at the last. This undermines the positive aspects of Pompey’s portrayal in the work. 
Within this framework, Pompey was always destined to succumb to Caesar’s genius, and with 
this Mommsen’s narrative line is allowed to emerge once again.  
 
Summary 
Gelzer’s hostility toward Pompey is more subtle in both biographies than in the works of his 
predecessors. At times he freely credits certain Pompeian achievements including his 
statesmanship and military capabilities. However, in both cases these positive passages are 
undermined in the climactic episodes. There is also a disparity in the level of hostility in the 
two works. Pompey is understandably less credited throughout Caesar. The conclusions of the 
Pompeius, however, were also determined by Gelzer’s pro-Caesar tendenz. In short, Caesar 
dominated Gelzer’s perceptions of Pompey in both biographies. Mommsen is at least partly to 
blame in both cases. Within Gelzer’s Caesar, we saw that the Pompeian themes of ‘treachery’, 
‘power-mongering’, and ‘political ineptitude’ were prominent. Pompeius likewise focused on 
Pompey’s ‘treachery’ and ‘political ineptitude’, but also alluded to the ‘stupid’ Pompey48, an 
entirely Mommsenian construct. Gelzer thus displayed a pre-disposition to Roman politics 
which stemmed from modern readings of Pompey, despite claiming that his work wished to 
moderate, or at least offer an alternative to, both Mommsen and Meyer’s legacies49.  
  
6.2. Ronald Syme 
Ronald Syme’s name is synonymous with revisionist history. His seminal The Roman 
Revolution, completed in 1939, focused on the transformation of the Roman state between the 
years 60 BC and AD 1450. Syme looked to the late republic for answers regarding the gradual 
emergence of Augustus, seeing in the late republic the conditions which allowed Augustus to 
seize power and to entrench it. Unlike his predecessors, he did not view the emergence of the 
Principate as either a good thing or as a result of any inevitable ‘march of history’. In this 
regard, Syme’s approach to this period was original. On the other hand, he was favourably 
disposed towards Caesar and gave much more attention than others to the contribution of 
                                                 
47 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 222. “Pompeius war ja gar nicht gefährliche Mann, den sie fürchteten. Frei und 
überlegen handelnde Staatsmänner hätten ihm sehr wohl einen seinen Ehrgeiz befriedigenden Platz ein räumen 
können, indem sie ihn freiwillig als den Reichsfeldherrn anerkannten, als den sie ihn zuletzt wenigstens gegen 
Caesar ertrugen.” Translation: “Pompey was not at all a dangerous (risk-taking) man whom they feared. Free 
and superior statesmen could well have given him a place satisfying his very obvious ambition, recognising him 
voluntarily as the field-marshal of the empire, who at last was bored against Caesar.”  
48 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, 165-6. 
49 M. Gelzer, Pompeius, Vorwort, 21. “Das Buch will keine Rettung sein. Ich verkenne die schwachen Seiten des 
Pompeius, die Mommsens Witz herausforderten, nicht, möchte ihm aber in der römischen Geschichte doch 
einen höheren Rang zuerkennen, wenn er auch nie die Stellung erlangt hat, die Eduard Meyer ihm zuschreiben 
wollte.” Translation: “The book does not want to rescue him. I do not ignore the weak sides of Pompey, who 
pushed Mommsen’s wit out, but I would rather give him a higher rank in Roman history, even if he never 
attained the position which Edward Meyer would have attributed to him.” 
50 Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1939). 
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Antony in the years after Caesar’s death51. To set up his case for the period down to AD 14, 
Syme slides over various significant political and military details. His aim was to “trace the 
transformation of the Roman state … by emphasising the personalities and acts of Augustus’ 
adherents”52. To this end, much significance is given to a range of powerful individuals53 and 
their role in the Republic’s demise, thus revealing his debt to Münzer and Gelzer’s 
prosopographical approach. Syme also prioritised a study of the oligarchy as a whole, as well 
as warfare, provincial affairs and constitutional history. Consequently, his presentation of 
Pompey reflects his view that the figures of the late Republic, and Pompey in particular, were 
more to blame for the onset of the Principate and its authoritarianism than Caesar and his 
supporters.  
 
In his preface, Syme declares his preference for Caesar’s side during the late republic and civil 
war period, as the republic system no longer worked. He bases this view on the accounts of 
three authors, C. Asinius Pollio, Sallust, and Tacitus. The claim is problematic. Firstly, Syme 
accepts the ‘invectives’ as Sallustian54, where most other scholars do not, and takes the most 
pessimistic readings of Sallust on offer. Secondly, he cites Sallust’s Histories, which are 
heavily fragmentary. Even more worrying is his claim to have used ‘Asinius Pollio’ when we 
have at most eight fragments of Asinius Pollio’s history. This suggests that Syme mined 
Plutarch’s, and especially Appian’s, accounts, and thereafter framed these as ‘Pollio’s’ 
opinions. Syme’s hypothesis thus relies on the loose notion that he knew what Pollio wrote. 
Syme states that all three sources were ‘republican’ in sentiment, but in fact the authors he 
relies on to support this view were in fact very much in favour of the Principate (especially 
Appian).  
 
Syme uses this theory to develop the theme of Augustus’ faults but sets them against a 
teleological reading of the late Republic. Caesar and Antony are exempted from criticism. His 
view of the republic is thereby subservient to this approach. All this makes him predisposed to 
a negative view of Pompey. He projects onto him various negative characteristics that he later 
sees in Augustus and purposefully neglects to assess them against their very different 
backgrounds.  
 
This argument for Augustus’ use of Pompey’s tactics has some merit when considered in 
isolation. After all, Pompey was invested with extraordinary political roles and stood as the 
first citizen of Rome55. Eduard Meyer had already introduced this idea in Caesars Monarchie 
und das Principat des Pompeius56 (1918). Syme’s approach, however, inverted Meyer’s 
                                                 
51 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, Preface, I. 
52 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, Preface, I. 
53 Syme cites the influence of several historians who specialised in prosopography to achieve this end, including 
Münzer, Groag, Stein, and Gelzer. R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, Preface, II. 
54 R. Syme, Sallust, University of California Press (Los Angeles, 1964). 
55 Cic. leg.Man. 52. “What then says Hortensius? That if one man is to be put in supreme command, the right man 
is Pompeius; but that supreme command ought not to be given to one man.” 
56 Eduard Meyer, Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius, J.G. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 
Nachfolger, (Berlin, 1918). 
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positive reading of this emulation and used it as a means of denigrating both Pompey and 
Augustus, thereby challenging traditional views of the Augustan principate57. This was a 
refreshing take on a period of Roman history, especially to a world experiencing 
totalitarianism, and was highly influential. Yet, Syme’s argument took on countless 
hypothetical interpretations not explicitly stated in the ancient evidence. These include but are 
not limited to: Pompey’s self-propagated image58, Augustus’ use of and control over Livy, 
Virgil, and Horace59, which is surmised via circumstantial evidence, as well as the generalised 
assumption of Pompeian influence over Augustus’ principate60. Even if these are granted the 
benefit of the doubt, and, there is a case that they deserve to be, Syme’s work is based on an 
inescapable paradox. The Roman Revolution challenged one questionable modern view of 
Rome’s past (the nature of Augustus’ principate) using an equally dubious and dominant 
modern portrayal (Pompey as a cruel, sinister, and violent figure). This had great bearing on 
the continuation of anti-Pompeian history in modern scholarship.  
 
Syme’s Pompey 
Syme’s proclaimed focus is the oligarchic nature of Roman politics and the families which 
traditionally dominated the senate. Even so, he dedicates two chapters to the most influential 
figures of their generation, Pompey and Caesar: The Domination of Pompeius and Caesar’s 
Dictatorship. These chapters are situated at the beginning of the work and outline the major 
events of the period as well as outlining Syme’s view of both characters. They lay the 
groundwork for subsequent criticism, which is primarily targeted at Pompey.  
 
The Domination of Pompeius outlines Pompey’s origins, career, and character. The themes can 
broadly be separated into three groups: ‘treachery’, ‘indifference’, and ‘weakness’. Pompey’s 
treachery is the most evident theme throughout the chapter. Syme represents Pompey as a 
menacing political figure during his early years. He preserves the theme of treachery, like many 
of his predecessors, citing Pompey’s ruthlessness in politics. Syme focuses on Pompey’s 
merciless killing of Servilia’s husband, Marcus Iunius Brutus61. Much is made of Helvetius’ 
description of Pompey as the teenage butcher, adulescentulus carnifex62. Syme summarises 
Pompey in memorable prose: 
                                                 
57 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, Preface, II. “It is surely time for some reaction from the traditional and 
conventional view of the period. Much that has recently been written about Augustus is simply panegyric, 
whether ingenuous or edifying.” 
58 This manipulation, for Syme, rendered the “authentic” Pompey “politically forgotten” and was replaced with a 
eulogised, indeed almost mythologised, figure that was fabricated to reinforce Augustus’ legitimacy and 
authority. R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 316-7. 
59 Syme, when discussing Augustus’ emulation of Pompey, argues that Augustan literature was propaganda which 
gave Pompey undue credit to serve Augustus’ political purpose See: R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 323. 
60 What Syme describes as a “violent and illicit” career marked by “treacheries and murders” is re-imagined as 
the “champion of the Free State against military despotism” to reflect Augustus’ desired image as defender of 
the Republic rather than tyrant. See: R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 322-3. 
61 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 27. 
62 Val. Max. 6.2.8. 
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The career of Pompeius opened in fraud and violence. It was prosecuted, in war and in 
peace, through illegality and treachery…After supporting Lepidus to the consulate and 
encouraging his subversive designs, he turned upon his ally and saved the government.63 
 
Syme also accuses Pompey of treachery towards Caesar. He states that, as their relations 
deteriorated in the late 50s, Pompey attempted to annul Caesar’s right to stand for the 
consulship in absentia via trickery64. Syme combines this with descriptions of Pompey’s 
general aloofness during the latter part of his career. In reporting Pompey attempts at 
impartiality, Syme inverts the evidence to magnify Pompey’s treachery. He then moves onto 
Pompey’s alleged detachment in 51 BC, describing Pompey’s recall of a legion from Gaul in 
hostile terms65. This resulted in Caesar surrendering two legions because Pompey recalled the 
legion he had previously lent to Caesar66. Syme’s description implies that Pompey only chose 
a side if they were in a clearly favourable position. Pompey was thus always “playing a double 
game”67 and his aloofness was a tactic68. Doing this allowed Pompey to turn against the losing 
side without remorse. Syme marked it as a fundamental Pompeian trait: a man who cared only 
about maintaining political dominance.  
 
The theme of ‘indifference’69 is referenced throughout the chapter and builds on from 
Pompey’s treachery. There are two notable examples for Pompey’s indifference and each is 
imbued with the implication of cruelty. All three also have contentious elements. Firstly, Syme 
insinuates that Pompey may have restricted the availability of corn in Rome during the late 50s 
BC, thus placing political pressure on his adversaries via the starvation of Rome’s poorest 
citizens70. Yet he fails to reference the ancient evidence supporting this claim. Despite the 
ambiguity of the sources, Syme is happy to introduce such hostile material because it suits his 
view. Likewise, Syme’s portrayal of Pompey’s decision to kill Carbo, a former friend and 
political ally, is evocative71. He stresses the savagery of Pompey’s character and adds in his 
footnotes that neither friend nor enemy was safe from Pompey’s brutality. We have seen that 
Carbo’s death could be read in more than one way and that even Mommsen allows that it was 
a case of following Sulla’s orders. Syme, however, uses the event to draw as bleak a picture of 
Pompey as even more unjust than cruel. 
 
                                                 
63 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 28-9. 
64 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 40. 
65 This mirrors the both Mommsen and Gelzer’s interpretations of the events. See: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, 
Vol. 5, 183; M. Gelzer, Caesar, 197. 
66 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 40. See too, 46. “Helped by the power, the prestige, and the illicit armies of 
Pompeius Magnus (stationed already on Italian soil or now being recruited for the government and on the plea 
of legitimacy), a faction in the Senate worked the constitution against Caesar.” 
67 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 43. 
68 See also: R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 42.  
69 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 67. “Pompeius could surely have saved him (Gabinius from the publicani), 
had he cared. But Gabinius had served his turn now.” 
70 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 37. 
71 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 27. For the Carbo passage and its relation to M. Junius Brutus death see 
footnote 1 on page 27. 
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These events, as they appear in Syme’s Roman Revolution, are underpinned by Pompey’s 
indifference. As previously mentioned, several modern historians conceptualised Pompey as a 
man of cold character. Syme respects this portrayal throughout these three examples. Syme’s 
depiction of Pompey’s indifference primarily implies ‘cruelty’ as a leading vice, but, it also has 
wider implications. Syme uses Pompey’s indifference to actively reinforce representations of 
numerous Pompeian vices. Pompey is variously shown as merciless, cold, insatiable in 
ambition, and disloyal. As such, his indifference sits at the core of Syme’s conceptualisation 
of Pompey which determines his understanding of both the late republic and early imperial 
periods.  
 
Syme finally reinforces the trope of Pompey’s weakness, which he demonstrates first by listing 
all the examples of Pompey’s caution or his desire for unswerving admiration and affection. 
Syme deems these traits a hindrance to Pompey’s political and military position. Thus, 
‘weakness’ doesn’t necessarily extend to all of Pompey’s ‘vices’, some of which allowed him 
to achieve great political success. Syme centres the representation of this weakness upon 
Pompey’s return to Rome after conquering the East72. He suggests that Pompey made very few 
astute political decisions at the time, stating that “Pompey trod warily and pleased nobody”, 
and that his first speech before the senate was “flat and verbose, saying nothing”73.  
 
Syme’s criticisms of Pompey are subtler than those of his predecessors and generally need 
extrapolation. The fast-flowing approach of the Roman Revolution, moving from one 
catastrophe to the next, does not allow an audience to appreciate the scale of Syme’s 
prejudices74. It masked Syme’s vocabulary usage which is inherently hostile to Pompey. For 
example, Syme’s introduction to Pompey is rife with calculated vocabulary. Firstly, Syme 
states that Pompey was ‘lurking’75 - not residing - in Picenum after his father’s death. He 
continues by commenting that Pompey triumphed over the ‘remnants’76 of a Marian army and 
consequently added ‘Magnus’ to his name. Subsequently, Syme relates Pompey’s rise and 
dominance of the Roman political landscape after the enactment of the lex Gabinia. He 
comments that “no province of the Empire was immune from his (Pompey’s) control”77, 
implying that Pompey’s control was a sickness spreading across the Roman world, thus 
needing a cure. Syme clearly wished to subvert Pompey’s image by creating a negative 
representation at the most fundamental level. He portrays Pompey using evocative language 
that both alludes to and magnifies the worst elements of Pompey’s character.  
                                                 
72 This reflects Mommsen and Gelzer’s readings. See: T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 492; M. Gelzer, 
Caesar, 151-2. 
73 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 33. See also: Cic. Att. 1.14.1. (SB 14) 
74 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, Preface, II. “The design has imposed a pessimistic and truculent tone, to the 
almost complete exclusion of the gentler emotions and the domestic virtues.” 
75 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 28. “After his father’s death, protected by influential politicians, he lay low, 
lurking no doubt in Picenum.” 
76 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 28. “He held a command in Africa against Marian remnants and triumphed, 
though not a senator...” 
77 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 29. “No province of the Empire was immune from his (Pompey’s) control. 
Four years before, Pompeius had not even been a senator. The decay of the Republic, the impulsion towards the 
rule of one imperator, were patent and impressive.” 
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The reasons for this negative portrayal only become clear later in the work. The following 
chapter, Caesar the Dictator, sees Caesar become the focal point and while Pompey still plays 
the villain, the move in focus makes him more peripheral to the narrative. The increasing 
importance of the theme of ‘legacy’ superficially resurrects Pompey’s portrayal in this chapter. 
Syme argues that Pompey received the more favourable outcome overall which he attributes to 
the makeup and outcomes of the civil war. In death, Pompey became eulogised as the righteous 
defender of the Republic78. Consequently, the Pompeians were able to make his “the better 
cause” by which they “usurped the respectable garb of legality79.” Syme suggests that Caesar’s 
legacy was thus unfairly muddied because contemporaries reviled Caesar acting as dictator, 
when Pompey was actually more destructive to the “ills of the Roman state80. He states that 
contemporaries considered “his (Caesar’s) rule was far worse than the violent and illegal 
domination of Pompeius” whereby its existence made “the present unbearable, the future 
hopeless.”81 While superficially rejecting pro-Caesarian sentiments, this passage actually 
builds a stronger and less-idealised portrayal of Caesar and his legacy. Thus, Caesar ‘the 
dictator’ was slain for what he was, not what he might become: a god82. Caesar’s assassination 
forever altered his legacy and he became a god and myth in death thus “passing into the realm 
of history into literature and legend, declamation and propaganda”83. Here, Syme believes that 
the righteousness of the Pompeians shifted onto Caesar. Posterity condemned the acts of the 
‘Liberators’ as worse than a crime: a folly84.  
 
Syme’s interpretation is problematic because contemporaries were divided on whether 
Pompey’s cause was righteous. The ‘oligarchy’ certainly saw things this way, but they were a 
minority which Syme admits85. Most the senate wished to avoid civil war. This was their 
priority. Thus, their decision to follow Pompey to Macedonia was not necessarily indicative of 
their commitment to his cause. Furthermore, the suggestion that the ‘Liberators’ used this ‘garb 
of legality’ to justify assassinating Caesar is based on a hostile reading of the evidence. An 
equally convincing reading might suggest that Caesar’s assassination was a reaction to 
                                                 
78 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 51. 
79 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 51. 
80 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 316. “But Pompeius was sinister and ambitious. That princeps did not cure, 
but only aggravated, the ills of the Roman state… Not only that. The whole career of Pompeius was violent and 
illicit, from the day when the youth of twenty-three raised a private army, through special commands abroad 
and political compacts at home, devised to subvert or suspend the constitution, down to his third consulate and 
the power he held by force and lost in war. His murders and his treacheries were not forgotten”. See also: R. 
Syme, The Roman Revolution, 50-1. “Pompeius had been little better (than Caesar), if at all, than his younger 
and more active rival, a spurious and disquieting champion of legitimate authority when men recalled the earlier 
career and inordinate ambition of the Sullan partisan who had first defied and then destroyed the senate’s rule.” 
81 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 56. 
82 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 56. See also: F.E. Adcock, The Cambridge Ancient History, IX, 724. 
83 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 53. 
84 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 57. 
85 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 47. “As the artful motion of a Caesarian tribune had revealed, an 
overwhelming majority in the senate, nearly four hundred against twenty-two, wished both dynasts to lay down 
their extraordinary commands. A rash and factious minority prevailed.” 
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desperate circumstances. As Syme suggested, Caesar’s dictatorship made for a bleak future, 
nevertheless, this does not equate to Pompey’s cause becoming righteous in comparison.  
 
Summary 
Syme’s Roman Revolution raised legitimate questions about the interpretation of the late 
republic and principate. He swept away mythic interpretations of Caesar and challenged 
Augustus’ positive representation and thereby opened fresh avenues for historical inquiry. His 
frank writing style frequently offers important reconstructions, either previously unconsidered 
or ignored86.  
 
However, Syme adhered to equally traditional (and questionable) readings of the late republic. 
He firmly rejects Mommsen’s overall reconstruction of the Republic as “too simple to be 
historical”87, but follows several of Mommsen’s Pompeian paradigms. Even Syme’s original 
historical methodology is paradoxical. Although he opens new avenues of historical inquiry, 
his methodology was deliberately selective. Syme chose to focus on particular social/political 
groups in history, which yielded his desired results. Yet, he thereafter imposes the results of 
this inquiry onto the entire period. Syme was equally selective with his reading of the ancient 
evidence. By recreating Asinius Pollio, and reading Sallust and Tacitus in an idiosyncratic way, 
he could make Caesar into a late republican hero88, and Pompey its enemy. This corresponds 
to several of Syme’s historical forebears, despite his radically different motive. The presence 
of these methodological issues reduces the value of The Roman Revolution’s countless 
insightful points, which are disharmonious to Syme’s intentions. Yet, this has not prevented 
the work from being influential and it continues today to provide the basis for re-evaluations 
of both the late republic and early principate.  
 
6.3. H.H. Scullard 
H. H. Scullard’s From the Gracchi to Nero89 is a detailed narrative history of Rome’s late 
republic and early principate periods. It deals with events from the middle of the second century 
BC to the middle of the first century AD. Scullard’s work was written and published in 1959 
                                                 
86 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 59. “The Liberators knew what they were about. Honourable men grasped the 
assassin’s dagger to slay a Roman aristocrat, a friend and a benefactor, for better reasons than that. They stood, 
not merely for the traditions and the institutions of the Free State, but very precisely for the dignity and the 
interests of their own order. Liberty and the Laws are high-sounding words. They will often be rendered, on a 
cool estimate, as privilege and vested interests.” 
87 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 47. “The conquest of Gaul, the war against Pompeius and the establishment 
of the Dictatorship of Caesar are events that move in a harmony so swift and sure as to appear pre-ordained; 
and history has sometimes been written as though Caesar set the tune from the beginning, in the knowledge that 
monarchy was the panacea for the world’s ills, and with the design to achieve it by armed force. Such a view is 
too simple to be historical.” 
88 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 54. “This extreme simplification of long and diverse ages of history seems to 
suggest that Caesar alone of contemporary Roman statesmen possessed either a wide vision of the future or a 
singular and elementary blindness to the present. But this is only a Caesar of myth or rational construction, a 
lay-figure set up to point a contrast with Pompeius or Augustus... as though Pompeius, the conqueror of the East 
and of every continent, did not exploit for his own vanity the resemblance to Alexander in warlike fame and 
even in bodily form. Caesar was a truer Roman than either of them.” 
89 H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, Methuen & Co. Ltd (London, 1959). 
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and immediately became a popular point of reference for students: its target audience. It 
received new life in 1980 when the fifth edition published by Routledge press ensured the 
longevity of its foundational influence on another generation of scholars. 
  
The work is principally prosopographical. Like Syme, Scullard considered the ‘oligarchy’ 
crucial to understanding the Roman past and instilled this throughout his work. His literary 
approach is clear and unembellished which suits its intended audience (students). Its directness 
makes it valuable for analysis for this thesis because it demonstrates the propagation of 
Mommsen’s anti-Pompeian historiography. 
 
Scullard’s Pompey 
On the surface, Scullard’s history deals with Pompey in an even-handed manner. His work 
lacks the blatant disdain toward Pompey which is a feature of earlier studies. Pompey is not 
criticised for executing Carbo, and his decision to execute Brutus after his surrender90 is treated 
with impartiality. This is because Scullard’s disapproval of Pompey was not founded on his 
political errors. Instead, Scullard practiced a reductionist approach wherein the fundamental 
characteristics of each man, great or otherwise, were condensed and then preserved into a basic 
character profile. Thus, From the Gracchi to Nero highlights how Scullard adapted common 
preconceptions of Rome’s key personas.  
 
While Scullard admits Pompey’s achievements were great, he measures his character in the 
shadow of Caesar. This is a conventional approach for attacking Pompey’s character among 
scholars and Scullard’s work reflects their methodology, as his portrayal of Pompey is 
increasingly negative from the moment that he labelled Pompey’s achievements ‘great’. 
 
Later in the work, Scullard draws a much more negative picture of Pompey. He suggests that 
Pompey was not a gifted politician calling him ‘inexperienced’. He adds that Pompey did not 
take advantage and dominate the Roman political scene, but still wanted recognition of his 
greatness91. This resembles Mommsen’s paradigms of Pompey’s ‘ineptitude’, ‘vanity’, and 
‘weakness’, which was thereafter adapted by Gelzer and Syme92. The ancient evidence does 
not support these views93. These views are problematic because Pompey’s reliance on political 
allies to achieve and then maintain political dominance does not equate to political impotence. 
Rather, it exemplifies Pompey’s astute political instincts, insofar as he identifies and utilises 
                                                 
90 H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 85-6. “…(Pompey) went north against Brutus, whom he besieged in 
Mutina; after Brutus has surrendered, Pompey had him put to death, perhaps being uncertain whether to treat 
him as a citizen or enemy.”  
91 H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 111-2. “His (Pompey’s) motive was not fear, but probably the lack 
of desire to take control; he was at heart a constitutionalist, and though a great administrator, he lacked 
experience of political life at Rome. He wanted recognition of his greatness more than the hazards of a dictator’s 
life.”  
92 T. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. 4, 492; M. Gelzer, Caesar, 151-2; R. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 33. 
93 See: Cic. Sest. 15; Diod. Sic. 38.10; Val. Max. 8.15.8; Vell. Pat. 2.33.3; Plut. Pomp. 1.3; Sert. 27.3; App. Bell. 
Civ. 1.13.115; 2.11.87.  
 
155 
 
his contemporaries’ abilities to achieve his goals. This holds true irrespective of subsequent 
events whereby Pompey was defeated by Caesar.  
 
Scullard develops this portrayal throughout the work. Pompey receives praise for his 
achievements but these are always conditioned by direct comparison to Caesar. The most 
significant example of this occurs after Scullard’s account of Pompey’s death, the timing of 
which is purposeful. Scullard comments that Pompey’s “gifts as a soldier and administrator 
raised him high above his contemporaries” and that this “made him a worthy opponent of 
Caesar”94. Ultimately, he concludes that Pompey lacked the final spark of genius that set Caesar 
apart95. It is clear that Scullard’s decision to compare Pompey and Caesar’s careers had two 
roles; namely, to subordinate Pompey, and to elevate Caesar’s greatness.  
 
Pompey’s subordination to Caesar is absolute and Scullard’s opinion unmistakable throughout 
this passage. However, there is more to be said for what this passage reveals about Scullard’s 
methodology. Scullard’s choice of vocabulary reveals his determinist reading of the late 
republic. In particular, his comment that Pompey “was a worthy opponent of Caesar”96 
illustrates how he prefigured the ancient record through hindsight. It implies that Pompey’s 
pre-destined role was to challenge Caesar and ultimately lose. In Scullard’s eyes, Pompey’s 
greatness allowed him to reach an elevated position, and, this consequently allowed Caesar’s 
genius to prove the telling difference between the two. This sense of fate and necessity is what 
drives Scullard’s negative portrayal of Pompey, as he was always ‘destined’ to succumb to a 
greater man.  
 
It is unfair to treat Scullard alone harshly for this methodological approach when it was the 
common view of most scholars throughout mid-twentieth century scholarship. In his defence, 
Scullard did not intend to portray Pompey as a weak or incapable individual, unlike most of 
his scholarly forebears. He frequently praises Pompey. However, the defining aspect of 
Scullard’s work is its adherence to the then widely-accepted determinist reading of Roman 
history whereby Caesar’s genius was fundamental for change within Roman society. This 
theoretical framework shaped the development and survival of negative Pompeian portrayals, 
even within scholarly contexts that claim impartiality. 
 
 From the Gracchi to Nero embodies the passive manifestation of Mommsen’s questionable 
historical Pompeian construct. While Scullard’s commentary on the late republic is brief, its 
influence is immeasurable. His decision to reiterate accepted norms exemplifies how 
widespread this idea of Pompey was at the time. Its continued use embodies the continuity and 
longevity of this stance and demonstrates how it has influenced subsequent generations of 
Roman scholars. 
                                                 
94 H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 139. 
95 H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 139. “His (Pompey’s) gifts as soldier and administrator raised him 
high above his contemporaries and made him a worthy opponent of Caesar; he lacked only that final spark of 
genius that set Caesar apart.”  
96 H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 139. 
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Chapter Seven: Later Twentieth Century Approaches to Pompey 
 
Along with the advent of post-modern thought, and the subsequent crisis of knowledge and 
‘facts’, scholarly practices shifted throughout the middle and late twentieth century and 
demanded increased specialisation from academics. In late republican Roman studies, narrative 
histories consequently decreased in popularity, because a multitude of works in this genre 
already existed and they were also deemed to lack critical acumen. This popular form of 
discourse was replaced by ‘political biographies’ of prominent late republican figures. While 
Caesar and Cicero were most popular, because of their extensive literary legacies, Pompey also 
received extensive attention from modern historians.  
 
Pompey’s treatment within late-twentieth century political biographies is diverse, which 
undoubtedly originates from his enigmatic persona in the ancient evidence1. In some works 
Pompey is villainous and his sole purpose is to succumb to Caesar’s genius. In other works, he 
is the republic’s last tragic defender. However, neither of these extremes represents the Pompey 
of the ancient evidence. Instead, they are either the adoption of Mommsenian constructs of 
Pompey, or, redemptive reactions against these tropes. None of the late twentieth scholarship 
cites Mommsen’s Romische Geschichte, which was published one-hundred and thirty years 
prior. Nonetheless, it is possible to see how Mommsen’s prejudices, having taken hold in the 
works of his successors, remained an integral part of the narrative in the intervening period. To 
this end, every representation speaks volumes about the complexity of Pompey’s legacy, both 
ancient and modern. Each account is thus valuable, because it reveals aspects of Mommsen’s 
Pompey have survived and how they were perpetuated. 
 
The ensuing analysis takes three English-language biographies of Pompey, which were 
published between 1979 and 1981. These are: John Leach’s Pompey the Great (1978), Robin 
Seager’s Pompey: A Political Biography (1979), and Peter Greenhalgh’s two-volume work 
Pompey: The Roman Alexander (1980) and Pompey: The Republican Prince (1981). Each 
represents the various ways Pompey was interpreted throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
They also have distinct methods, focuses, and perspectives, which sharpens the contrast 
between each work and makes them useful for comparison.  
 
7.1. John Leach 
John Leach was trained at the University of Oxford and cites D.L Stockton as a primary 
influence on his approach to history. Rather than pursuing a career in academia, Leach became 
a schoolteacher in Oxford. Leach prioritised the ancient evidence above modern scholarship, 
                                                 
1 Anthony Marshall laments this in his reviews of Leach and Seager’s biographies of Pompey. See: Anthony J. 
Marshall, review of Pompey the Great, by J. Leach; Pompey: A Political Biography, by Robin Seager; Mark 
Antony: A Biography, by Eleanor Goltz Huzar’, Phoenix, Vol. 35, No. 3, Classical Association of Canada 
(1981), 281-5. 
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an approach he ascribed to his role as a teacher of ancient history2. Nonetheless, Leach’s 
Pompey the Great shows signs of significant modern scholarly influence because the 
judgements are inconsistent with the ancient tradition. This resulted in a mixed portrayal of 
Pompey, particularly after his break with Caesar.  
 
Leach’s Pompey 
Leach earnestly attempts to present both the positive and negative elements of Pompey’s 
character throughout the work. There are numerous examples of this, though one from an early 
section of Leach’s work is noteworthy:  
And yet here was a young soldier who had not even entered the Senate; his family was 
not long established in Roman politics... like his father he scorned traditional methods of 
advancement... He had taken advantage of a time of upheaval and civil war, when 
irregularities were justified on the grounds of expedience, and he had the foresight to 
make himself indispensable to the victor of that war and the most powerful man in the 
Roman world.3 
 
This passage embodies the multi-faceted nature of Leach’s Pompey. There is, without question, 
a sense of awe toward Pompey’s achievements in the face of adversity. Pompey’s ruthless 
ambitiousness and political aptitude are commended. Leach’s choice of vocabulary enriches 
the text and pushes particular readings. Sections of the passage impartially develop Pompey’s 
portrayal; Pompey ‘justified’ his choices and his ‘foresight’ forged an indispensable role for 
himself. However, Leach does not hold back from injecting a manipulative and callous Pompey 
into his text: Pompey ‘takes advantage’ of the upheaval, for example, and there are shades of 
the ‘cruel’ trope. Furthermore, Pompey ‘scorned’ traditional methods of advancement, and his 
‘power-mongering’ tendencies operate in an environment of political anarchy. Leach obviously 
wishes to project an image of Pompey that remains faithful to the ancient evidence, but his 
emphasis on Pompey’s alleged ‘cruel’ and ‘power-mongering’ tendencies goes beyond it, 
especially with respect to Carbo. This suggests that Leach approached this subject with a 
preconception of Pompey which dictates his portrayal despite his good intentions. 
 
Leach outlines the events around Carbo’s execution, before actually recording Pompey’s role 
in the proceedings. His contextualisation of the events is unfavourable to Pompey, as it 
underlines his culpability in the execution and perpetuates the misreading of the teenage 
butcher trope. Yet Leach’s portrayal of Pompey is thereafter balanced, which highlights how 
his predisposition to anti-Pompeian narratives shapes his reading of key sections of the ancient 
evidence. Leach emphasises the deep impression Pompey made on his contemporaries when 
as a twenty-four-year-old commander, who was not yet old enough to enter the senate, he 
executed a man who had thrice been consul4. There are several issues with Leach’s use of the 
                                                 
2 John Leach, Pompey the Great, Croom Helm (London, 1978), 9. “If there are few overt references to modern 
studies of the period, this is because I share the belief of many teachers of Ancient History that it is by an 
informed study of the original sources that the student can obtain the clearest understanding of the life and 
people of the Classical world.” 
3 John Leach, Pompey, 33. 
4 J. Leach, Pompey, 29. 
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ancient and modern evidence in this passage. Firstly, Leach recognised that this negative 
reading survives in modern works with anti-Pompeian sentiments, but does not cite or analyse 
the modern sources themselves. Secondly, he refers to Valerius Maximus’ description of 
Pompey as the teenage butcher5, but does not mention the rest of the passage which offers a 
much more positive image of Pompey than the epithet alone suggests6. Leach somewhat 
balances the scales by referencing the ‘favourable counter-propaganda’, stating that “Pompey’s 
firm control over his soldiers, his leniency towards Sicilians who had shown support for the 
Marian cause, his refusal to order a search for the less important Marians trapped on the island, 
and his restraint and freedom from corruption in his dealings with the Sicilian cities”7. 
Unfortunately, he omits any references to the sources and their relative value. Finally, Leach 
refers to the incident later in the book at the moment of Pompey’s execution of M. Brutus8 as 
an example of how Pompey’s enemies used the execution of Carbo as a means to blacken his 
character. Here he alleges that the representation of Pompey as cruel and perfidious was the 
result of hostile reporting9. Furthermore, Leach firmly rejects the ‘cruel’ trope in his account 
of the Sertorian war when he emphasises Pompey’s praiseworthy decision to burn a number of 
incriminating letters10 unread and also execute Perperna11 immediately. In his opinion, this 
saved Rome from further proscriptions and political purges.  
 
In summary, Leach’s account of Pompey’s early career is positive, if uneven. This differs from 
nineteenth and early twentieth century approaches. This stems from Leach’s approach to the 
evidence, wherein he prioritises the ancient sources over modern accounts. Unfortunately, its 
execution in the work is flawed. Without reference to or analysis of the ancient sources, Leach’s 
treatment lacks incision. His treatment of the Valerius Maximus passage demonstrates the 
problem best. The result is a puzzling portrayal of Pompey which reflects the inconsistencies 
of the evidence but doesn’t explain them. It thus becomes apparent that, despite Leach’s best 
efforts, modern prejudices have seeped into his work. His reading of key parts of the evidence 
highlights how the dominant anti-Pompeian narrative affects not just readings of the late 
republic, but also readings of the evidence itself.  
 
Leach goes on to praise Pompey’s conduct in the wars against the pirates and Mithridates. He 
states that ‘Pompey’s strategy in the war against the pirates was deceptively simple in concept 
and brilliantly executed’12. In the introduction to the work’s next chapter, titled Conqueror of 
                                                 
5 Val. Max. 6.2.8. 
6 Val. Max. 6.2.4. See Discussion at section 1.4. 
7 J. Leach, Pompey, 29. 
8 Plut. Pomp. 16.  
9 J. Leach, Pompey, 42-3. 
10 J. Leach, Pompey, 52. “After the battle news was brought to Pompey that Perperna had been captured hiding in 
a thicket, and that in an attempt to save his own skin he was offering to produce some incriminating letters from 
several consulars at Rome, which he had found among Sertorius papers. With this information a number of 
secret Marian sympathisers could be uncovered.” 
11 J. Leach, Pompey, 52. “It is to Pompey’s eternal credit that he refused even to see Perperna, but ordered his 
immediate execution and burnt the letters unread.” 
12 J. Leach, Pompey, 70. 
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the East: The New Empire 66-62, Leach attacks modern accounts stating that they have perhaps 
lost sight of the full significance of the campaign.13 He highlights the political and military 
magnitude of Pompey’s successes after which Rome’s most dangerous enemy since Hannibal 
was defeated and vast territories were absorbed into her empire. Leach also emphasises the 
similarities between Pompey and Alexander’s achievements, reflecting the reconstruction 
favoured by Plutarch’s Life of Pompey14.  
 
In describing the lead-up to the civil war, Leach asserts that Caesar was the aggressor during 
the political tussle with Pompey in the late fifties. He also defends Pompey’s law in 52, which 
mandated an interval of five years between magistracies and provincial commands and stated 
that candidates for office must submit their nomination before the assembly in person. This 
consequently stripped Caesar of his exemption from the requirement to return to Rome if he 
wanted to stand for the consulship after the termination of his Gallic command. Leach defends 
this action, stating that Pompey’s hasty amendment, which reinforced Caesar’s status, proved 
that it was an accidental oversight15. He adds that Pompey was enacting a senatorial decree 
from the previous year, arguing that it “can hardly be counted as a deliberate attack by Pompey 
on Caesar.”16 Likewise, Leach later portrays the political circumstances in Rome during 50 BC 
even-handedly. He concludes with a defence for Pompey’s stubbornness against Curio’s 
demands, stating that “Pompey’s own position had been under attack and he was fighting to 
maintain his supremacy.”17 
 
Leach’s view of Pompey changes after the outbreak of the civil war. The biography signals this 
shift with Pompey’s decision to recall two legions from Caesar in 50. Leach states that Pompey 
was planning for the coming conflict18 and was taking advantage of the situation by reducing 
Caesar’s strength19. He thus does not defend or justify Pompey’s decision, despite its legality. 
Hereafter Leach’s reading is increasingly negative, because he uncritically reproduces the 
negative testimony of select ancient evidence and reflects some Mommsenian paradigms of 
Pompey. For instance, Leach states that Pompey’s character profoundly changed during the 
civil war, whereby a growing ‘bitterness’ and ‘savagery’ could be detected20. He dramatically 
refers to the wider implications of this, stating that: “the country towns of Italy, who were a 
year before offering prayers to his wellbeing, were now terrified of his anger and harshness”21. 
                                                 
13 J. Leach, Pompey, 78. “The full significance of the campaign on which Pompey now embarked has perhaps 
been lost sight of in many modern accounts, with their main emphasis on political and military history.” 
14 Plut. Pomp. 2.  
J. Leach, Pompey, 78. “Furthermore, as Alexander’s conquest had been, so was Pompey’s to be a journey of 
exploration, to extend the boundaries of knowledge in several fields, and to combine the interests of power 
politics with those of scientific research.” 
15 Suet. Caes. 26.1; 28.3. 
16 J. Leach, Pompey, 160. See also: James Sabben-Clare, Caesar and Roman Politics 60-50 BC, Oxford University 
Press (Oxford, 1971), 320. 
17 J. Leach, Pompey, 167. 
18 J. Leach, Pompey, 166. 
19 J. Leach, Pompey, 164. 
20 J. Leach, Pompey, 184. 
21 J. Leach, Pompey, 184. 
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Finally, he references Pompey’s allusions to the resurrection of Sullan terror22. This shift 
reflects Leach’s belief that Curio was the important political figure of 50 BC23. Moreover, he 
states that both the Optimates and Pompey had underestimated Curio’s political independence 
and abilities24. While Leach subsequently defends Pompey’s stance against Curio25, he aligns 
his reading of this period with Cicero, who was sceptical of Pompey’s intentions and feared his 
diminishing moral character. Leach then questions Pompey’s general competence during the 
war. He first queries Pompey’s economic management because he fell into heavy debt26. 
However, Leach’s criticism is perplexing as it is unsupported by the ancient evidence. 
Moreover, it contradicts Leach’s earlier praise for Pompey’s abilities as a statesman. Leach 
hereafter states that Pompey contributed to the greater part of his own misfortune throughout 
the civil war27. He veils his criticism of Pompey’s military capacity in the civil war by including 
contemporary concerns with Pompey’s control over his colleagues, who doubted their 
commander’s competence28. This, along with Pompey’s decision to reject Caesar’s peace 
overtures, highlights his vanity, delusional self-overestimation, and inability to accept a 
superior. Leach seals the portrayal of Pompey’s decay with his failure to achieve victory at 
Dyrrachium29. Leach’s inconsistent portrayal of Pompey in this period reflects the ambiguity 
of the ancient record, but also his innate preconceptions of this period which were determined 
by his foundational understanding of late republican history.  
 
In his conclusion, Leach represents Pompey as a man defined by good and bad traits. His work 
is not apologist and thus does not overstate Pompey’s good qualities. Leach concedes that 
Pompey had imperfections, which impacted his abilities as a statesman, politician and general, 
but stresses that the period between Sulla and Caesar’s dictatorships was understood as “the 
era of Pompey the Great.”30 Leach also emphasises the positive aspects of Pompey character 
over the negative traits. Thus, Pompey’s vanity31, coldness32, and fear of losing supremacy33, 
are given a subsidiary role in comparison to his compassion, honesty, and modesty34. Most 
importantly, Leach highlights the complex nature of Pompey’s character which is “hard to 
                                                 
22 Cic. Att. 8.11-16 (SB 161-6) and 9.7-10 (SB 174-7) 
23 J. Leach, Pompey, 163. 
24 J. Leach, Pompey, 163. 
25 J. Leach, Pompey, 166. 
26 J. Leach, Pompey, 188. 
27 J. Leach, Pompey, 188. 
28 J. Leach, Pompey, 196. 
29 J. Leach, Pompey, 198. 
30 J. Leach, Pompey, 213. 
See also: Cic. Att. 11.6 (SB 217); Sall. Hist.  2.16-17; Luc. Bell. Civ. 1.98-157 and 9.186-214.  
31 J. Leach, Pompey, 211. “...he came early to the conclusion that he was a man out of the ordinary, a Roman 
Alexander, who could earn by his services to his country a position of honour and prestige that was also quite 
out of the ordinary. This is well exemplified by his love of titles and outward display; his frequent references in 
his own speeches to his own achievements, and his reputation for personal pride and vanity.”  
32 J. Leach, Pompey, 212. 
33 J. Leach, Pompey, 212. 
34 J. Leach, Pompey, 213. “Pompey was a leader who combined humanity with integrity and efficiency, capable 
of deep and lasting friendships, ready to forgive offences, less ruthless than many of his peers, and at least aware 
of the dangers and responsibilities of power.” 
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understand, sometimes infuriating, often admirable.”35 Yet, Leach’s conclusion outlines an 
inescapable issue with his work, namely that his rejection of modern authorities is superficial. 
This was best exemplified during the civil war, where Leach perpetuated anti-Pompeian tropes 
which originated from the prejudices of his forebears and lead back to Mommsen. These 
included, Pompey’s ‘political ineptitude’, ‘vanity’, ‘delusion’, and ‘cruelty’. These readings 
stem from Leach’s conception of the late republic and remain despite his effort to remain 
faithful to the ancient sources and avoid too much modern commentary. While his 
characterisation is more measured than others, mostly due to his refusal to allow Caesar to 
dominate the story, the result is confusing and inconsistent because the Pompey of the civil war 
period does not reflect the Pompey of the sixties and fifties.  
 
7.2. Robin Seager 
Robin Seager studied Classics at the University of Oxford and later pursued a career in 
academia, spending his entire career at the University of Liverpool. Seager has written and 
published numerous works on the late republic and early imperial periods, as well as 
contributing to several other publications. Seager’s Pompey: A Political Biography was first 
published in 1979 and received mixed reviews36. Despite this, it became the most influential 
biography of Pompey in English. Unlike Leach, Seager cites modern scholarly sources 
throughout his biography. This makes it simpler to trace his ideological and methodological 
influences, which typically originate from German schools of thought. In the preface, Seager 
cites Matthias Gelzer as a major influence37. This is evident, as he references both Gelzer’s 
biographies on multiple occasions. Unsurprisingly, his work thus reflects Gelzer’s pro-
Caesarian reading of the late republic, and this in turn deeply affects his interpretation of 
Pompey.  
 
Seager’s biography of Pompey was not a historical reaction against Leach’s Pompey the Great. 
They were published less than a year apart, which means each work was in the process of 
writing, editing, and publication around the same time. However, Seager directly rejected 
Leach’s biography38 in a footnote which was added after the work’s first publication. This can 
be found in later reprints of Seager’s biography of Pompey. 
 
                                                 
35 J. Leach, Pompey, 213. 
36 Marshall and Starr offer positive reviews, while Stockton and Bachrach are critical of Seager’s approach. 
Anthony J. Marshall, Review of Pompey the Great, by John Leach; Pompey: A Political Biography by Robin 
Seager; and Mark Antony: A Biography by Eleanor Goltz Huzar”, in Phoenix 35, no.3. (1981): 281-5; Chester 
G. Starr, Review of, Pompey: A Political Biography, by Robin Seager. The American Historical Review 85, no. 
4 (1980): 864-5; D.L. Stockton, Review of Pompey: A Political Biography, by Robin Seager. The Classical 
Review 30, no. 2 (1980): 248-50; Bernard S. Bachrach, Review of Pompey: A Political Biography, by Robin 
Seager. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 454, Sage Publications 
(1981): 223-4. 
37 Robin Seager, Pompey: A Political Biography, Basil Blackwell (Oxford, 1979), IX. “Scholars and students have 
had at their disposal only foreign works: in German the admirable study by the greatest of all historians of 
republican Rome, Matthias Gelzer…” 
38 Robin Seager, IX. (Footnote 1) “Since this book, and these words, were written, there has appeared J. Leach, 
Pompey the Great (London, 1978), which does little to improve the situation.” 
 
162 
 
Seager’s Pompey 
Seager manipulates the historical record against Pompey from the work’s beginning. His first 
chapter in Pompey: a Political Biography outlines Strabo’s (Pompey’s father) political career 
and achievements, which deliberately introduces Pompey as the son of one of Rome’s most 
maligned political figures39. Seager thus implies that the adage, ‘like father like son’, reflects 
Pompey’s similarities to his father. However, Seager eventually concedes that Pompey learnt 
from Strabo’s failings and that this ultimately prepared him for political life in late republic 
Rome.  
 
Unlike Leach, Seager criticises all aspects of Pompey’s involvement in the Sullan civil war. 
He stresses Pompey’s dependence on political support during his early years in politics and 
highlights Carbo’s role in his rise to political prominence. This foreshadows Pompey’s later 
betrayal of Carbo and intensifies his treachery40. Moreover, Seager uses dramatic language to 
heighten Pompey’s reprehensible decisions. Carbo is presented as prey41 captured by a ruthless 
predator that lacks basic human compassion42. Seager reiterates Pompey’s cruel, cold, and 
treacherous aspects, commenting that “Pompeius was never to show any hesitation in betraying 
old friends when the occasion demanded.”43 He thus adapts a familiar anti-Pompeian 
framework, which prefigures Pompey’s later treachery against Cicero and Caesar. Seager is 
sceptical of Pompey’s actions throughout his early career and manipulates the text to tarnish 
his persona. For example, he frames Carbo’s ‘proscribed’ status only after labelling Carbo ‘a 
victim’ of Pompey’s decisions. He asserts that any defence for Pompey’s cruelty based on 
Sulla’s domination is flimsy, because it only applies to his execution of Carbo and not the 
countless other men Pompey was ordered to execute44. Seager reiterates this when Pompey 
executes Domitius, where he again dismisses proscription as a valid defence and asserts that 
the wrongful act had subsequent ‘political repercussions’. Seager’s reading ignores aspects of 
Plutarch’s Life of Pompey, namely its negative portrayal of Carbo and its assertion that 
‘Pompey suffered as many as possible to escape detection’45. Instead, he follows the modern 
tradition which chose to accept the interpretations of Oppius46 and Helvius Mancia47. Lastly, 
Seager concludes the chapter with a general comment on Pompey’s early political standing and 
character, revealing Seager’s prejudices against Pompey. He states that Pompey was a Sullan 
                                                 
39 Robin Seager, Pompey, 5. “Two motives are cited for this popular hatred of Strabo: his avarice and his persistent 
refusal to come to the aid of the state in its hour of need.” 
40 Robin Seager, Pompey, 7.  
41 Robin Seager, Pompey, 9. “He (Pompey) was invested with praetorian imperium by a decree of the senate and 
sent in pursuit of Carbo, who had fled, when the resistance to Sulla collapsed, first to Africa, then to Sicily. The 
chase was soon over.” 
42 Robin Seager, Pompey, 9. “Carbo was captured, and despite his pleas for mercy he was put to death and his 
head sent to Sulla.” 
43 Robin Seager, Pompey, 9. 
44 Robin Seager, Pompey, 9-10. “He (Carbo) is described as consul at the time of his death, which at least serves 
to date that event before the end of 82, but, unlike others among Pompeius early victims, he is also labelled, by 
sources concerned to justify Pompeius behaviour, as one of the proscribed.” 
45 Plut. Pomp. 10.5. 
46 Plut. Pomp. 10.4-5. 
47 Val. Max. 6.2.8. 
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during his early career, albeit an “ambitious, arrogant and unmanageable Sullan”48. This casts 
Pompey as a dangerous supporter of Sulla, which is itself charged with negative connotations.  
 
Seager’s account for the middle section of Pompey’s career recognises his achievements49, but 
subtly manipulates how they are presented. For example, Seager frames Pompey’s 
achievements against the pirates as ‘exaggerated’50, stating that contemporaries were 
hyperbolic when they claimed “that no pirate was ever seen in the Mediterranean again.”51 
Moreover, he emphasises Pompey’s subsequent clash with Metellus in Crete as a costly episode 
which diminished his political standing and marred his expedition against the pirates. Seager 
was equally cynical of the Gabinian law, which promoted Pompey to the command. He stressed 
that the Senate almost universally opposed the bill and that Caesar only supported it to win 
popular support52. This reading is supported by non-contemporary ancient evidence53, but this 
does not explain Seager’s framework which accentuated how unpopular Pompey was with the 
conservative senators at this time and ignores his popularity with the Roman people54. 
 
Seager’s biography is equally unfavourable for the later portion of Pompey’s career. The one 
exemption is Pompey’s legislative actions in 52, which are fairly treated. Here Seager 
outwardly rejects the idea that these laws were a method to undermine Caesar’s political 
position55. However, he later contradicts himself and states that Pompey’s aim throughout the 
fifties was to prevent Caesar becoming his equal56. Therefore, Seager frames Caesar and 
Curio’s actions as ingenious, because their political machinations created Pompey’s 
uncomfortable political situation in late 50 and early 49 and forced him to defend his primacy. 
                                                 
48 Robin Seager, Pompey, 13. “In 80 and for a further decade Pompeius was a Sullan: an ambitious, arrogant and 
unmanageable one, it is true, but nevertheless, for what the label is worth, a Sullan.” 
49 R. Seager, Pompey, 52. “The most elaborate aspect of Pompeius settlement of the East was his organisation of 
Pontus. Here he displayed all his administrative skill.” 
 See also: R. Seager, Pompey, 55. “Nevertheless it was not only the Roman state that was to profit from Pompeius 
conquests. Honours were heaped upon him in unprecedented measure... But more than wealth Pompeius had 
acquired clientelae on a scale hitherto unwitnessed.”  
50 R. Seager, Pompey, 39. 
51 Flor. Epit. 1.41.15. Pompey himself never claimed this, as argued in K. Welch, Magnus Pius: Sextus Pompeius 
and the Transformation of the Roman Republic, The Classical Press of Wales (Swansea, 2012). 
52 The bill was clearly popular among the common populace. See: Cicero, leg.Man. 44. “Do you believe that there 
is anywhere in the whole world any place so desert that the renown of that day has not reached it, when the 
whole Roman people, the forum being crowded, and all the adjacent temples from which this place can be seen 
being completely filled,—the whole Roman people, I say, demanded Cnaeus Pompeius alone as their general 
in the war in which the common interests of all nations were at stake?” 
53 Plut. Pomp. 25. “When these provisions of the law were read in the assembly, the people received them with 
excessive pleasure, but the chief and most influential men of the senate thought that such unlimited and absolute 
power, while it was beyond the reach of envy, was yet a thing to be feared. Therefore they all opposed the law, 
with the exception of Caesar…” 
54 Cic. Q.F. 1.2.15. (SB 2) “Our free constitution is a total loss, so much so that C. Cato, a young harum-scarum 
but a Roman citizen and a Cato, had a narrow escape with his life when he addressed a public meeting and 
called Pompey ‘our unofficial Dictator.’ He wanted to charge Gabinius with bribery and for several days the 
Praetors would not let themselves be approached or give him a hearing. It was really touch and go with him. 
You can see from this what the state of the whole commonwealth is like.” 
55 R. Seager, Pompey, 148.  
56 R. Seager, Pompey, 152-3. 
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Moreover, Seager states that their actions emphasised Pompey’s vanity57, which further 
perpetuates Mommsenian tropes. He thereafter highlights Pompey’s deceitfulness with his 
decision to recall two legions from Caesar58 and foolishness for claiming military superiority 
over Caesar59. In addition, Seager questions Pompey’s leadership throughout the war, and 
stresses both his Sullan aspirations60 and mental instability61. Hereafter, he understates 
Pompey’s victory at Dyrrachium62 and instead focuses on his inability to bring the war to a 
successful end. Finally, Seager concludes that Pompey was undone by his need to be liked, as 
he crumbled under the mounting pressure of his colleagues, who wished to fight Caesar at 
Pharsalus. This culminated in Pompey’s ‘cracked’ nerves at Pharsalus63 as he was defeated by 
a superior general. Seager hereafter emphasises Caesar’s noble restraint during the war, rather 
than focus on Pompey’s plight. He thus demonstrates his blatantly pro-Caesar reading of the 
period.  
 
In his concluding chapter, Seager offers a cynical view of Pompey’s life and legacy. He states 
that Pompey always aimed at supremacy and was fortunate to have died before his ‘good 
intentions’, namely saving the republic, could be put to the test64. He thus insinuates that 
Pompey would never have relinquished his control. Seager thereafter suggests that Pompey’s 
legacy could only have been positive if he had died from the fever which struck him in 5065. In 
short, Pompey’s conflict with Caesar was always going to end badly. Unsurprisingly, Pompey’s 
vices are henceforth the predominant focus of this chapter. Seager cites Pompey’s inability to 
accept an equal66, his lust for power, his conceited and hypocritical nature, and his 
deviousness67. More importantly, Seager suggests that Pompey provoked crises to maintain his 
power and prestige, as these were the only times that his assistance was required. This 
                                                 
57 R. Seager, Pompey, 157. “Pompeius made an error which only his vanity can explain: he allowed himself to 
believe that all those men who had flocked to celebrate his return to health would come forward with equal 
enthusiasm if he called upon them to fight.” 
58 R. Seager, Pompey, 157. “Pompeius, however, played a trick on Caesar, choosing this moment to ask for the 
return of the legion he had loaned him, so that in practice Caesar lost two legions and Pompeius none. Too 
underline the deceit, the men were never shipped to the East, but were retained in southern Italy to await 
developments.”  
59 R. Seager, Pompey, 164. “Pompeius claim to military superiority, if it was not simply a foolish and short-sighted 
lie to boost public morale, is intelligible only on the assumption that he expected to have much more time at his 
disposal to make his preparations and assemble his forces.” 
60 R. Seager, Pompey, 176. “At the end of February Cicero claimed that Pompeius, together with many of his 
followers, had long been hankering after domination on the Sullan model.” 
61 R. Seager, Pompey, 177. 
62 R. Seager, Pompey, 181. 
63 R. Seager, Pompey, 182. 
64 R. Seager, Pompey, 186. Interestingly, Seager cites Syme as the origin of this idea: R. Syme, Roman Revolution, 
51. 
65 R. Seager, Pompey, 186. See also: Vell. Pat. Hist. 2.48.2, Sen. Dial. 6.20.4, Juv. 10.283ff. and their contrast in 
the accounts of Caesar, cf. and App. Bell. Civ. 2.86.363. 
66 R. Seager, Pompey, 187. 
67 R. Seager, Pompey, 188. “But Pompeius character did not make matters easy. His conceit and hypocrisy inspired 
resentment, his deviousness bred distrust.” 
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highlights Seager’s predisposition to modern anti-Pompeian paradigms68. It further strengthens 
Seager’s connection with Mommsen’s ‘treacherous’, ‘vain’, ‘power-mongering’, and ‘foolish’ 
Pompey. However, Seager’s portrait is not entirely negative. He does point out that Pompey 
always resigned commands when they were no longer necessary, and that his hunger for power 
was moderated by an “outward appearance of goodwill.”69 Yet even here there is a hint of 
hypocrisy.  
 
The work’s final paragraph is crucial, as it outlines the fundamental difficulty which Pompey 
poses the historian. Seager rightfully states that Pompey’s representation was, and is, split 
between two extremes which border on caricature70. Pompey was undoubtedly more complex 
than either end of this spectrum admits. Yet, he is recreated as a ‘cardboard cut-out hero’ 
because this reality is easier to accept than the awkward and elusive figure, who looms large in 
Roman history. Seager concludes that when we accept this cut-out figure, Pompey ceases to 
matter as even a symbol of a bygone era71. He thus outlines the problems of the ancient 
evidence and the issues they cause modern scholarship. Inadvertently, Seager also describes 
how modern readings, including his own, fall into the trap of reading Pompey’s character 
according to Mommsen’s more straightforward narrative of the late Republic. 
 
Seager’s Pompey: a Political Biography best typifies how modern anti-Pompeian constructs 
survived into the twentieth century. Moreover, its dominance among modern biographies of 
Pompey highlights how this prejudice remains engrained in common understandings of the late 
republic. Seager’s work is also helpful, as it traces its influence to Gelzer, whose seminal 
biography of Pompey accepted Mommsen’s constructs of Pompey.  
 
7.3. Peter Greenhalgh 
Peter Greenhalgh studied at Cambridge University after receiving a scholarship at King’s 
College in 1964. He published several works throughout his academic career, but is most 
famous for his two-part biography of Pompey. The first volume, Pompey: The Roman 
Alexander (1980), outlines Pompey’s career until his return to Rome after the Mithridatic war. 
The second volume, Pompey: The Republican Prince¸ covers the later part of Pompey’s career 
and summarises his legacy. This work differs from its peers because it is redemptive and thus 
challenges anti-Pompeian paradigms, but specifically states its antipathy to Seager’s anti-
Pompeian stance72. However, its approach is equally as prejudiced as its modern counterparts, 
except it favours Pompey over Caesar. Greenhalgh’s biography is also defined by its writing 
                                                 
68 R. Seager, Pompey, 188. Seager supports this view with reference to both M. Gelzer (Pompeius, 140, 159) and 
C. Meier (RPA 143f, 289f), but doesn’t include ancient evidence. 
69 R. Seager, Pompey, 187. 
70 R. Seager, Pompey, 189. “In death Pompeius became a symbolic figure, crudely ambiguous: failed pretender to 
sole dominion of the Roman world, or martyr in the cause of libertas and auctoritas senatus. Both images border 
on caricature...” 
71 R. Seager, Pompey, 189. 
72 Peter Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, Weidenfeld and Nicholson (London, 1981), 308. 
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style, which is both accessible and ‘colourful’73. Greenhalgh cites Sir Frank Adcock as the 
progenitor for this approach to biographical writing, which is dictated by accessibility74 and 
‘beautiful prose’75. This methodology challenges both the elitist ideals which govern specialist 
scholarship and the historiographic practices that define the discipline76. Unfortunately, it 
shoots itself in the foot by failing to include footnotes. 
 
Greenhalgh’s Pompey 
Peter Greenhalgh’s Pompey: The Roman Alexander offers a positive portrayal of Pompey’s 
early career. He stresses Pompey’s military prowess and supports this with a flattering outline 
of Pompey’s role77 in the Sullan civil war. Greenhalgh rejects the traditional modern anti-
Pompeian narrative concerning the Carbo incident, but with some concessions. He admits that 
an ancient tradition attests Pompey’s cruelty78 and that his actions caused widespread distress 
both politically and socially. However, he exonerates Pompey, stating that Plutarch proved he 
acted on Sulla’s commands79. Moreover, he comments that Carbo’s cowardice justified his 
execution, according to the Roman concepts of Virtus and Dignitas80. Despite this, Greenhalgh 
acknowledges that Pompey’s decision to interrogate Carbo was a costly error which 
overshadowed his career and legacy. The interrogation made Pompey seem culpable for the 
execution and suggested that Pompey relished his position of authority81. Greenhalgh adds that 
the main defence for Pompey’s interrogation - that Pompey was inquiring about the disposition 
of the Marian forces in Africa - is flimsy82. To its credit, Greenhalgh’s argument carefully 
considered Plutarch’s account rather than simply accepting the cruel portrayal. Yet, it fails to 
                                                 
73 Peter Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, Weidenfeld and Nicholson (London, 1980), XII. “…I learnt 
from his (Adcock’s) lively wit and sparkling prose that history which is worth writing at all is worth trying to 
write well.” 
74 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, XI. “In reconstructing Pompey’s life I have tried not to write 
for the academic at the expense of the general reader or for the general reader at the expense of the academic. 
To compartmentalize readers of historical biography by this literary apartheid has always seemed to me rather 
artificial and offensive. There are of course some highly technical writings so esoteric that only specialists are 
likely to read them, but even these should not be illiterate or more boring than they can help, and certainly 
biographies have no such excuse.”  
75 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, XI. 
76 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, XI. “That scholarship should be regarded as a medicine which 
can be good only if unpalatable is a curiously puritanical hangover in a permissive age, and there is a suggestion 
of literary insecurity among those who profess to be serious scholars but scorn readability as somehow irrelevant 
or even inimical to their profession.” 
77 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, Weidenfeld and Nicholson (London, 1980), 21. “He (Sulla) 
saw in him a young man of great ability whom he could mould in his own image...” See also: P. Greenhalgh, 
Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 15, for a detailed summary of Pompey’s early military successes. 
78 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 23. “A hostile tradition has it that this was not an isolated 
instance of cruelty on Pompey’s part.” 
79 Plut. Pomp. 10. 
80 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 23. 
81 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 23. “...even so it cannot be denied that the young inquisitor 
relished his authority.” 
82 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 23. “The best that can be said in defence of Pompey’s conduct 
is that he may have felt it necessary to interrogate Carbo about the strengths and dispositions of the Marian 
forces in Africa...” 
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emphasise that Pompey sent all significant prisoners to trial throughout the war83 and that 
Pompey’s immediate execution of Perperna84 in the Sertorian war shows that he could adapt to 
different circumstances and pressures. Crucially, Greenhalgh’s argument is contradictory, as it 
first exonerates Pompey of the charges of cruelty and thereafter admits that modern arguments 
which assert Pompey’s cruelty have some credence. This demonstrates how Greenhalgh 
manufactures a pro-Pompeian perspective, despite evidence for the criticism of Pompey in the 
ancient sources. Greenhalgh thus perpetuates an insupportably pro-Pompey reading, which is 
as problematic as Mommsen’s pro-Caesar reading.  
  
Greenhalgh’s biography celebrates Pompey’s military successes during the middle part of his 
career. He uses Dio’s description of Pompey’s promotion to the command against the pirates 
to highlight Pompey and Gabinius’ masterful manipulation of the crowd to gain their support85. 
However, he does not mention Dio’s anti-Pompey perspective, which underpins the entire 
episode. Hence, Greenhalgh has interpreted this evidence without consideration of its 
standpoint. Thereafter he outlines Pompey’s commendable conduct and achievements in the 
war against piracy86. His undertaking, for example, “would not have been brought to so rapid 
and permanent an end but for the enlightened clemency of the commander-in-chief.”87 This 
hyper-positive reading is increasingly evident in the work’s subsequent chapters, which are 
titled: Generalissimo in the East, The New Alexander, and The Great Settlement. These 
reinforce this favourable portrayal of Pompey throughout his command in the east and 
culminate in Greenhalgh’s description of Pompey’s crowning achievement: the eastern 
settlement. Greenhalgh stresses that this settlement was “extremely skilful” and “the 
culmination of a carefully planned and coherent exercise in empire-building” which wove all 
these “multi-coloured threads into one coherent web on the loom of Roman interest”88. 
Moreover, it was a work of “administrative art”89 defined by the remarkable speed with which 
Pompey completed it. In summary, Greenhalgh’s portrayal for the middle (or peak) of 
Pompey’s career is charged with motive. Its flowery and extravagant dialogue aims to 
marginalise Pompey’s alleged flaws and redeem his character.  
 
Unsurprisingly, Greenhalgh’s favourable portrayal of Pompey continues in the second volume 
of his biography: Pompey: The Republican Prince. He states that Pompey was fair to Caesar 
with his the legislative actions in 52 and adds that there was “no sign whatsoever that Pompey 
ceased to trust Caesar in 52 despite the usual anachronism of the non-contemporary sources 
                                                 
83 Plut. Pomp. 10. 
84 Plut. Pomp. 20. 
85 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 81-4. 
86 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 97. “No honest assessment of Pompey’s achievement in the 
war against the pirates can be too favourable, for all that his success attracted some small-minded and jealous 
criticism from lesser men. In no more than three months the maritime commerce of the Mediterranean world 
had been freed from near-paralysis by a remedy that was as permanent as it was immediate.” 
87 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 97. 
88 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 150. 
89 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander, 150. 
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anticipating their estrangement”90. Greenhalgh adds that Pompey’s efforts let Caesar return as 
consul and gave him time to adjust to the now unfamiliar political scene at Rome. Greenhalgh 
thus asserts that Pompey not only held faith with his ‘protégé’ but also cleaned the sink of 
Romulus for his return91. Finally, Greenhalgh stresses that Pompey’s recall of his own legion 
from Caesar was not an unfriendly act as claimed by the non-contemporary sources. He justifies 
Pompey’s decision by stating that Pompey’s troops in Italy were dispersed and would thus take 
time to organise and that Pompey’s Spanish legions would take a long time to reach Syria. 
Hence, Greenhalgh claims that Pompey’s decision to recall the legion from Gaul was sensible, 
as they were battle hardened, readily accessible, and “no longer needed in Gaul”92. 
Furthermore, Greenhalgh uses these circumstances to support his portrayal of Caesar’s 
distrust93. 
 
Greenhalgh determines that Caesar’s actions before the civil war initiated the conflict. He cites 
Curio, who was acting on Caesar’s command, as the primary instigator. Thus, Greenhalgh 
believes that Pompey and Caesar’s political split occurred because Caesar increasingly 
distrusted his ally, as a result of his nine-year absence from Roman political life94. Greenhalgh 
also stresses that Caesar’s proconsulship in Gaul reinforced his belief that the army was a 
general’s best method to defend political power. He thus perpetuates a paranoid and alienated 
Caesarian depiction, which absolves Pompey of blame. Finally, he blames Curio’s overtures in 
February 50 for their political break. He asserts that Caesar’s demands, wherein Pompey must 
disarm first, were entirely unjustified and imbalanced. Moreover, these terms were insulting 
and Pompey’s ensuing rage forced the majority of the senate to react satisfactorily95. 
Greenhalgh concludes that no reconciliation was hereafter possible and that Pompey was thus 
absolved from initiating the civil war. 
 
Greenhalgh maintains his positive representation of Pompey during the civil war96, calling the 
civil war a mutual struggle97 and arguing that chance ultimately decided the victor98. This 
                                                 
90 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 90. 
91 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 92-3. 
92 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 119. 
93 He states that Caesar’s propaganda misrepresented the Senate’s decree as a calculated effort to weaken 
Pompey’s political standing. See: P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 119. 
94 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 116. 
95 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 116-7. 
96 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 252. Even in defeat Greenhalgh portrays Pompey as the 
righteous side. “He could either stay or flee - lose life, battle and war all at once, or preserve his life in the hope 
of losing only the battle. Caesar says that Pompey and all his officers and men had sworn not to leave the field 
except in victory, but it seemed more useful if less glorious now to ride back to the camp and try to organize its 
defence. There were seven fresh cohorts guarding it... there might yet be a chance of salvaging the nucleus of a 
future army from the mess.” 
97 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 204. “But if Pompey’s fleet was suffering, Caesar’s army was 
suffering more, and though Caesar glosses over his own difficulties in his memoirs, his revelations that he had 
taken a legion over a hundred miles south of the Apsus to try to find supplies tells its own story, especially when 
combined with his increasingly desperate messages to Antony to sail from Brundisium at any cost.”  
98 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 224. “Caesar attributes his disaster (Dyrrachium) more to bad 
luck than to bad management on his own part or to good management on Pompey’s. But while it may well be 
true that many more reputations for generalship have been made or destroyed by luck than the writers of military 
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reading challenges the Mommsenian paradigm, wherein Caesar’s genius intellect made his 
victory both inevitable and easy. Greenhalgh praised Pompey’s conduct during the war, as he 
cared about the lives of Roman citizens99 and employed sound strategic choices. Moreover, he 
does not attribute the war’s conclusion to either Pompey’s failures or Caesar’s genius100. 
Instead, he stresses the importance of chance and thereby rejected the determinist aspect of his 
scholarly predecessors. Ultimately, Greenhalgh blames the senators, kings, and princes who 
pestered Pompey and demanded a swift end to the war after Dyrrachium101 for Pompey’s 
defeat. He stresses that even Caesar was sympathetic to Pompey’s political conundrum before 
Pharsalus102. However, this originates from a questionable reading of Caesar’s Commentaries, 
a work that he had previously criticised as “downright false”103.  
 
Greenhalgh hereafter summarises Pompey’s legacy and its issues in modern scholarship. He 
states that modern works on Pompey must distinguish between his heroic-tragic legacy and the 
actual person behind this characterisation. Greenhalgh’s Pompey: The Republican Prince 
glorifies the tragic aspects of Pompey’s death and cites Cicero’s letter to Atticus to support this 
portrayal104. Yet, Pompey’s attested imperfections sober this reading. Greenhalgh concedes 
this and offers Lucan’s Catonian speech as a perfect obituary for Pompey105, wherein “affection 
is not so blind to imperfection that the man of flesh and blood becomes a mere icon in the 
hagiography of lost causes.”106 Finally, Greenhalgh only vaguely references Pompey’s flaws107 
throughout his conclusion. Instead, he obstinately pushes his redemptive reading.  
 
Greenhalgh’s construction of Pompey was a reaction to modern discourses that espoused 
Mommsenian models. He rejected all facets of Mommsen’s Pompey and instead perpetuated 
an equally selective but positive portrayal. The premise of Greenhalgh’s research was merit 
worthy, as modern Pompeian discourse is unfairly negative. However, his methodology was 
unsound because it produced an outcome as flawed as the works he was attempting to denounce 
Greenhalgh thus epitomises the problems with modern interpretations of Pompey, which fail 
to take adequate account of the deep divisions of opinion in the ancient evidence. In this way, 
although its conclusions are completely different, it bears a close resemblance to Mommsen’s 
treatment of this difficult but significant individual. 
                                                 
history usually admit, there is something suspicious in Caesar’s special pleading at certain critical points in his 
narrative.” 
99 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 226-7. 
100 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 252. Greenhalgh never offers Caesar outright praise in the 
text, though he does suggest that Pompey underestimated the discipline of Caesar’s troops after the defeat at 
Pharsalus. 
101 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 244. 
102 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 244. 
103 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 239. “Caesar’s account is typically selective if not downright 
false.” 
104 Cic. Att. 11.6.3-4. (SB 217) “...I could not help feeling sorry for Pompey’s fate, for I knew him as a man of 
integrity, honour and principle.” 
105 Luc. Bell. Civ. 10.119-24. 
106 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 269. 
107 P. Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Republican Prince, 268. “Pompey may not have been the ideal guardian of the 
ideal republic envisaged by Cicero, but if a guardian was needed for the very imperfect republic in which Cicero 
lived, Pompey’s ambitions were more compatible with its preservation than Caesar’s.” 
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Summary 
Leach, Seager, and Greenhalgh’s portrayals of Pompey demonstrate different responses to 
Mommsen’s anti-Pompeian discourse, as it survived in the modern historiographic tradition. 
Leach attempted to reject the tradition by analysing Pompey’s political career solely through 
the ancient evidence. However, Leach’s conclusions highlighted the foundational level that 
Mommsenian constructs shape Pompey’s interpretation in modern discourse. Seager was 
conditioned by Gelzer’s reading and was thus a successor of Mommsen’s Pompeian paradigm. 
Moreover, he allowed his personal agenda to colour the ambiguous portrait preserved in the 
ancient evidence. Similarly, Greenhalgh’s approach to the anti-Pompey discourse was 
supported by a selective and redemptive reading of the ancient evidence. Thus, each work 
allowed personal agendas and reactive readings dictate their representations of Pompey. Seager 
highlighted these issues in reference to the ancient evidence, but with startling relevance to 
modern studies, stating:  
It was easier and safer to forget the ambivalent figure, whose political career raised such 
awkward questions, and remember instead only a cardboard hero, the mighty conqueror 
who had triumphed over three continents and brought the East under Roman sway. Once 
that happened, then even as a symbol Pompeius had ceased to matter.108 
                                                 
108 R. Seager, Pompey, 172. 
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Conclusion 
 
Prior to this examination, there had not been a comprehensive study of the interpretations of 
Pompey from Mommsen onwards set against a survey of what the surviving record actually 
has to say. This is due to two primary factors. The decline of narrative histories and the 
increased specialisation of scholarly research allowed the claims of earlier works to go 
unchallenged. This ensured that prejudices, derived directly and indirectly from a Mommsenian 
narrative, remained dominant in contemporary treatments of Pompey. Moreover, these 
constructions are transmitted through accessible works that are the common first resources for 
young historians and those interested generally in late republican history. These audiences are 
likely to accept the conclusions of modern scholarly narrative histories and biographies because 
they are not trained to scrutinise the ancient evidence, and are even less prepared to investigate 
the development of modern traditions in historiography. These works have a domino effect, as 
they reflect the views expressed by their scholarly predecessors, unless the new generation 
specifically queries these traditions.  
 
Consequently, the origins of the negative stereotypes often go unchallenged. Most modern 
scholars thus accept this discourse without realising that it originates more from Mommsen’s 
Römische Geschichte than the ancient source tradition itself.  
 
This thesis investigated the adaptation and normalisation of Mommsen’s anti-Pompeian 
prejudices over several generations. It also demonstrated how each scholar’s emphasis on 
different negative aspects of Pompey reflected a specific historical narrative, context, and idea 
about motivation. The primary conclusions are as follows. The influence of Determinism, 
Nationalism, and Romanticism upon Mommsen helped construct a Pompey characterised by 
vices and shortcomings. Mommsen based this reading on evidence, which reinforced his 
position and overlooked important ancient evidence. His paradigm of Pompey thereafter 
endured through the popular narrative histories and biographies of nineteenth and twentieth 
century scholars, including Ihne, Fowler, and Heitland whose accessible works promoted 
Mommsen’s ideas through direct citation or reference. As the comparison of their works attests, 
each author concentrates on a Mommsenian motif of Pompey that best reflects their reading of 
late republican politics. In doing so, they set a precedent for the subsequent generation of 
scholars. The Second Wave works by Gelzer, Syme, and Scullard reflected Mommsen’s 
negative assessments of Pompey through their engagement with the previous scholarly 
generation.  
 
Just as Mommsen influenced the First Wave, the methods and conclusions of the Second Wave 
influenced Leach, Seager, and Greenhalgh. Leach’s biography of Pompey opted to use 
primarily ancient evidence with limited reference to the modern scholarship. This approach 
was ultimately unsuccessful because, in the end, it had to align itself with either a positive or 
negative stance. Leach’s choice of the more popular negative trope is a basic consequence of 
engaging with a pre-existing discourse of anti-Pompeian scholarship. Seager, however, openly 
acknowledged his scholarly debt to Gelzer and, by proxy, Mommsen through an assessment of 
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Pompey’s life based on scepticism and manipulation of the evidence. Greenhalgh reacted to 
the negative tradition by fabricating an overly optimistic portrayal of Pompey which borders 
on caricature. By concentrating on a polarised version of Pompey, he too distorts the evidence 
and misleads his reader by omitting key pieces of evidence. He thus employs a methodology 
consistent with his contemporaries and predecessors but to achieve a different end. The 
formulations of Pompey in Mommsen’s subsequent generations of scholars are at the core on 
Pompeian scholarship as they reveal the transferral of a negative Pompey from one scholarly 
generation to the next.  
 
This examination has also yielded specific results, which reflect the diversity of modern 
interactions with Mommsen’s Pompeian paradigm. Syme demonstrated how a rejection of 
traditional narratives of Augustus could still incorporate Mommsen’s Pompey. He revealed 
how modern authors conveniently pick up anti-Pompeian narratives to explain what was wrong 
with the late republic, and, for Syme, how these were continued through the actions of 
Augustus. An analysis of Ihne’s Römische Geschichte illustrated how the Mommsenian 
archetype had an immediate impact on other writers. Likewise, a comparative examination of 
Gelzer’s Caesar and Pompeius demonstrated that a modern anti-Pompeian reading could 
remain prominent but vary according to a text’s subject matter. Thus, Pompey’s portrait in 
Gelzer’s biography of Caesar differs from that of his biography of Pompey. Other notable 
historical trends were also demonstrated. For instance, the Anglophone scholarship proved that 
Mommsen’s depiction of the ‘stupid’ Pompey declined in popularity over time and was 
replaced by the ‘incompetent politician’ Pompey. Heitland emphasised Pompey’s ‘stupidity’ 
and ‘vanity’, while later twentieth century works, namely Gelzer’s Pompeius and Leach’s 
Pompey prioritised Pompey’s political incompetence which was more defensible according to 
the ancient evidence. Finally, the analysis of Leach revealed that Mommsen’s anti-Pompeian 
paradigms endured in a work that disavowed pro-Caesar readings of the late republic. All of 
the above contributed to the variety of Pompeian portraits, which each reflected, modified, and 
adapted, Mommsen’s foundational construct.  
 
The benefits of historiography to examine the dissemination of modern constructs and their 
effects upon the reception of ancient evidence cannot be underestimated. An approach that 
adopts historiography, reception studies, and textual analysis has shown that Pompey was not 
a one-dimensional individual comprised of negative characteristics and shortcomings but a 
complex, multifaceted historical figure. Anti-Pompeian readings mostly result from the 
domination of Caesar over both the ancient and modern traditions. Interpretations of his life 
tend to focus on extremes: either overwhelmingly positive or damningly negative. These 
ultimately reduce a nuanced political figure to stereotypes and tropes which are inherently 
linked to his enigmatic nature, a lack of first-hand evidence, and divisive portrayal in the 
ancient record. Pompey’s portrayal in the modern Anglophone record is more caricature than 
reality, comprising a patchwork of polarised ancient accounts which modern scholars must 
elucidate. To achieve this, they prioritise one set of evidence over the other and assessing which 
portrayal best suits the overall scope and motive of any work. Future scholarly attention could 
be directed towards incorporating more reception studies and historiography in classical studies 
to reconcile other disparate portrayals in modern popular histories with the ancient record and 
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other victims of Mommsen’s reconstruction. What remains of Pompey’s life is a cardboard cut-
out of causal links, generalisations, and echoes of nineteenth-century theories which do not 
attest to the diversity of the ancient record but reflect the legacy of Theodor Mommsen. 
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